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ABSTRACT 
Terence John Corps 
Reciprocity Revised: The Jacksonians, Navigation,and the 
Shaping of United States Commercial Policy, 1829-1850 
Submitted for the degree of Ph.D., 1992 
The study investigates the importance of the policy of 
reciprocal navigation within U.S. domestic politics and 
commercial diplomacy in the late Jacksonian era. 
Addressing the neglect by historians of the development of 
the policy after 1829, the study examines the basis of a 
strong minority in opposition to the existing equality in 
commercial exactions granted to the shipping of foreign 
countries which reciprocated with like terms. This 
opposition, located chiefly in the maritime centres of New 
England and Baltimore, and reaching its climax in the 
harsh economic climate of the early 1840s, made use of 
pressure group tactics in an attempt to persuade American 
policy-makers to suspend the policy, or to abandon it 
altogether. They. also drew attention to similar problems 
in the related matter of trade with Britain's colonies in 
the western hemisphere. Their efforts met with varied 
results: the gradual improvement of the colonial trade 
problem until its final resolution with the reform of the 
British Navigation acts in 1849; short-term legislative 
attention to the issue of reciprocal navigation, but with 
no positive outcome; temporary suspension of the policy by 
diplomatic officers of the Tyler administration; and 
finally the further extension of reciprocity, and the 
exploitation by the Polk administration of the opposition 
to it as a negotiating tool to win commercial concessions 
from European states. The study concludes that reciprocal 
navigation, while not a party issue as such, did evoke 
responses which reflected prevailing partisan and 
sectional attitudes. At a time of growing sectional 
tension the issue tended to divide northern and southern 
Whigs, for and against sympathy for the critics of 
reciprocity respectively; while Democrats managed to 
maintain party unity on this issue, despite the apparent 
southern priorities of the Polk administration, as 
revealed by their manipulation of shippers' discontent. 
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Introduction 
Amidst the obvious fascination for dispute and 
controversy in history it is hardly surprising that more 
mundane business is frequently neglected. In diplomatic 
circles, for example, the careful nurturing of peaceful 
relationships overseas and the gradual development of 
policy stances struggle hard to grasp the attention in the 
same way as do acquisition of land, crises, and war. And 
yet it is often less exciting matters which demand the 
most energy and time from diplomats around the world and 
which, arguably, have the greater long-term impact upon 
peoples' lives and everyday interests. 
U.S. commercial diplomacy in the Jacksonian era is a 
case in point. It rarely wins the notice of historians, 
despite being a~ important element in the domestic and 
foreign relations of the country at the time. Politicians 
and diplomats made strenuous efforts to foster the various 
interests involved in American overseas trade, and yet 
historians have usually only examined those commercial 
issues which provoked controversy or a near break-down in 
foreign relations. One thinks of Andrew Jackson's deal 
with Britain in 1830 to open the colonial trade; of 
elements of the negotiations with France over spoliation 
claims; and, again with Britain, of the commercial aspects 
of events leading to the Webster-Ashburton treaty. Yet it 
has been the more momentous issues of cross-border 
relations with North America, in Maine, New York, and 
later Oregon, which have dominated general and specific 
historical study of Anglo-American affairs of the period. 
In the same way expansion and war with Mexico account for 
much of the study of U.S. relations with their southern 
neighbour. 1 
In the light of this general neglect it is not to be 
expected that the narrower issue of reciprocal navigation 
would receive much attention. The policy of treating 
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foreign and American ships equally in terms of tonnage and 
import duties imposed in U.S. ports (provided American 
vessels were treated reciprocally in foreign ports) has 
generally been judged as having reached maturity by 1829. 
Significantly Vernon Setser ends his major study of 
reciprocity in 1829, and other diplomatic and maritime 
historians, when touching on the topic at all, usually 
assert that the years 1830 to 1850 witnessed the 
unquestioned continuation and extension of the policy. 
And yet important groups within the maritime economy 
did question the sense and effects of reciprocal 
navigation in the late 1830s and 1840s. Undoubtedly 
anxious during depressed conditions at the end of the 
1830s, critics of reciprocity called for the suspension 
and even a reversal of the policy. Historical study has 
largely ignored ~his development. Indeed, most historians 
portray these years as healthy ones for American 
navigation. Even those who do acknowledge a degree of 
unease among the maritime interests at the time have 
focussed upon the underlying problems of depression and 
relative inefficiency of American shippers, rather than 
looking in any detail at how that unease was translated, 
in some cases, into attacks upon reciprocity.2 
A connected issue, in that it aroused the anger of 
American shippers about the access to and share of trade 
with a particular market, was the British colonial trade 
as regulated by Andrew Jackson's "successful" arrangement 
of 1830. For most historians the arrangement, which 
heralded the final opening of the West Indian colonies to 
American vessels, represented the glorious conclusion of a 
fifty-year story of American diplomatic effort. Jackson 
and his officials are lauded for their triumph in 
fostering the interests of American commerce. But here 
again the mid-1830s saw the start of a wave of criticism 
of the trading conditions endured by American shippers, as 
it seemed that British rivals enjoyed unfair paper and 
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natural advantages. Maritime communities, especially in 
New England, mobilised in opposition to prevailing 
conditions and called for a diplomatic remedy or, failing 
that, legislative retaliation. While historians have paid 
more attention to these moves than to the reciprocal 
navigation issue, there has not been detailed examination 
of their causes and consequences both abroad and in 
domestic circles.3 
In explaining the contemporary neglect of problems in 
the colonial trade in the later Jacksonian era, Lloyd 
Maxwell goes some way to explaining the lack of historical 
study of questions of commercial diplomacy: 
The period from 1830 to 1850 was one of internal 
political conflict in the United States. Party 
rivalry was exceedingly intense, and at times 
the local controversies were so bitter as to 
leave Congress little time 4or inclination to deal with f~reign affairs. 
Certainly politicians were caught up in a host of 
difficult and time-consuming matters which historians have 
chosen to examine in preference to commercial diplomacy. 
Banking and finance; internal improvements; the domestic 
implications of the tariff; Indian removal; and, towards 
the end of the period, expansion with its increasingly 
sectional dimension; all these combined with the everyday 
business of partisan wrangling to occupy the attention of 
contemporary politicians and of subsequent historians of 
the period. What Maxwell does not make clear, however, is 
that on occasions reciprocity and commercial diplomacy 
were intimately bound up with the domestic political 
agenda, either as issues in their own right, or as side-
issues to a more important domestic dispute. Commercial 
diplomacy was, of course, closely connected to the issue 
of the tariff, but it also impinged on other debates, as 
well as providing opportunities for actions of sheer 
partisan spite and for the expression of sectional or 
interest-related loyalties. 
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Historical neglect of these issues might also be 
explained, in part, by the fact that in its basic lines 
navigation policy did not change greatly. Critics of 
reciprocity undoubtedly failed to prevail upon the U.S. 
government to modify the policy which they considered so 
damaging. Resort to traditional pressure group methods of 
lobbying Congress and the Executive branch failed to 
transcend the simple reality that critics of reciprocity 
were in a minority, not only within the whole range of 
economic interest groups pressing for attention but even 
within the narrower groups interested in commerce and 
navigation. Against such odds success was most unlikely. 
But failure to secure satisfactory results did not 
mean that critics of reciprocity were without any 
influence. Indeed, far from having no impact whatsoever, 
they did cause policy-makers in Washington, especially 
those in the State department, to reconsider reciprocity 
and to re-define its position within U.S. commercial 
policy as a whole. At first this resulted in the Tyler 
administration suspending the previously unchecked 
progress towards the most liberal of navigating rights, in 
apparent sympathy with the criticism circulating at the 
time. The return of the Jacksonians to office with James 
K. Polk's arrival in the White House in 1845 brought with 
it continued recognition of the substance of much of the 
criticism of reciprocity, as U.S. diplomats abroad and in 
Washington admitted the benefits accruing to some foreign 
shipping rivals. But their response was more exploitative 
than sympathetic. Driven by concern for the wider 
interests of commerce, and especially of agricultural 
producers, the Polk administration turned the criticism 
into a negotiating tool, dangling the carrot of 
reciprocity before foreign countries as an incentive to 
grant other commercial favours to the United States. Even 
if the results were again negligible, the attempt revealed 
some of the Polk administration's priorities, at a time 
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when sectional prejudices were increasingly influential in 
political party splits. 
Reciprocal navigation had been challenged but 
survived as a favoured policy of the United States. 
Indeed, after 1850, when Britain adopted the most liberal 
of reciprocal terms, it was unlikely that the United 
States would move away from their support for the policy. 
Ironically, subsequent developments apparently confirmed 
much of the substance of the criticism during the 
Jacksonian era, as reciprocity combined with technological 
advances in navigation to bring about a more general, 
long-term decline in the fortunes of American shipping in 
the second half of the nineteenth century. 
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Chapter 1. The Maturing of Reciprocity, 1815-1836 
One month after his defeat in the 1828 election 
President John Quincy Adams sent his final annual message 
to Congress. To a certain extent this was an exercise in 
self-vindication. Among the successes he chose to 
celebrate was the recent negotiation with the Austrian 
representative in Washington, Baron de Lederer, a 
negotiation which had led to the preparation of a treaty 
of amity, navigation and commerce between the two nations, 
a treaty which now only required approval by the Austrian 
government. Aside from the pleasure he took in the 
prospective establishment of friendly relations with one 
of the "most eminent and powerful nations of the earth," 
Adams rejoiced also in the fact that this occasion 
promised the extension of "those principles of liberal 
intercourse and of fair reciprocity which intertwine with 
the exchanges of.commerce the principles of justice and 
the feelings of mutual benevolance." After a brief review 
of the history of American adherence to reciprocity in 
commercial relations Adams expressed his hope that other 
nations would adopt the principles of this policy, so that 
"by its universal prevalence one of the fruitful sources 
of wars of commercial competition will be extinguished."1 
On this occasion the retiring President refrained 
from drawing attention to the fact that he had been 
personally responsible for many of the strides taken 
towards the extension of reciprocity in commercial 
relations over the past twelve years, whether as diplomat, 
Secretary of State, or as President. Indeed that period 
which had seen Adams at the pinnacle of his Executive 
career had also witnessed the most remarkable advancement 
in the commercial policy of the United States. The years 
of peace following the defeat of Napoleon in 1815 brought 
with them both old and new challenges to American 
commercial and shipping interests overseas. Markets and 
shipping routes left open during wartime were now closed, 
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as European powers sought to recover strength after the 
ravages of war. To the United States there remained two 
options: retaliation, or the encouragement of more 
liberal treatment by others. By a combination of both, 
wrapped up in the veil of policy known as reciprocity, the 
United States had by 1830 reached the position which Adams 
celebrated in his final address. What is more, the 
administration of his successor, Andrew Jackson, would be 
guided by the same principle in its conduct of commercial 
diplomacy, and by 1837 further important commercial 
treaties based on the principle of reciprocity had been 
signed with countries in all parts of the world. 
Reciprocity in commercial relations embraced a number 
of different aspects, and too often historians have used 
the term rather loosely to explain American policy in the 
first half of the nineteenth century. At the most general 
level "reciprocal treatment" simply meant that the 
contracting parties exchanged the same privileges, in 
whatever field of activity, however limited or restricted 
those privileges might be. For example, this might entail 
the right of each country to appoint consuls in the 
territories of the other. However, as applied more 
narrowly to commerce and navigation, "reciprocity" took on 
more specific meanings. In commerce the term was used 
loosely to denote that countries placed each other's 
products on the same footing, usually on "most favoured 
nation" terms. However, reciprocal arrangements in 
commerce might also involve the mutual reduction of 
customs duties by two countries. As applied to 
navigation, though, reciprocity assumed yet another 
meaning, and it is with the development of this concept 
that this study is concerned. 
In essence reciprocity in navigation determined that 
each country's ships were allowed to trade on the same 
terms in the other country's ports as were the vessels of 
that country. This did not mean that an American ship 
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entering a foreign country could claim to be charged the 
same duties as were imposed upon a ship of that country 
entering an American port, as some contemporaries 
mistakenly believed. Rather, an American vessel entering 
a foreign port could claim to be treated on exactly the 
same terms as a ship of that port's nationality, whether 
it be in the payment of import, export or tonnage duties. 
It was this principle which Adams celebrated in his 1828 
address and which the Jackson administration pursued 
relentlessly in the years which followed. In the process 
the policy was refined and matured, so that by 1837 it was 
only the geographical scope and not the theoretical basis 
of reciprocity which could be further extended. 
In order to understand fully the principle of 
reciprocity in navigation and why American statesmen were 
determined that it become a mainstay of commercial policy 
throughout the world, it is necessary to trace the roots 
of American practice in this field. The policy derived 
its origins from the days of the War of Independence. As 
the war denied them access to what had been their 
traditional markets and shipping routes, most especially 
in their once-fellow British colonies in the Caribbean, 
the new United States were forced to re-define their 
commercial position within the world. Whereas previously 
their only legal trade had been with other parts of the 
British empire, now the United States had to seek new 
markets for their goods, new suppliers of products they 
might require, and new routes in which their shipping 
would be allowed to flourish. Under wartime conditions 
they found a willing ally in France, with which kingdom a 
treaty was signed in 1778, guaranteeing that American and 
French vessels entering each other's ports would be 
afforded the same treatment as those of the "most favoured 
nation." The same principle was included in a treaty with 
the Netherlands in 1782. So was set in train a process of 
commercial relations which would last into the mid-1830s. 2 
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The end of war and the successful attainment of 
independence in 1783 caused a slight shift in approach. 
Despite the successful negotiation of a treaty with 
Prussia in 1785, it was to be relations with Britain which 
really signalled how effective American policy was. The 
United States might have secured their political 
independence, but it soon became clear that British 
knowledge of credit and marketing skills, the deep-seated 
preference for British goods, and an unwillingness to 
break away from old habits were to ensure that Britain 
would still figure highly in American trade. The problem 
now posed, though, was how to make sure that Britain did 
not exploit those factors to win a disproportionate 
influence over American interests. The United States 
needed to take measures to guide American trade along 
natural routes, free from the influence of Britain, but 
most importantly ·of all they had to develop their own 
independent facilities for trade and shipping, to provide 
a healthy platform on which to base any resistance to 
British pretensions, as well as simply for the material 
welfare of their own people. 
It was believed that the new federal Constitution 
ratified in 1787-88 afforded to the national government 
powers to fulfil these ambitions. Admittedly these powers 
were not as extensive as those enjoyed by some nations. 
Most notable was the prohibition of export duties on 
American products as a concession to Southern staple 
producers. However, there was still ample scope for 
commercial regulation in the imposition of import duties 
and whatever duties Congress might see fit to impose on 
tonnage, and in light and harbour dues. 
Making use of these tools, Congress set about 
designing policies to foster the American merchant marine 
as a means to the future economic and naval strength of 
the country. Duties on foreign shipping in the coasting 
trade from one American port to another were raised to 
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prohibitive levels, providing one field of shipping 
activity in which American vessels could enjoy a monopoly. 
In certain other specific trades American participation 
was protected by the imposition of higher duties on goods 
when carried in foreign vessels, most notably in the tea 
trade from the Orient. However, the two main planks in 
the first U.S. commercial policy were the tariff act and 
tonnage duties of 1789. American-owned tonnage was 
charged six cents per ton, American-built, foreign-owned 
tonnage thirty cents, and completely foreign tonnage was 
to pay fifty cents when entering American ports. By the 
tariff act a ten per cent discount in import duties was 
given to all goods entered in American vessels, a measure 
changed in form, but not in its effect on shipping, in 
1794, when the discount was exchanged for a ten per cent 
extra duty on goods carried in foreign ships. 
These discriminations, initially a policy of 
protection to the infant American shipping industry 1 soon 
came to be regarded as a weapon in future commercial 
negotiations with other countries. From the very 
beginning there were some, among them James Madison and 
Thomas Jefferson, who believed that due credit ought to be 
given to those countries which were prepared to meet the 
United States on treaty terms. In a noted report on the 
status of American commerce abroad Secretary of State 
Jefferson stressed that the United States should not 
afford equal treatment to those countries which refused to 
treat American interests equally in their ports. His 
solution was to encourage others by offering to reduce or 
remove completely the discriminations against those 
countries which reciprocated by means of treaty relations. 
Opponents of this line of policy, including Jefferson's 
Cabinet rival, Alexander Hamilton, realised that Britain 
was the main target of the proposed discrimination. They 
were anxious to maintain close trading relations with the 
former mother country, at least until such time as the 
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United States were strong enough financially to stand on 
their own feet, and they succeeded in preventing the 
imposition of an extra discrimination against British 
vessels trading in American ports. Indeed, Federalist 
policy makers even forestalled the need for such a line of 
action anyway by their negotiation of "most favoured 
nation" terms with Britain in the infamous Jay treaty of 
1794. Even so the policy of removing discriminations on 
the shipping of those countries which reciprocated had 
been mooted and would be suggested again occasionally in 
the course of the next twenty years, most notably when 
Samuel Smith, Baltimore merchant and representative of the 
commercial interest at Washington brought up the matter in 
the first years of the new century.3 
At that time Smith's was a lone voice. What is more, 
the issue of reciprocity in navigation hardly merited the 
attention of American policy makers, as war raged in 
Europe for most of the years between 1793 and 1815, and 
indeed as the United States themselves were at war with 
Britain between 1812 and 1815. For the first half of this 
twenty-two year period American commercial prosperity was 
stimulated by the demands of the warring powers for 
neutral trading and shipping services. Markets previously 
closed were now opened, and American mercantile groups 
made full use of the opportunity to promote their 
fortunes. After 1805 conditions grew markedly worse, as 
issues of impressment, contraband and blockades took the 
diplomatic stage, relegating questions of reciprocity, 
access to markets, and "most favoured nation'' treatment to 
the background. The triangular battle of commercial 
restrictions between the United States, Britain and 
France, which eventually led to war between the first two 
in 1812, brought to an end the artificially stimulated 
prosperity of American shipping but more importantly made 
impossible any pursuit of a coherent commercial policy in 
the first years of the nineteenth century. 
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The return of peace in Europe in 1815 heralded the 
first real years of normality for American commercial 
relations with Europe. However, if peace was to be 
celebrated for its own sake, this did not mean that normal 
relations would be profitable ones for the United States. 
No longer were the nations of Europe dependent on others 
to be their suppliers and carriers, and 1815 witnessed the 
recommencement of a rivalry to secure the biggest slice of 
the commercial pie possible. 
In their rivalry European countries regarded the use 
of commercial restrictions and prohibitions as legitimate 
and essential weapons. In the name of protecting domestic 
production and producers in their overseas colonies, or 
for the purpose of raising revenue, countries such as 
Britain, France, Spain, and the individual states of 
Germany imposed heavy import duties on foreign products. 
Such measures hit the United States particularly hard in 
the light of their traditional role as a colonial producer 
for Europe. Cotton, alone of American staple products, 
escaped the heaviest duty levels. The wartime relaxation 
of old navigation systems was also brought to an end. 
Many countries allowed access to their colonies in their 
own ships only; and trade with their European possessions 
was often restricted to their own vessels and those of the 
country of origin of any imported product. Even in those 
trades which were open heavier duties were charged on 
foreign tonnage and on produce carried in foreign ships. 
It is fair to remark that at this stage the United 
States shared in such restrictions. In 1817 prohibitive 
duties in the coasting trade were replaced by an absolute 
prohibition of foreign shipping in that important branch 
of trade, destined to become more valuable still as the 
continental integrity of the United States was achieved in 
the course of the century. The discriminating tonnage 
duties remained in force in American ports and the tariff 
act of 1816 incorporated the standard ten per cent 
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discrimination in favour of goods imported in American 
vessels. However, it soon became clear from the 
diplomatic and legislative initiatives taken after 1815 
that these duties were there to be removed, whenever 
evidence emerged that other countries had similarly 
removed their discriminations against American vessels. 
In other words discriminating duties were now no longer 
intended as a permanent protection to American shipping, 
but were, rather, to be used as an encouragement to other 
countries to liberalise their commercial policies. It was 
from this point that the policy of reciprocity in 
navigation really took off. 
The first steps towards a policy of reciprocity in 
navigation were taken in Congress, where a bill drafted by 
Samuel Smith was passed unanimously by the Senate and 
without significant opposition in the House. This act 
offered the prospect of removal by further legislation of 
all discriminating duties on tonnage and imports in 
vessels of those countries which likewise removed their 
own discriminations against American vessels. The only 
limitation in these conditions was that they were to apply 
solely to vessels carrying articles of their own country's 
production, a principle known as reciprocity in the direct 
trade. When the Netherlands, Prussia and the Hanseatic 
towns gave evidence of acceding to these terms, further 
acts were passed in 1818 and 1819 removing discriminating 
duties imposed on their vessels in the direct trade. 
These acts were designed to expire in 1824, at the same 
time as the experimental period for the act of 1815 came 
to a close. The experiment was judged a success, however, 
and in 1824 a new act was passed renewing the offer of 
reciprocity in the direct trade indefinitely and 
confirming the operation of the acts with regard to direct 
trade with the Netherlands, Prussia and the Hanse towns. 
At the same time it affirmed that similar reciprocal 
conditions were to be effective with Russia, Norway, 
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Sardinia, and Oldenburg. Finally it streamlined the 
procedure by which further countries could be added to the 
list, by empowering the President to issue a proclamation 
removing discriminating duties on receipt of the necessary 
evidence of reciprocal treatment. In this way Hanover and 
the Papal States were brought under reciprocal conditions 
in 1827 and 1828 respectively. 
Reciprocity in the direct trade would have been 
adequate if all trade involved straight outward and return 
voyages between two countries. Such is the nature of 
international commerce, however, that such voyages are 
exceptional and rarely the most profitable. Few 
countries' productions are so perfectly complementary as 
to enable vessels to ply fully laden between the two, 
maximising their profits in the process. It is far more 
common for ships to make triangular or multi-legged 
voyages, carrying products of their own country to one 
destination, picking up a new cargo there for carriage to 
a third country, before re-loading with a third cargo for 
the voyage home. Some ships even make tramp shipping 
their only business, never trading in their own country's 
products. In the wake of the Napoleonic wars such routes 
were not always easy to find. Britain, for example, 
prohibited all imports not carried in British vessels or 
in ships of the products' country of origin. In 
retaliation Congress passed a navigation act in 1817 which 
in turn refused entry to non-British goods carried to . 
American ports in British ships. Even in those countries 
which did allow trade in third-party goods there remained 
the problem of discriminating duties, again a circumstance 
which was perpetuated by the United States themselves. 
As moves were made to liberalise American policy with 
regard to the direct trade, so too were proposals made 
that reciprocity should be extended to this indirect trade 
in third-party goods. In 1818 Secretary of State Adams 
noted how various influential men, such as his own Cabinet 
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colleague William H. Crawford and once again Samuel Smith, 
were calling for the removal of all discriminating duties. 
At that time Adams himself was against the proposal to 
extend the reciprocal experiment, but seven years later, 
in his first annual message to Congress as President, he 
called for the very same principle as the basis for 
American trade. Noting the current limit of reciprocity 
to the direct trade only, the President declared that it 
would 
deserve the serious consideration of Congress 
whether even this remnant of restriction may not 
be safely abandoned, and whether the general 
tender of equal competition ••• may not be 
extended to include all articles of merchandise 
not prohibited, of what country soever they may 
be the produce or manufacture. 
He hinted that various European countries had enquired 
about such terms, and he felt sure that if enacted such a 
measure "would recommend itself by the experience of its 
advantages to the general accession of all." A bill was 
prepared at that session but it failed of passage for fear 
of its effect on the continuing dispute with Britain over 
her colonial trade. In 1827, though, Congress took up the 
measure again, and after enquiries to the Secretary of 
State, Henry Clay, from the Chairman of the Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Levi Woodbury, as to the likely 
effects of such a measure, an act was passed the following 
year, offering to the whole world reciprocal conditions in 
the indirect trade.4 
The legislative basis for reciprocal navigation was 
completed a further two years later when tonnage duties 
were abolished. The Maine Senator Peleg Sprague regarded 
this measure with great relief, as it removed a burden 
which together with other impositions was "oppressing and 
nearly overwhelming the navigation of the country." While 
the imposition of these tonnage duties upon American 
shipping and such overseas vessels as enjoyed reciprocal 
treatment was abolished, there remained a 50 cent tonnage 
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duty on foreign vessels in all trades not covered by 
reciprocal arrangements. This duty remained as a means of 
encouraging further countries to extend their reciprocal 
relations with the United States.s 
The act of 1828 signalled the intention of Congress 
that American commercial relations should be governed in 
future by the principle of reciprocity of navigation in 
the indirect trade. However, the very principle of 
reciprocity relied for its success on the terms being 
taken up by other countries. As things stood in 1828 the 
list of countries granted reciprocal treatment on a 
legislated or proclaimed basis was very impressive, but 
the amount of trade with those countries constituted only 
a small fraction of American overseas commerce. For the 
policy to be judged a success in terms of being widely 
applied it would have to operate in the trade of the 
United States with France and most especially Britain, 
which, despite early warnings of disproportionate 
influence, remained far and away the major American 
trading partner. 
There were still many who regretted this state of 
affairs. As late as 1837 the veteran Philadelphian 
politician Charles J. Ingersoll expressed his worry that 
British influence in American trade was too great, causing 
the commerce and prosperity of the United States to 
suffer. He considered it "the obvious interest & the 
policy of this country ••• not only to back off a little 
from that anchorage, but to draw nearer to France, Russia, 
Austria and the great continental powers." Others 
regarded efforts to find new trading partners in distant 
parts of the world and with the newly independent states 
of Latin America as another means of lessening the 
dependence of the United States upon British trade. 
However, most realised that Britain would remain an 
essential commercial partner, and so were determined that 
American shipping would have as fair a participation in 
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her trade as possible. For this to eventuate it was hoped 
that Britain would open up her trade routes and allow 
reciprocal conditions to operate in them.6 
The omission of Britain from the list of countries 
enjoying privileges under the acts of 1824 and 1828 did 
not signify total failure in these ambitions. Running 
parallel to the legislative offer of reciprocity were 
diplomatic efforts to secure reciprocity by direct 
negotiation, the principle to be cemented in commercial 
treaties. If anything treaties were to become the 
preferred form, offering a greater sense of permanence, a 
much surer guide to merchants as to the sort of conditions 
they could expect in foreign ports, and an agreed form of 
redress for any infractions of the reciprocal principle. 
Accordingly, in 1815, Britain became the first 
country to enter reciprocal conditions with the United 
States on a treaty basis. The arrangement was negotiated 
by the peace commissioners from Ghent, John Quincy Adams, 
Henry Clay and Albert Gallatin, who had moved on to London 
after the return of peace to discuss a variety of issues, 
including damages, impressment and access to Britain's 
colonial trade. Failing on those questions, the 
commissioners nevertheless succeeded in getting Britain to 
accede to the terms of the act of 1815, putting trade on a 
conventional basis of reciprocity in the direct trade. At 
first this arrangement was limited to four years' 
duration, but when Adams, as Secretary of State, 
considered renewal in 1818, he was so impressed by figures 
from Liverpool and other British ports which revealed that 
"a constant preference had hitherto been shewn to our 
vessels for freight from thence," that he decided that the 
convention should be continued for another ten years at 
least. Gallatin, now the Minister to France, was 
dispatched to London to discuss a variety of matters, and 
along with settlement of the questions of the Canadian 
fisheries, the northwestern boundary line and compensation 
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for slaves seized during the war, the commercial 
convention of 1815 was extended for another ten years. 7 
The convention with Britain set in train a process of 
treaty-making which would last for the next twenty years. 
Indeed, the arrangement with Britain was taken as an 
inspiration by some American diplomats. Jonathan Russell, 
the American man at the Swedish court, was convinced that 
the convention of 1815 would have "a salutary influence on 
our negotiations with other nations.'' Two years later he 
succeeded in signing a similar treaty with Sweden, 
removing all discriminating duties in the direct trade. 
The British convention also reinforced the message sent 
out by the act of 1815 and encouraged other countries to 
come to seek terms from the United States. The Danish 
minister, Pedersen, was keen for such an arrangement in 
1818, but negotiations broke down when Denmark insisted 
that all Baltic products should be treated as Danish for 
the purposes of reciprocal treatment and refused to reduce 
duties imposed on American vessels passing the Sound. 
Negotiations with Spain and Portugal also proved fruitless 
at this time. Efforts to come to terms with France were 
more successful, but only after a contentious and 
protracted negotiation about the heavy French 
discriminations against American ships and claims over 
Louisiana. After Gallatin failed to reach agreement with 
the French court, talks switched to Washington where Adams 
and Hyde de Neuville, the French representative, drew up a 
treaty providing for a gradual reduction of discriminating 
duties in the direct trade, until they disappeared 
altogether by 1828.8 
While Europe provided the main field for commercial 
diplomacy, exciting developments in the western hemisphere 
afforded new opportunities for the extension of the policy 
of reciprocity. The second, and this time successful, set 
of revolutions in Central and South America confronted the 
United States with important decisions to make about the 
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future status of political and commercial relations with 
the region. Although in the course of the revolutions the 
United States had adopted a neutral stance, allowing trade 
with both Spain and the colonies in revolt, there were 
many who were wary of affording total recognition to 
independent Latin American states. Among the doubters 
were merchants who enjoyed a growing and profitable trade 
with the still-loyal colony of Cuba~~iho feared that Spain 
might retaliate by closing access to that island. 
However, leading statesmen, and most importantly Secretary 
Adams, and future Secretary of State Clay, were keen to 
cement relations with the southern continent, in 
anticipation of both the commercial and political benefits 
which would accrue.9 
As early as 1820 Clay predicted that events in the 
southern continent could only be productive of beneficial 
results. The independent states would look for new 
markets for their goods, new suppliers of their own needs 
and new carriers for all their trade. The United States 
could fill all those roles, creating "a system of which we 
shall be the centre, and in which all South America will 
act with us." This system would compensate for losses 
sustained in the recent hard times in the wake of the 
Panic of 1819. The future, indeed, looked rosy: 
In relation to South America, the people of the 
United States will occupy the same position as 
the people of New England do to the south of the 
United States. Our enterprize, industry, and 
habits of economy, will give us the advantage in 
any competifbon which South America may sustain 
with us &c. 
Adams considered the issue more in political terms. 
He recalled the problems the United States had confronted 
in securing genuine independence from British influence, 
because of lingering commercial ties. He anticipated that 
new Latin American states would confront similar problems 
if they did not take early steps, guided by treaties with 
the United States. Those treaties should be based on 
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principles of "entire and unqualified reciprocity," or at 
the very least "the mutual obligation of the parties to 
place each other permanently upon the footing of the most 
favoured nation." Adams explained why: 
These principles are, indeed, indispensable to 
the effectual emancipation of the American 
hemisphere from the thraldom of colonizing 
monopolies and exclusions •••• The time has 
been, and that not remote, when some of those 
States might, in their anxious desire to obtain 
a nominal recognition, have accepted of a 
nominal independence, dogged with burdensome 
conditions, and exclusive commercial privileges 
granted to the nations from which they have 
separated, to the disadvantage of all others. 
They are all now aware that such concessions to 
any European nations would be incompatible with 
that indepey~ence which they have declared and 
maintained. 
Adams' concern in principle led to firm action in 
practice with the successful negotiation in 1824 of a 
treaty with Colombia upon the "most favoured nation" 
basis. Ideally all treaties would have been based on 
reciprocity. In 1825 Henry Clay noted how reciprocity was 
a much simpler system to operate, not requiring detailed 
knowledge of the commercial relations of contracting 
parties with all other countries, so that the United 
States might claim similar privileges. What is more the 
"most favoured nation" principle "may not be, and scarcely 
ever is, equal in its operations between the two 
contracting parties." The United States offered far more 
liberal terms in general, and so American shipping was 
unlikely to secure as favourable treatment in foreign 
ports as foreign vessels would receive in American ports. 
However, for treaties with countries with no or 
insignificant amounts of shipping of their own the "most 
favoured nation" principle would suffice, as American 
ships were unlikely to meet with much competition from 
home-grown rivals. Such treaties were acceptable in Asian 
and African countries, and with Latin America, too, where 
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they acquired an added importance as a means of counter-
acting British, French and Spanish influence. Britain was 
the main cause for concern, as that country had the 
experience and resources to develop a commercial 
stranglehold over the southern continent's trade. Britain 
already had well-established trade with many of the 
independent states, for example supplying Chile with 80 
per cent of its imports. It was possible that American 
shipping might never effectively rival this influence, but 
American statesmen were determined that Americans should 
at least have a fair chance by removing obstructions to 
their best opportunities. So then the treaty with 
Colombia ended a five per cent discrimination in favour of 
British trade and shipping. In all future negotiations 
with the countries of the region the United States refused 
to sign treaties which did not include at least the "most 
favoured nation" ·principle.12 
Where possible, however, the United States secured 
reciprocal treatment which would counter British influence 
equally well, if not better in some cases, for if Britain 
did not enjoy reciprocal relations with the contracting 
party, then American shipping would in fact be the 
favoured interest. Here the Adams administration met with 
some success, signing treaties with the Confederation of 
Central America in 1825 and with Brazil in 1828. Trade 
with Central America itself was not great, but American 
shippers hoped to make it an entrep8t for all Latin 
American trade, with American vessels participating both 
in voyages between Central America and the continent to 
the South, and from Central America to the rest of the 
world. Trade with Brazil was more substantial, and the 
desire for negotiation was heightened by rumours that 
American products were charged between 15 and 24 per cent 
higher import duties than were imposed upon like articles 
from elsewhere. The treaty signed in 1828 removed these 
discriminations, except for the right to impose them in 
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favour of Portugal. Most significantly, though, both the 
treaties with Brazil and Central America applied the 
principle of reciprocity to navigation in the indirect as 
well as the direct trade, a marked extension in comparison 
to those treaties signed with Europe so far discussed.13 
Indeed, the Central American treaty became a model 
for future negotiations with Latin American and European 
countries alike. Before the passage of the 1828 act the 
treaty basis represented the only means by which the 
United States could respond to approaches of countries 
like Sweden, Austria and Denmark when they suggested the 
total removal of discriminating duties on shipping. In 
1825 Clay put aside the continuing issue of the Sound dues 
and signed a treaty of full reciprocity in the indirect 
trade with Denmark. He negotiated a similar treaty with 
Rumpff, the special minister plenipotentiary from the 
Hanseatic towns in 1827, although this treaty was marred 
by the omission of an article determining that only ships 
built in the respective countries could be considered 
national vessels for the purposes of reciprocal treatment, 
an omission which would cause problems in the next decade. 
Five months later he signed yet another treaty, this time 
with the Prussian minister Niederstetter. Meanwhile, he 
had sent instructions to John Appleton, the American 
charge in Stockholm, offering to Sweden terms of indirect 
trade reciprocity. Appleton was successful in his 
approaches and returned to the Secretary a treaty whose 
provisions appeared to Clay "to be characterized by great 
liberality, and to come up entirely to any expectations 
which I had formed."14 
Despite these notable successes, the policy could not 
be considered complete until Britain was a party to full 
reciprocity. Here the omens were not good, for, of 
course, Britain did not only discriminate against foreign 
shipping in the indirect trade but prohibited it 
altogether. Even so, when time came around for the 
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reconsideration of the 1818 convention, Clay hoped that 
the principle of full reciprocity might be incorporated. 
Albert Gallatin once again was the special agent sent to 
the Court of St. James to discuss this and other matters. 
The British negotiators were prepared to concede some 
elements of reciprocity, for goods of third parties 
carried between the United States and Britain rather than 
direct from the third countries concerned. However, Clay 
rejected this as likely to operate more in Britain's 
favour. He considered it probable that Britain would act 
as an entrep$t for European goods, with British ships 
undercutting American participation in the direct trades 
with each respective country in Europe. He saw no similar 
prospect for American ships carrying Latin American 
productions indirectly to Britain via American ports. 
"How would American navigation, which can sustain any just 
competition, support itself against such great 
inequalities?'' Posing this rhetorical question, he 
ordered Gallatin to reject the British proposals and to 
agree only to a renewal of the 1818 convention "without 
alteration." This Gallatin did in 1827.15 
The failure to bring Britain within the terms of full 
reciprocity in the indirect trade slightly stained but 
could not tarnish altogether the record of Adams and Clay 
in the field of commercial diplomacy. By means of 
legislative and treaty agreements they had extended 
reciprocity in either the direct or indirect trades to 
most of Europe and they had established a foothold in 
Latin America as well. While the 1827 convention with 
Britain failed to include reciprocity in the indirect 
trade, the direct trade agreement did cover the single 
most important branch of trade which the United States 
enjoyed. Over the course of twelve years the policy of 
reciprocity in navigation had been refined into its mature 
state, from the legislative to the treaty basis and from 
operation in the direct trade only to the indirect trade 
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of some countries. A sound foundation had been laid, and 
now it remained to be seen how the administration of 
Andrew Jackson assumed the responsibility for this 
important arm of policy. 
The initial response of the Jackson administration to 
questions of commercial diplomacy was to follow in the 
footsteps of its predecessor. Negotiations already in 
progress were continued and in three or four cases carried 
through to a successful conclusion. Of course, this did 
not mean that the continuation of the policy of 
reciprocity in navigation was automatic or that it would 
persist for the rest of Jackson's two terms. On several 
other major issues of economic policy, such as the tariff, 
internal improvements, and banking and finance, it took 
several years for distinct party differences to emerge, 
and so it was conceivable that the Jacksonians might 
develop their own approach to shipping policy as the 1830s 
progressed. However, for the duration of Jackson's term 
in office this development did not occur, and there was a 
steady pursuit of exactly the same principles as had been 
the guiding force for Adams and Clay. 
The strongest evidence for continuity came in the 
form of three treaties signed by the United States, with 
Austria, Mexico and Turkey respectively. Each stemmed 
from negotiations begun during Clay's tenure at the State 
department. What is more each reflected a different 
aspect of the expectations, frustrations, and achievements 
of the reciprocity policy, which determined how successful 
the policy was in practice. 
Both Austria and the United States had been keen for 
the mutual abolition of discriminating duties since the 
mid-1820s, and only delays in negotiations had prevented a 
treaty from being seen through to completion before the 
close of the Adams administration. Even so Adams felt 
confident enough to give premature notification of a 
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prepared treaty to Congress. It was left to the Jackson 
administration to complete the formalities, initially 
issuing proclamations in accordance with the acts of 1824 
and 1828 when it became clear that Austria had already 
removed her discriminating duties upon American shipping 
in both the direct and indirect trades; then submitting 
the treaty to the Senate for their approval; and finally 
acknowledging the exchange of ratifications. This treaty 
represented another successful step in the extension of 
reciprocal conditions in trade with European countries. 16 
More frustrating and ultimately less of a success for 
the United States was the treaty with Mexico. Against a 
background of heavy Mexican duties on American shipping 
and products, Clay had impressed upon Joel Poinsett in 
Mexico City the desire of the United States "to establish, 
as the basis of all their Commercial Treaties, those 
[privileges] of equality and reciprocity." Two treaties 
were signed but failed of ratification by Mexico, even 
though Clay had surrendered many of the liberal features 
he thought should be in them. After yet more delay Mexico 
finally ratified a treaty which Clay's successor, Martin 
Van Buren, described as "not the best." While it did 
remove discriminating duties on tonnage in all trades, it 
provided for an equal imposition of import duties only in 
the direct trade. Worse still, these terms were to be 
postponed for six years, for the duration of which the 
"most favoured nation" status was to operate in both 
trades for both tonnage and import duties in order to 
allow the Mexican mercantile marine to develop a stronger 
base. Thwarted in the attempt to get full reciprocity, 
the United States had even been forced to accept a 
temporary suspsension of reciprocity in the direct trade. 
But as in the case of Colombia it was more important to 
secure some sort of treaty footing so as not to be in a 
less favourable position than potential foreign rivals 
with regard to Mexican trade.17 
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Negotiations with Turkey were centred around the 
American desire to secure access to the Black Sea. Clay's 
attempts to secure this had been without success, but 
changes in Europe suggested that things might improve. 
The previously closed trade had been opened by means of a 
treaty between Russia and Turkey in 1830, but Russia 
interpreted this as offering access only to those 
countries which enjoyed treaty relations with Turkey. 
Representatives of the mercantile interest, such as 
Baltimore's Isaac McKim, considered it urgent that the 
United States should now come to terms, "to be put on a 
footing with other Nations." William Offley, the 
negotiator on the spot, insisted that any treaty be based 
on reciprocity, but Secretary of State Van Buren realised 
that gaining any access at all was more important than 
securing recipr~cal conditions, especially if insisting 
upon the latter jeopardised the success of the negotiation 
as a whole. This more realistic approach shone through in 
his orders to Offley, which made no reference to 
reciprocity and called only for the right to navigate and 
trade in the Black Sea. This the treaty did provide for, 
affording an example of a treaty with a country where 
access on equal terms with foreign rivals was more 
important than equality of treatment with the shipping of 
the contracting party.18 
Continuity in negotiation need not have meant that 
the Jackson administration fully espoused the policy of 
reciprocity. It might have been the case that proceedings 
were too far advanced for the United States to withdraw 
without damaging their reputation and causing the country 
severe embarrassment. After completing those negotiations 
the Jacksonians might decide to adopt a completely new 
tack. However, the reaction to these three treaties 
reveals that this was far from being a partisan question, 
so far as the substance of the policy was concerned. What 
is more, the future negotiating stance of the Jackson 
- 31-
administration would confirm that there had been no 
fundamental shift in policy. 
There were hints of the bi-partisan nature of the 
issue as early as 1827. Two years earlier Adams had 
suggested a bill offering total reciprocity to any takers. 
At that time it had been his supporters, in a majority in 
Congress, who responded by drafting an instrument. 
Circumstances intervened to block further progress of that 
bill, and when the matter was next considered in the 1827-
28 session, Jackson supporters were in the majority. Even 
so, they navigated the bill through Congress, and Adams 
had no qualms about signing it, regardless of where credit 
for the measure might go. Nor was there any apparent 
attempt in the 1828 campaign to make a party issue out of 
reciprocity. Clay confirmed this in what amounted to a 
farewell speech at Frederick in Maryland after retiring as 
Secretary of State. Celebrating the success of the Adams 
administration in concluding more treaties than had been 
signed in the previous thirty-six years, he also paid 
tribute to the opposition: "Whilst a ceaseless opposition 
has discovered real or imaginary objection to almost every 
important measure of the late administration, these 
treaties have not only escaped all animadversion, but have 
commanded universal approbation."19 
This agreement in substance continued into the next 
administration, even if the parties did argue over where 
credit for new treaties lay. Just as Clay had lauded the 
Adams administration for its successes in commercial 
diplomacy, so too did Jacksonians celebrate their fortune 
and efforts. This extended beyond the annual roll of 
honour in the President's address to Congress into 
campaign literature. As President, Jackson was credited 
with initiating moves which led to the successful 
negotiation of treaties. Then in the 1836 and 1840 
campaigns Martin Van Buren was still being praised for his 
tenure in the State department several years earlier, 
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which had overseen the signing of as many as four 
treaties. Although written some years later, the 
"Autobiography" of Amos Kendall still captures the flavour 
of this literature. Displaying none of the magnanimity to 
political opponents revealed earlier by Clay in his 
speech at Frederick, Kendall averred that the foreign 
relations of the United States were "found in a disordered 
state" in 1829. Among other successes, the Jackson 
administration had won "most favoured nation" status for 
ships trading with Turkey, and had initiated relations 
with Austria, "extending to our commerce many advantages 
in her ports." All this, done against a background of 
alleged partisan efforts to withhold appropriations for 
ministers, had brought tangible rewards for merchants, 
shippers, ship-builders, farmers and manufacturers 
alike. 20 
The National Republicans responded in like fashion. 
The address from their national convention in 1831 
acknowledged the "appearance of success" in foreign 
affairs during Jackson's first term. However, it claimed 
for the opposition much of the credit for this success and 
accused the President of being small-minded and 
ungrateful. Jacksonian success was 
in consequence of the fact that several 
arrangements with foreign powers which had been 
matured, and in some instances concluded, under 
the preceding administration have been made 
public under this. Such was the case with the 
treaties with Austria ••• and with Turkey. In 
announcing the conclusion of these arrangements, 
a president of an elevated and generous 
disposition would have taken delight in doing 
complete justice to the merits of a political 
competitor. General Jackson took to himself, 
without scruple or ceremony, the whole credit of 
these negotiations, and on this and other 
occasions affectedly avoided to mention the name 
of his predecessor. 
Clay played around with a similar theme during the 1836 
campaign, although only in the intimacy of private 
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correspondence: "I negotiated various treaties. Several 
of these (those for example with Austria and Mexico) were 
agreed upon, but not actually signed and were subsequently 
concluded in the name of the succeeding Administration."2l 
Throughout these statements the tone was the same. 
Both parties were keen to claim credit for the policy 
rather than to criticise the other for their espousal of 
it. In substance they were agreed. Any potential 
difference over the substance of the policy would have 
required one or more of several circumstances to prevail. 
The parties might have clashed over the constitutionality 
of the policy, over its main intentions, or over the way 
in which it was operating in practice. However, in none 
of these cases did such a clash occur in the period of 
transition from the Adams to the Jackson administration. 
Unlike other issues, such as the protective tariff 
and internal improvements, there was little constitutional 
doubt about the policy of reciprocity. The Constitution 
expressly states that Congress has the power "to regulate 
commerce with foreign nations," which gives clear sanction 
for acts such as those offering reciprocal conditions in 
1824 and 1828. What is more, the right of the Executive 
branch to pursue commercial aims through diplomacy was 
accepted, especially if those aims fitted in with the 
intentions of any legislation on the subject. If anything 
the policy which reciprocity replaced, discriminating 
duties for protective purposes, held within it the 
potential for greater constitutional debate. Some did 
still regard the discriminating import duties as a 
legitimate form of protection. John Scott, from Missouri, 
deemed it essential that "our commerce, and shipping 
interest [be] guarded and well regulated," and thought the 
extra duties imposed by the tariff of 1824 were 
appropriate for the task. However, the Adams 
administration, and the Jacksonians after them, both 
considered the removal of special privileges for American 
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shipping at home in return for equal treatment overseas as 
the best form of encouragement, and as a result the 
likelihood of constitutional argument was diminished.2 2 
The beauty of the policy was that it seemed to 
combine high principle with the best interests of the 
United States. The removal of discriminating duties was 
hailed as part of a general liberalisation of trade. It 
lessened unnatural burdens on commerce and allowed trade 
to follow a more natural and therefore preferable course. 
James Lloyd, the Massachusetts Senator representing 
Bostonian shipping interests, avowed that "the leading, 
fair, and honorable principle of our commercial 
intercourse with foreign nations undoubtedly is, and 
should be that of reciprocity." However, he added that 
this was a principle "alike of National self-respect, and 
interest •••• " Jonathan Russell, celebrating the 1815 
convention with Britain, considered the achievement of 
reciprocity as vital, certain as he was that "the 
sagacity, skill & enterprize of our fellow citizens will 
always secure the ascendant in a free commercial 
competition & that we shall always have the advantage in 
every advancement towards liberal principles." Americans 
pursued reciprocity, therefore, both in the name of 
principle and for material interest, and the more it was 
extended, the greater were the benefits expected to accrue 
to the United States.23 
Those benefits were expected to come in several 
forms. The abolition of discriminating duties and an 
increased atmosphere of competition for the carrying of 
trade to and from the United States would force down the 
price of carriage of products both ways, to the benefit of 
producer and consumer alike. However, the policy should 
not promote those groups at the expense of the interests 
of American shippers. Both parties saw the value of a 
strong mercantile marine for the defence and commerce 
needs of the country and celebrated advances in this 
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branch of industry. Reciprocity did not represent the 
removal of protection on routes already open to American 
shipping, but rather was designed to open up opportunities 
in new routes. And, as Russell had hinted, most 
considered that American vessels were particularly suited 
to exploiting such conditions. 
The competitiveness of any country's shipping 
depended upon a complicated combination of costs of ship-
building, the provision of crews and supplies, the speed, 
efficiency and safety of the service, and the ability to 
maximise returns on each leg of any voyage. Each of these 
factors was subject to considerable fluctuation and often 
they balanced each other out, which makes it difficult to 
judge just how competitve American shipping was. However, 
the impression left on the minds of contemporaries was 
that American shipping was more competitive than its 
rivals around the year 1830, and there are one or two 
hints as to why. 
Most acknowledged that American ship-builders 
provided better and cheaper products than rival shipping 
powers could obtain. Admittedly ship-builders usually had 
to pay higher wages than their foreign rivals and 
frequently were forced to purchase articles such as hemp, 
sail duck and iron fittings from a costly, protected 
market. However, their great advantage lay in the ready 
supply of timber, and especially of the preferred oak, 
near the main ship-building centres in New England and the 
Mid-Atlantic regions. The cheap supply of timber was 
handed on to shippers in the form of cheaper vessels, and 
this gave them a competitive advantage over rivals such as 
Britain, as borne out by the successful participation of 
American ships in the trade between the two countries.24 
Just as ship-builders had to pay higher wages than 
their competitors, so did American shippers have to do 
likewise for their crews. However, in their case this was 
counter-balanced by the greater skill and efficiency of 
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American seamen. Francis Grund, German by birth, but a 
long-time resident in American port cities, noted that 
higher wages were counteracted by "the much smaller number 
of sailors, and the greater rapidity of passages." They 
could make four voyages to any other ships' two or three, 
and all with smaller, better-disciplined crews. Another 
foreign observer, Alexis de Tocqueville, agreed with this 
assessment but placed more stress on "moral and 
intellectual qualities." Noting that the "vessels of the 
United States cross the seas at a cheaper rate," he 
attributed this to a kind of "heroism" in the way 
Americans did business: "The European merchant will 
always find it difficult to imitate his American 
competitor, who, in adopting the system which I have just 
described, does not follow calculation, but an impulse of 
his nature."25 
Cheaper ves~els, more efficient and skilful crews, 
and even a more enterprising approach to the business of 
shipping and commerce; these were the factors designed to 
allow American shipping to exploit conditions of 
reciprocity. With equal treatment in foreign ports, how 
could this competitive edge fail to afford American 
vessels a profitable participation in the trade with other 
countries? 26 
There remained one other possible cause for party 
division over the policy of reciprocity. If the policy 
failed in practice to live up to its theoretical 
expectations, then either of the parties might have 
dropped it in favour of a more overtly protective line, 
pandering to the doubts of those groups who found 
themselves injured by it. However, there is no evidence 
by 1836 of any real doubts. The policy was still very 
much in its infancy. The act of 1828 was still fresh, and 
the earliest treaty incorporating indirect trade 
reciprocity had only been operating for ten years, clearly 
not enough time to assess the value of the experiment. In 
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the direct trade, where reciprocity had operated for an 
extra decade, the policy seemed only to have brought 
benefits. The potential for complaint appeared limited. 
Exceptional commentators did identify problems 
confronting shippers but excused reciprocity from blame. 
The most famous was Churchill C. Cambreleng, Jacksonian 
representative of New York City mercantile interests, and 
a close friend of Martin Van Buren. In a report drafted 
for the House Commerce Committee, of which he was the 
Chairman, Cambreleng highlighted what he considered to be 
a worrying decline in shipping fortunes since 1807 and 
blamed this on the "most strange and contradictory" policy 
towards navigation. Noting the progress of the 
reciprocity policy, Cambreleng proceeded to criticise 
connected policies which undermined its best effects: 
we have done every thing to smooth the paths of 
the Ocean, while we have imposed the heaviest 
taxes on our own navigation, and taken the most 
effectual means to destroy the employment of our 
ships [by protective tariff duties imposed in 
1828]. In short, it has been our peculiar 
policy to secure an enlarged intercourse with 
all the world for empty ships, of the most 
expensive construction. Such diplomacy, with 
such legislation, is an absurd mockery. Our 
treaties and our navigation laws are idle 
pageants unles [sic] we relieve ship-building 
from its taxes, and secure with foreign 
countries mutual commerce, as well as 
reciprocity in navigation. 
For Cambreleng reciprocity in navigation was a desirable 
policy, but only when accompanied by policies which 
increased the volume of trade available for carriage by 
American shippers. Consistent with his free-trade beliefs 
this meant reducing tariff duties; either by legislation 
or by diplomatic efforts with those countries which did 
not rival the United States in shipping, so that Americans 
would be able to participate fully in the carriage of 
their own produce to the markets of the world, which was 
"naturally our employment."27 
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While Cambreleng worried about the damaging effects 
of other policies on the benefits of reciprocity, others 
celebrated the extension of the policy and the results it 
seemed to bring. In 1832 the President himself praised 
the "rule which has long guided our national policy, to 
require no exclusive privileges in commerce and to grant 
none." This policy was "duly producing its beneficial 
effect in the respect shown to our flag, the protection of 
our citizens and their property abroad, and in the 
increase of our navigation and the extension of our 
mercantile operations."28 
So the working of the policy gave no reason for any 
shift in approach by the Jackson administration. 
Reciprocity was still in its experimental phase and so far 
had given no reason to doubt its effects. Consequently, 
inspired by principle and by hopes for the future 
prosperity of American commerce and shipping, the 
Jacksonians pressed on with efforts to extend the policy 
by diplomatic means. The direction their negotiations 
followed was, not surprisingly, very similar to that of 
their predecessors. The first intention in any talks was 
to secure reciprocity in the indirect trade. In Latin 
America there remained the fall-back position of the "most 
favoured nation" status, which was still an acceptable 
second best. Treaties with more obscure parts of the 
globe also tended to end up along "most favoured nation" 
lines. Of course, each individual negotiation was 
influenced by local conditions and by the bargaining 
position and strengths and weaknesses of the contracting 
parties. But throughout, Jacksonian negotiators stuck by 
the same basic rules, in the process extending the policy 
of reciprocity still further in its geographical scope. 
Perhaps the most noted treaty success was the 
agreement signed by James Buchanan on a mission to Russia. 
Trade with that country took place mainly through her 
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Baltic ports. There was some direct importation of 
American rice, tobacco and coffee, subject to no 
discriminating duties, since Russia had responded 
positively to the act of 1824. However, by far the most 
important "American" trade to Russia was in the indirect 
importation of Cuban sugar which enjoyed no such exemption 
from extra duties. While American participation in the 
trade could hardly be increased, as American vessels 
carried 90 per cent of the return cargoes of Russian hemp, 
iron and sail duck, the securing of reciprocal conditions 
in the indirect trade would relieve the importation of 
sugar from a needless burden. So then Cambreleng hoped 
that a treaty could secure such privileges, while another 
correspondent of Van Buren, James A. Hamilton, considered 
that the prospect of Russia becoming a first-rank 
commercial power was reason enough for her to be bound by 
sound principles£ "and in no way could this be so well 
secured as by inducing her while she is in her commercial 
infancy to avow by a Treaty with us her regard for these 
enlightened and liberal views which we have proclaimed as 
the true basis of navigation and trade."29 
Buchanan left for Russia in 1832, and after a 
difficult negotiation, in which he made full use of his 
ability to charm the Russian emperor, he succeeded in 
signing a treaty on full reciprocal terms. He was most 
pleased with his efforts, and it was generally 
acknowledged that the treaty would be beneficial to 
American shipping. Prince Lieven, the Russian minister in 
London, asserted in conversations with Aaron Vail that the 
commercial prowess of Americans would guarantee that all 
the benefits of reciprocity would go to the United States. 
After all "the Russians were not now, nor had any prospect 
for a long time to come, of being able to enter into 
competition with us in the carrying trade which the Treaty 
secured to us between Russia and foreign countries." 
Vail's commentary on the Prince's comments could stand as 
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a textbook explanation of American adherence to 
reciprocity: 
The superiority of our commercial marine and 
mercantile skill is brought home to the 
conviction of the people and Statesmen of this 
country by the increase of our tonnage and the 
monopoly which, from the unavoidable course of 
things, falls into our hands whenever any thing 
like fair & equal terms are extended to us. 
Ironically, American trade with Russia fell in value in 
the years immediately after the signing of the treaty, 
though through no fault of that instrument. Despite a 
reduction in import duties on Russian naval supplies in 
the 1832 tariff, alternative sources reduced the return 
cargoes available for American vessels, just as the 
Russian government began to protect her domestic 
production of sugar with higher import duties, which 
damaged the indirect trade from Cuba. An increase in the 
cost of sugar in ·cuba also caused American shippers to 
seek other markets where they could sell the product for 
higher prices. To such developments the policy of 
reciprocity had no answer.30 
Legislative arrangements also provided for the 
extension of reciprocity in the indirect trade in Europe. 
President Jackson brought three countries within the scope 
of the act of 1828, issuing proclamations which removed 
discriminating duties on the vessels of the Grand Duchies 
of Oldenburg, Mecklenburg-Schwerin and Tuscany in 1830, 
1835 and 1836 respectively. Potentially of greater 
importance were continued approaches to Spain. Although 
dispute over duties imposed in Spanish colonies prevented 
any treaty from being signed, gradually reciprocal terms 
were secured in trade with the mother country. In 1832 an 
impatient Congress imposed additional discriminating 
duties upon Spanish vessels entering American ports, but 
this measure had its intended coercive effect upon the 
Spanish government, which proceeded to drop its own 
discriminations by royal order. Initially this was 
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thought only to apply to the direct trade, and one 
supporter of the Secretary of State, Henry Gilpin, praised 
Van Buren for securing even this much, "notwithstanding 
the proverbial repugnance of the Spanish government to 
make any changes in its commercial policy." By 1840, 
however, it became clear from Spanish complaints at unfair 
treatment that the royal order of 1832 had been 
interpreted by the Spanish authorities to include American 
vessels in the indirect trade as well, an unexpected but 
welcome bonus.31 
Even in those negotiations which ended in failure the 
intention remained the winning of reciprocity in the 
indirect trade. In 1833 Auguste Davezac, the American 
diplomatic representative in the Netherlands, was sent 
instructions to negotiate a treaty with the Kingdom of the 
Two Sicilies, whose "basis must be that of reciprocal 
equality establi~hed by our treaty with Central America." 
However, these negotiations fell into abeyance as the 
Sicilian government proved unwilling to meet American 
terms. Davezac was also central in negotiations at his 
appointed station, the Netherlands. Despite being 
included in the list of countries favoured by the act of 
1824, the Netherlands had for some years discriminated in 
favour of their own shipping by means of a ten per cent 
bounty. After several failed diplomatic approaches, and 
the neglect of Congress to provide some sort of 
retaliatory measure, Davezac was ordered to address the 
problem, by offering to the Dutch treaty terms of complete 
reciprocity in both direct and indirect trades. Again the 
Dutch refused to comply and the issue of the bounty would 
rumble on for the rest of the decade. It was complicated 
by relations with the newly independent Belgium, which 
also discriminated against American shipping, yet which 
did not share Dutch good fortune in enjoying equal 
treatment for her vessels in U.S. ports. The United 
States, anxious to promote good relations with a country 
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which might prove useful as an access route to German 
markets, were keen to remedy this situation. So, when the 
new Belgian minister, Baron Behr, arrived in Washington 
offering reciprocal conditions in the indirect trade, the 
United States were happy to agree to those terms. Jackson 
was most disappointed, therefore, when he learned that 
Behr had been admonished for going beyond his orders on 
the separate issue of neutrals' rights in wartime, with 
the result that the Belgian Senate refused to ratify the 
treaty. Nevertheless, the American government remained 
firmly wedded to its belief in the policy of reciprocity 
and ordered Virgil Maxcy to keep the matter before the 
eyes of the Brussels government, while in Washington John 
Forsyth kept the Belgian representative informed of the 
continuing "ardent desire of this country to effect the 
entire and mutual abolition" of discriminating duties.32 
The Jackson ·administration followed similar 
principles in its diplomacy in Latin America. Here, 
though, continuing political instability, the desire of 
new nations to win Spain's recognition for their 
independence, and the development of a degree of pan-Latin 
American feeling complicated negotiations considerably. 
In some regions diplomatic relations were impossible, 
notably the Rio de la Plata district, while in more 
established nations U.S. negotiators had to work hard to 
combat efforts to favour either Spain or fellow Latin 
American countries with preferential trading terms. 
Political instability played its part in some of the 
more successful negotiations as well. Relations with 
Colombia seemed to be progressing well when American 
representations brought an end to discriminating duties on 
American shipping and imports, duties which went against 
the "most favoured nation" terms of the 1824 treaty in 
that other Latin American countries were not charged them. 
In recognition of the Colombian removal of these duties, 
Congress passed a special act which established 
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reciprocity in the direct trade with Colombia in 1832. 
However, events were already conspiring to render this act 
useless, as Colombia underwent political fragmentation 
into three parts, New Granada, Venezuela and Ecuador. The 
question now arose as to whether the three new states 
would all abide by the treaty of 1824, and indeed whether 
the separation would be permanent. American statesmen 
covered themselves by preparing to negotiate new treaties 
with each of the three. Relations with New Granada were 
soured when that country re-imposed a discrimination 
against the United States. Nevertheless, Robert McAfee, 
the American charge, was ordered to keep pressing for a 
treaty on the principle of reciprocity in the indirect 
trade. Indeed, Secretary of State John Forsyth ordered 
that failing full reciprocity it was "not our wish to 
negotiate upon any other basis •••• " These 
negotiations came· to nothing, however. More encouraging 
were assertions from Venezuela that she was prepared to 
offer the most liberal terms. In 1835 John Williamson was 
dispatched with orders to sign a treaty based on the 
principles embodied in the acts of 1824 and 1828, and in 
January 1836 he succeeded in reaching such an agreement 
with the Venezuelan government. Similar approaches were 
made to the government of Ecuador, although its location 
meant "that our commerce with Equator is not of much 
extent." As of 1836, though, these had come to nothing.33 
Once again, as in Europe, treaties which appeared not 
to meet demands for full reciprocity were the result of 
failed negotiation rather than of altered intention. 
Treaties with Chile and Peru, both on the "most favoured 
nation" basis, illustrate this. As was often the case the 
initiative for negotiation was taken by the American 
representative on the spot, in the case of Chile, Samuel 
Larned. In the last years of the Adams administration he 
expressed his intention to use the Central American treaty 
as a basis for one he hoped to sign with Chile, and only 
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failing that would he accept "most favoured nation" terms. 
The change in administration brought no change in this 
basic approach, and Martin Van Buren ordered his new man 
John Hamm to adopt the same line, pressing for reciprocity 
first and, only after failing to achieve this, "most 
favoured nation" status second. The resulting treaty 
proved to be one of the most disappointing from an 
American point of view, since it not only failed to secure 
reciprocity but even allowed Chile to grant special 
privileges to other Latin American states. Hoping that 
differences between Chile and other states would prevent 
her from operating this discrimination, the United States 
nevertheless made repeated, unsuccessful attempts to have 
this provision abolished. Similar problems bedevilled 
negotiations with Peru. In practice things did not start 
off too badly as it was reported that Peru did not 
discriminate against American vessels in either direct or 
indirect trades. However, Peru was unwilling to enshrine 
this in treaty terms, and despite repeated instructions 
from Washington ordering him to accept no less than full 
reciprocity, the American negotiator, Samuel Larned again, 
realised that "most favoured nation" terms were the best 
that could be secured. This was to be the basis of the 
treaty he signed in 1836, this time without the odious 
discrimination in favour of fellow Latin American 
countries.34 
While "most favoured nation" terms represented a 
fall-back position for negotiations in Latin America, in 
other parts of the world they were the upper limit of 
American expectations. American merchants already enjoyed 
rich rewards from their adventurous voyages to Asia and 
countries on the Indian Ocean rim. While unchallenged by 
native shipping, Americans did fear that they might be 
discriminated against, or excluded altogether from trade 
with these regions, if Britain, France or the Netherlands 
exerted too great an influence. So it was important that 
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equal American access be secured by means of "most 
favoured nation" terms. The principle had already been 
applied to Turkey, and in 1832 an American merchant who 
traded regularly in Asia, Edmund Roberts, was dispatched 
by President Jackson to seek arrangements with Siam, 
Cochin-China and Japan. Breaches of etiquette caused 
negotiations to collapse with Cochin-China, while time ran 
out for a mission to Japan. But Roberts did succeed in 
signing a treaty with Siam placing American ships on equal 
terms with their rivals. On his return journey he made a 
similar arrangement with Muscat, which included much of 
the east coast of Africa and the spice island of Zanzibar 
and whose Sultan was an old acquaintance of Roberts. A 
second mission, in 1835, proved less successful, as once 
again negotiations with Cochin-China broke down and as 
Roberts died before he could proceed to Japan. However, 
the principle had been well established, and in 1836 a 
treaty was signed with Morocco, where "the commerce with 
the United States shall be on the same footing as is the 
commerce with Spain, or as that with the most favoured 
nation for the time being."35 
In December 1838 the Senate called upon the Secretary 
of State to present to them a report showing 
the nature and extent of the privileges and 
restrictions of the commercial intercourse of 
the United States with all foreign nations, so 
as to show how far the commerce and navigation 
of this Republic are favoured and encouraged, or 
burdened and restricted in different countries. 
The document submitted to the Senate by John Forsyth 
provides a useful progress report for the policy of 
reciprocity after twenty years of development. Listing in 
turn those countries which enjoyed reciprocal conditions 
in the indirect and direct trades, "most favoured nation" 
terms, or no established commercial relations at all, 
either by treaty or legislative basis, Forsyth concluded: 
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The success of our efforts in the advancement of 
liberal principles of intercourse has been such 
as to justify a hope that we may, by constant 
adherence to the true principles of political 
economy, and the use of the means fairly within 
our reach, be successful in the correction of 
the opinions on this subject which now form the 
great barrier to a universal, unrestricted, and 
advantageous interchange of the varied 
commodities of the civilized world. 
American efforts had indeed been successful in extending 
the policy of reciprocity in Europe and Latin America. 
Buoyed up by the belief in the competitive advantages of 
American shipping, American statesmen appeared confident 
that reciprocity would promote American interests while 
upholding the great principle of more liberal 
international trade. However, even as Forsyth reported, 
the policy of reciprocity was heading towards stormier 
seas, as doubts were expressed as to its true effects in 
several important trades.36 
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Chapter 2. Reciprocity and the Colonial Trade, 
1815-1842: A Special Case 
John Forsyth's report of 1839 was for the most part 
an upbeat document. He remarked how by means of "most 
favoured nation" arrangements the "navigation and commerce 
of the United States, so far as it regards foreign 
competition, stand on satisfactory grounds in the ports of 
each of the most important Powers." He hoped that a 
further spread of reciprocity would extend competition 
with national vessels as well. However, he sounded a 
gloomier note in conclusion, in a clear reference to 
Britain and France, when he noted that in some trades 
American ships still did not receive equal treatment. At 
the same time he adverted to another area of trade where 
there remained cause for concern: 
In regard to the national and colonial 
competition-with the several Powers with whom 
our commerce is extensive, our condition is very 
different: our products are prohibited, or 
burdened with high duties, for the protection of 
the home or colonial interests of the1respective Powers with whom we have intercourse. 
American statesmen had had considerable difficulty in 
extending the principle of reciprocal navigation to 
colonial trades, largely because a different set of 
priorities operated upon the minds of colonial powers. In 
direct trades with Europe reciprocity held out the 
prospect of cheaper carriage for the benefit of both 
producer and consumer. Countries with little shipping of 
their own were most likely to accept these terms as a 
means to reducing a pointless burden. Even acknowledged 
shipping powers usually met the United States half-way 
with reciprocity in the direct trade, since maintaining 
their discriminating duties would only provoke the United 
States into imposing duties of their own, with the result 
that both sides would be burdened, without effective 
protection to the shipping of either. But the origins and 
history of overseas colonies dictated that they were owned 
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by powers which considered the very purpose of colonies to 
include fostering the maritime strength of the mother 
country. As a result of this they established strict 
navigation systems to ensure that colonies lived up to 
expectation. Colonies were prohibited from trading with 
other countries except indirectly through the mother 
country, and this trade was closed to foreign vessels. 
Similarly trade between two colonies of the same country 
could only be conducted in the ships of those colonies or 
the imperial power. For most of the early history of the 
various colonies the object of protecting the mother 
country's shipping interests was plain, and reciprocity 
held little attraction for imperial powers. Only much 
later did they begin to take the interests of the colonies 
as producers and consumers into account and to relax their 
laws to allow colonists to find new markets for their 
goods, alternative carriers of their cargoes, and cheaper 
suppliers of their import requirements. 
The location of the United States meant that they 
were well placed to fulfil some, if not all, of these 
roles for European colonies in the western hemisphere. 
The country demonstrated its value to them during the 
Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, when the United States 
acted as neutral supplier and carrier for many of the 
colonies. As American traders enjoyed a prosperous 
participation in these trades and as colonial populations 
developed a taste for American goods and especially their 
value for money, there was pressure to regularise these 
relations after peace returned in 1815. In some cases 
this led to rapid and successful adjustment, but in 
others, most notably that of the British colonial trade, 
long and heated disputes ensued before settlement was 
reached. Americans longed to secure access to the trade 
with the British West Indies, keen to restore old trades 
which had been profitable during their own colonial past. 
However, the presence of British colonies to the north of 
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the United States greatly complicated negotiations to open 
the West Indies trade and provided a source of continuing 
discontent for certain American shippers even after the 
renowned reciprocal arrangement of 1830 finally opened the 
British colonial trade to American shipping. 
American statesmen realised that the legal position 
of the colonies stood in the way of any American claims to 
trade with European colonies by right. However much 
Americans might disapprove of colonial possessions, they 
had to accept that ultimately the right to trade with them 
depended on the mother country. Henry Clay admitted as 
much in 1826: "It is the undoubted right of any nation to 
prohibit or to allow foreign commerce with all or any part 
of its dominions, wherever situated •••• " So then the 
colonial power could restrict colonies to trading with the 
mother country alone, and the United States would have no 
grounds for complaint. Clay continued, though: "[T]he 
moment it chooses to relax and open its Colonial ports to 
a foreign trade • • • the right is acquired by the Foreign 
States to examine and judge for themselves the conditions 
on which they are proposed to be admitted, and to reject 
or accept them accordingly." If, then, the colonial power 
sought to restrict trade between the United States and its 
colonies to its own and colonial shipping, the United 
States would have every right to refuse to do business. 
Similarly, if the colonial power imposed discriminating 
duties on American ships entering its colonies, then the 
United States could appeal for reciprocal treatment or, 
failing that, impose their own discriminations on its 
ships coming from those colonies. After all, trade was a 
thing of "mutual convenience and advantage," and, as Clay 
concluded, "in trading with any Colonies we have no more 
imagined that a privilege had been gratuitously conceded 
to us than that we had made such a concession to the 
colonial power in allowing its Colonies to trade with the 
United States."2 
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These principles guided American statesmen in the 
period 1815-1840. However, they had to be careful that 
strict adherence to principle did not get in the way of 
trade which in practice might transcend the restrictions 
imposed by colonial powers. The trade with Spain's 
Caribbean possessions was a case in point. American 
vessels did have access to Cuba and Puerto Rico, but 
American produce was subjected to heavy import duties, and 
American ships were charged burdensome tonnage duties. 
What is more, the Spanish operated discriminations in 
favour of their own shipping. Repeated diplomatic efforts 
to have extra duties on American vessels removed failed in 
the 1820s and 1830s, and Congress throughout imposed 
retaliatory duties on Spanish ships coming from the 
islands. Despite these problems American trade with Cuba 
assumed extensive proportions, becoming one of the most 
valuable of all; not just colonial, trades in terms of 
shipping employed and amounts of imports and exports. 3[11VH£S •. £-•·'.J 
The American appetite for improved conditions in the 
Spanish colonial trade was whetted by success in securing 
better treatment in the island colonies of other European 
countries. The 1822 convention with France lacked a 
clause concerning French colonies, but soon after its 
conclusion the King of France issued a decree opening the 
Caribbean islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique to American 
vessels on equal terms in the direct trade. In this case 
the French government was clearly swayed by the interest 
of island consumers and producers, for whom American 
carriers could provide a cheaper service than could French 
shipping. As a result the French did not demand 
equivalent treatment for French vessels arriving in 
American ports. However, American politicians considered 
it only fitting that the United States should uphold the 
principles of reciprocity, and Jacksonian leaders in 
Congress piloted through a bill in 1828 which returned the 
favour to French vessels, an embarrassingly smooth 
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settlement in the eyes of the Adams administration as it 
struggled to solve the British colonial trade problem. 
Most, though, considered the arrangement to be a success, 
and while the 1830s saw a freezing of relations with 
France over the issue of old claims, the following decade 
saw similar reciprocal conditions extended to the port of 
Cayenne in French Guinea (1841) and to France's two 
remaining possessions in maritime Canada, the islands of 
Miquelon and St. Pierre (1847).4 
Danish possessions in the western hemisphere 
consisted of the Arctic colonies of Greenland, Iceland and 
the Faeroe Islands, as well as the Caribbean islands of 
St. Croix and St. Thomas. The Arctic colonies remained 
closed to foreign shipping throughout this period, but the 
United States did enjoy good terms in the Caribbean. As 
early as 1818 John Quincy Adams learned that American 
vessels had access to the islands for the carriage of 
American products, and this state of affairs was enshrined 
in the treaty of 1826, which also established that 
reciprocity would operate in the direct trade with St. 
Thomas and St. Croix. Predictably, though, Americans were 
not allowed to participate in the trade between those 
islands and Denmark herself. It soon became clear that 
American vessels enjoyed favorable treatment in the Danish 
island trade, since the ships of many countries were 
excluded from the islands altogether. However, in 1831, 
when the Danes suggested that this practical monopoly be 
enshrined in a hard and fast arrangement, in return for 
the abolition of American import duties on Danish island 
products, President Jackson refused to accept such terms 
on traditional ideological grounds that the United States 
should never give or accept special privileges in its 
trading relations.s 
The highlight of American attempts to secure access 
to colonial trades came with the arrangement with Sweden 
over her Caribbean island of St. Bartholomew. American 
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trade with the island was more extensive than that with 
the mother country, and so it was gratifying that the 
treaty with Sweden in 1817 confirmed that reciprocal terms 
would operate in the direct trade with St. Bartholomew. 
In orders for renewal of the treaty in 1827, Secretary of 
State Clay instructed John Appleton to push for even more 
favourable terms in the form of reciprocity in the 
indirect trade of the island with foreign countries. 
Appleton fully complied with these orders and, moreover, 
even secured access and reciprocal conditions in the trade 
between St. Bartholomew and Sweden herself. If this were 
not sign enough of Sweden's abandonment of the original 
purpose of the colonial system, the treaty also guaranteed 
that American products would receive similar equal 
treatment, whether it be with colonial goods entering 
Sweden, or with Swedish goods entering St. Bartholomew.6 
Despite strenuous efforts American statesmen failed 
to emulate the success of the arrangement with Sweden in 
their negotiations to secure wider access to other 
countries' colonies. The most that the United States 
could usually expect to obtain was reciprocity in the 
direct trade with colonial possessions, as was the case 
with the Dutch colonies of St. Eustacius, Cura~ao and 
Surinam.7 However, these terms were usually adequate to 
cover the sort of business which went on between the 
United States and the Caribbean. For the most part this 
involved the sale of foodstuffs and timber products 
shipped directly from Mid-Atlantic and Southern ports in 
exchange for colonial productions, exchanges which 
reciprocity in the direct trade would encourage. Nor did 
heavier duties in other routes seem to act as too great a 
discouragement, as the American carriage of Cuban sugar to 
Europe demonstrated. On top of this the European colonies 
played an integral part in the major American dispute over 
colonial trade in the 1820s, that with Britain, which 
resulted in American trade with the British West Indies 
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being prohibited for two considerable periods in the 
1820s. In order to preserve valuable markets and shipping 
business, Americans sidestepped the prohibition by 
exporting American produce to the British colonies 
indirectly via the colonies of other countries, taking 
advantage of their reciprocal terms. To Churchill 
Cambreleng, observing with dismay the British policy of 
restriction, the results were obvious: 
Her jealousy of our marine, induces her to 
except those [West Indies] colonies in a general 
emancipation of her colonial dominions, and to 
subject them to a gradual, but certain decline; 
while the islands of Sweden, Denmark, France, 
and Spain, are comparatively rising in 
importance through theiB unrestricted commerce 
with the United States. 
The struggle to win access to the British colonial 
trade occupies first place in the attention given by 
historians to colonial, and indeed all, trade disputes in 
the Jacksonian era. Biographers of the President and of 
his diplomatic staff and historians of American foreign 
policy of the era have focussed on this topic almost to 
the exclusion of other colonial trades, and the affair is 
the only one to have its own monograph. 9 This 
concentration is no doubt to be explained by the fact that 
the British negotiation was the longest and most difficult 
and aroused more heated contemporary feeling than any 
other colonial trade matter. Politicians raised the issue 
at two general elections, and although the influence of 
the affair in domestic circles should not be exaggerated, 
it did exceed all other trade matters in political 
importance. 10 
At first sight the size of the British colonial trade 
seems not to have merited this attention, especially in 
comparison with Cuba's. Despite the shared colonial past 
of the United States and the British colonies in the 
western hemisphere, the volume of trade to Cuba alone 
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usually exceeded that with all the British colonies, both 
in North America and the Caribbean. This was even the 
case some years after the final opening of the British 
colonial trade to American participation in 1830. Yet, 
neither contemporaries, nor historians after them, 
directed the same attention to the long and unsuccessful 
effort to have heavy restrictions removed from the Cuban 
trade. Other reasons must, therefore, lie behind the 
importance of the British colonial trade. Traditional 
links to the British colonies undoubtedly played their 
part, but far more influential was the practical position 
of American trade with the respective colonies. In 1815 
Spain at least allowed American vessels to trade with 
Cuba, and her shipping was not sufficiently strong to 
interfere with a profitable American participation in that 
trade. The British colonial trade posed more difficult 
questions. ·British maritime interests were in a healthier 
condition than those of Spain and were in a stronger 
position to exploit, and perpetuate, discriminations in 
their favour at the expense of American shipping 
interests. What is more, the presence of British colonies 
in North America threw up rivals for most American 
interest groups, in the form of the shippers of the 
Maritime provinces and the producers of the mainland 
provinces. These groups complicated the issue in a way 
unknown in debates over other colonial trades. And these 
complications determined that many ups and downs would 
occur before the matter was settled in 1830, and that for 
some American interest groups the settlement would be a 
hollow victory. 
The story of the struggle to secure access to 
Britain's colonial trade has been told too many times to 
require re-telling here. However, a brief summary of the 
main phases, and especially of the major issues involved, 
is instructive in providing the essential background to 
later problems which arose in this trade. 
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In the 1780s and 1790s the newly independent United 
States, being a foreign country, were excluded from legal 
trade with the British colonies. Jay's treaty did not 
remedy this situation, as its article on the colonial 
trade was considered almost so restrictive as to be 
derisory, resulting in its rejection by the Senate. Years 
of war in Europe brought a relaxation of restrictions as 
British governors opened their islands to American trade 
for the sake of survival, but Anglo-American commercial 
wrangling and then war in 1812 led to the closure of such 
links and to the loss of a profitable line of business for 
many producers and shippers.11 
Peace in 1815 heralded fifteen years of on-off 
negotiations and legislative retaliation which culminated 
in Andrew Jackson's famous reciprocal arrangement of 1830. 
In 1815 the British islands, with the exception of 
Bermuda, were closed to American vessels, while the 
British authorities did allow their own ships to sail 
between the United States and the colonies. After 
American negotiators failed to secure a clause on the 
colonial trade in the convention of 1815, Congress imposed 
a limited degree of retaliation in 1817 by banning all 
imports from islands which refused entry to American 
vessels. However, this rather toothless measure still 
allowed British ships sailing from Britain to the United 
States to carry away a cargo of American produce for sale 
in the islands. So then, when the British offered terms 
even less favourable than those in Jay's treaty, limiting 
the size of American vessels, restricting the sort of 
articles they could carry, and putting them only on the 
"most favoured nation" rather than a reciprocal basis, the 
American response in 1818 was much firmer: Congress 
established a virtual non-intercourse with all colonial 
ports bar Bermuda, and even that island was included in 
1820 when it became clear that its exclusion diluted the 
effect of the 1818 act. 
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The trade remained closed until 1822, although some 
exchange did occur illegally by smuggling and legally 
through the island colonies of other countries. In 1822 
Britain relaxed her restrictions and allowed American 
ships to trade on equal terms in the colonies. The acts 
of 1818 and 1820 compelled President Monroe to open 
American ports in return, but clumsy drafting of the acts 
did not provide for reciprocal treatment. After Congress 
failed in 1822-23 to pass a new law to meet the British 
terms, the ironic situation prevailed in which the United 
States imposed discriminating duties on British ships from 
the colonies, whereas American vessels received equal 
treatment in colonial ports. Britain did not allow this 
to last for long, though, and in 1823 imposed her own 
discriminating duties. But at least the trade was open to 
the shipping of both sides for the first time and the 
beginnings of a healthy exchange ensued. 
This brighter picture did not last. Negotiations to 
replace mutual burdens by mutual freedom came to nothing. 
When, out of miscomprehension of what was required of 
them, the United States failed to comply with a new 
British law for the regulation of her West Indies trade in 
1825, Britain issued an Order-in-Council prohibiting 
American participation in the Caribbean trade once again. 
Further negotiation failed to clear things up, and so 
President Adams had no choice but to retaliate by 
re-enforcing the non-intercourse measures of 1818 and 
1820. Again the trade was closed on both sides, apart 
from the route through other countries' colonies and the 
even more indirect channel of the North American colonies. 
This was the position when the Jackson administration 
took over the reins of government in 1829, proclaiming a 
new, more flexible approach to the matter. In fact, what 
the Jackson administration offered during negotiations in 
London through the agency of Louis McLane was not far 
removed in substance from the final stance of the Adams 
-57-
administration. However, McLane was in the position of 
being able to divorce his own efforts from earlier more 
extreme claims on the part of Adams and Clay. The 
reduction of certain American tariff duties in 1830 and 
the passage by Congress of prospective legislation 
empowering the President to re-open the West Indies trade 
on the American side whenever Britain came to terms also 
improved the atmosphere for negotiation. Even so McLane 
had to struggle hard to overcome the influence of 
representatives of British North American interests, which 
had profited from the prevailing situation; the producers 
of Canada in supplying the West Indies, and the shippers 
of Nova Scotia and New Brunswick in carrying both American 
and Canadian products to the islands. Here, veiled 
threats from Washington that all intercourse with the 
North American colonies might also be terminated played 
their part. Armed with these carrots and sticks, and 
against the background of possible turmoil in Europe after 
revolution in France, McLane succeeded in reaching 
agreement with Britain: reciprocity would operate in the 
direct trade with the British colonies in the western 
hemisphere; American vessels would be allowed to carry 
colonial products to other parts of the world; British 
vessels sailing to the United States via the colonies 
carrying the productions of Great Britain would be treated 
on reciprocal terms as if coming direct from the mother 
country; but, of course, American vessels were still 
prohibited from the trades between colonies, and between 
the colonies and Britain herself.12 
This brief summary does not do justice to what was a 
highly complex issue which had persisted for nearly fifty 
years. The question was complicated by the lack of any 
single "American" approach to the colonial trade affair. 
Various interest groups had quite distinct aims when it 
came to securing access to the West Indian trade, and, 
depending on whose star was in the ascendancy, this had a 
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profound impact upon the stance adopted by successive 
administrations in Washington. 
These differences stemmed from fundamental divisions 
within the mercantile sector of the economy. The major 
clash was between producers and shippers. Samuel Smith 
described this division explicitly in 1825: 
Commerce and Navigation are by many considered 
as one great whole, but you know that they are 
selarate and distinct interests, however nearly 
al ied; Commerce can exist without the Nation 
being its own carriers, but certainly not with 
the same advantages, activity or enterprize. 
• • • The Southern States having the great and 
valuable articles of export, are more attentive 
to Commerce. It is not of such vital importance 
to them whether their produce be carried by the 
vessels of the one or the other nation. 
As applied to the colonial trade this implied that 
producers, whether Southern food and staple farmers, or 
even the budding. exporting sector in the Mid-West, were 
not concerned whose vessels carried their goods, as long 
as colonial markets were open and the method of carriage 
was the most economical available. Shippers, on the other 
hand, had a vested interest in securing a participation in 
the colonial trade. Here, though, one more distinction 
needs to be made. Smith believed there was a sectional 
dimension to the matter: while the Southern states were 
the producing interest, "the Eastern States own nearly 
half of all the shipping of the United States, they have 
little of their own produce comparatively, and therefore 
are compelled to seek employment in the Southern States 
and elsewhere for their Ships." Indeed, shippers of New 
England did rely on the business provided by the carriage 
of produce of other regions and were especially keen to 
incorporate the West Indies into triangular and multi-
legged voyages. They also felt threatened by rival 
shippers from New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. As a result 
they desired more stringent safeguards of their role in 
the colonial trade. However, the flipside of Smith's 
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assertion that the Eastern states owned one half of U.S. 
shipping is that the other half belonged to other regions, 
namely the Mid-Atlantic and the South. Vessels of ports 
from New York southwards could all participate in the 
colonial trade on a more direct basis, less bothered about 
securing complex triangular voyages. Nor were they likely 
to feel so threatened by British North American shipping, 
since their advantages of proximity and ice-free harbours 
would nearly always outweigh any unfair advantages granted 
to rivals by the British government.13 
These differences had the potential to disrupt a 
concerted American negotiating stance. For a start they 
affected the retaliatory options open to Congress, as in 
1817 when the attempt to influence British opinion by 
means of non-importation from the colonies bore the 
hallmarks of a concession to the producing interest, since 
British vessels would still be allowed to carry away 
American products for sale in the West Indies. Divisions 
in the mercantile sector also made it likely that those 
whose needs from negotiation were least would feel their 
interests were being sacrificed if American demands for 
better terms for the sake of others obstructed a final 
settlement. Throughout the affair many considered that it 
was Eastern shippers who held the ear of the Adams 
administration at the expense of the wider American 
interest. Supporters of the administration feared that 
the opposition might make political capital out of this, 
especially in 1826 when the British closed the trade for 
the second time. Churchill Cambreleng, advising Van Buren 
in 1830 on how to alter the American negotiating stance, 
noted: 
some of our little traders to the East may, as 
they always will, grumble at any temporary 
alteration of their trade • • • • It has been 
our misfortune to be advised too frequently by 
small traders who do not see far enough ahead. 
It was such petty counsellors that gave Mr. 
Adams the advice which led him into difficulties 
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and kept him negotiating for years about li£4le 
nothings till he lost the West India trade. 
Initially, however, these differences in outlook did 
not have too damaging an effect. The first objective was 
to get Britain to end her prohibition of U.S. vessels from 
trade with her American colonies, and here shippers and 
producers were in concert. Both groups were also keen 
that any direct trade between the United States and the 
colonies be on reciprocal terms. This was essential for 
American shippers, both Northern and Southern, if they 
were to have a fruitful share in the colonial trade. The 
motivation of producers is not quite so apparent, but they 
supported access on equal terms for reasons of self-
interest, principle and patriotism. Aside from a general 
belief in liberal trading conditions the world over, they 
also desired to strengthen the U.S. merchant marine in the 
wake of the war ~gainst Britain. Undoubtedly, though, 
their own interests came first. In common with others 
they believed that American ships, if left free of unfair 
restrictions, would provide a faster, more efficient and 
cheaper service than could protected British shipping. So 
then they were keen for a degree of competition to be 
introduced into the trade, so that they might benefit from 
the cheaper carriage of their products to the colonies. 
The future President from Virginia, John Tyler, summed up 
the producer stance in extolling the virtues of the 1818 
non-intercourse act. The act would not only "bring into 
existence 75,000 tons at the least of American shipping," 
but would also allow Americans to take their own goods to 
the West Indies "and dispose of them on our own terms, and 
in our own way, and thereby enhance their value."15 
The solidarity between shippers and producers in 
favour of reciprocity in the direct colonial trade 
accounts for the near unanimous support for the non-
intercourse act of 1818 when Britain refused to offer 
anything other than the limited terms of the "most 
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favoured nation."16 Non-intercourse did injure producers, 
however, as direct access to their markets in the British 
colonies was replaced by indirect and more costly access 
via the islands of other countries. Murmurs of 
discontent, rising to full-blown memorial activity, 
followed when it was learnt that the U.S. negotiator in 
London in 1818 had been ordered to reject as inadequate a 
British offer of access and reciprocal terms. This set 
the pattern for the 1820s, as Southern producers and 
shippers expressed their satisfaction with access and 
reciprocity, while American statesmen pressed for more. 
In 1822 and 1825 Southern and Mid-Atlantic mercantile 
representatives, such as Samuel Smith, Littleton Tazewell 
and Churchill Cambreleng, were happy with the terms 
offered by British legislation and called for the removal 
of U.S. discriminating duties in return. Predictably they 
were less happy vhen negotiations broke down, with the 
result that the trade was shut down again in 1826-27. 
The refusal of the United States, until 1827, to 
accept terms of access and reciprocity in the direct trade 
with the colonies revealed a true difference in interest 
between Northern and Southern shippers. One reason that 
New England shippers were so keen to secure access to the 
colonial trade was their fear that a British monopoly of 
that trade would disadvantage Americans in other routes as 
well. Always aware of the value of the triangular voyage, 
they thought that the prohibition of American vessels from 
the colonial trade would allow British ships to undercut 
American rivals in the direct Anglo-American route: they 
could carry British goods to the United States, pick up a 
cargo of U.S. produce for carriage to the West Indies, and 
then clear for Britain carrying colonial products; the 
prohibition of American vessels from the latter two legs 
would give British ships an overwhelming advantage in the 
first, devaluing the reciprocal convention of 1815. Of 
course, access to the colonial trade would not have solved 
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the problem completely, since the British monopoly of 
trade between the colonies and the mother country would 
have perpetuated the advantage. Only the scrapping by 
Britain of her navigation system would have remedied this 
problem, and some Americans did call for the right to sail 
between British possessions for that very reason. 
However, that could never be a serious aim for American 
negotiators, and the most that they could hope for was 
that reciprocity in the colonial trade would even up the 
odds somewhat. 17 
However, there remained one further aspect of British 
policy which threatened to upset those odds. In the talks 
of 1818 the British offered reciprocity for shipping in 
the colonial trade but they still hoped to protect their 
own shipping indirectly by means of a system of 
preferential duties imposed on colonial goods. For 
example, grain p~oducts and timber from the mainland 
provinces of North America were charged a lower import 
duty in the West Indies than were U.S. products of the 
same type. Americans in general were worried that this 
would encourage the Caribbean colonies to seek their 
supplies in Canada rather than the United States, but 
Northern shippers also feared that this device might be 
used to divert U.S. produce, naturalised as Canadian, from 
the direct route to the West Indies, mainly in American 
vessels, to the indirect route in British and colonial 
ships alone. Opposition to this policy lay at the heart 
of the U.S. refusal of British terms in the years up to 
1827. The 1818 talks broke down over British insistence 
on maintaining it; U.S. legislation in 1823 to remove 
discriminating duties was so worded that preferential 
treatment for colonial products would have to be abolished 
before British vessels sailing from the colonies would be 
treated equally--and so those duties remained; and orders 
in 1824 to Richard Rush in London demanded that Britain 
surrender her right to impose the preferential duties. 
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Ironically the British acts of 1822 and 1825 
regulating the West Indian trade had reduced preferential 
duties somewhat, but even so Britain still insisted on the 
right to impose them. She claimed, quite lawfully, that 
the internal duties of the British Empire were no concern 
of the United States and she asserted that the proximity 
of the United States to the West Indies really ought to 
merit an even greater preference in favour of colonial 
products. This reasoning made sense to the Southern 
mercantile interest, which espied fewer demons in the 
preferential duty policy. Samuel Smith reported to Henry 
Clay in 1825 that Southern producers and shippers had 
secured a fair share of the supply trade of the West 
Indies despite any extra duties and he saw no reason "to 
fear a competition in the article of flour, or in any 
other article which we are permitted to import into the 
colonies •••• "· He saw no obstacle to removing all 
discriminating duties on shipping, after which American 
"enterprize ••• proximity and our articles essential to 
the Islands will do the rest."18 Most importantly, 
Secretary of State Clay was beginning to think along 
similar lines, admitting that there was "more than 
plausibility in the British claims," and asking: 
Can we not maintain a successful competition 
with the produce of the Northern B. Colonies, 
even with the British protecting duties against 
us if all the alien duties [on navigationj were 
abolished by both Countries, from our proximity 
and superior natural advantages? 
In accordance with this change of tack, in orders to 
Albert Gallatin as early as 1827 Clay set to one side the 
fears of Northern shippers, as he dropped the insistence 
that Britain surrender the right to impose the 
preferential duties. However, by that time Britain had 
had too much of American pretensions and negotiations 
stalled, leaving the trade closed on both sides.19 
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Martin Van Buren blamed past insistence that the 
preferential duties be abandoned for much of the failure 
of previous negotiations. In his orders to Louis McLane 
he noted that the President had been "admonished, by the 
past, of the inutility of protracted discussions upon a 
subject which has been over and again debated" and so did 
not wish to "harass the British Cabinet by their 
repetition." However, in the light of Clay's earlier 
surrender of this point, this stance can hardly be 
regarded as the crucial element behind the success of the 
1830 negotiations. Nor did the Jackson administration 
abandon all hope of having the duties abolished, and 
McLane even suggested that the U.S. tariff reductions of 
1830 be considered as an equivalent for the maintenance of 
the lower level of preferential duties established by the 
British act of 1825. However, the British government 
categorically refused to accept such a mutual reduction as 
an enshrined part of the arrangement and reserved the 
right to increase the preference for colonial goods over 
American products, a stance which McLane was forced to 
accept. It remained to be seen whether Northern shippers 
would accept this with equal grace.20 
Initial reactions to the arrangement were predictably 
mixed. Jacksonians praised the efforts of Van Buren and 
McLane and the forthright stance of the President. Men 
like Churchill Cambreleng and Samuel Smith celebrated the 
substance of the arrangement, which was a "complete 
success," and "all important to his [Jackson's] glorious 
and fortunate administration.~' James A. Hamilton simply 
saw it as the "coup de Grass~~Cfo the opposition." 
National Republicans feared that Jackson would take great 
credit for the negotiation, and Alexander Everett 
explained away rather disappointing election returns in 
Maine in 1830 as a result of the "West India issue 
••• which has taken a turn rather favorable to the 
Administration." For the most part opposition to the 
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arrangement reeked of the purely partisan, with attacks on 
the way in which it was negotiated rather than upon its 
substantial prov1s1ons. This reached a climax in the 
approach to the 1832 election, when the National 
Republicans accused Van Buren of dragging domestic 
politics into diplomacy by intimating to the British that 
the Adams administration had been in the wrong. However, 
opposition leaders such as Clay found it difficult to 
attack the substance of the arrangement when he had been 
prepared to accept very similar terms in 1827.21 
Meanwhile, events in Britain seemed to confirm the 
worst fears of Northern shippers. In April 1831 
Parliament reverted from the lower preferential duties set 
by the act of 1825 to a system designed to benefit their 
shipping. J.C. Herries proposed a bill to allow American 
beef, pork, ham, flour, wood and lumber to be imported 
into the West Indies duty-free when coming indirectly via 
British North America, while the same products were 
burdened with heavy duties when carried directly in 
American vessels. McLane vigorously opposed the bill on 
the grounds that "so far as it proposes to give 
encouragement to the indirect over the direct trade, it is 
a palpable evasion of the arrangement recently concluded 
with this government for a renewal of the direct 
intercourse." The British government rejected his 
arguments, and although the collapse of the Wellington 
ministry stopped the progress of the Herries bill, the new 
President of the Board of Trade, Poulett Thompson, secured 
the passage of another which, even if it did reduce the 
duties on direct importation somewhat, further encouraged 
the indirect route by removing all duties on u.s. goods 
entering Canada as well as on such goods entering the West 
Indies via the North American route. Martin Van Buren 
assessed the results accurately: "Mr Thompson's Bill is 
••• in the result much more favorable to the United 
States, at least to their producing interest, than Mr. 
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Herries' bill," but it "must in some degree, exclude 
American shipping from the carrying trade of our produce 
to the West Indies."22 
In his annual message of 1831 President Jackson put a 
similar interpretation on the measure. Reviewing the 1830 
arrangement as a whole Jackson noted that there were signs 
that it was "highly beneficial." American vessels 
outnumbered foreign shipping in both outward and incoming 
voyages to the West Indies, by two-to-one in the former, 
and three-to-two in the latter. What is more, American 
agricultural interests also fared well. From the North-
Western states and New York there was an increased trade 
across the border and lakes to Canada, "which may prove 
more than equivalent to the loss sustained by the 
discrimination made to favor the trade of the northern 
colonies with the West Indies."23 
This was too much for some representatives of 
shippers to stomach, and in the Senate John Holmes and 
Peleg Sprague, both from Maine, rounded on the President 
for his remark. Holmes questioned the success of the 
negotiation when even Jackson had to admit that the 
increased trade across the border to Canada made up for a 
loss to American navigation. Sprague lambasted the whole 
arrangement, which he considered too recent to merit the 
premature and undue praise it had received. Preferential 
duties had effectively secured to British shipping the 
control of the supply trade to the West Indies. Even if 
the arrangement did benefit the producing interest, this 
was scant compensation so far as Sprague was concerned: 
If it might, it would still be a miserable 
apology for the injury to the ship owner. Never 
in the whole history of our country, was the 
idea tolerated, that our navigation should be 
sacrificed in any event, or for any 
consideration •••• There can be no divorce of 
the great interests of the country. They are linked 
by indissoluble bonds, and injury to one is 
depression to all. 
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Sprague rounded off with a more familiar partisan attack. 
He denied that Clay and Gallatin would have sacrificed so 
much; they would have ensured that Britain agreed to stick 
by the duty levels imposed by the act of 1825. Why had 
McLane failed to take such a firm line?: 
It is the demon of party which now for the first 
time has crossed the Atlantic to present our 
domestic divisions to a foreign court. 
A clamor in relation to the colonial trade 
has been raised against the late administration 
as one of the means of driving them from power; 
and their successors, to get some color of a 
redemption of previous promises for political 
ends, deemed it necessary that, at any rate, 
something should be done, to be trumpeted by 
partisans. Even the President has said ••• 
that one of the reasons which stimulated his 
negotiation was the 'influence it was believed 
to have had in the elections w2~ch terminated in 
the change of administration.' 
Such attacks weighed little with the Jackson 
administration which had already made up its mind that no 
further advances could be made on the issue of the 
preferential duties. In August 1831 Van Buren's successor 
as Secretary of State, Edward Livingston, had taken note 
of McLane's view that all his efforts had failed and that 
"all further argument would be nugatory." The new 
Secretary had ordered that no further claims should be 
made on this point: 
There is an evident impolicy in reiterating 
demands which we cannot enforce, and have good 
reasons to believe will not be voluntarily 
granted. For having repeatedly, during the last 
fifteen or twenty years, acknowledged the right 
in the Mother Country to regulate the trade 
between its colonies, and to admit or prohibit 
foreigners to participate in it, the only 
argument we could urge for a relaxation in our 
favor would be one addressed to the interest, 
not to the justice of the nation; and although 
it would be easy to show that the interest of 
the English sugar Colonies would be promoted by 
abolishing the discrimination, yet that of her 
navigation will be, probably so much benefited, 
that it will not be difficult to determine which 
the national policy and prejudices will prefer. 
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Although he agreed to delay final judgement until the 
practical effects of the preferential duties were known, 
Livingston seemed convinced that producers would probably 
benefit, and, in complete antithesis to Peleg Sprague, he 
regarded this as adequate compensation: 
It is true ••• that the navigation of the 
United States is excluded from this trade; but 
so it was before the arrangement, and will 
always be. And it surely would not be the 
policy of the United States to sacrifice the 
probable nay a certain benefit to internal 
commerce and agriculture, for the very 
improbable chance of obtaining by coercion an 
advantage to our navigating interest. Until, 
then, the advantages or disadvantages of this 
present system are tested by experience it is 
deemed most prudent not to renew any discuss~gn 
on the subject of the discriminating duties. 
In 1839 the administration of Martin Van Buren found 
no cause to disagree with Livingston's assessment. Of 
course John Forsyth expressed dissatisfaction that 
colonial trades in general were not on a more liberal 
footing but he admitted that reciprocity did prevail in 
the direct trade with the British West Indies colonies. 
Even though the effects of the preferential duty policy 
were further exaggerated by the establishment of "free 
ports" in British North America, where U.S. produce might 
be warehoused free of duty before carriage to the West 
Indies, Forsyth continued in the tradition of Samuel 
Smith, Edward Livingston, and even Henry Clay, in 
regarding this as unlikely to damage the interests of the 
majority of American producers and shippers: 
The disadvantage accruing to our navigation from 
this circuitous trade in British bottoms, is in 
a great measure neutralized by the enhanced cost 
of the goods in consequence of the expense of 
double carriage and insurance, unloading, 
reloading, commissions, &c., to which they are 
subjected before they reach their places of 
destination, and by the interruption of 
navigation at some of them by the2~ce, during a considerable portion of the year. 
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The Secretary of the Treasury, Levi Woodbury, also 
presented evidence that the arrangement of 1830 was 
working insofar as the colonial authorities were faithful, 
for the most part, in its execution. Consular reports 
from Nassau and Turks Island in the Bahamas, from 
Kingston, Jamaica, and from Bermuda, gave notice that 
local authorities had complied with the act of Congress of 
1830 which had re-opened the trade, so that American 
vessels in the direct trade with the islands were treated 
exactly as British vessels in the same routes. To the 
North the returns from Sydney on Cape Breton and Pictou, 
Nova Scotia, painted a similar picture of reciprocal 
conditions. Only one return, that from Thomas Leavitt, 
the consul at St. John, New Brunswick, presented contrary 
evidence, reporting that American ships carrying away coal 
were charged an export duty of four shillings per ton, 
whereas British and colonial vessels paid no such charge, 
a clear infraction of the 1830 agreement. However, the 
local authorities had intimated that if the United States 
made a remonstrance, the British government would remedy 
this. What is more the record of the British government 
in such cases was good, since it had already ordered a 
colonial authority to have unjustly levied duties refunded 
to American shippers.27 
Such a favourable report was an ironic reply to House 
resolutions calling for information with which to 
investigate alleged problems with the colonial trade 
arrangement. The House had become interested in the issue 
in response to growing outcry about how the arrangement 
was working in practice. If Peleg Sprague had previously 
waged a one-man crusade on the subject, then from 1837 
onwards his efforts were reinforced by those of his fellow 
citizens of Maine. In legislative resolutions and 
memorials from individual ports they made known their 
dissatisfaction with the 1830 arrangement, and by 1842 
most of the major maritime centres of the State, including 
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Portland, Bangor, Eastport, Lubec and Bath, had issued 
complaints about some aspect of the regulation of the 
colonial trade. If this activity was centred in Maine, 
other ports nevertheless made similar noises, especially 
towns in New England such as Portsmouth, Boston, and 
Providence, but even New York and New Orleans as we11. 28 
Whatever the geographical derivation of the memorials 
the general impression they gave was the same. 
Memorialists from Newburyport, Massachusetts, asserted in 
1840 that the "existing arrangements ••• are unequal and 
injurious to the navigation and commerce of the United 
States." They had "operated to the great encouragement of 
British tonnage, and to the unjust and impolitic 
discouragement of American tonnage, in the trade between 
the United States, Great Britain, and the British 
colonies." In 1841 colleagues in Portsmouth agreed, 
noting that the arrangement had proved "injurious" and 
that after eleven years of operation "no benefits have 
resulted to us ••• but, on the contrary, much injury has 
resulted to the commerce and navigation of this 
country." The Boston Chamber of Commerce in 1841 set up a 
special committee to investigate the colonial arrangement 
which they found "injurious to the interests of our 
country," having fostered British navigation at the 
expense of American "to a deplorable extent." Meanwhile 
to the South Isaac Coffin, writing from New Orleans in 
1842, declared that the arrangement had led to an increase 
of British tonnage, causing a "serious injury to American 
commerce."29 
It was Maine, though, which cried first and loudest 
about this perceived problem. In a memorial presented to 
the House in February 1838 the citizens of Lubec avowed 
that the "present arrangement ••• is exceedingly 
injurious to the maritime interests of said State [Maine], 
and of all the ship-owning States." Their successors in 
1842 joined with fellow shippers in Eastport to bemoan the 
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lack of a fair competition in the colonial trade, a 
circumstance which exacerbated the depressed condition of 
Maine shipping. Earlier that year memorialists from 
Bangor had asserted that "the effect of the present 
colonial arrangement ••• bears with great severity upon 
the navigation interests of our own State." It was time 
to make moves on the subject, "unless we wish to see our 
foreign and coasting trade not only crippled but 
destroyed." The citizens of Portland inquired "what 
benefits have resulted to us, beyond those we enjoyed 
during the period that they [the colonial ports] were shut 
to us?" In questioning just how far reciprocal conditions 
really did operate they summarised the problems posed by 
the arrangement of 1830: 
Are our vessels admitted to all British Colonial 
ports where custom-houses are established, in 
like manner as British vessels are into the 
ports of the United States? Are they admitted 
to carry all the productions of this country to 
her ports, and fairly offer them for sale? Are 
not our fish oil and salted fish, the staple 
articles of the New England States, prohibited 
by her altogether in their Colonies? Are not 
many of the articles which we are allowed to 
take there under this boon taxed more onerously 
than like articles, arriving in British vessels, 
from other colonial ports, even to the extent of 
a prohibitory duty? Are not the ports to which 
we may trade limited also? Is not the monopoly 
of a large proportion of the carrying trade by 
British vessels operating injuriously to 
American vessels? • • • a trade we enjoyed the 
princi~81 share of prior to the opening of these 
ports. 
The Portland memorialists had raised a number of 
distinct issues, each of which were blamed for American, 
and especially Maine's, problems. Some of these issues 
stemmed from infractions of the arrangement, whereas 
others were inherent in its very terms, but together they 
made a strong case, eagerly adopted by men already under 
pressure from the hard economic conditions which prevailed 
from 1837 onwards. 
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The prohibition of trade in certain articles and the 
limitation of ports which American vessels might use 
constituted two of the inherent effects of the 
arrangement. The British act of 1825 forbade all foreign 
vessels from importing to the West Indies certain 
products, especially those of the fisheries. This 
measure, designed to protect the fishing fleets of the 
Maritime Provinces, cut off a potentially profitable trade 
for New England fishermen and shippers. However, as the 
United States had accepted the act of 1825 as one of the 
bases of the arrangement of 1830 it was unlikely that 
Britain could be persuaded to abandon it. 
Critics of the arrangement judged more damaging 
Britain's policy of selecting "free ports" in Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick with which American vessels could trade. 
U.S. legislation provided for equal treatment of British 
ships coming from- ports to which American vessels had 
access, but this did not mean that Britain had to open all 
her colonial ports. When it became clear that all U.S. 
ports were open, while only selected colonial ports were 
opened to Americans, Maine shippers made it known what 
they thought of the selections. The Lubec memorialists of 
1838 complained how "our vessels are suffered to enter 
only a few specified ports • • • and these ports are such 
as do not generally afford profitable cargoes for the 
United States." Shippers from Eastport informed Samuel 
Morse, the U.S. collector of customs in the Passamaquoddy 
district of Maine, that with the exception of Sydney and 
Pictou where coal could be obtained, "from no 'free port,' 
• • • is there a single article of commerce • • • which an 
American vessel can procure for a cargo, without it first 
having been brought from some other port, and freight paid 
to the English carrier." Morse relayed this information 
to Washington, reporting that there were only two or three 
ports on the Bay of Fundy where American ships could 
trade, "but neither plaster, grindstones, nor wood, which 
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constitute almost the entire trade of the Bay of Fundy 
with the United States, is shipped from either of these 
ports." He was also scornful of the creation of two new 
free ports at Digby and Arachat in Nova Scotia, since 
"these are also places having nothing to export."31 
This situation was clearly intolerable to Maine 
shippers, who complained at not being able to find return 
cargoes after exporting U.S. goods to the provinces. 
However, British and provincial shippers faced the same 
problems, at least on paper, since the Free Port act of 
1833 ruled that the selected free ports were the only 
places in the colonies through which any trade with 
foreign countries could take place, even trade carried in 
British vessels. 
The memorialists asserted, though, that this equal 
restriction on paper did not translate into equal 
opportunity in pr~ctice. Citizens of Lubec complained 
that while Americans were afforded the least possible 
share, "the arrangement gives British colonial vessels 
constant and lucrative employment." The plaster trade 
once dominated by American carriers "now ••• is 
performed to a great extent by British vessels, and soon 
will be wholly so." Their Eastport colleagues concurred, 
avowing that "the commercial marine of those colonies has 
thereby increased more than four-fold •••• " How could 
this be the case if British vessels were legally bound to 
use the same ports as Americans? The Eastport group had 
hinted at one means: British vessels could first carry 
export products from other places to the free ports, in 
the process giving themselves a competitive edge over 
American ships when it came to bidding for cargoes. The 
House Committee of Foreign Affairs came to a similar 
conclusion when it investigated the matter in 1839. 
British ships simply collected plaster from the banks of 
rivers and inlets "where no port, or even town, exists," 
called at a free port for clearance papers, and then 
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sailed to the United States. Strictly speaking this did 
not infringe either British or American laws.32 
There was evidence, though, of more underhand methods 
which clearly did infringe both British and American law. 
The Eastport shippers complained that many British ships 
did not even bother to call at free ports for clearance 
papers but rather, after trading at outposts of the 
provinces, proceeded "direct to those [ports] of the 
United States, and use any, and all of them, as freely as 
American vessels could do •••• " U.S. consuls in the 
Maritime Provinces confirmed these claims. Jonathan 
DeWolf in Sydney reported that "many British vessels are 
engaged in carrying plaister to the United States from 
several ports on the Bay of Fundy, which are not free 
ports." Meanwhile Thomas Leavitt reported from St. John, 
New Brunswick that it was "obvious" that, whereas American 
vessels were restricted to free ports, "British vessels 
engaged in the same trade enter other ports with their 
cargoes from the United States, and clear with cargoes 
from those ports to the United States." In Leavitt's eyes 
this was a clear infraction of the British act of 1833, 
and although he was , reassured by claims of the 
authorities in New Brunswick that the law had been fully 
complied with, he was certain that the case was different 
in Nova Scotia, where it was "beyond a doubt, that British 
vessels, enter and clear to and from the United States 
with their cargoes at ports other than 'free ports,' which 
American vessels cannot enter."33 
Whether by fair or foul means British gains in the 
direct trade with the Maritime Provinces were seen as 
American losses. The Eastport shippers bemoaned the fact 
that Americans were almost totally excluded from the 
plaster trade which "previously • • • employed nearly ten 
thousand tons of American shipping, and one thousand 
seamen." Four years later the Bangor memorialists 
remarked how American vessels "are not admitted to the 
- 75-
great plaster quarries of Nova Scotia," and that "of 
course, the large and important trade in plaster to the 
United States is almost wholly monopolised by the 
British." Also in 1842 two groups revealed how 
the plaster trade was to the citizens of Maine. 
Lubec/Eastport shippers noted that the carriage 
important 
The joint 
of plaster 
was a vital source of employment in the dry season when 
the lumber trade was stagnant for lack of water power to 
drive sawmills. The Portland memorialists inflated the 
Eastport estimate of the amount of U.S. shipping involved 
in this trade, putting it at some 75,000-100,000 tons per 
annum, carrying freight worth around $150,000. Future 
British domination spelt financial disaster: 
This is no inconsiderable sum to be deducted 
from the hard and small earnings of the 
industrious mariner, and compels him to abandon 
a losing business, (a business in which his 
competitor has a decided advantage,) and embark 
in some other, which he finds already too crowded; 
the inevitable consequence of which is~4 the reduction of freights, already sufficiently low. 
The solution to this problem was not straightforward, 
since even in the legal trade British vessels were likely 
to enjoy a certain competitive edge, as they could still 
secure clearance papers at free ports for goods brought 
from other provincial ports. The Lubec memorialists 
confronted this dilemma by making the forthright, if 
somewhat inaccurate, demand that the United States take 
such action "as will oblige Great Britain to perform her 
part of the arrangement, by opening all her colonial 
ports, as required by said act of May 29, 1830." The 
Eastport group also avowed that 
the interest of the State of Maine, require that 
all the ports in the provinces of Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick, which are now, or may hereafter 
be, ports for the delivery and reception of 
cargoes for British vessels, be made ports of 
entry for the delivery and reception of cargoes 
for American vessels, or that the ports of the 
United States should be closed against British 
vessels coming from said provinces. 
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The Maine State legislature hoped for a similar result 
but, in recognition of the fact that Britain need not, nor 
was likely to, open all her ports in the provinces, 
demanded that the enforcement of the law of 1830 be 
tightened to keep out British ships coming from non-free 
ports. Stopping this infraction might not counter the 
competitive position of provincial vessels but it would 
ensure that all trade would have to go through the free 
ports, giving American vessels a fairer chance of picking 
up return cargoes.35 
The abuse of the free port system affected the 
shippers of Maine almost exclusively, but there were other 
problems in the colonial trade with a wider impact. The 
hoary issue of preferential duties on colonial produce was 
one such and attracted much attention, especially from 
groups in New England as a whole, who considered their 
carriage of northern products to the West Indies to be 
under threat. 
U.S. officials at both ends of the trade reminded 
Washington that the duties were still causing 
difficulties. Robert Harrison, in Kingston, Jamaica, was 
happy with most aspects of the arrangement of 1830 but 
reported "that the protecting duties on the produce of the 
British North American Colonies are so high that our 
vessels from the 'New England States' are unable to 
compete with them." Since his arrival only three American 
vessels carrying white pine lumber had arrived at 
Kingston, and that had been by accident! Equally damaging 
were the duties on fish; and, "as lumber and fish are the 
principal products which a greater part of the 'five New 
England States' formerly traded in to the West Indies 
• • • no part of the Union has suffered so much by the 
opening of the ports of these Colonies, as they have." 
Indeed, "their trade has been completely knocked up." The 
customs collector for the district of Portland and 
Falmouth, John Anderson, explained why the trade to the 
- 77-
West Indies had nearly been abandoned after proving "a 
losing business." Preferential duties had 
forced such productions, as yet do go there, 
first via Nova Scotia or New Brunswick, where 
they are carried by British vessels and entered 
for exportation, and thus avoid a duty there; 
whence they are exported in British bottoms, and 
are exempt from the duty, in the West India 
Colonies, that would be imposed if exported in 
United States vessels directly from the United 
States. 
Worse still, the free port policy gave British ships an 
advantage in the short northward leg of this trade also.36 
Once again Maine shippers were to the fore in 
complaints about this policy. Delegates to Boston from 
Lubec and Eastport in 1842 were especially worried at the 
effect of preferential duties upon lumber exports, since 
lumber was "one of the great staples of Maine, and one 
which above all others, she desires to carry to all 
markets, for herself." The export of flour by the 
indirect route also gave cause for concern: 
The process, which gives to our provisions, this 
unnatural route ••• which makes it expedient, 
to bring them north and east, to get them south 
and west, may do infinite credit to the sagacity 
of those who devised it, but its equality, is 
not very clearly perceived, since its object is, 
that the planters shall receive them, by vessels 
of their own nation, at all hazards and at 
whatever additional expense. 
Bangor's memorialists also noted that the British "were 
not slow to perceive the signal advantage they had gained" 
by the imposition of these duties. As a result "we cannot 
export our produce to them through the neutral islands as 
formerly, as supplies for the British islands are now 
mostly received direct from their northern Provinces."37 
On this point the opinions of Maine were reinforced 
by similar views from other New England communities. A 
report drafted by the Boston Chamber of Commerce remarked 
how Britain had imposed "heavy, and in some instances, 
prohibitory duties on our products when imported into the 
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West Indies from the United States, and admitted the same 
articles free of duty when imported circuitously through 
the provinces." Vast amounts of flour went north by sea 
and by land, providing "a vast field for the employment of 
British vessels, to the exclusion of our own, in the 
transportation of our own products." In 1842 William 
Parker of Portsmouth wrote to the Secretary of State, 
Daniel Webster, noting how as a result of the duties 
"articles of our produce are daily shipped to the British 
provinces in British vessels, nominally landed and 
naturalized, and sent directly to the West India 
colonies."38 
There seemed to be no easy solution to this problem. 
Some of the memorialists recognised that McLane had fought 
to have the principle of preferential duties disallowed 
but that his efforts, like those of his predecessors, had 
proven fruitless.· As long as both sets of colonies 
remained British, then Britain could regulate the trade 
between them as she liked, and only calls from West Indian 
consumers for cheaper imports stood any chance of changing 
the policy; but even then the interests of British and 
provincial shippers and producers were more likely to 
prevail. One extremist suggested the ultimate remedy of 
U.S. purchase of all the Canadian provinces, but such an 
unrealistic view did not win favour with critics of the 
arrangement of 1830. 39 However, they produced no 
constructive alternative solution of their own. Instead 
they limited themselves to calls for amendment of the 
arrangement with the intention of making it truly 
reciprocal, but without giving any clues as to how this 
could be achieved. The Bangor memorialists wanted 
Congress to interfere to place American trade with the 
colonies "upon a just footing of reciprocity," which would 
allow the enterprise and skill of Maine shippers to secure 
a just participation in the trade. William Parker called 
on the Secretary of State "to protect us in all our just 
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rights in our intercourse with foreign nations and in the 
consequences resulting from the existing untoward 
arrangement with the British Government."40 
If no such amendment of the arrangement were 
possible, then most critics were keen that the act of 1830 
be repealed. Recalling conditions before 1830 with 
nostalgia, they claimed they were prepared to live with 
the consequences of a closed trade. So then Mr. Rogers of 
Bristol expressed the hope that "the West India treaty 
with G. Britain may be abolished unless that Govt. will so 
modify it as to make it perfectly reciprocal." If not, 
the circumstances which had prevailed under the Adams 
administration were to be preferred, with the United 
States "carrying our own produce to.St. Barts & St. Thomas 
and their [British] vessels takein~~~t from those Islands 
to their own ports." The shippers of Eastport and Lubec 
also called for modification or abolition of the 
arrangement; at least under the latter condition the old 
trade via the neutral islands would be revived. 41 
One final problem highlighted by the critics of the 
1830 arrangement also seemed unlikely to be remedied, 
because it was an unavoidable, if unpalatable, consequence 
of an open colonial trade. In the years up to 1830 many 
Northern shippers had feared that British ships would 
undermine American participation in the transatlantic 
trade by means of triangular voyages involving the 
colonies. Nothing had changed in 1840: the United States 
remained powerless to challenge the British monopoly of 
trade between the colonies and the mother country. 
Critics remarked upon this state of affairs in order to 
enlist the hostility of those groups involved in trades 
with Britain. Many worried that British vessels trading 
in the West Indies would call at U.S. cotton exporting 
ports for a cargo to take to Britain. They spread scare 
stories about the increasing British presence in Savannah, 
Charleston and New Orleans, where they had a "decided 
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advantage over us, even in the direct freights to and from 
our own ports." Shipmasters of New Orleans judged 
problems in the direct trade with the colonies as "now a 
minor consideration." Far more worrying was the way the 
colonial trade allowed British vessels to take as an 
"incident of their voyage" what was the lifeblood of 
American shippers. Others even warned that the British 
would use the preferential duty policy at home to 
encourage the trans-shipment to Britain of naturalised 
American goods in British vessels. Finally, some claimed 
that British ships would soon be carrying over half the 
cotton trade to Britain.42 
Undoubtedly these claims were exaggerated. Although 
there was a triangular trade involving British vessels 
carrying timber products to Southern ports and then cotton 
to Britain, this did not jeopardise the domination of New 
York and Boston shipping in the cotton trade. Historian 
David Williams estimates that American vessels carried 
some 65 per cent of that trade in the 1830s. Northern 
shippers operated their own triangular route between 
Britain, New York, and Southern ports, and especially from 
New Orleans which accounted for one third of U.S. cotton 
exports. Clearance figures for New Orleans reveal an 
American share of two-thirds or more, and even Isaac 
Coffin, a critic of the colonial arrangement, admitted 
that British vessels made up only one quarter of 
clearances from the port. However, there are signs that 
less important cotton ports did witness higher proportions 
of British shipping. Coffin claimed that share was 75 per 
cent in Savannah, and 50 per cent in Charleston, those 
ports being responsible for 20 and 23 per cent of cotton 
exports respectively. Clearance figures for Mobile reveal 
a similar picture, with the American share falling from 80 
per cent in 1840 to 46 per cent by 1844. So there were 
some grounds for concern and certainly enough for critics 
of the arrangement to use in their memorial activities. 43 
ITABS. 3.7(b), 3.8(b)J 
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The accuracy of claims with regard to the colonial 
trade itself depends on three assessments: the state of 
navigation in the direct trade to the West Indies; the 
amount diverted from that direct trade into the indirect 
route via the Maritime provinces as a result of the 
preferential duties; and the state of navigation in the 
direct trade to the Maritime Provinces. Unfortunately the 
second of these, the most important of the three, is also 
the most difficult to assess. 
Overall American navigation fared well in the direct 
trade to the West Indies. Most of this trade went from 
ports in the Southern and Mid-Atlantic regions and was 
carried in American vessels. As many had predicted, 
American shippers from these ports enjoyed an advantage in 
this trade by virtue of their proximity to the West 
Indies, their access to rich hinterlands, and their 
artificial improvements such as the Erie Canal. Indeed, 
some Canadian grain products found their way to the West 
Indies through the Lakes and the Erie Canal route. New 
England's direct trade with the West Indies was not as 
substantial, but in this American ships also dominated. 
American consuls in the West Indies commented on this 
healthy state of affairs. From Turks Island John Arthur 
reported that "by far the greater proportion of imports 
from the United States into this port are brought in the 
vessels of the United States." George Ruyter on Bermuda 
returned figures for the year to August 1839 showing 71 
American entrances from the United States compared to 40 
British. Robert Harrison averred that three-fourths of 
the trade from the United States to Jamaica was carried in 
American ships, which convinced him "that there can be no 
exclusive privileges granted to British vessels •••• " 
The only black mark was a decline in volume and value of 
trade to the Danish and Swedish West Indies. 44 [TABS.5.I-3] 
Of course what these returns do not reveal was the 
amount of American produce which made its way to the West 
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Indies via the indirect route under the encouragement of 
preferential duties. Certainly the value of U.S. exports 
to British North America rose during the 1830s, from $2 
million per annum at the start of the decade, to $3 
million by 1838, and to $6 million by 1839 and 1840. It 
was also the case that the United States exported more to 
the North American colonies than to the West Indies. 
However, there is no way of knowing how much of this 
produce was consumed across the border, how much was 
shipped to Britain or the rest of Europe, or how much went 
to the West Indies. The claims of the critics of the 1830 
arrangement suggest that large amounts did go to the West 
Indies, which deprived American shippers of their rightful 
business, but historians deny that the inter-colonial 
trade was very important to the British provinces. Their 
main interest was in the transatlantic trade, and they 
sent large amounts of produce to the West Indies only in 
times of glut in Britain. Significantly, though, 1835-36 
were years of plenty in Britain, which might have 
triggered increased activity by provincial shippers in the 
trade to the West Indies, provoking the anxious American 
reaction a year later. Under normal conditions, though, 
the amount exported from British North America to the West 
Indies was far less than that exported from New York 
alone. Moreover, figures provided by the Bangor 
memorialists to show that the trade to the North American 
colonies exceeded that with the West Indies, actually 
reveal that both trades had increased since 1830, that 
with the West Indies at a faster rate. It is still 
possible, however, that on a local level New England 
shippers were deprived of the carriage of their own 
products such as lumber and fish.45 [TABS.l.5, 5.3-4] 
More clear-cut were signs of difficulties in the 
direct trade with the North American provinces. Figures 
for 1833 reveal that many Southern and Mid-Atlantic ports 
did trade with British North America, with Alexandria, 
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Delaware and New York City to the fore. British vessels 
took a disproportionately high share of this trade. This 
pattern was repeated in most New England ports and 
especially in Boston. Rather surprising in light of 
memorial activity from these ports was the apparently 
healthy position of American shipping in the trade from 
Providence and Portland. The most telling figures come 
from the Passamaquoddy collection district, the home of 
the most vocal and consistent critics from the ports of 
Eastport and Lubec. Here hard statistical evidence bears 
out the claims that British ships were abusing the free-
port system in the plaster trade, with 97,670 tons of 
foreign shipping clearing for the North American provinces 
compared to only 2,535 tons of American shipping. Figures 
for the whole decade reveal further that British shipping 
had greatly benefited from the arrangement, rising from 
insignificant levels in 1830 to an equality, or better, by 
1840. 
Surprisingly, on the spot reports from Nova Scotia 
and New Brunswick did not paint such a distressing 
picture. Jonathan DeWolf in Sydney, Cape Breton, remarked 
that most of the trade there was in the export of coal, 
"in which American vessels are chiefly employed • • • the 
proportion of British vessels being very small." In the 
first seven months of 1839 American vessels constituted 44 
of the 52 vessels clearing for the United States. Another 
coal-exporting port, Pictou in Nova Scotia, provided a 
similar picture. James Primrose reported that the coal 
trade was "conducted almost exclusively in the vessels of 
the United States."46[TABS. 5.3,5.5] 
Maine shippers were not impressed by these returns or 
any others from Nova Scotia and New Brunswick reporting 
healthy conditions in the colonial trade. Joseph Noyes, 
signatory to the letter from Eastport to Samuel Morse and 
one-time representative of the town's views in Congress, 
doubted the very basis of the report presented by Levi 
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Woodbury, "whose information ••• was of the most 
imperfect character imaginable and was not sought from the 
proper sources." He charged that U.S. commercial agents 
in the Maritime Provinces were British subjects "and as 
far as I know themselves engaged in trade." He asked 
Caleb Cushing: "How could they give an impartial view?" 
Three years later there were to be demands by some 
merchants for the removal of Primrose from his office. 47 
Noyes and others put greater store by the more 
sympathetic reports of American customs collectors such as 
Samuel Morse, and John Anderson in Portland. The latter 
agreed that there was an "excess of their tonnage over 
ours" in the trades with New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. 
However, he differed from others by accounting for this 
excess "without imputing to them [the British] any 
violation of the existing commercial arrangement." He 
introduced a final and in the long run more significant 
set of reasons for American problems in this trade. They 
struck at the very basis of American competitiveness in 
shipping in a way which cast a cloud over the future 
prospects of American navigation. 
Local knowledge was one reason for the imbalance of 
shipping in the Bay of Fundy trade: "They are familiar 
with the navigation of the remote bays and creeks in which 
their cargoes are taken in, and consequently less liable 
to injury from the tremendous tides in that region." 
Provincial shippers, owning "roughly built vessels," were 
suited to the "hard, laborious" plaster trade and for want 
of an alternative were satisfied with the "very small 
profit" which it afforded. But very few Americans would 
engage in it "while they can find employment for more 
expensive and better built vessels." The very nature of 
the trade exaggerated the imbalance in tonnage, since the 
voyage between the gypsum quarries and Eastport was only a 
few hours, allowing Provincial vessels to make as many as 
twenty voyages every year. 
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This might explain the size of the imbalance, but it 
did not console Maine shippers. There was still carrying 
to be done, and they were not taking a fair share of it. 
Although Anderson claimed that Americans were not willing 
to take the smaller profits accruing from this trade, the 
various memorials reveal that Maine shippers still 
considered it a vital branch of their business. However, 
Anderson hinted at another reason why Americans lost out: 
"their [Provincial] vessels are less expensively built, by 
the whole amount of duties that our ship builders and 
owners pay on materials, and less labor is expended on 
this class of their vessels on the inside finish and 
ornamental work." What is more, "the seamen's wages too 
are lower, and their food less expensive, than in our 
vessels.'' It seemed that the traditional American 
competitive edge in initial outlay costs and in shipping 
skill and enterprise had been lost in this localised 
instance. 48 
Some of the memorialists admitted to this fact, for 
example those from Bangor: 
Coasting vessels from Nova Scotia and New 
Brunswick, which can be built there cheaper than 
in the United States, on account of the 
exemption from duty on iron, hemp, rigging, and 
other articles imported from Great Britain, are 
now filling all our harbors with wood, potatoes, 
lime, fish, plaster, hay, oats, and other 
produce of the Provinces •••• Some vessels 
from Nova Scotia entered laden entirely with 
eggs! 
The Boston Chamber of Commerce remarked that "our 
competitors have other advantages over us." Their costs 
in building ships were up to one third less than in the 
United States, and their vessels were also manned and 
equipped more cheaply. The Chamber could see only one 
redeeming feature, in that "from their manifest 
inferiority, they do not command the same rates of freight 
as our own;" but even this was not very consoling, because 
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it meant they could undercut American rivals. In short, 
"their influence is powerful for evil against us."49 
The experience of New England shippers and especially 
those of Maine at the end of the 1830s was not a happy 
one. They viewed with alarm the growth of British 
shipping in the trade with Nova Scotia, and what they 
perceived to be an increasing indirect carriage of U.S. 
products to the West Indies via the Maritime Provinces. 
They even tried to raise fears for American participation 
in the transatlantic trade. Of course, these complaints 
arose at a time of depression in the United States. In 
1838 a Mr. Chickering of Newburyport reported that he had 
"never lived in such times for business," and that "the 
situation for trade was never so bad in Newburyport as.at 
this time." Four years later he found little had changed, 
considering it "almost impossible to describe the state of 
trade in this region, and I suppose throughout the 
country." John Porter corroborated this view as he 
watched "gloom & melancholy" spreading over the town. In 
the midst of the depression, "all kinds of business 
appear[ed] to have been siezed by a general paralysis," 
and the "freighting business ••• continued at a great 
aggregate loss." 
The depression was triggered partly by a crisis in 
world trade, which caused the value and volume of American 
exports and imports to slump. Undoubtedly this reduced 
the amount of carrying to be done, and some of the 
memorialists admitted that American shipping was suffering 
from an over-capacity. Mr. Rogers of Bristol, Rhode 
Island, reported how ships had lain in dock without 
business for months on end. Many shipowners had been 
forced into an unrewarding participation in whaling or 
even to sell their vessels, "thereby suffering great loss 
in addition to that by their preceding voyages •••• " 
In these circumstances the critics of the arrangement 
found it even more galling that they should have to submit 
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to British infractions and to the advantages which the 
British enjoyed. They called for amendments to its terms 
or for its total abolition. After all, as Henry Lee, a 
doyen of the Massachusetts mercantile community, noted in 
1842, if American shipping was too extended for its 
employment, nothing could save it from further 
depreciation except a decrease in tonnage, 
or an increased employment resulting from such 
modifications in our commercial arrangements 
with foreign nations as may give us back some 
portion of the freighting business which for 
want of due attention to our navigating 
interests had been drawn from us by our foreign 
competitors. 
First among Lee's list of competitors was Great Britain, 
but two subsequent names, those of the Hanseatic towns and 
Sweden, revealed that problems of competitiveness and 
unfair commercial agreements had arisen in other trades as 
well.SO [TAB.l.l] · 
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Chapter 3. Reciprocal Navigation under Fire, 1836-1846 
For John Quincy Adams, one of the two main architects 
of reciprocal navigation, life after the Presidency was 
not a time for peaceful retirement. He threw himself into 
yet another career pursuing a busy, often controversial, 
course in the House of Representatives. In the process he 
left behind in his journal an interesting if not always 
disinterested record of Congressional proceedings. On 
February 16, 1843, in a surprisingly dispassionate entry, 
he noted how his colleague John P. Kennedy of Baltimore 
had brought forward for debate a resolution "declaring the 
expediency of repealing the reciprocity treaties with the 
minor navigating powers." This resolution represented the 
culmination of the first round of a fight lasting for most 
of the 1840s to bring attention to the issue of 
reciprocity and to re-define it in substance and in its 
relation to other goals of U.S. commercial diplomacy. 1 
Unlike the criticism of the colonial trade 
arrangement, the initial expression of discontent with 
reciprocity, up to 1840, came not from home-based 
mercantile groups but rather from U.S diplomats overseas, 
although they doubtless took heed of the views of those 
Americans who traded with the countries where they 
resided. Soon, however, domestic opinion was mobilised, 
and the years 1842 to 1843 witnessed a flood of memorials 
and concerned correspondence arriving in Washington. The 
issue matched the colonial trade affair in complexity. 
Critics complained about how the policy operated in 
different trades, both direct and indirect, and this fact 
determined that several U.S. maritime centres were 
involved. As in the colonial trade critics believed that 
in certain cases commercial treaties were being infringed. 
And, of course, underlying these complaints were the same 
general economic conditions and the fears of declining 
American competitiveness which had influenced critics of 
the colonial arrangement. 
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The involvement of so many trade routes and countries 
in this issue inevitably raises the question as to which 
treaties in particular aroused the anger of American 
shippers. Many of the memorials to Congress do not 
survive and their short titles recorded in the legislative 
journals were couched only in the most general terms. 
They concurred in describing the treaties as "not 
beneficial," or "highly injurious," or as causing 
"material injury." They all called for such modification 
of navigation treaties as would afford the United States 
just terms of reciprocity and place American shipping upon 
more equal terms with that of foreign nations, but they 
did not specify which nations were involved. Equally 
vague were some of the individual correspondents of 
leading American statesmen. The company of Pearce and 
Bullock of Providence attributed problems confronting 
American navigation to the "large number of foreign 
vessels that are allowed to compete on equal terms with 
our own." They too hoped that in any future commercial 
arrangements U.S. shipping would be placed "in a better 
condition so as to afford to American industry in this 
department of the arts an adequate reward."2 
Other critics allow us to pinpoint the location of 
the problem with greater accuracy. Another Providence 
resident, the merchant and manufacturer Edward Carrington, 
noted that it was "the reciprocal treaties made between 
the U. States and European Powers" which had proven 
injurious to the U.S. mercantile marine. New York 
memorialists in 1844 called on Congress to investigate all 
treaties of reciprocity but drew a distinction when it 
came to their preferred course of action: they prayed 
that "the treaties with the Northern Powers of Europe may 
be annulled, and those with other nations that are 
susceptible of improvement may be altered accordingly." 
Into the latter category fell the convention with Britain, 
which needed modification to settle the colonial trade 
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problem. The former category included Sweden, Denmark and 
the Hanseatic towns of Hamburg and Bremen. Henry Lee had 
also highlighted the Hanseatic towns and Sweden as problem 
states, while Kennedy's resolutions named those three and 
added to them Austria, the Netherlands, Russia, Prussia, 
and Denmark. Therefore critics of the policy seemed to 
have northern Europe in mind when they called for change. 3 
This impression is confirmed by an examination of 
attitudes to treaties with other countries. Although 
satisfaction with a policy is notoriously more difficult 
to identify than dissatisfaction, there are hints as to 
where reciprocal navigation treaties were considered 
beneficial. Those treaties with Latin American countries 
gave no grounds for concern. The report accompanying John 
Kennedy's resolutions made this quite clear: "The few 
treaties of this character [full reciprocity in the 
indirect trade] which we have entered into with the South 
American States,--Brazil and Venezuela--have produced no 
inconvenience, and may therefore be left upon their 
present basis." In August 1843, Secretary of State Abel 
Upshur considered the treaty with Brazil to be "decidedly 
favorable" to the United States, and a few months earlier 
Henry Clay, admittedly an interested party as the man who 
headed the State department when it was signed, judged 
that "the success of our navigation with the Brazils" was 
a sign of the value of that treaty.4 
Nor did treaties with Mediterranean countries provoke 
complaints. Again the evidence is sparse, but the signs 
are that a treaty signed with Sardinia in 1838 was 
regarded as a success. In terms of navigation Austria was 
a Mediterranean power trading through Trieste, and the 
inclusion of that state in Kennedy's resolution is rather 
puzzling. Prospects for shipping looked quite good, 
especially after the efforts of Nathaniel Niles to reduce 
duties on tobacco. Niles, a special agent for the 
Mediterranean region, who had also negotiated the 
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Sardinian treaty, naturally was full of his own triumph: 
the usefulness of my service both in Sardinia & 
Austria is more & more apparent every day. More 
than double the ordinary number of American 
ships will have entered at Trieste this year 
owing to the abandonment of the Restrictions. 
The results of my labours are equally obvious at 
Genoa. 
This no doubt self-interested assessment was borne out 
later in the 1840s. Ambrose Dudley Mann, another special 
U.S. agent in Central Europe and normally critical of the 
reciprocal navigation treaties, saw no reason to worry 
about the one with Austria. Indeed, "our navigation in 
its intercourse with Austria is on as good a footing as we 
could reasonably desire." U.S. ships benefited greatly 
from the terms of the treaty, and dominated the trade with 
that country. Austria's mercantile fleet was 
comparatively small and, being involved mainly in trade 
with Turkey, did·not pose a threat to American shipping. 
Kennedy had probably included Austria in his resolution 
because vessels from that country arrived in the United 
States in much larger numbers than normal in 1836 and 
1837, the very time when worries about the policy of 
reciprocal navigation began to surface. 5 
Mann also shed light on the exact location of the 
problem within northern Europe. In 1849 he reported that 
U.S. shipping carried 95 per cent of the direct trade 
between France and the United States. Again in marked 
contrast to his usual hostility to the policy, he 
anticipated that "if we were permitted to engage in the 
indirect trade with France we shall enjoy it in a similar 
ratio." Similar hopes were expressed about participation 
in the indirect trade with Britain. Here then another 
distinction can be made. The complaints were directed 
only at those treaties already offering full reciprocity 
in the indirect trade to the shipping states of northern 
Europe. The harshest criticism fell on the treaty with 
the Hanseatic ports, and some denied that problems existed 
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elsewhere. In 1842 the American agent in Belgium, Virgil 
Maxcy, noted that he had "not supposed that the principle 
thus extended had operated unfavorably except in the case 
of the Hanse Towns and especially Bremen •••• " This 
view was apparently confirmed by reports from the American 
minister in Sweden, Christopher Hughes, who reported in 
1831 that Ameri~an vessels dominated the trade with 
Sweden, and ten years later that "the footing of our 
concerns & relations with this Government & with the 
commercial community in Sweden, leaves nothing to be 
desired; .•• it cannot be better!" However, critics of 
reciprocity did stress Swedish and Danish shipping, 
alongside that of the Hanseatic ports, as those giving 
most cause for concern. More importantly the State 
department took account of this opinion when it revised 
its approach towards commercial diplomacy later in the 
decade. So it is, then, that while the focus of this 
chapter will be the trade with the Hanseatic towns, the 
complaints about other countries do provide acceptable 
reinforcement of its main points. 6 
At first view the Hanseatic ports of Hamburg, Bremen 
and Lubeck appear strange targets for the widespread 
hostility of American shippers in the late 1830s and early 
1840s. Size and location made it unlikely that they would 
ever be major trading partners of the United States. All 
three were mere independent city states with populations 
too small to provide a market for American carriers to 
service. Moreover, the position of Lubeck on the Baltic 
side of the Jutland peninsula meant that any American 
vessels had to sail to it by way of the Danish Sound, 
something which discouraged a large trade with the city. 
The location of Bremen and Hamburg on the North Sea 
coast of Germany, on the Weser and Elbe rivers 
respectively, determined that their trade was more 
important. Along with the Netherlands and Belgium they 
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represented obvious routes by which merchants could trade 
with the interior of Germany. Again, the potential of 
this trade should not be overstated, since Germany was not 
a major trading partner of the United States at this time. 
Trade with Germany rarely accounted for more than five per 
cent of total U.S. exports and imports. Secretary of 
State Clay, the man responsible for the treaties with 
Prussia and the Hanseatic towns and who might, therefore, 
have been expected to be bullish about prospects for 
commerce, nevertheless predicted in 1830 that the United 
States were "not likely to have any extensive commercial 
or diploma tic connections with any of those Powers." 7 {!M 1:3] 
Clay's pessimistic outlook was coloured by the 
political and economic condition of Germany. The region 
emerged from the Napoleonic wars without the hundreds of 
small states and principalities which had characterised 
its past history, but the Bund set up in 1815 was still a 
loose confederation of some thirty-plus states, including 
large kingdoms, like Prussia and Bavaria, and the smallest 
enclaves and city states like the Hanseatic trio and 
Frankfurt. Potentially disastrous economic circumstances 
resulted from this political maze, with each state 
imposing its own customs and transit duties on goods for 
consumption or on those simply passing through to another 
destination. With this patchwork of customs regimes and 
with restricted communications, the idea of Germany as a 
wider market was not one to contemplate with optimism. 
The 1830s witnessed developments which encouraged 
hopes of improved commercial opportunity in Germany and 
which seemed likely to increase the importance of routes 
to the interior. There were gradual moves towards 
commercial rationalisation within Germany: larger states 
brought enclaves into their own tariff regimes; and they 
linked with neighbours in customs unions, unifying levels 
of customs duties and removing transit dues between their 
component parts. By far the most successful union was 
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that headed by Prussia, which by 1828 had formed a 
continuous stretch from East Prussia across to the 
Rhineland. This league adopted Hesse Cassel and Saxony 
from rival leagues in 1831 and 1833 respectively, before 
linking with its main rival in the South, headed by 
Bavaria and Wurttemburg, in 1834. This combination, now 
the foremost customs organisation in the region, became 
the Zollverein and by 1841 it had made further converts. 
At that time only the North-West corner of Germany stood 
alone, with the states of Hanover, Oldenburg and Lippe 
Schaumburg forming their own Steuerverein, while the 
Hanseatic towns and the Grand Duchies of Mecklenburg 
remained aloof from the process of consolidation. 
To an outside commercial power these events were 
mixed blessings. Observers expected that the process 
would stimulate economic development within Germany. John 
Forsyth asserted ·that "the removal of numerous 
obstructions which had before impeded internal intercourse 
••• must necessarily produce a reviving and invigorating 
effect upon the agriculture and manufactures of the 
various countries coming within their influence." As 
German manufactures and exports would increase, this could 
not fail "to create an additional demand for the great 
staple productions of the United States." Commercial 
union seemed to reflect more liberal attitudes in general, 
and many hoped that this would entail a reduction of 
import duties throughout the Zollverein as well. However, 
this was not the only possible result of a unified German 
tariff. Different interests within the region would still 
fight for their preferred level of duties, possibly 
adopting protection which could be detrimental to American 
exporters. Even so American hopes remained high.8 
The prospect of increased trade with Germany 
heightened the potential importance of relations with the 
Hanseatic ports, which partly explains why those cities 
came in for added diplomatic attention in the late 1830s. 
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The independent stance adopted by the states of the North 
Sea coastline of Germany clearly complicated matters, and 
the need to balance diplomatic relations between members 
of the Zollverein and non-members was to take up much time 
and effort. However, for American shippers there were 
more worrying reasons why the Hanseatic towns demanded 
attention. The very existence of the towns was grounded 
in traditions of seafaring, and many Americans feared that 
Hanseatic merchants were using their experience to take 
unfair advantage of treaty relations with the United 
States. Even the relatively small levels of trade with 
Germany did not moderate American fears of Hanseatic 
competition, since those fears involved trades far removed 
from the direct voyage between U.S. ports and Bremen and 
Hamburg. 
The first reports of problems in the trade with the 
Hanseatic towns surfaced in 1836 in despatches from the 
U.S consul in Bremen, Joshua Dodge. Until that time there 
was no widespread hostility to the treaty. Indeed, in 
1835 Henry Wheaton, the U.S. Minister in Berlin, had 
reported: "The duties of navigation & Tonnage, & those 
[products] imported in the respective shipping of both 
countries, are already placed on the footing of perfect 
reciprocity, either by treaty, or by proclamation," in 
areas "including the entire coasts of Germany, on the 
Baltic, North Sea & Mediterranean." This despatch 
recorded only the status of shipping according to the 
provision of treaties, but Wheaton most likely would have 
reported any known difficulties faced in practice. A year 
later he had changed his tune, noting that Dodge, "our 
intelligent, active and faithful consul at Bremen," had 
reported to him that "merchants in Hamburg and Bremen 
[were] strongly impressed with the unfavorable operation 
of the Reciprocity treaty of 1827 upon our Navigation as 
competing with the shipping especially of Bremen." Andrew 
Stevenson in London told of his own conversations with 
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Dodge on the subject. The consul considered the treaty as 
having had "an extremely injurious effect upon our 
commercial interests in their intercourse with Germany," 
with the American flag "nearly driven out of the trade 
with Bremen" and the carrying trade to Germany "almost 
exclusively" in the hands of Bremeners.9 
Dodge's views reached Congress as well as the State 
department. In recognition of his knowledge of the area, 
he had been appointed agent for the promotion of tobacco 
exports to Germany. In 1837 in communications to Daniel 
Jenifer of Maryland, the chairman of a select committee 
examining the tobacco trade, Dodge included among his 
conclusions hints of the problems facing navigation. He 
contended that the treaty, "although based upon the 
principle of reciprocity, in the practical result has 
failed to prove so to the United States." He illustrated 
the point with figures: whereas entrances of American 
ships to Bremen from the United States had totalled 47 in 
1823 compared to 15 Bremen vessels, the numbers for 1835 
were 27 and 55 respectively; clearances from Bremen for 
the United States showed a similar trend, from 42 American 
and 15 Bremen ships to 17 and 64; finally, Bremen vessels 
had secured a tight hold on the carriage of tobacco--they 
carried 18,661 hogsheads to Bremen in 1835 compared to 
4,737 in 1828, while American shippings' share had fallen 
from 13,417 hogsheads to 6,346. Clearly "the shipping 
interest of the United States has been materially 
affected."10 
Initially Dodge combined his duties as consul and 
tobacco agent but by 1839 he found the burden of both jobs 
unbearable. He was also finding further residence at his 
consulate "extremely disagreeable": the inhabitants of 
the port were 
perfectly well acquainted with the 
during my residence among them 
considered it my duty, as a native 
an American consul to represent to 
- 97-
fact, that 
• I had 
American and 
our Govermt. 
the injurious effects to our commerce of the 
misnamed reciprocal treaty with the Hanse towns, 
besides which the Bremeners have neither 
forgotten nor forgiven my having put a stop to 
several abuses in their commercial relations 
with the United States. 
Dodge requested and received dismissal from the 
consulship, but his successors' reports confirm that 
Dodge's views were not just the result of the bad personal 
relationship to which he admitted by the end of his term 
in Bremen. Before he became consul Marcus Darckheim, on 
examining the treaty, had found that far from "being any 
thing like reciprocity in its provisions" it was "nearly 
altogether in favor of the good Burghers." In confirmaton 
of this, two years later he produced figures which 
revealed the same sad trend reported by Dodge. Although 
the total amount of shipping between the United States and 
the Hanseatic towns had increased, the lion's share had 
fallen into Bremen hands: in 1840 20 American ships 
entered Bremen from the United States, while Bremen 
vessels made up 75 of the 79 foreign ships making the same 
voyage; again the picture was repeated in the reverse 
trade, which employed 27 American and 98 Bremen out of 104 
foreign ships.11 
The appointment of Francis Grund as U.S. consul at 
Bremen represented a return to the less savoury personal 
relations experienced by Dodge, but in Grund's case it was 
more the result of his personality than of any attacks on 
the treaty. Although German by birth, Grund was 
effectively a naturalised American by virtue of long 
periods of residence in U.S. ports. He was highly 
impressed with his adopted country and wrote works 
extolling its virtues. He also cut an impressive figure 
on first meeting, and one Bostonian described him in 1835 
as a "German and a Republican, and withal a profound 
scholar, who during his residence in Boston has acquired 
the respect and esteem of our best citizens." It was 
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undoubtedly these qualities and his native origins which 
made him a natural choice for diplomatic service in 
Germany, and he took up the office of consul at the start 
of John Tyler's presidency. In that post he revealed a 
darker side to his character. Both at Bremen and later as 
consul at Antwerp he pursued his own financial gain and 
demonstrated the ski 11 of annoying the host authorities. 
Arrogant, quick to take offence, and possessed of a hot 
temper which occasionally landed him in even hotter water 
(at one stage he was in virtual exile from Antwerp after 
drawing a knife on a man in a fight), he proved unsuitable 
for the duties assigned to him. His superior in Belgium, 
Thomas Clemson, described his activities there as a 
"repetition of his conduct and the enmity he excited 
against himself at Bremen where his name is held in 
detestation until this day."12 
Such a damning record warns against taking Grund's 
reports too literally. However, in the context of earlier 
complaints his criticism of the treaty merits attention. 
Moreover, he had a vested financial interest in any 
increase in U.S. shipping, as his consular fees depended 
on services rendered to American traders: when Grund 
complained that the value of his office had declined from 
up to five thousand dollars annually to just over six 
hundred, his view can be accepted. What had accounted for 
this fall? The figures told a familiar story, with 
American ships barely accounting for 25 annual clearances: 
"now the whole trade of the U.S. is monopolised by the 
shipowners of Bremen, sailing their vessels under the 
Hanseatic flag, & sending home the American ships in 
ballast."13 
While Grund poured out his invective against the 
treaty in a twelve-page despatch, his colleague at Hamburg 
responded to a request for information from the State 
department in a one-page reply couched in a calmer tone. 
John Cuthbert judged that the treaty was "faithfully 
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adhered to'' in Hamburg and that the United States were 
deprived of no privileges which were granted to other 
countries. Traditionally, though, American trade with 
Hamburg was much less important than that with Bremen, as 
Britain tended to dominate the business of the former. 
What is more, a great fire destroyed much of Hamburg's 
oldest mercantile quarter in 1841, and so American trade 
was likely to be even less substantial. As for LUbeck, 
the location of that port dictated that little American 
trade took place with it.14 
A large number of memorials in 1842-43 attest to a 
mobilisation of domestic opinion on this matter by the 
turn of the decade. Individuals and companies, such as 
Edward Carrington and the firm of Pearce and Bullock, both 
of Providence, also brought this fact to the attention of 
leading statesmen who might be expected to influence any 
alteration in the policy. 15 In the winter of 1842 Henry 
Lee of Boston produced further discouraging evidence of 
the state of shipping in the Hanseatic trade: American 
exports to the towns amounted to $4,110,655 in 1841, but 
American vessels carried goods only to the value of 
$1,278,450; of foreign exports gathered in U.S. ports 
before carriage to the Hanseatic towns American ships 
transported only $93,000 out of $450,061; finally of 
imports from the towns foreign vessels carried goods to 
the value of $2,157,377 out of a total of $2,449,964.16 
One regular contributor on the issue was Hugh 
Birckhead, a friend and correspondent of Daniel Webster. 
Birckhead was a prominent businessman, merchant, bank 
director, and leading member of the Board of Trade in the 
city of Baltimore, a community deeply interested in the 
reciprocity question as a result of its involvement in the 
tobacco trade. Birckhead noted his impression that the 
Hanseatic treaty had been "highly injurious to our 
shipping, driving a large amt. of our Tonnage from the 
carrying trade and transferring it to foreign bottoms." 
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However, Birckhead's use of the term "carrying trade" 
and his own trading interests reveal how the issue 
involved more than the direct tobacco trade to Bremen. 
His company had once been involved in the West Indies 
trade but now concentrated its efforts in South America, 
another field of intense Baltimore mercantile activity. 
Yet even though he had no trade links with Bremen, 
Birckhead still criticised those treaties with the 
Hanseatic towns and other shipping powers of northern 
Europe which afforded their vessels equal treatment in the 
indirect trade from third countries, including Latin 
American states. Later in the decade James Birckhead, a 
relative and the U.S. consul at Rio de Janeiro, was to set 
his name at the top of a memorial sent from Americans in 
that city, complaining at the effects of reciprocal 
navigation in the indirect trade. In explaining his fears 
for American participation in the Latin American trade, 
Hugh Birckhead threw severe doubt upon the working of the 
policy of reciprocity in its entirety and questioned the 
very principles which lay behind it: 
There can be no doubt, but tho' the shipping of 
the U. States, can successfully compete with 
that of any other country, if it is equally 
placed upon an equal footing, this equality, 
however, is not always obtained with the mere 
right of trading in similar products, at equal 
duties & charges, and this I believe is all our 
reciprocal Treaties pretend to secure. 
Equality was lacking when American shipping tried to 
compete with Prussian and Bremen ships, Birckhead claimed: 
first there is not equality in the products of 
those Countries compared with ours: none in the 
extent of coasts & number of ports, and above 
all, none in the cost of ships, or the expense 
of sailing them--to constitute a fust 
reci?rocity, 1}t should exist in-a I these part1.culars. 
Unequal trading conditions and unequal costs; these 
were to be the Scylla and Charybdis of American navigation 
when faced with the shipping of those countries of 
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northern Europe enjoying treaties of reciprocal 
navigation. Other critics took up these themes in their 
attacks on the policy of reciprocal navigation, especially 
as it operated in the indirect trade. However, in the 
case of Bremen there were problems in the direct trade as 
well, as its very first critics pointed out. 
Certainly the statistics presented by the critics of 
the treaty painted a depressing picture in the direct 
trade to Bremen, with American vessels taking an ever 
smaller share of the carrying to and from the United 
States. Some simply accused American shippers of 
neglecting their opportunities, while Bremen's merchants 
exploited that neglect energetically to promote their own 
interests. But many blamed other problems, such as the 
difficulties experienced by American shippers in securing 
return cargoes after taking tobacco to Bremen. While some 
cargoes on offer ·consisted of textiles, especially linens, 
the major part of return freights was the human "cargo" of 
emigrants, and most Americans agreed that Bremen vessels 
had been particularly successful in securing the larger 
share of this "trade." There was disagreement, however, 
as to why this was the case. 
Joshua Dodge asserted that "the increase of Bremen 
tonnage has in a measure arisen from the great 
emigration." He blamed liberal treaty terms for this 
state of affairs. Under those terms Bremen shippers could 
afford to set lower rates of passage which enabled them to 
monopolise the carriage of emigrants across the Atlantic. 
Marcus Darckheim agreed that "the transport of emigrants 
is • • • a lucrative branch of business to the Bremen ship 
owners." Despite relatively low rates of passage, they 
still took a small profit, "even were they to bring no 
return freight." It was hardly surprising, then, that 
they were in a strong position to bid for cargoes of 
tobacco. Darckheim gave other reasons for the dominance 
of Bremen in this business, including a simple preference 
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for Bremen ships. Emigrants found "invariably good and 
prompt opportunities at this Place," and as a result "the 
greater number of those from the interior of Germany 
prefer taking this route to any other •••• " 
Despite a prediction by Dodge in 1835 that a surplus 
of land on the German market might prevent potential 
emigrants from obtaining the resources necessary to make 
the journey west, they continued to come in large numbers. 
The depression years of 1837 to 1840 did witness a slump 
in emigration, but by 1841 Darckheim reported that some 
12,650 passengers had left for the United States in the 
previous year, most of them in Bremen vessels. Three 
years later the problem lingered on. The U.S. consul in 
Bavaria, Louis Merk, reminded Henry Wheaton that "our 
vessels must now often leave the Ports of Bremen & Hamburg 
in Ballast, whilst a Bremen or Hamburg ship sails in 
company with them to the United States & earns many 
thousand dollars Passage--money for emigrants." He 
suggested that American bankers be allowed to offer 
special terms for the transference of money to all 
emigrants who made the voyage in American vessels. If 
Francis Grund is to be believed, though, this would have 
been of no avail. He intimated that there was a law 
compelling German emigrants to travel to the Americas in 
Bremen vessels.18 
If correct Grund's accusation laid bare a direct 
infraction of the treaty: any restriction of emigration 
to Bremen vessels went against the guarantee that American 
ships would share all privileges enjoyed by Bremen rivals. 
Critics claimed that the terms and spirit of the treaty 
were broken in other ways as well. American merchants 
demanded reciprocal treatment in all elements of business, 
from residence qualifications to guild regulations, yet 
found themselves blocked at every turn. Although not 
questions of navigation, these elements combined to 
undermine the position of Americans in Bremen and so to 
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increase the advantages enjoyed by Bremen merchants and 
shippers. 
Even before the treaty was signed, Albert Gallatin 
had warned Henry Clay of such dangers. He noted 
that they are very narrow and selfish, as 
regards merchants residing within their own 
precincts and that they may be unwilling to 
grant to citizens of the United States .•• the 
same privileges, which foreign merchants 
indiscriminately enjoy, in common with our own 
citizens, in the ports of the United States, 
where they reside. 
In 1832 the U.S. consul at Bremen, Nathaniel Pearce, 
revealed that Gallatin's warnings were not without 
substance. He complained at a regulation which required 
that all merchants residing in the city, including 
consuls, had to be registered as citizens. Consequently 
Pearce had experienced great difficulty in securing 
recognition from.the Bremen authorities. 
Some years later a letter from a successor as consul 
convinced Pearce that this was the "true picture" in 
Bremen. Marcus Darckheim revealed how the Senate exacted 
"protection money" from all strangers residing in the 
city, on top of the regular dues paid by Bremen merchants. 
This unequal treatment rendered the treaty "so far as 
citizens of the U.S. are to be benefitted by it, a mere 
nullity." When Darckheim complained, the Bremen 
authorities did not force him to pay the due, but he 
attributed this to their wish not to let the matter get in 
the way of the treaty's renewal when its expiry was 
looming. Darckheim noted other infractions: American 
merchants were supposed to have all the rights of native 
burghers but especially "the right to clear and enter 
goods & vessels without having to employ anyone." Yet 
Bremen merchants enjoyed guild privileges closed to 
Americans, and Americans had to use the expensive services 
of merchants, whereas Bremen sea captains arriving in U.S. 
ports could employ brokers to transact their business for 
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a much smaller fee. Darckheim even faced personal 
problems: when his daughter wished to marry a Bremen 
citizen, she first had to obtain burgher status herself, 
or her husband would lose his own status. As this would 
cost 266 Rix dollars and as Darckheim had four other 
daughters, he anticipated losing "no trifling sum" to 
secure the happiness of his family. This was manifestly 
unfair when Bremeners of both sexes had become U.S. 
citizens "without paying a cent for it either to the 
government or any of the corporations or towns." 
The problem persisted into Francis Grund's term in 
Bremen, provoking the same damning reaction: 
The express law • • • prevents any one from 
trading here ••• without his becoming a 
citizen of Bremen. The Bremen merchants-are 
subject to no restriction whatever in the U.S. & 
on the principle of reciprocity, the American 
who wishes to establish himself here, ought not 
to be prevented from carrying on trade and 
traffic. 
By these means Bremen merchants secured an unfair 
advantage in monopolising the best commercial information 
in their own port but "at the same time saving the 
commission on the purchases in America by sending out 
their own agents to Baltimore and New York." To remedy 
this Grund s~ggested a stricter interpretation of 
reciprocity as applied to merchant status when it came to 
renewing the treaty. Otherwise "from the corporation laws 
of this place the parties on this side can or will be 
allowed to interpret it as may best suit their convenience 
and interest."19 
If such problems had an adverse effect upon American 
participation in the direct trade, the influence of 
emigration and infractions of the spirit of the treaty 
harmed U.S. interests in the indirect carrying trade as 
well. Bremen ships carried emigrants to Latin America and 
in the process undercut American shippers in that route. 
Residence qualifications affected Americans trading 
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indirectly to Bremen as much as they did those trading 
directly to the port. But on top of these factors were 
several more which represented the major cause for concern 
about the practical operation of the treaty of 1827. To 
make matters worse, those new factors were also believed 
to operate in favour of the shipping of other northern 
European states. 
According to their critics reciprocal navigation 
treaties failed to give a true equality of conditions to 
both contracting parties. The New York memorialists 
claimed that the system of reciprocity "gives to others 
the freedom of trading with us, while it fetters our own 
navigation." Hugh Birckhead asserted that equality could 
only consist of exact comparability of opportunities for 
trade in both countries, whether in the number of ports, 
or in the amount of trade transacted in them. Of course, 
critics never regarded the inequality as favouring the 
United States, and so this line of argument provided a 
foundation for attacks on the treaties.20 
Certainly in terms of the number of ports opened to 
reciprocal conditions by the treaties the United States 
offered more than their treaty partners. Just as there 
were complaints about the limitation of access only to 
free ports in the colonial trade, so the disparity of 
numbers of accessible ports was raised in this case as 
well. Birckhead noted the rather obvious point that 
"Bremen has but one port to admit us to, while we have 
fifty for her ships to enter." The New York memorialists 
broadened the canvas by including Sweden and Denmark in 
their analysis: "Hamburg and Bremen are but single ports; 
those of Sweden and Denmark are but few in number. While 
our vessels ••• are thus necessarily restricted, the 
ships of these countries enjoy the advantage of free 
access to all the ports of our extended Union."21 
It was in the volume of goods carried, however, that 
the disparity appeared most pronounced. Even before the 
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treaty had been signed James Brown had warned the 
negotiator from the Hanseatic towns not to expect the same 
full reciprocal terms as had been granted to Denmark and 
Central America. After all "it must have occurred to him 
that the Hanseatic Towns were not in the same condition 
with [those] Countries ••• having no productions of 
their own and being the carriers of those of other 
powers." Subsequent critics stressed how the Hanseatic 
towns and the Baltic powers had little indigenous trade in 
which American vessels might attempt to share. Francis 
Grund noted how the people of Bremen scarcely consumed as 
much as a suburb of New York or Philadelphia. He 
emphasised the point: "Bremen is not a country •••• It 
possesses no manufactures, no agriculture, no exchange of 
commodities that have not previously been imported into 
it; it is in fact but a warehouse from which goods are 
almost as soon exported as they are imported into it." 
Bremen was not even a particularly valuable entrep6t so 
far as the United States were concerned, because 
anticipated increases in trade with the interior of 
Germany had not yet materialised. Edward Carrington 
agreed that the Hanseatic towns were little more than 
"ports of transit" and that they had "no produce or 
manufactures to give us to be the carriers of •••• " 
Even Sweden and Norway were "very limited consumers of 
foreign productions," offering little in the way of 
indirect trade for American shippers to participate in. 
And Henry Wheaton made the same point, highlighting 
Denmark and the Hanseatic towns "which have no back 
country & a comparitively small number of consumers."22 
The critics made clear their opinion that such levels 
of trade were a scant return for what the United States 
had on offer. Carrington remarked how little Bremen gave 
to American ships "in return for the benefit granted 
them.'' The New York memorialists noted how the policy of 
reciprocity granted "to other nations, who can make no 
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adequate return, the liberty of bringing into our ports 
all foreign productions whatever, thereby interfering 
directly with our own carrying trade." The consuming 
power of these small states was "comparatively trifling," 
so that privileges had been given to those "without the 
power to reciprocate the benefits we confer." Francis 
Grund put it most eloquently: "there cannot be a perfect 
reciprocity between a commercial nation of 10 millions, 
possessing 1600 miles of sea coast & abounding with the 
most magnificent harbors in the world, and the Government 
of a town of 45,000 inhabitants!"23 
The results of this folly could be seen in several 
trades. "It is not only the American shipping to this 
place which suffers," claimed Grund, "but the whole trade 
of the U.S. with the nations of the Baltic and the Gulf of 
Finland." He estimated that nearly two-thirds of the 
trade from Denmark, Sweden, Norway and Russia to the 
United States, took the route via Bremen in Bremen's 
ships. Intrusion in indirect trade also helped to explain 
the contradiction between the denial by Christopher Hughes 
of any problems in the direct Sweden-United States trade 
and the attacks upon the treaty with Sweden by critics of 
reciprocity. As early as 1835 Hugh Legare reported from 
Belgium how "our trade with the U.S. is usurped ~ the 
Swedes," and nine years later the U.S. consul in Antwerp 
noted that the carrying trade with Belgium was "almost 
entirely monopolised by vessels of foreign nations, 
principally of Sweden and the Hanseatic Towns." But the 
effects were felt in further-flung trades as well. In 
1841 Marcus Darckheim reported how Bremen vessels had 
sought employment in the South Seas in rivalry with 
Americans, and a year later Edward Carrington remarked how 
Hanseatic vessels interfered "in bringing the produce of 
foreign Countries into our ports on the ~ terms as our 
own ships," citing the example of a ship based in Hamburg 
carrying China teas and Batavian coffee.24 
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More common was the view that these forces operated 
with most damaging effect in the trade with Latin America. 
Once again this development had had its prophet, in the 
person of Joshua Dodge. In 1835 he had anticipated the 
day when a fall in demand for ships to carry emigrants 
would set adrift a fleet of large Bremen vessels looking 
for work. He predicted that they would "probably go into 
the West India or South American trade, & carry the 
produce of those countries to the United States, thus 
entering into competiton with our vessels in a trade which 
until now has been carried on almost exclusively by our 
Countrymen." In 1842 Carrington listed Brazilian coffee 
among the goods which a Hamburg vessel had brought to the 
United States. Birckhead drew attention to Hanseatic, 
Swedish and Prussian vessels which were "beginning to 
interfere with our trade in other quarters." He had 
learnt from Rio that six German as opposed to only three 
American vessels had recently loaded with cargoes of 
coffee. Finally the New York memorialists summed up how 
this threatened American shippers: 
The produce and manufactures of the north of 
Europe are taken to Brazil, and these foreign 
vessels then bring us the coffee which we 
require for our own consumption; our own 
vessels, accordingly, being thus interfered with 
in their return freights, cannot carry our own 
produce and manufactures as cheaply or 
extensively as they could do if ~gis carrying 
trade was left in our own hands. 
The effects of reciprocity affected not only the 
direct trade between the United States and northern 
Europe, therefore. They also damaged American trade with 
Latin America by allowing foreign ships to carry Latin 
American products to U.S. ports. This in turn worsened 
the terms of trade for Americans carrying U.S. products to 
Latin America, since it reduced the number of return 
cargoes available to them. Yet, in return the United 
States received no similar benefits in the indirect 
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carrying trades of northern Europe. Moreover, there was 
one other factor which enabled Bremen and other countries 
to exploit this situation. Apart from the hint of 
restriction in the carriage of emigrants these were all 
trades open to American shipping. Unlike Britain's 
inter-colonial trade there were no closed routes, and so 
U.S. vessels were free to compete with northern European 
rivals so far as access to trade routes was concerned. 
However, as Birckhead hinted, this did not guarantee a 
complete equality for American ships: the relative costs 
of rival shipping added the final element to the argument 
against reciprocal navigation. 
Critics of the reciprocity treaties touched on the 
question of comparative costs with varying degrees of 
elaboration. The New York memorialists remarked that 
Sweden, Denmark and the Hanseatic towns employed ships 
"cheaply built atid cheaply navigated." Henry Lee had to 
admit that in those trades the United States had "as far 
as our navigation is concerned a successful competitor." 
Diplomatic sources added weight to this view. Henry 
Wheaton believed the granting of reciprocal treatment gave 
an advantage to "the shipping of that one of the two 
contracting parties which can build, equip, man, provision 
and navigate at the cheapest rate." The statistics in the 
Bremen trade left no doubt as to which of the two that 
was. Grund agreed with this assessment and believed it to 
be near impossible for American shipowners to compete with 
the low freight rates which Bremen shippers could afford 
to offer as a result of their much lower costs in wages 
and provisions.26 
It was difficult to quantify the competitiveness of 
any country's shipping. Hugh Birckhead thought it was 
pretty well accepted that "the ships of those countries 
cost fully one third less than ours, and the expense of 
sailing them, is from one third to one half less." 
"Nautilus," in an article published in the Baltimore 
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American, estimated that a month's voyage for a 450 ton 
vessel with a crew of fifteen would cost the American 
shipper $409, compared to only $201.36 for his Bremen 
rival. However, while wage and provision costs were no 
doubt higher in the United States, many claimed that those 
costs could be balanced out by the fact that any decent 
American vessel would require a smaller crew and a shorter 
time at sea. The initial capital outlay in the purchase 
of vessels remained the most important factor, and here 
there were signs that Americans might be at a 
disadvantage. The price of new American-built vessels was 
rising as the ready supply of timber for ship-building 
dwindled. The maritime historian J.G.B. Hutchins suggests 
that this occurred towards the end of the 1830s, and there 
were even signs in the 1840s that New England was having 
to import timber for ship-building and other purposes from 
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick. In the case of the Bremen 
trade the lax drafting of the treaty exacerbated the 
problem, because Hanseatic merchants were allowed to buy 
their ships abroad, wherever they were cheapest, and claim 
for them the reciprocal treatment due to any other 
Hanseatic vessel. Together these factors left the 
impression that the Hanseatic towns, Sweden and Denmark 
were able to fit out ships more cheaply, which, on top of 
their seafaring traditions and expertise, made them more 
than adequate rivals to American shippers. 27 
In the light of this competitive advantage and the 
benefits derived from reciprocal conditions which enabled 
northern European rivals to underbid American vessels in 
most trades, Hugh Birckhead saw "great reason to apprehend 
that this interference of foreign vessels in our 
circuitous voyages is destined to increase naturally." He 
believed that U.S. statesmen had not sufficiently 
appreciated the difference in costs and expense of sailing 
and he feared that ''unlesa some modification of the 
existing laws is speedily effected, the Prussians, Swedes 
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& Bremeners will engross much more of the carrying trade, 
that legitimately belongs to us." Edward Carrington would 
have agreed. To him it seemed "unequal and impolitic to 
give these little fellows equal advantage in ~ own 
commerce as ~ enjoy."28 
Such sentiments demanded some sort of response. What 
options were open to American statesmen, and, more 
importantly what sort of measures did critics of the 
policy suggest? The early critics were encouraged by the 
fact that the Hanseatic treaty was due to expire in 1839, 
as long as its provisions were not allowed to continue 
beyond the original twelve-year term by means of its 
perpetuating clause. In 1836 Wheaton suggested that "as 
the period [was] now rapidly approaching when that Treaty 
may be revised at our option" the State department should 
listen to the reports of how it operated. A year later he 
advised that "the expediency of renewing it in its present 
form, deserves the most serious consideration in respect 
to its practical working upon the employment of our 
shipping." Joshua Dodge was more explicit, considering it 
his "duty towards my fellow citizens to state ••• the 
strong objections there are against the said treaty being 
renewed." His opinion convinced the House select 
committee on tobacco, which did not "perceive any 
obligation on the part of the United States to continue in 
force that treaty a moment longer than the time allowed 
for its discontinuance, no reciprocal benefits having been 
derived to the United States."29 
If most agreed that the treaty should not remain as 
it was, then there was similar unanimity in favour of a 
modified form of treaty. In principle it was preferable 
that the United States should maintain its treaty 
relations, but there was also the very practical reason 
that annulling the treaty altogether would "throw that 
portion of the trade which is now carried on under their 
[Hanseatic] flag, into the hands of the Danes, Swedes, 
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Russians and Dutch •••• '' Some even feared that a 
refusal to regulate trade by treaty would lead to 
Hanseatic vessels being transferred to the register of 
those countries and pursuing their damaging business under 
different flags. So a modified form of treaty .was the 
preferred course. Minor changes could include a clause 
forbidding the Hanseatic towns from flagging foreign-built 
ships for the purpose of claiming reciprocal treatment; as 
Bremen was not a major ship-building power, it was 
anticipated that this would reduce her competitive edge. 
Another change could be along the lines suggested by 
Marcus Darckheim, making much clearer the rights of 
American merchants residing in the Hanseatic ports.30 
However, the main target for change was the grant of 
reciprocity to foreign shipping. Nothing much could be 
done about the direct trade. Unless Hanseatic vessels 
were charged heavy discriminating duties or prohibited 
from it altogether, they would dominate the direct trade 
for as long as they enjoyed competitive advantages in 
costs. Any such duties or prohibition would most likely 
have been mirrored by similar actions by the Hanseatic 
towns, causing the shippers, consumers, and producers of 
both parties to suffer needlessly. So then reciprocity in 
the direct trade was unlikely to be changed. But it was 
not the number of Hanseatic vessels in the direct trade 
which was so galling. Rather it was their involvement in 
the U.S. indirect carrying trade which aroused most anger. 
Here the scope for reform was much wider. 
The solution was simple. Those countries which had 
competitive shipping but also very small carrying trades 
should no longer be offered equal treatment in the 
indirect trade. This would not apply to Latin American 
states which had little shipping to compete with the 
United States. Nor would the limitation affect Britain, 
should she ever open her indirect trade to foreign 
shipping, because although a major shipping power, her 
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large volume of trade seemed likely to offer enough 
business for all-comers. But the Hanseatic towns and 
other smaller shipping powers of northern Europe met both 
criteria. Wheaton's suggested revision of the Hanseatic 
treaty would limit equal treatment to their vessels in the 
direct trade only, carrying their own and other German 
products to the United States. Rather optimistically he 
hoped that U.S. vessels would still receive equal 
treatment when arriving in Bremen or Hamburg with goods 
from all third countries but he was prepared to accept a 
limitation of reciprocity to vessels carrying the 
productions of the American continent. It was essential, 
though, that Hanseatic vessels should pay extra duties 
when bringing goods to the United States from anywhere 
other than Germany. Hugh Birckhead proposed a similar 
restriction: "It has always appeared to me that our 
offers of reciprocity should not extend beyond the lines 
drawn by Great Britain--which, I believe, goes no further 
than to permit foreigners to exchange their productions 
for the products of England." Foreign vessels could clear 
U.S. ports for any location they chose, but he "would not 
allow them to bring Coffee & sugar from Brazil & Hemp from 
Manilla, without subjecting them to a discriminating 
duty." Edward Carrington rounded off this argument: 
I am decidedly of opinion, that our Treaties, 
allowing foreign vessels to participate in our 
general commerce has been a great error--These 
Treaties ought to have confined the trade to the 
contracting parties--There is no equality in 
allowing Vessels of Sweden, Hanseatic Cities &c. 
the same privilege of of [sic] bringing into 
this Country the products of all Countrie~1on the same terms as our own vessels • • • • 
Carrington went one step further by proposing that 
the standard discriminating duty be increased from ten to 
twenty per cent, to apply to all trades not covered by 
treaty terms. He even suggested a discrimination in the 
direct trade regardless of any reciprocal arrangements. 
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His was a fervently protectionist view, as befitted a man 
who manufactured textiles as well as owned ships. He was 
quite happy with the prospect that extra discriminating 
duties might reduce imports, in effect acting as an 
indirect form of protection to American manufactures.32 
For others less enamoured with the protectionist 
principle the implication behind the proposed withdrawal 
of full reciprocity was distressing. It signalled that 
the interests of U.S. shipping no longer coincided with 
what had become a cherished principle of commercial 
policy. Reciprocity was satisfactory for as long as 
American vessels maintained a competitive edge, but once 
that edge was lost the policy was more likely to harm 
American navigation. Henry Lee found this particularly 
troubling. As a busy merchant with a trading empire 
stretching out from Boston across Europe and Asia, the 
West Indies and Latin America, he had been a free-trade 
spokesman for Massachusetts merchants in the 1820s and 
1830s, as they strove to thwart the efforts of 
protectionists. He had written the major "Boston report" 
in 1827 attacking the defeated woollens tariff of that 
year and in 1831 he worked closely with Albert Gallatin to 
produce a supplement to the report of the Philadelphia 
Free-Trade Convention. As a free-trade enthusiast it had 
greatly pleased him to see that "even those most favorable 
to the promotion of our Navigation, have ••• avowed 
their readiness to place this interest on the principle of 
reciprocity." It seemed that free-trade ideas had 
triumphed in relation to navigation, if not to commerce in 
general. By 1842, though, circumstances had changed, and 
Lee was contemplating a revolution in American thinking. 
This issue also placed Lee in a difficult political 
position, when the crisis of New England shipping put him 
in bed with one-time party opponents who were now his 
colleagues on a committee in Boston co-ordinating attacks 
on the reciprocity policy. Referring specifically to the 
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colonial trade issue, this staunch Jacksonian was pained 
to admit that the past views of the Jackson administration 
might be "adverse to the principle which the Committee in 
order to obtain their ends, may, perhaps be disposed to 
maintain."33 
Lee's behaviour revealed how local hardship could 
reverse earlier partisan and principled stances on this 
particular subject. Further evidence of this was to be 
found in Baltimore where in the spring of 1842 an anti-
protection Democrat, Beale Richardson, took part in a 
massive public meeting "without respect to party." 
Admitting that "the principles of what was called 'free 
trade' ••• were not conducive to the prospects of the 
mechanical, the agricultural or the trading classes," he 
assented to calls for a much more protective tariff, 
including such "discriminating duties • • • as will place 
them [U.S. vessels] in the ground of a fair competition 
with the vessels of other commercial nations."34 
Understandably concern of the type displayed by Lee 
and Richardson was most common in maritime communities. 
Observers of the policy from other regions were less quick 
to condemn it. Henry Clay of Kentucky adopted a very 
different attitude. Of course, as co-author of many of 
the treaties which were under fire Clay was not a 
disinterested party, but if he had resided in a port city 
then he might have been more sympathetic. As it was, he 
chided his colleague Daniel Webster for adhering to the 
movement to revise the reciprocal navigation policy: 
He speaks of the injury to our Navigation by the 
Reciprocity treaties, the great interest of the 
Country which has been constantly flourishing, 
amidst the depression of all other great 
interests. Instead of looking with the eye of a 
Statesman to the whole system of Reciprocal 
navigation, like a pleader, he selects the 
single case of poor Bremen! 
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Significantly Clay did not deny the existence of a problem 
in the Bremen trade. He did suggest, though, that 
American shipping as a whole was, in his word, 
"flourishing." This assertion highlights the need to 
examine more closely the state of American navigation both 
in its totality and in certain ports and trade routes, in 
order to pinpoint more accurately the exact location and 
timing of the problems which arose.35 
Economic historians are generally agreed that the 
1830s and 1840s were successful years for American 
shipping. Americans did well in their two most important 
trades, those with France and Britain; the speedy 
development of packet lines brought a regularity to 
shipping business, especially in New York; towards the end 
of the 1840s glorious clipper fleets ruled the waves with 
grace and speed; and the coasting trade, reserved 
exclusively for American vessels, provided an increasingly 
valuable amount of business, especially after the 
acquisition of California in 1848. A cursory glance at 
the shipping statistics appears to confirm this healthy 
picture. The total amount of tonnage registered to 
American shippers rose steadily throughout the period. 
The figures also show that American vessels took a more 
than equal share of an increasing volume of trade: total 
entrances and clearances by American ships rose during the 
1830s and 1840s and remained ahead of foreign 
participation; for nearly the whole period American 
vessels accounted for between 60 and 70 per cent of 
entrances and clearances.36[TABS.2,3.I] 
Contemporary reports raise doubts as to just how 
healthy things were. In hard times an increase in total 
tonnage might have contributed to an overcapacity of 
shipping in certain trades, as Henry Lee had hinted. In 
April 1842 one newspaper, admittedly with a political axe 
to grind, reported how in these "Whig times!" one third of 
five hundred ships at Brooklyn were lying idle, "with no 
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captains, no crew, no freights, and no prospect of getting 
any for some time to come." Many were up for sale, with 
"no buyers in the market." Six months later the same 
paper reported how a drop in demand for ships had caused 
carpenters to be thrown out of work in Philadelphia. 
Closer examination of the statistics suggests that 
these were indeed relatively hard times for shippers. 
While the overall trend in most figures was upwards, the 
period of successive crashes and depressions between 1836 
and 1844 witnessed violent fluctuations in the fortunes of 
American shipping. 1836 to 1838, 1840, and 1842, were 
particularly bad years, with falls in the number of 
entrances and clearances by American vessels. As many 
critics of reciprocity had feared, foreign shipping did 
not seem to suffer as badly, and in the years 1836-37 and 
1842, both times when criticism reached a climax, the 
American share of carrying declined in relation to that of 
foreigners. Significantly the first two years in 
particular witnessed a surge in activity for most 
countries' shipping, including that of the Hanseatic 
towns, Denmark, Sweden, Austria, Russia, Prussia, and even 
Sardinia. In the case of the first three named that 
participation remained fairly high after 1837 as well, 
while the share of the others fell back to more "normal" 
levels. In times of economic distress, then, American 
shippers shared in the discomforts endured by other 
Americans, as they watched foreign shipping profit from 
flue tua tions in their own fortunes. 37 [TABS. 3.1 ,4] 
National statistics cannot give an adequate picture 
of the more specific location of the problems which arose, 
because certain ports and trades were affected more than 
others. Even composite regional statistics, for the New 
England coast and for the Mid-Atlantic/Gulf coast ports 
combined, conceal local variations, both sets of figures 
revealing steady increases in tonnage. Such numbers are 
easily distorted by the success of one or more ports, 
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while hiding the failure of others. In New England, for 
instance, small ports like Salem went into decline while 
Boston fared relatively well. The same was seen to an 
even greater extent in the Mid-Atlantic region, which 
included both New York City, a steadily growing giant, and 
Philadelphia, whose overseas trading interests had 
declined sharply since 1815 and which now dedicated itself 
to fighting Baltimore for a greater share of the 
hinterland and coasting trades. But figures from selected 
collection districts do show the same pattern of 
fluctuation in the share of carrying as do the national 
figures, with natural local variations and exaggerations. 
American shipping did consistently well in what was left 
of Philadelphia's overseas trade, while in New England 
ports Americans fared relatively badly compared to other 
collection districts. All, though, shared the same 
depressing figure·s for the years 1837 and 1842.38 (r.v..~.2, ~.1..-SJ 
It is hard to determine exactly which communities 
felt hardest the effects of reciprocity. If the problems 
had been limited to the direct trade, the analysis would 
be easier. Marcus Darckheim's consular return for 1840 
identifies those U.S. ports doing business with Bremen, 
with Baltimore and New York far in advance of others. As 
Bremen vessels took the lion's share of this intercourse, 
it is not surprising that those two cities produced vocal 
critics of reciprocity. However, those figures tell only 
part of the story, because they do not reveal whether 
American ships from other ports lost out in the carriage 
of goods from New York and Baltimore to Bremen. The 
difficulties in the indirect trade pose even greater 
problems of analysis, since by definition it involved 
foreign ships calling at any U.S. port carrying goods from 
any foreign country, again in competition with American 
vessels based in any port. Short of examining every 
consular return and customs collector's report to discover 
where the vessels of all countries enjoying reciprocity in 
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the indirect trade embarked and where they arrived in the 
United States, it is not possible to locate where the 
problems were hardest felt. Investigating the complaints 
where they arose, therefore, represents the most 
accessible route into the problem.39 
The inclusion of New Englanders in the list of 
critics hardly needs explanation. For many years 
navigation was the lifeblood of much of the region, and 
although changing economic circumstances in the 1820s had 
encouraged diversification into textile manufactures, 
overseas commerce remained a mainstream occupation. 
Boston, the centre of the region's economic life, just 
outran New Orleans for second place behind New York as the 
busiest American port. American shippers did well in this 
trade, as the entrance and clearance figures reveal: 
American shipping far exceeded foreign ships in tonnage; 
even so, the total number of ships was in foreign vessels' 
favour, which, as ships were easier to visualise than 
total tonnage, might have accounted for heightened fears 
at the level of foreign involvement in the port's trade. 
This imbalance can be explained by the regular sailings of 
small British vessels from the Maritime Provinces, one 
trade in which Boston, in common with the rest of New 
England, did lose out. Elsewhere, though, Bostonian and 
other New England shippers were active, in the trades with 
Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and from the 
Pacific North-West coast to the Orient. In 1839-40 the 
city of Boston even celebrated becoming the first u.s. 
terminus for the Cunard transatlantic line, for vessels 
continuing on from Halifax, Nova Scotia. 40 [TABS.3.; ·' ·8] 
With so diverse a range of trading interests, it was 
almost inevitable that New England shippers would face 
rivalry from northern Europeans. However, their concern 
did not derive from fears for their involvement in the 
region's direct trade with Bremen. Darckheim's figures 
reveal how insignificant this was: only two ships sailed 
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from Bremen to New England ports in 1840; and only eight 
cleared for the German port, all from New Bedford and most 
likely carrying whale oil, one of the few New England 
products with a market in Germany. Far more worrying was 
the threat posed by Bremen shipping in other routes. 
These included direct trades from other U.S. ports to 
Germany, since New England vessels often did the carrying 
of other American regions, a fact hidden by entrance and 
clearance figures. Most at risk, though, were the 
prestige carrying trades from Latin America, the Caribbean 
and even the Far East. News of the threat, real or 
alleged, of Bremen competition in these routes caused New 
England shipping groups to mobilise and to issue calls for 
a change in policy. 
Criticism of reciprocal navigation far exceeded the 
piecemeal complaints of interested individuals like Henry 
Lee and Edward Carrington, important though these were. 
By means of a unique blending of the issue with the 
problems confronting New England shippers in the colonial 
trade there emerged a co-ordinated regional effort to 
bring matters affecting navigation before the public and 
political eye. A committee based in Boston spearheaded 
the movement in the autumn of 1842. It consisted of some 
important businessmen, including the chairman, Thomas 
Lamb, President of the Washington Insurance Company of 
Boston, Benjamin Rich, a self-made sea captain, 
J. Ingersoll Bowditch, another insurance company 
president, and J. Thomas Stevenson. In mid-November they 
began to publicise a mass meeting to be held in Boston on 
1 December and they solicited the advice and help of New 
England shippers, among them the worthy Henry Lee. 
Indeed, so anxious was the committee to recruit Lee's 
experience and expertise that they postponed the meeting 
until 15 December, to allow him time to do the necessary 
spadework for any report he might choose to make. They 
were well rewarded when he set about his task with an 
-121-
------------- -
energy which made him "of more use to the committee than 
any other two men or perhaps all of them together." 
The meeting of this "New England Commercial 
Convention" attracted men from all maritime corners of the 
region, from Lubec and Eastport in the most northerly part 
of Maine, to Bristol and Providence in Rhode Island. A 
further postponement of the Convention to the end of 
December meant that some had to leave before it started, 
but they ensured that they forwarded their views on paper. 
Those who stayed found it a valuable occasion and 
anticipated great things from the meeting. Thomas Curtis, 
a delegate from Boston, noted how many able reports were 
made, so detailed as to be "better fitted for perusal than 
hearing." But pride of place went to Henry Lee, who 
produced a "very very large report which I [Curtis] should 
suppose he had been writing during the past ten years, 
going over the past present and future." The colonial 
trade took up most of the Convention's time, but no doubt 
with Lee having played such a prominent part reciprocal 
navigation was unlikely to have gone unnoticed. 
The least impressive aspect of the Convention was its 
final outcome. A report was promised, along with 
resolutions to be sent to Congress, but time rolled by and 
neither appeared. As many delegates began to doubt that 
the report would emerge before the current session of 
Congress ended in March 1843, "it was ••• determined 
that Congress should be memorialized from the several 
towns interested in New England." As a result of this 
directive a veritable flood of memorials from over twenty 
New England communities reached Congress, and, if the 
example of Massachusetts Congressman Robert Winthrop was 
imitated by colleagues, other memorials were held over 
until the next session when legislators would have more 
time to consider them. There could be no mistaking the 
depth of New England feeling. Shippers were worried about 
the threat posed to their interests by competitive rivals, 
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both in the restricted colonial trade and in the indirect 
carrying trades; and they were prepared to call for 
political action to remedy their grievances.41 
Other regions were not quite so prolific in the 
articulation of complaints about reciprocal navigation. 
Indeed, apart from Baltimore and New York, the port of 
Alexandria, just downstream from the nation's capital, was 
the only other source of memorial activity on the issue. 
This memorial came from the company of William Fowle & 
Sons, which had a substantial amount of money invested in 
foreign trade. Their concern probably related to the 
participation of foreign shipping in the carriage of 
Chesapeake tobacco to Germany, or maybe in some indirect 
carrying routes.42 
Similar fears, heightened by their heavy involvement 
in trade with Latin America, inspired the mercantile 
community of Baltimore to make the efforts they did to 
bring the problems of reciprocal navigation to the 
attention of politicians and statesmen. As in Boston the 
overall shipping statistics look encouraging. In numbers 
of vessels and total tonnage American ships out-traded 
foreign vessels by three-to-one throughout the 1830s and 
1840s, although 1837 was relatively a very bad year. 
Again, though, northern European rivals were believed to 
pose a threat in certain specific routes, including the 
trade in tobacco to Bremen, which, as the figures provided 
by Marcus Darckheim reveal, was the most important of any 
U.S. port with that city. Much of the early criticism of 
reciprocal navigation came from parties interested 
primarily in the fortunes of tobacco, such as special 
agent Dodge and the select committee on the tobacco trade 
which counted among its members Isaac McKim and Daniel 
Jenifer, both Maryland Congressmen. The dominance of 
Bremen vessels in that trade undoubtedly aroused 
discontent among shippers keen to carry their local 
product to German markets. 
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Valuable trades with Latin America were believed to 
be under greater threat. These were an important line of 
business for the city, as they had compensated to a degree 
for a relative decline in Baltimore's trade with the 
Caribbean after 1815. American merchants still carried 
over two-thirds of the trade in provisions from Baltimore 
to the West Indies, but that trade was not as important as 
it had once been. In its place the city developed its 
trade with Latin America, and, according to historian 
Rhoda Dorsey, the 1820s and 1830s and again the later 
1840s, were the most successful years. To explain the gap 
between those two periods in terms of the effects of 
reciprocal navigation would be to draw a highly 
circumstantial conclusion, but even the hint of a more 
competitive rival in that trade would have given cause for 
concern, and there were more than enough such hints 
circulating at the beginning of the 1840s. 43 [TAB. 3.6] 
The result of this concern was an active campaign in 
Baltimore. Hugh Birckhead, of course, was a resident of 
the city and tried to put his friendship with Daniel 
Webster to good use. He was also involved in two other 
publicising efforts. He was a vice-president of the huge 
meeting, some nine thousand strong, which gathered at the 
Exchange Building in April 1842, a meeting so large that 
it had to be moved outside. When their memorial, over 
fifty yards in length, reached Congress John Quincy Adams 
described it as a "strong tariff petition," which implies 
that it did not deal with the state of navigation alone. 
This is borne out by the fact that shippers were not in a 
majority at the meeting and by the composition of 
Birckhead's fellow vice-presidents, who included 
merchants, bankers, manufacturers and artisans among their 
number. But the inclusion of a clause calling for the 
protection of navigation by discriminating duties showed 
the value of linking the problems faced by shippers with 
those c6nfronting other groups within the economy in a 
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joint initiative to promote all domestic interests. At 
the beginning of 1843, Birckhead was active in yet another 
capacity. At the same time as another memorial was being 
circulated among the merchants of Baltimore, he took part 
in the deliberations of a special meeting of the city's 
Board of Trade, which appointed an investigative 
committee, which in turn spawned a further memorial on the 
dangers of the reciprocity treaties.44 
The position of New York was in many ways similar to 
those of Boston and Baltimore. The city was indisputably 
in the process of growth, only temporarily stalled by a 
great fire in 1835 and by the economic problems of the 
late 1830s. New York dominated the transatlantic trade 
and became the hub for much of the external and internal 
commerce of the country. Most statistical indicators of 
the fortunes of shipping showed an upward trend. However, 
if there was a perceived threat to American navigation in 
any trade route, it would more than likely impinge on the 
interests of at least some New York merchants, since the 
city had commercial links with most parts of the world. 
Accordingly the arrival in Washington in 1844 of a 
memorial from New York attacking both reciprocity in 
navigation and the colonial trade arrangement should not 
occasion much surprise. More surprising was the stature 
of some of the sixty-plus named individuals and companies 
who signed the memorial. These included successful 
enterprises, and not just businessmen facing economic 
ruin. Prominent were the ship-building firms William H. 
Webb and William H. Brown, as well as the smaller 
companies of Smith and Dimon, and Brown and Bell. 
Shipbuilders had a greater stake than most in the fate of 
American navigation, since it represented the most 
important market for their product. Shipowners clearly 
had an interest in protecting the participation of 
American vessels in the carrying trade, which accounts for 
names of the packet operators Elisha Hurlburt, w. Nelson, 
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and the renowned Edward Collins on the memorial. Famous 
general mercantile firms such as the Griswolds, Moses Hick 
Grinnell, Howland and Aspinwall, and Woodhull and Minturn, 
all of whom did business with Latin America, were also 
conspicuous among the signatories. But the memorial was 
nothing if not cosmopolitan, and in addition to the names 
of artisans and mechanics there were the marine insurers 
Walter Jones, the mercantile financier, James Brown, a 
scion of the famous Alexander Brown company of Baltimore, 
and, most colourfully, the maritime cartographers, Edward 
and George Blunt.45 
This reflection of apparent unanimity in the New York 
mercantile community was shattered when a second memorial 
from the city reached Congress two weeks later. This 
memorial, signed by Jonathan Goodhue and nine other 
shipowners, challenged its predecessor by questioning the 
assumption that American navigation needed protection. 
The memorialists proclaimed that "the true interests of 
the country will be best promoted by the utmost freedom of 
trade." If American vessels were unable to compete with 
more efficient rivals, this was no reason to reject 
long-cherished principles, making consumers and producers 
pay more for the carriage of their goods. Significantly, 
though, they denied that foreign vessels even did pose a 
threat by offering lower freight rates. American shippers 
need not and for the most part did not "fear the 
competition of those of any other nation." In spite of 
heavier outlay costs to buy ships, the prices of which 
were inflated by heavy duties on ship-building materials, 
American vessels were "now successfully competing with 
those of every nation, in every trade, which is open to 
them." Consistent with their free-trade outlook they 
longed for the day when lower tariff duties would make it 
possible to see "how vastly beyond the need of 
'protection' and the reach of competition the skill of our 
ship builders, the superior character of the American ship 
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masters and the enterprise of our merchants, can render 
our commercial marine." 
The composition of these memorialists gives no real 
clues as to why they differed from their fellow New 
Yorkers. They included operators of packet lines to 
Europe such as Mortimer Livingston, J.J. Boyd, and 
Goodhue, but the involvement of the latter in carrying 
cotton to Russia in return for Baltic products should have 
made him an ideal candidate to sign the anti-reciprocity 
memorial, since it was more than likely that Bremen ships 
competed with him in that route. Most puzzling of all, 
though, was the presence of three names on the second 
memorial: Henry Grinnell, the brother and partner of 
Moses Hick Grinnell who had signed the first memorial; and 
Charles Marshall, a sea captain turned commission merchant 
and agent for a packet line, and William Whitlock, another 
merchant of varied interests, who shared the interesting 
distinction of signing both memorials! 46 
Referring to Marshall and Whitlock when he presented 
the second memorial, Senator Silas Wright noted that one 
or two men had signed the first one "by mistake," which 
raises doubts as to whether any signatory knew what they 
were putting their name to when a paper was thrust under 
their nose. The existence of this second memorial also 
raises the question as to how widely held sentiments 
hostile to reciprocity really were. New York provided 
just one example of a counter-movement, but the absence of 
records of similar movements in other maritime communities 
need not mean that all agreed with the complaints against 
reciprocity: those happy with, or indifferent to, the 
prevailing policy were far less likely to express their 
opinion. Moreover, while the existence of any such silent 
majority in favour of the policy cannot undermine the fact 
that the sentiments articulated above were passionately 
held, it does raise doubts as to how criticism of 
reciprocity would be received at Washington. After all 
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these were hard times for all, and special pleading by one 
group was not guaranteed a sympathetic ear at the nation's 
capital. Yet, action by the federal government was what 
the critics of reciprocity demanded, and their efforts 
succeeded in bringing the matter into the political eye 
for much of the 1840s. 
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Chapter 4. Congress and Reciprocity, 1840-1845 
In December 1840 John Davis of Massachusetts 
presented to the Senate one of the many memorials calling 
for action to secure better conditions for American 
vessels trading with the Caribbean. After Davis had 
spoken in favour of the memorial, his Massachusetts 
colleague, Daniel Webster, expressed the hope that the 
committee charged with studying the subject would broaden 
its focus to include "all the consequences of that system 
of policy which they had been for some years in the habit 
of calling the reciprocity system •••• " He made plain 
his opinion immediately, asserting that the treaties which 
cemented the policy were "entirely destitute of all the 
essential principles of reciprocity." His memory jogged 
by Webster's request, Davis recalled earlier memorials 
from merchants in Baltimore, "setting forth the unequal 
advantages which they enjoyed in the transhipment of 
tobacco to Germany." Reciprocal treaties had driven them 
out of the trade, rendering the system "of very doubtful 
policy," Davis averred, as he consented to Webster's 
request. James Buchanan of Pennsylvania warned that this 
was an important topic, which might involve changing a 
long-standing policy, but he did not deny that, "in some 
respects, particularly in regard to our commerce with some 
of the Hanse towns," the policy had been disastrous. 1 
A discussion followed as to which committee should be 
entrusted with the memorial, the Foreign Relations 
committee, or its Commerce counterpart. Both chairmen 
tried to pass the buck, claiming that the other's 
committee was better suited to the task, and the eventual 
choice of the Commerce Committee proved disappointing, as 
that body failed to produce a report. Nevertheless the 
episode was a significant one. In the debate two future 
Secretaries of State had expressed opinions on reciprocal 
trade relations, providing hints as to how they might be 
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expected to respond to the issue when in office. 
Moreover, memorial activity had been successful in 
bringing the issue to the attention of Congress, in 
combination with the colonial trade affair. Over the next 
five years Congress would ponder these matters in tandem, 
although heavy workloads and partisan battles on other 
issues would prevent any constructive legislative action. 
Memorial activity in the years 1838 to 1844 revealed 
not only the discontent of shipping groups, but also a 
conviction that the federal government had powers to 
remedy the prevailing state of affairs. In the spring of 
1842, when the campaign was at its height, this belief 
became stronger still. J. Chickering of Newburyport urged 
Congressman Caleb Cushing that "nothing but the action of 
the Government is wanted to stay the destruction of the 
country." His colleague John Porter avowed that it was 
"in the power of Congress to relieve us in one week, and 
put the wheels of business again in motion." In 
Baltimore, meanwhile, Hugh Birckhead hoped that judicious 
policies would "revive the drooping and desponding spirits 
of our people," while The American, taking some solace 
from the fact that the issue had at least been broached, 
demanded the establishment of a better system of import 
duties and commercial regulations--"That constitutes now 
the first great duty of the Government." 2 
While the implication behind these entreaties was 
that Congress should act, there was some uncertainty as to 
the form that action could or should take. Both issues 
involved diplomatic as well as commercial questions--the 
colonial trade issue stemmed from the arrangement of 1830, 
while the reciprocity policy involved U.S. treaties with 
countries the world over--and so the Executive branch was 
likely to play an influential role in any modification of 
policy. Even so, the issues were commercial matters first 
and foremost, involving hardships suffered by important 
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interest groups, and the legislative body was 
traditionally the forum for consideration of such topics. 
Congress had several courses of action at its disposal, 
from the general publicising of the issues, to specific 
measures relevant to each in turn. 
Although the colonial trade arrangement of 1830 had 
been secured by diplomatic efforts, it rested solely upon 
the legislative basis of the prospective act passed in May 
1830. Congress could, therefore, request the Executive 
branch to ensure the proper enforcement of the terms of 
the act, which in itself might solve the problem of 
infractions, such as the abuse of the free port policy. 
Congress could also assess the effects of the arrangement 
and recommend that the State department attempt, through 
negotiation, to obtain a better deal. Ultimately Congress 
retained the power to repeal the act of 1830, to re-impose 
discriminating d~ties against British vessels coming frdm 
the colonies, or even to close down the trade altogether. 
The range of options with regard to the reciprocity 
policy was just as wide, but the supreme-law status of 
treaties limited the possible actions of legislators 
somewhat. Again, Congress could demand that the Executive 
branch put an end to any infractions of the treaties, but 
this would not have solved the problem of the quite 
legitimate involvement of foreign ships in the indirect 
carrying trade. In theory Congress could call for the 
abrogation of the treaties before they expired, but this 
would require the concurrence of the Executive. 
Abrogation would also entail the loss of the non-offensive 
elements of the relevant treaties, and it would most 
likely subject American shipping to retaliatory duties in 
foreign ports. The most realistic option for Congress, if 
it chose to act on the matter, lay in recommending that 
expired treaties not be perpetuated, and that any new or 
renewed treaties provide for different terms. The Senate 
could have a say in this through its ratification power. 
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Two courses of unilateral action open to Congress 
were likely to be more symbolic than effective. It could 
repeal the legislation of 1824 and 1828, but this would 
not remedy the main problems which lay in trades with 
countries already enjoying treaty relations with the 
United States. Repeal would send a message to the 
Executive branch, however, highlighting concerns about the 
policy of reciprocity. The same was true of the final 
option open to Congress, the imposition of extra 
discriminating duties by means of tariff legislation. 
Again this would affect only those trades not covered by 
treaty relations or by legislative provision of 
reciprocity, but it would signal the desire of Congress to 
afford greater protection to American shipping. 
The advocates of change proposed all these 
alternatives at various times. At first they were happy 
for Congress simply to investigate, to discover the true 
causes of their distress. But as depression gripped more 
tightly, they resorted to calls for the more extreme 
remedies, such as revision or abrogation of the reciprocal 
treaties, and the repeal of the act of 1830. Throughout, 
though, the conviction that Congress should act prevailed. 
Some hinted at the political rewards for successful 
action, or, more darkly, at the less welcome consequences 
of ignoring their interests. Again the crisis year of 
1842 witnessed the climax of this approach. Lewis 
McKenzie asserted that action would win the "thanks of all 
interested in Commerce." Joseph Sumner of Maine, noting 
that there was no other subject "about which we have so 
much enquiry, & which so much appears to engross the 
public mind in this state," called for retaliatory duties 
in the colonial trade: "Nothing could be done by the 
present Congress to render the administration so 
popular." Chickering also believed that returning the 
colonial trade to its pre-1830 condition would be a 
"popular act for the Administration."3 
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Any failure to tackle the problems confronting the 
nation as a whole and of shipping in particular would 
provoke a less favourable response. The confused 
political climate of the early 1840s, as Whigs battled 
Democrats and the nominal Whig President, "his accidency" 
John Tyler, sought a following of his own, often thwarted 
effective legislative action, laying Congress open to 
criticism. In 1842 John Porter complained that "Congress 
is spending its precious time in petty disputes and 
quarrels, while we the great & leading interests of the 
nation are neglected." If the Whig majority did not bury 
their differences and do something for the sake of their 
"suffering & bleeding country," then there would be "such 
an expression of public opinion throughout the country, as 
has not been had in your day or mine." The Whigs would 
"sink so low, that ••• even the crowns of their heads 
'will soon be out of sight.'"4 
A final method of enlisting Congressional support was 
the use of rhetoric designed to appeal to those not 
directly interested in shipping. Advocates of change 
realised that their problems were limited in impact to 
certain communities, and indeed to certain groups within 
some cities. In the economic context of the late 1830s 
and early 1840s, when most Americans had been touched by 
successive crashes and depressions, the champions of one 
group, and a fairly small one at that, were unlikely to 
win favours on the grounds of economic hardship alone. As 
their objective was a type of protection likely to 
increase the cost of carrying to producers and consumers 
alike, they tried to couch their appeals in terms which 
would attract the support of a wider constituency. 
On the most general level this involved pointing out 
the injustice of the prevailing situation. It was an 
affront to American sensibility to be denied liberal 
trading conditions, and Francis Grund went so far as to 
refer to "the evils under which the commerce of the U.S. 
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is now suffering • • • " More practical, though, were 
appeals to the general material interest. Shipmasters at 
New Orleans declared that under the current colonial 
arrangement "the commercial interests of our country do 
and will more and more suffer." Memorialists from 
Portsmouth claimed that it "does appear to impede our 
advancement to the climax of commercial prosperity." 
Meanwhile the Portland memorial called for a modification 
of the arrangement on terms which would "appear the most 
to conduce to the welfare and prosperity of these United 
States." The memorialists from Bangor illustrated how 
universal the importance of this matter was: 
Every citizen in the State who raises a bushel 
of potatoes or of grain, or cuts a cord of wood, 
or burns a cask of lime for exportation, or who 
fells a pine tree, or owns a ton in shipping, is 
deeply interested in this business, and is 
essentially _injured by5the present arrangement of the colonial trade. 
Memorialists and individual correspondents also 
claimed that healthy American shipping was vital for the 
survival of the nation. In 1844 the New York memorialists 
declared that the commercial marine constituted "the 
foundation of our national defence, while its strength and 
efficiency are so intimately connected with the 
preservation of national character and the maintenance of 
national security." The meeting in Baltimore in 1842 
resolved that protection of navigation was all the more 
important "from the fact that a flourishing Commercial 
marine must be looked to as the best nursery of seamen for 
the national navy in time of war." The memorialists from 
Portland agreed, describing the "hardy seamen of America," 
as "the right arm, the very strength of our defence on the 
ocean, the highway of nations." The sea was the nation's 
best means of defence; so "should not • • • our carrying 
trade, and particularly the coasting carrying trade, as 
well as our fisheries--these nurseries of our seamen--be 
protected, that their numbers may more rapidly increase?"6 
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Edward Carrington resorted to this line of argument 
in his series of letters to James Fowler Simmons. By 
persisting in the current policy "our Merchant Ships will 
have to be laid up or sold to foreigners--our ship 
Carpenters and Rope walks abandoned--and then where will 
be your Navy?--No seamen, no Carpenters, Caulkers, Riggers 
&c. &c." He returned to the point a week later: 
If we expect to maintain a Navy, we must have 
revenue and seamen, and without commerce we 
cannot have either--and if we expect to have a 
revenue, duties must be laid, and if commerce 
and seamen, our merchant ships must have the 
carrying of its own exports and Imports, under 
certain privilege~ foreign ships. 
This was vitally important because "in no other way can we 
be an independent nation and have the means of sustaining 
our independence." The remedy was obvious: "we must 
legislate for ourselves, work for ourselves, and defend 
ourselves as Citizens of our country." William Parker of 
Portsmouth, a correspondent of Daniel Webster, made a 
similar link of interest and policy, avowing that "the 
importance of our navigation may well entitle it, not 
merely to a fair field, but to especial favor." Yet 
currently even a fair field did not exist, as by the 
colonial trade arrangement "many and great advantages are 
now given ••• to our most active competitors."] 
References, such as Parker's, to the specific British 
threat to American interests were a common rhetorical 
device in this campaign. Fear of British influence was a 
potent force in the United States in the late 1830s and 
early 1840s. In commerce Britain seemed to represent the 
biggest obstacle to American fortunes. Besides the 
alleged results of the colonial trade arrangement there 
were suspicions that British diplomats were deliberately 
hampering the efforts of their U.S. counterparts to secure 
favourable commercial treaties in Latin America. The 
actions of Britain in China in 1840 only reinforced these 
fears, as she used naval power to seize Hong Kong and 
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force open other Chinese ports. So it was essential that 
the United States should not let Britain trample over 
their interests as well, although one Whig commentator, 
partly from partisan motives, asserted that Americans had 
''suffered too much already by a desire to succumb to 
British arrogance," as a result of the 1830 arrangement. 
The Bangor memorial catches the tone of these fears: 
The grasping insatiable power of Great Britain 
is beginning to be felt all around us. She is 
intruding herself upon our Northeastern and 
Northwestern frontier; she is dividing with us 
our foreign trade, and has the monopoly in some 
portions of our coasting trade, she preaches 
free trade to our manufacturers, but practises 
herself entire prohibition; she has extended her 
system of unequal laws and unequal privileges 
until the trade of the world has become 
tributary to her; and when the pen of her 
diplomatists has failed to succeed, the bay§net 
·of her soldier is brought into requisition. 
This ominous assessment reveals that there were 
greater perils endangering Anglo-American relations than 
commercial issues alone. Frontier disputes in both the 
Northeast and Northwest, with skirmishes across the 
Canadian border in 1837-38, had aroused genuine concern 
that war would break out until negotiations between 
Webster and Lord Ashburton defused most of the more 
explosive issues in the late spring of 1842. The most 
passionate memorials against the colonial trade 
arrangement were drafted before the negotiations, and were 
infused with the spirited assertion that U.S. policies 
should be modified so as to stop them fostering the 
navigation of a potential enemy. More immediately many 
feared that Britain would exploit another loophole in U.S. 
commercial laws to pose a direct threat to the nation, by 
means of her growing fleet of steam vessels. As Congress 
embarked upon five years of debating issues related to 
navigation, it was to be the question of British steamers 
which attracted the initial and most immediate attention. 
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For some years British steam vessels based in the 
Caribbean and the Maritime Provinces had been plying to 
and between Southern and Northern U.S. ports, carrying 
passengers and mail. Many Americans viewed this activity 
as damaging to the nation's commercial interests and 
questioned whether it was in contravention of the 
prohibition of foreign vessels from the coasting trade--
there were doubts as to whether that restriction applied 
to passengers and mail as well as goods. In the tense 
atmosphere of early 1842, though, critics aroused darker 
fears about British steamers. Expressing concern for the 
safety of the nation, Edward Carrington rated its maritime 
defences so inadequate as to be "at the mercy of any Small 
naval force, and particularly the Steam Navy of G. 
Britain." The defences of Norfolk, the Washington Naval 
Yard, New York, Newport, Boston and Portsmouth could all 
be by-passed by armed steamers, "in defiance of the 
present fortifications,'' and the cities and dockyards they 
"guarded" be bombarded and destroyed "before breakfast." 
He found the situation most threatening: 
Do our Government mean to allow British war 
steam ships, (under the name of mail packets, 
commanded by British Naval officers,) to visit 
all our most important Seaports, Sound out the 
channels of the Bays and Rivers, and become as 
well acquainted with the navigation as our own 
pilots--with our defences and localities of our 
harbors. 
If so, then the United States would "soon find ourselves 
in the predicament of the Chinese--& a British steamer 
will be going up the Hudson River, burn Albany, and return 
before morning." Expressing similar fears, the editor of 
the Baltimore Republican and Daily Argus likened British 
steamers to the Trojan Horse, posing a distinct military 
threat by their capacity to carry large numbers of men and 
munitions. He implored the "lazy drones" in Congress not 
to fall into sleepy oblivion and to devote time to debate 
the threat. 9 
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Congress paid heed to such pleas and in March 1842 
the House adopted two resolutions: one from Congressman 
Stanley of North Carolina calling on the Secretary of the 
Treasury to suggest legislation to secure the American 
monopoly of the coasting trade in goods and passengers; 
and the other from John Minor Botts of Virginia committing 
the Judiciary committee to investigate possible amendments 
to the revenue laws to prevent foreign steamers from 
carrying letters between U.S. ports. Early the following 
month the Commerce committee drafted its own bill with the 
same aims in mind.10 
This bill sparked off a heated debate when Stanley 
called it up on April 25. George Proffitt, a Tyler Whig 
from Indiana, described the bill's prohibition of foreign 
vessels from the carriage of passengers between American 
ports as "narrow and bigoted in its spirit, and altogether 
behind the age."· Millard Fillmore countered that the bill 
merely extended to passengers the same principle as 
existed for goods, a just retaliation to similar British 
regulations. A speech by Robert Rhett confirmed John 
Quincy Adams' opinion of Southern contributions to the 
debate--"in hatred of internal industry," and blazing out 
"for free trade and the rights of the citizen." Rhett 
refuted Fillmore's claims that the bill was retaliatory 
and condemned it, suspecting that its object was "to 
secure to our railroad companies the transportation of the 
passengers who now took passages on board the British 
steamers." This represented a serious threat to the "most 
enlarged personal liberty to travel where we would, and as 
we choose." After Caleb Cushing had spoken in favour of 
the measure on commercial and strategic grounds and Mark 
Cooper of Georgia had reiterated Rhett's arguments against 
it, the House voted to postpone consideration of the bill. 
As Congress became preoccupied with other business 
the coasting trade bill was neglected for the rest of the 
session. By the time Congress next met the Webster-
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Ashburton treaty had taken much of the urgency out of the 
question. There was a suggestion that a select committee 
look into the matter, but the proposed course of action 
revealed a change in approach. The urgent desire to 
prohibit British steam vessels was replaced by the view 
that it might be expedient to aid "individuals or 
companies in the establishment of lines of steam vessels, 
for the purpose of transporting the mail between some of 
our principal Northern and Southern ports to foreign ports 
on the Lakes and the Mississippi river." It was hoped, 
though, that these vessels could be built under Naval 
auspices and used as war steamers in future.11 
The issue had been transformed from one involving 
access to ports to one of subsidy to mail steamers, 
another major concern of shipping groups in the 1840s, but 
not directly connected to the issue of trading rights. 
The British steamer question did, however, signify 
Congressional interest in shipping matters in 1842, and 
that interest was seen also in attention given to the 
colonial trade and reciprocal navigation issues. Although 
little action resulted, the problems were discussed, 
solutions were proposed, and the issues did come under 
close legislative scrutiny for the first time, with the 
potential for influencing the way the federal government 
acted upon them. 
The two regular sessions of the 27th Congress, from 
December 1841 to March 1843, constitute the high point of 
legislative consideration of reciprocal navigation. For 
all the activity from 1838 onwards, the outcome of earlier 
sessions had been little more than fact-finding, with no 
suggestions of constructive remedies. No doubt this was 
partly because many did not know the true facts of the 
issues--as the House Foreign Affairs committee noted in 
1839 in calling upon the Secretary of the Treasury for a 
report, it could not make any positive recommendation for 
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action on the colonial trade issue out of "deficiency of 
exact information." Requesting information on commercial 
arrangements generally was an annual occurrence, as 
illustrated by a resolution proposed by Senator Thomas 
Hart Benton in 1838, calling upon the Secretary of State 
to report • • • the nature and extent of the 
privileges and restrictions of the commercial 
intercourse of the United States with all 
foreign nations, so as to show how far the 
commerce and navigation of this republic are 
favored and encouraged, or burdened 1~r restricted, in different countries. 
Similar resolutions introduced the matter to both 
chambers in the Special and first regular sessions of the 
27th Congress. But the latter session witnessed an 
acceleration of the process, as calls for information from 
Cabinet officers were supplemented by more specific 
resolutions for committee investigations. In the House 
John Pendleton Kennedy requested that the Committee of 
Commerce be charged with inquiring into the effects of 
recent tariffs, and "into ••• the past and present 
condition of our navigation," with a view to recommending 
"such measures as may be necessary to enlarge our 
commercial marine." Meanwhile in the Senate Levi Woodbury 
resolved that the Commerce committee be directed to 
inquire into the State of our tonnage, freights 
and commerce with foreign powers, and report 
whether it is prosperous or other wise, and the 
existing arrangements by treaties or laws in 
relation thereto; and also whether the 
regulations by other Governments, are equal and 
in conformity to the spirit of these 
arrangemen~s; and if.not ~o, y~at measures are 
proper to 1nsure rec1proc1ty. 
This heightened activity was mainly in response to 
the increase of memorial communication from distressed 
communities. Complaints of maritime hardship seem to have 
been loudest in early 1842, and although contemporaries 
would not have had the statistics for that year to hand, 
those figures do illustrate what was no doubt the 
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perception that foreign shipping was taking an increasing 
share of the American carrying business. 
But there were also political grounds for 
anticipating more action on the part of the 27th Congress. 
In 1841, for the first time, the Whigs had secured control 
of both houses as well as the Presidency in the form of 
first William H~nry Harrison, and then, after Harrison's 
most unfortunate demise, John Tyler. The Whigs were by 
renown the party more committed to the use of federal 
government powers to aid domestic interest groups, and in 
1841 their leaders in Congress proposed a complete 
overhaul of the political economy, with new policies lined 
up for banking and finance, the tariff, and distribution 
of land sales revenues for projects of internal 
improvement. Shippers hoped that changes in navigation 
policy might form a part of this revolution and 
intensified their efforts accordingly. 
Of course, the Whig programme was so broad as to 
raise doubts as to whether there would be time to 
accommodate navigation issues as well. These doubts were 
strengthened after the Special session of the 27th 
Congress in the summer of 1841, when arguments over a new 
national bank demonstrated that President Tyler was more 
out of line with Whig thinking than party leaders in 
Congress feared. However, even though this raised the 
spectre of vetoed legislation and slow progress, shippers 
still clung to hopes for action by a Whig Congress. 
Certainly they feared worse from the Democrats. After the 
1842 mid-term results had promised a Democratic House in 
the new Congress, one shipper avowed that "the present 
Congress ••• is our only hope, if legislation, is to be 
resorted to."14 
Moves in the House gave shipping groups cause for 
optimism in early 1842, as individuals and committees 
expressed fears similar to their own. William Pitt 
Fessenden introduced the memorial from Portland with 
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sympathetic words on this "subject ••• of great 
importance." He expressed concern at the growth of 
provincial shipping with the United States and deplored 
the crippling of the indirect trade with the British West 
Indies through other countries' island colonies. Worst 
hit by this development was New England, whose trade with 
the West Indies had "now become of little or no value." 
Meanwhile, a protectionist report on the tariff from the 
Committee on Manufactures revealed that a wider number of 
politicians than might have been imagined were familiar 
with the problems of reciprocity. The report asserted 
that a non-protective tariff would be as disastrous for 
manufacturing as the impact upon navigation of the 
reciprocal treaties, "under which we have lost a great 
part of the carrying trade of our own produce."15 
Events in the Senate no doubt dented the mood of 
optimism somewhat. The former Secretary of the Treasury· 
and now Senator from New Hampshire, Levi Woodbury, 
presented the Portsmouth memorial, but defended the policy 
of reciprocity and the colonial arrangement of 1830. The 
system of reciprocity was "the glory of the country," 
which in general had worked well despite infractions of 
its spirit. He gave his whole-hearted support to the 
principle of equality in world trade, even if it did 
result in American shippers not carrying as great a share 
as they might like. Indeed, "he showed how unreasonable 
it was to expect that the United States should own the 
tonnage or carrying trade of the whole world." Americans 
could expect no more than a "fair competition and such 
advantages as could be gained from superior skill, 
accommodation, and energy in competition with the vessels 
of less favored nations." As for the colonial trade, 
Woodbury believed the petitioners had a just complaint, 
"not so much of the arrangements themselves, as that 
arrangements ••• in respect to the British colonies 
••• were, on their side, unfairly carried into effect." 
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Overall, though, he perceived no grounds for concern. He 
cited figures showing how American tonnage was increasing 
both nationally and at the local level, in Maine and 
Massachusetts, and he expressed pleasure at the fact that 
American shipping carried two-thirds of the nation's trade 
as a whole, and the same proportion of the most important 
transatlantic business. 
Woodbury's stance should not occasion much surprise. 
As a loyal Jacksonian he had condemned the failure of the 
Adams administration to settle the colonial trade dispute, 
and had taken considerable pride in the far smoother 
implementation of reciprocity in the French colonial 
trade. To Woodbury Jackson's negotiations with Britain 
were a triumph, and he stood by the arrangement of 1830 
for the rest of the decade. His Treasury department 
report of 1839 uncovered little evidence to cast doubt on 
the usefulness of the arrangement, taking the line that 
the colonial trade was a matter of commerce which 
interested the whole country, and not just one of 
navigation important only to the East. Predictably he 
asserted that commerce as a whole had been the winner, 
with an increased share in the direct trade to the West 
Indies from the more southerly ports and higher levels of 
exportation of products both to Britain and the colonies. 
On top of political loyalty and statistical evidence, a 
genuine belief in free-trade principles convinced Woodbury 
that reciprocity and the colonial arrangement were 
inherently right. He even tried to attribute the 
healthier shipping statistics of the 1830s to lower levels 
of tariff duties compared to the 1820s, until James Fowler 
Simmons countered with the fact that as a result of the 
tariffs of 1832 and 1833 duties were actually higher in 
the later decade! 
Woodbury's general description of affairs was no 
doubt accurate: American tonnage did increase; the 
proportional share of entrances and clearances did not 
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fall to disastrous levels. As such his speech can be 
regarded as representative of the less vocal majority who 
found little to complain about in the current system, a 
stance later to find expression, again with free-trade 
overtones, in the second New York memorial of 1844. But 
apart from acknowledging certain British infractions of 
the arrangement of 1830, Woodbury did not really confront 
the specific criticisms of reciprocity. He gave less than 
convincing explanations of those statistics which did 
reveal heavy imbalances in favour of foreign shipping, and 
he offered little comfort to those shippers who did 
experience real distress.16 
While the Senate as a whole proved as unhelpful as 
Woodbury in this session, failing to broach either of the 
major issues affecting navigation, this was more than made 
up for by the attention given to both in the House. Two 
major reports emerged from the Foreign Affairs and 
Commerce committees, the first dealing exclusively with 
the colonial trade issue, the second with commercial 
affairs in general but with special emphasis on reciprocal 
navigation. Moreover, both reached conclusions which 
heartened the shipping fraternity. The reports, and 
especially their proposed solutions, reflected the 
personal and political interests of their authors, Caleb 
Cushing and John Pendleton Kennedy, with whom must lie 
much of the credit for the publicity given to navigation 
issues at this juncture. However, neither was able to 
mobilise sufficient support to secure legislative action, 
in what would become a familiar pattern of raised but 
thwarted hopes. 
On April 14, 1842 the Foreign Affairs committee 
presented House Report No.650 on the colonial trade, a 
long paper consisting of twenty pages of analysis and 180 
pages of supporting documentation. The report was 
nominally the committee's response to the memorial from 
Jabez Mowry and his fellow citizens of Lubec, but it 
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examined sixty years of Anglo-American relations over the 
colonial trade, as well as the more recent criticisms of 
the arrangement of 1830. 
As an important member of the committee since he 
entered the House in 1835, Caleb Cushing had received many 
letters on the colonial trade issue. However, his 
interest and concern derived from more than official duty 
alone. He was the representative of the Massachusetts 
maritime community of Newburyport, which despite the 
development of manufacturing remained proud of its sea-
faring tradition and still pursued commercial activities. 
Cushing was a fit representative, with friends and 
relatives in the town's commercial community and with his 
own interest in matters of commerce, travel and foreign 
affairs. His place on the Foreign Affairs committee 
nourished these interests, but later in the decade he was 
able to combine them in an even more active role as 
special U.S. minister to China, where he signed the 
commercially significant Treaty of Wanghia in 1843. 
The report opened with a fairly standard history of 
the colonial trade affair, before moving on to assess the 
effects of the 1830 arrangement. Cushing left no doubt as 
to his view, claiming that figures revealed "a remarkable 
and most extraordinary augmentation of the relative amount 
of British tonnage entered and cleared in the ports of the 
United States." This 500 per cent increase, compared to 
the 50 per cent growth in American tonnage, had occurred 
at a time when British shipping had performed badly 
elsewhere; indeed, "in her relations with the United 
States alone, have her commercial treaties proved 
beneficial to Great Britain." The wealth and population 
of the maritime provinces were booming and there was even 
evidence of Americans investing in British-registered 
shipping. From these facts Cushing concluded that there 
was "some inequality" in the existing arrangement, or that 
"for some other cause, those arrangements foster and 
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promote the navigation of Great Britain without being in 
the same way beneficial to that of the United States." 
After a less than critical examination of the 
charges made in the memorials and correspondence, Cushing 
presented a familiar list of "alleged" problems as the 
cause of the current situation: the abuse of free ports, 
the use of preferential duties, and the prohibition of 
certain products; and the more natural factors of 
geographical location and lower costs. His conclusion was 
forthright: "the existing arrangements ••• are 
prejudicial to the United States, by reason of their 
inequality, and their want of that just reciprocity, and 
that mutual participation of advantages which any state is 
entitled to demand, in its intercourse with all other 
independent states • • " It was, therefore, the 
committee's duty to inquire into the defective elements of 
the arrangement and suggest a proper remedy. 
In considering possible remedies Cushing was 
encouraged by the fact that the arrangement was founded on 
legislation which could be repealed or amended. As a 
result the arrangement could be treated as an experiment, 
and now he judged that 
the experiment has been sufficiently tried 
••• in the infliction of immense and still 
increasing injury to our commerce and navigation, 
the progress of which, if not arrested in time, 
will eventually place all our maritime resources 
at the mere discretion of Great Britain. 
As the outcome was "unequal, unjust, and injurious," so 
the United States had a right to respond to British 
restrictions, discriminations and regulations with 
measures of their own. However, Cushing and the committee 
shied away from immediate legislative retaliation, which 
was "the certain means of effectually guarding and 
securing the rights of the United States." Instead, out 
of "national comity," they called for friendly negotiation 
with Britain, proposing the following resolution: 
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That the President of the United States be, and 
he hereby is, requested to enter into 
negotiations with the British Government, for 
the purpose of effecting a permanent, equitable, 
and just conventional arrangement of the 
commerce between the United r7ates and the 
British Colonies in America. 
The prevailing diplomatic atmosphere demanded such 
restraint. The imminent negotiations between Daniel 
Webster and Lord Ashburton might afford an opportunity to 
discuss the matter. But, more importantly, there was 
concern that retaliatory measures would add more fuel to 
the smouldering relations between the two countries, even 
to the point of provoking the British to call off talks. 
It is also possible that Cushing was influenced by 
political motives. Negotiation would give the initiative, 
and the chance for glory, to the Executive branch, and in 
the political context of 1842 this suited Cushing 
perfectly. Originally an Adams supporter in the 1820s, he 
had been a fervent and regular Whig in the decade up to 
the summer of 1841. At that time he was faced with the 
choice of whether to support John Tyler as President, and, 
as did most Whigs, he backed him at first. But when Tyler 
alienated the bulk of the party with his successive bank 
vetoes in the Special session of 1841, Cushing took the 
brave step of standing by him. He trusted the President 
more than he did the Whig leader in Congress, Henry Clay, 
and this earned him the wrath of regular Whigs who 
labelled him "Democrat" when he voted the wrong way on 
party measures. His stance even cost him the reward for 
his loyalty, as the Whig-dominated Senate three times 
blocked his nomination as Secretary of the Treasury. His 
proposed resolution might, therefore, reveal a reluctance 
to allow Congressional Whigs to take the credit for a 
legislative remedy to the colonial trade issue, and a 
greater trust in the Executive department.18 
Although some regretted that it did not go further in 
its recommended actions, Cushing's report met with a 
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generally favourable response. One New York 
correspondent, a Mr. York, commended the report as "able 
and important," and trusted that Congress would adopt its 
conclusions. Benjamin Rich of Boston expressed the 
appreciation of the city's mercantile community for the 
sympathetic tone of the report, and Lewis McKenzie trusted 
that Cushing would earn "the thanks of all interested in 
commerce." Joseph Sumner declared that the report was 
"just the thing" to show that the subject was "so well 
understood at Washington," but he thought more positive 
action should be taken: "Negotiation appears too tardy a 
remedy to meet the wants of the Country." He called for 
the levying of an extra tonnage duty upon foreign vessels, 
to put more pressure on Britain during the proposed 
negotiation. Joseph Noyes, the former Congressman from 
Eastport, suggested a similar course and claimed that the 
chances of success would have been much greater if Cushing 
had recommended that the President give notice of 
termination of the arrangement. This would have convinced 
Ministers of the "necessity of prompt action," whereas 
without such pressure the British government, knowing that 
the system favoured their shipping, would "not be likely 
to be in any hurry to enter into negotiation."19 
Issued six weeks later, the Commerce committee 
report, on the "Commerce and Navigation" of the United 
States, was more responsive to the calls for immediate 
positive action. As a result of the committee's wider 
brief it ranged over a much broader field of topics than 
Cushing's report. Moreover, the scope of the paper 
reflected the wide interests and talents of the committee 
chairman, John Pendleton Kennedy, Congressman from 
Maryland. 
Kennedy has been woefully neglected in studies of the 
politics of the early 1840s, despite the fact that he 
played an active, if short-lived, part in the partisan 
battles of that period. His fame rests almost exclusively 
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on his literary merits as the prolific author of the 
1830s, Mark Littleton. Born in Baltimore into the famous 
Pendleton familiy of Virginia, a rich uncle's legacy freed 
him from an unrewarding legal career, allowing him to 
pursue a gentle life of local service, literary 
pretension, and political dabbling. He sat in Maryland's 
House of Delegates in 1820. In 1838 he was elected to 
complete the congressional term of the deceased Isaac 
McKim, and although he failed to secure re-election for 
the next term, he did win a seat in 1840, and re-entered 
the House for the first of two terms in 1841. 20 
By personal interest and political inclination 
Kennedy supported active government involvement in the 
economy. His father, a Scotch-Irish immigrant, had been a 
merchant until his bankruptcy in 1809. Kennedy's 
truncated legal career brought him into contact with the 
broad spectrum of Baltimore's economic life so graphically 
illustrated by the mass meeting of 1842, whose memorial 
Kennedy presented in Congress. Even his two marriages 
reinforced these connections, first in 1824 to Mary 
Tennant, from a leading mercantile family, and, after her 
death, to Elizabeth Long, daughter of a manufacturer of 
Ellicott Mills, Maryland. Originally a supporter of John 
Quincy Adams in 1828, Kennedy became a Whig and a close 
friend of Henry Clay, backing his "American System" of 
economic measures. As early as 1830 he wrote a political 
tract attacking Churchill Cambreleng's free-trade report 
of that year. In the prologue to the 1842 report he 
recorded the remarkable spectacle of an energetic country 
enduring "deep suffering in every department of industry," 
and predictably he blamed this upon "some most unhappy 
mistakes in the policy of the Government." He referred, 
of course, to Jacksonian policies on banking and finance, 
although he also feared the effects of the compromise 
tariff of 1833 whose reductions really started to bite in 
1841-42. As a remedy he espoused the regular Whig 
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measures of sounder banking policy with a national bank, 
currency reform, land sales reform, and a more protective 
tariff.21 
In the light of these economic policy preferences, 
Kennedy's stance during the turmoil of the Tyler 
administration was understandable. On hearing the news of 
Harrison's death, Kennedy despaired, and from the first he 
harboured grave doubts about Tyler--"He is reputed an 
obstructionist of the worst school of Virginia." When 
Tyler vetoed the Bank bill in 1841, Kennedy went on to the 
offensive, attacking the President in a two-volume 
diatribe illustrating his treachery and duplicity. He 
never slackened in his assault on Tyler, and not 
surprisingly it led to the collapse of all civil relations 
between the two, as the President refused to receive 
Kennedy in the White House and as their two families 
pointedly ignored each other in the street. Kennedy's 
hatred of Tyler also affected his relations with Daniel 
Webster, whose talents he admired, but whose conduct gave 
cause for concern when he refused to resign as Secretary 
of State after the debacle of the Special session of 1841. 
Thereafter Kennedy doubted Webster's motives, accusing him 
of jealousy of Clay's influence, and he never really 
trusted his official actions. Such distrust coloured 
Kennedy's attitude to the Executive branch as a whole and 
inclined him to propose legislative solutions to the 
problems addressed in the Commerce committee report. 22 
The first fifth of the report looked at the general 
state of the economy, for, as Kennedy noted, "Commerce, 
navigation, domestic industry in all its departments, have 
equally suffered •••• " But the main focus was on the 
specific problems confronting the interests of navigation, 
in general trade and more narrowly in the colonial trade. 
Kennedy did not go fully into the latter subject, 
deferring to the "very full and satisfactory report" 
produced by the Foreign Affairs committee. But he did 
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express his frustration that American shipping was 
excluded from the trade of the British empire and 
especially from the indirect routes from Britain to the 
United States by way of colonies to the north and in the 
Caribbean. He called for the trade be put on a just basis 
and demanded that either American shipping be allowed "to 
participate with her in this carriage of ~ ~ 
commodities from and to any part of her dominions," or 
"regulations should be adopted which shall prevent her 
from monopolizing that carriage to herself." Failing a 
new arrangement, Kennedy thought it preferable to return 
to the conditions which had prevailed before 1830, which 
could be no worse than the current position. Britain 
should grant true reciprocity in the form of access to 
direct trade to all colonial ports, and more 
optimistically 
the privilege of carrying freely from the 
British colonies to the mother country, to all 
other British colonies, and to all foreign 
countries, all commodities of the same class or 
description as those which are ordinarily 
imported by the British colonies from the United 
States, on the same terms that British vessels 
may carry them. 
These terms would have entailed Britain scrapping her 
Navigation system completely, and Kennedy recognised that 
this was expecting too much. So he lowered his sights and 
proposed a bill to put pressure on Britain to make limited 
changes. In setting out the future conditions for equal 
treatment of British vessels in the colonial trade it 
aimed to remedy two of the alleged causes of distress. 
Reciprocity was only to operate in the direct trade with 
the colonies: no British ship arriving in a U.S. port 
from Britain could take a cargo of American products to 
the colonies--only American vessels, and British vessels 
coming from a colony, could take American goods back to 
it; and British vessels arriving in U.S. ports from a 
colony would only receive equal treatment after giving 
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bond that they would return direct to that colony rather 
than sail to Britain. In other words this measure would 
eliminate the advantage accruing to British vessels in the 
transatlantic trade from the triangular route via the 
colonies. The second element was more straightforward, in 
that it confronted the well-known abuse of the free port 
system: the bill required that close attention be given 
to the port of origin of British ships from the colonies, 
and that any vessels clearing from ports which were not on 
the free port list should be prohibited.23 
The bill made no attempt to remedy the problem of the 
use of preferential duties, but as it stood it won the 
plaudits of interested parties. Joseph Sumner admitted 
that he did not entirely understand its import but liked 
the idea that failure to meet its terms "throws us back to 
the same condition as to our intercourse with the 
Colonies, in which it was held previous to the year 1830." 
Theodore Chalk of Boston supported the use of bonds to 
ensure that ships from the colonies did not carry on with 
a circuitous route to Liverpool. And Henry Lee supported 
the measure, which left shipowners only wanting 
an attempt to obtain £l negotiation such 
modifications of the British colonial System as 
will give them the benefit of the recirrocitr 
~rinciple--according to an honest andibera 
1nterpretation of that term--and perhaps obtain 
some changes in our commercial relations with 
other powers. 
On the question of a negotiated settlement, it is likely 
that Kennedy would have disagreed with Lee, for surely the 
bill reflected his own political prejudices at the time. 
Rather than allowing the hated Tyler and the ambitious 
Webster to take the credit for a solution of this matter, 
Kennedy put his faith in legislative action. This 
displayed not only his own personal animosity to the 
President, but also the Whig tendency since the days of 
"King Andrew" to place more trust in Congress than in the 
Executive branch. Moreover, as his report reveals, the 
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same motivation influenced his contribution to the debate 
on reciprocal navigation as well.24 
If Kennedy disagreed with Lee on the proper approach 
to the colonial trade issue, he concurred in his hope for 
"some changes in our commercial relations with other 
powers." Here Kennedy again revealed a preference for 
legislative regulation of the country's overseas commerce. 
Reviewing the early years of American policy, he noted 
that one striking feature was that "the whole subject of 
trade and navigation was always kept within the control of 
Congress, and might be altered, relaxed, or enforced as 
the circumstances of the time and the case might render 
expedient." Only after 1815 had the United States pursued 
treaty-making on a wide scale, but now Kennedy asked 
whether reciprocity ought not to be subject to the 
legislative power of the countries involved, so that each 
"might be at liberty to discard them upon any inducement." 
As things stood, treaties secured reciprocal terms 
"against temporary changes or repeal." 
From the tenor of these remarks it was plain that 
Kennedy did not look favourably upon reciprocal 
navigation. He declared the policy to be an experiment 
which had failed on two counts. The first was that there 
remained certain important trades not covered by 
reciprocal terms, including most colonial trades and the 
indirect trade of Britain. Ironically these omissions 
were probably for the best, because analysis of shipping 
statistics and certain trade routes provided sad evidence 
of the second count of failure. Foreign vessels trading 
in U.S. ports were exhibiting "an extraordinary increase," 
an increase displaying a "steadiness ••• indicating no 
temporary or occasional impulse, but some permanent source 
of vigor." In trade with France and Britain American 
navigation grew at a slower rate than its rivals, but in 
some trades it actually declined at the expense of Danish, 
Swedish, Prussian, Russian, Dutch and Hanseatic shipping. 
-153-
This aroused fears of the anomalous situation in which 
American commerce was "chiefly sustained by the ships and 
seamen of transatlantic nations." As there was still 
plenty of carrying to be done, Kennedy could only surmise 
that there were "other active and efficient causes at work 
to increase the employment of foreign shipping and, to a 
certain extent, to supplant our own." 
From the statistics he discerned two clear patterns: 
That, our navigation in general has fared best 
in our commerce with those nations with whom we 
have not negotiated reciprocity treaties •••• 
That the results have been most to our 
disadvantage where the reciprocal privilege has 
been established on the broadest scale. 
Certain aspects of current policy Kennedy agreed with: 
mutual access to ports; consular privileges; and "most 
favoured nation" status in import duties. However, he 
considered equal treatment for foreign shipping less 
desirable. Even in the direct trade there were 
circumstances to justify exceptions to the accepted 
practice of not imposing discriminating duties. As a 
general rule, though, Kennedy considered that it was "a 
safe and useful restriction • • • to confine that 
privilege, of exemption from discrimination, to the 
importations of cargoes, the growth, produce, ~ 
manufacture of the nation from whence they are brought." 
Offering reciprocity in the indirect trade granted "a very 
important boon to any nation," as had been illustrated 
only too graphically by the speed with which small 
maritime powers, with lower shipping costs and little 
trade of their own, had signed treaties with the United 
States. Larger shipping powers such as Britain, France 
and Spain, not enjoying competitive advantages, had 
entered into limited arrangements, maintaining some degree 
of protection for their shipping. 
In the light of this analysis Kennedy hoped Congress 
would "discard whatever error of theory or practice it may 
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be convinced has crept into the administration of this 
branch of our polity." He reiterated his conclusion: 
"the facts would seem to disabuse the public mind of an 
impression that the reciprocity system founded· on treaty 
has, under any circumstances, produced a positive benefit 
to this country." Indeed, those facts demonstrated that 
even at its best the system was "but an arrangement 
recommended to the adoption of foreign nations by its 
value to them." The picture was gloomy, as American 
harbours filled with foreign flags, as mechanics and 
artisans were thrown out of work, and as naval 
preparedness was jeopardised. If "timely legislation" did 
not provide a remedy, then Americans would be confronted 
with the terrible sight of "the laying up of our own 
shipping to rot at our docks." 
Kennedy did not propose legislation, however; but 
rather two resolutions for Congress to consider. The 
first called on the President to give a year's notice for 
the termination of certain treaties already expired by 
their original terms but still in operation by means of 
perpetuating clauses. All were treaties offering 
reciprocity in the indirect trade to the countries of 
northern Europe. Any such treaties still in force by 
virtue of their original terms could be re-considered when 
the expiry date approached. Significantly, Kennedy 
excepted the treaties with Latin America, which "have 
produced no inconvenience, and may therefore be left upon 
their present basis." The second resolution set down the 
guiding principle that in any future treaties reciprocity 
should be limited to the direct trade only. Kennedy made 
plain that each case could be judged on its merits and so 
was insistent that the indirect reciprocity act of 1828 be 
left in place, in order that the United States could apply 
those terms when desirable, while keeping the subject 
within the control of Congress: this would "enable us, at 
once, to correct any injurious effect which might result 
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in any particular case to the detriment of our commerce or 
shipping."25 
The subsequent history of Cushing and Kennedy's 
proposed remedies set a persistent and frustrating trend 
in legislative action on matters relating to navigation. 
It was fateful that the issues were raised during one of 
the busiest periods in congressional history, at a time 
when the unique position of the President placed 
legislation more at the mercy of partisan politics than 
normal. Despite the fact that the first regular session 
of the 27th Congress was the longest on record, lasting 
well into August, navigation-related issues were crowded 
out by matters of more immediate importance. In 1842 it 
was the tariff which took first priority. The same 
occurred in later sessions, such as in 1843 when a 
warehouse bill, the repeal of the bankruptcy law, and 
general appropriation measures pushed reciprocity to one 
side. In the summer of 1842 there was also the diplomatic 
situation to consider, with even the most passionate 
advocates of legislative action being wary of the effect 
hostile bills might have upon the negotiations between 
Webster and Lord Ashburton. Together, the political and 
diplomatic environments blocked further progress on both 
the issues of most importance to shipping groups.26 
Kennedy presented his report on May 28 and introduced 
his bill and resolutions six days later. On June 8 
Cushing opened the way for discussion of the colonial 
trade affair by proposing that his resolution be referred 
to the Committee of the Whole, which, having Kennedy's 
bill before it already, could "determine between the 
alternative propositions." Kennedy agreed to the 
referral, which the House voted in the affirmative, but 
only after a passionate, two-day debate. Francis Pickens, 
while not denying that a problem existed, did deny the 
House's right to call upon the President to negotiate upon 
any matter. The House could only ask for information, 
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whereas "it was the business of the President ••• by and 
with the advice and consent of the Senate" to initiate and 
undertake negotiations. If Congress passed the 
resolution, "they were treading upon ground which they 
were unfit to tread upon." William Pitt Fessenden opposed 
Cushing's memorial from a quite different perspective. He 
was "opposed to any negotiation of this matter, and, 
principally, upon the ground that it would be useless to 
attempt to settle it by negotiation." He called on ex-
President Adams to back his opinion that it was essential 
to "proceed to legislate, and place our commerce upon that 
footing of equality which it ought to have." Adams 
obliged, agreeing that he wanted "peremptory legislation 
••• in opposition to legislation on the part of Great 
Britain," and "preliminary to negotiations for the reason 
that negotiation had failed to produce any effect." 
Fessenden's ·Maine colleague, the Democrat Joshua 
Lowell, sounded a less positive note. Even without the 
advantages enjoyed by British shippers on paper, their 
cheaper vessels, more expendable in heavy seas, their 
lower crew costs, and their familiarity with the geography 
of the Maritime Provinces would afford them a competitive 
edge over American rivals. He saw no harm in trying to 
remedy the existing abuses and so proposed, for the short 
term, tougher enforcement of the 1830 act against 
infractions of the free port system, followed by 
negotiation of the type proposed by Cushing. But if 
Kennedy's bill, as he understood it (though not having 
read it himself), threatened a return to non-intercourse 
conditions, then to pass it without first informing 
Britain of U.S. dissatisfaction with the arrangement would 
be "a rash, hasty, and ill advised proceeding on our 
part." It might hurt British interests, but it would hurt 
their own more, at the cost of increasing "the already 
excited ill-feelings of our British neighbours,"· and of 
adding "another to the long list of controversies now 
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pending between our two countries." Avowing his free-
trade beliefs, he concluded that legislation could only be 
justified on the ground of "uncontrollable necessity" and 
that it would never receive his support, "except as a 
dernier resort, when all reasonable measures shall have 
been tried and failed."27 
Lowell's warnings seemed to find their mark. When 
Kennedy eventually got the floor for debate on his bill at 
the end of June, he yielded to John Quincy Adams for 
discussion of French spoliation claims. Some time after 
the session Kennedy confided to his journal why he had 
postponed consideration of his bill and resolutions until 
December: "I did not call up these questions during the 
session because I thought they might lead to a debate 
unfriendly to the negotiation ••• ," by which he meant, 
of course, the Webster-Ashburton talks, and not any 
specifically devoted to the colonial trade issue.28 
Perhaps predictably it was the tariff bill, passed 
with other interests in mind, which provided the only 
legislation affecting reciprocity in this session. Even 
this measure was almost the victim of the partisan battles 
of the day, as Tyler vetoed two bills and as Whigs of 
different stamps in the House and Senate struggled to find 
a solution acceptable to him. There had been calls for 
the tariff to incorporate an increase, to 20 per cent, of 
the discriminating duty on the shipping of countries not 
enjoying reciprocity, and for an increase in special 
discriminations imposed on trade from the Orient. Senator 
James Fowler Simmons drafted a bill which would have 
imposed an extra five per cent duty on "teas imported from 
other places than those beyond the Cape of Good Hope, or 
in vessels other than those of the United States," as 
protection for American vessels against foreign shipping 
in the direct tea trade and against the indirect import of 
tea in British ships via Britain. Furthermore the usual 
ten per cent discrimination was to be doubled for goods 
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other than teas corning from beyond the Cape of Good Hope. 
The House bill drafted by Millard Fillmore was less 
generous to shipping, by making all importation of tea 
duty-free. Supporters of the rest of the bill hoped that 
changes could be made, "particularly in what may affect 
the shipping interest," and eventually the two chambers 
reached a compromise: despite the opposition of some such 
as John Calhoun, teas, coffees, and other oriental goods 
would be entered duty free when carried by American 
vessels, but under a 20 per cent ad valorem duty in 
foreign ships. This measure raised considerable problems 
of interpretation, when Dutch, Danish, and Austrian 
vessels, carrying these articles in routes covered by 
reciprocal terms, were charged the duty. Diplomatic 
representations and embarrassed letters from the State 
department to the Treasury department brought this 
infraction to an ·end, and there were also moves in 
Congress to refund duties wrongly paid.29 
Apart from the tariff, the first regular session of 
the 27th Congress had provided no effective action on 
issues involving navigation. However, the efforts of 
Cushing, Kennedy, and others had alerted Congress to their 
importance, and the flood of memorials from various 
meetings over the winter of 1842-43 reinforced the 
message. When the second session started, in December 
1842, Congress had ready-made options to hand. But, 
again, partisan politics, a full legislative programme, 
and diplomatic events were to overshadow issues of concern 
to shipping. 
In the case of the colonial trade issue, diplomatic 
developments elsewhere took over. Webster had not touched 
on the matter with Lord Ashburton in Washington, but now 
there were hints from London that another special mission 
might be possible, to discuss Oregon in the main, but also 
commercial questions. Webster approached Cushing and 
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Adams, the ranking members of the Foreign Affairs 
committee, for an appropriation for a mission, expressing 
optimism that Britain was "ready to talk to us on the 
subject of the Colonial trade." 
Webster was less optimistic about the prospects of 
getting money from Congress. Both Democrats and regular 
Whigs would be wary of financing a diplomatic initiative 
which might bring the Tyler administration great prestige. 
There were also policy grounds for opposing the mission. 
Whigs feared that the mutual reduction of import duties 
might constitute part of such talks. As the Whig 
protectionist band had only just got the tariff they 
wanted, they would be loath to see their handiwork undone 
by events beyond their reach. Finally, many Democrats 
expressed dissatisfaction with the "sell-out" of American 
interests in the Treaty of Washington, which they 
considered unjust, dishonourable, and disgraceful. So 
then Webster had good cause to state that "at the present 
temper of the two Houses, I exceedingly doubt whether the 
vote wd. be carried." Indeed, there were "a great many 
people in this country who want war with England; & many 
more who desire to keep up the agitation," who would 
therefore be likely to "oppose all extraordinary efforts 
to settle difficulties." 
Proceedings in Congress bore out these fears. Some 
continued to call for legislative retaliation in the 
colonial trade, to put pressure on Britain to listen to 
American arguments. But although Webster's proposed 
mission accorded with Cushing's view on how the United 
States should proceed, when he and Adams put the question 
of an appropriation to the Foreign Affairs committee, they 
received support only from Isaac Holmes. The call for the 
appropriation died. From then on the colonial trade 
received congressional attention only in discussions on 
the wider issue of reciprocity in general.30 
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On that issue the Senate proved slightly more active 
than in the previous session. Woodbury, declaring it to 
be an important inquiry "which concerned the whole 
country, but especially the Northern portion of the 
country," charged the Commerce committee with an 
investigation of the regulation of commerce. But he gave 
no signs of having changed his earlier opinions. More 
encouraging for those critical of reciprocity must have 
been the actions of Senator Merrick of Maryland, who in 
successive days introduced a bill "providing for a system 
of reciprocal commercial intercourse with foreign nations" 
and a copy of Kennedy's resolutions. But the Senate again 
shied away from immediate action and passed a resolution 
from the Commerce committee, discharging the committee 
from further consideration of the matter and referring it 
instead to the Secretary of State, for later report. 31 
It was left ~o John Kennedy in the House to take up 
the cudgels for his resolutions. Frustrated by repeated 
procedural objections to his attempts to make the 
resolutions the special order for the day, only after a 
month did Kennedy finally take the floor. In an hour-long 
speech, considered "able and elaborate" by John Quincy 
Adams, he reverted to the themes of his report to review 
the history and effects of the reciprocity policy. He 
claimed that some countries, notably Britain, encouraged 
reciprocity in others while not adhering to it themselves, 
and he warned that to put the policy into practice in full 
would be to fall into a "snare" set by British statesmen. 
The policy had had only harmful effects, and he blamed the 
failure to recognise that fact upon the mistaken view that 
the United States built and manned ships at a competitive 
rate. Adverting again to the dangers of placing 
reciprocity on the treaty basis, he repeated his remedy, 
as encapsulated in his resolutions of the first session. 
The main thrust of the short debate which followed 
was that there was inadequate time to see the matter 
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through to a conclusion. Cushing said a few words in 
favour of passing the resolutions, but others were quick 
to dismiss them. McKeon, a Democrat from New York, 
claimed there was "scarcely time to effect much good 
legislation thereon;" the Kentucky Whig Triplett also 
considered it "too late to effect much at this advanced 
period of the session;" and Millard Fillmore, anxious that 
the House proceed to other business, moved to discharge 
the Committee of the Whole from consideration of the 
matter. He averred that it was "apparent to all that this 
resolution could not be passed, or sufficiently discussed 
at this late period of the session; and that it delayed 
the action of the House on objects of indispensable 
necesssity." His motion passed, leaving the issue of 
reciprocal navigation to lie on the table.32 
Robert Winthrop was disgusted at these proceedings. 
He informed Thomas Lamb in Boston that the debate on the 
issue had been "arrested forcibly" and "very summarily 
disposed of," all because the House had been so busy that 
it was "unwilling to spend any time upon it." Kennedy 
left no record of his feelings at the failure of his 
efforts. Even so, the political developments of the 
session still made it one of the "most extradordinary 
chapters in our annals," as he witnessed the separation 
between Tyler and the Whigs ripening "into the deadliest 
hostility."33 
Political developments also affected the composition 
of the 28th Congress, and by the time reciprocity next 
arose as an issue a new cast of characters had taken the 
legislative stage. But the resulting drama was very 
similar. The changed political environment in 1843-45 
created even more confusion for those seeking legislative 
favours. John Tyler was still President, of course, and 
the Senate still had a Whig majority, but this remained a 
recipe for instability, not effective legislative action. 
The new Democratic majority in the House now raised the 
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prospect of inter-chamber disputes as well. The chances 
for constructive legislation were bleak, and apart from 
Democratic attempts to revise the tariff, little action 
was anticipated. Kennedy's assessment of the first 
session appears to bear out those anticipations: 
A dull session followed ending 17th June. A 
session of negations and do nothings. A 
miserable House of Representatives. A 
tyrannical domineering of the Loco Majority--a 
majority of sixty--! was on no Committee--so had 
nothin§4to do but look on, and laugh with Mr. Adams. 
It was possible, of course, that an issue not known 
to raise party hackles, such as reciprocal navigation, 
might receive more attention in a less busy session. The 
issue was still in the public eye, as memorials from New 
York, Boston and Alexandria demonstrated. Even if this 
represented a fall-off in memorial activity, the collected 
body of previous memorials remained on record. Moreover, 
a note of controversy had been added to the debate, as the 
supporters of reciprocity demanded recognition in the 
second New York memorial. Senator Silas Wright reflected 
this split when he presented the anti-treaty memorial: he 
admitted that he was "bound in candor to say, that he had 
entertained opinions different from those expressed by the 
memorialists," however impressive the experience and force 
of sentiment of that group. With opinions divided, the 
issue appeared ripe for discussion.35 
The people likely to be involved in any decisions 
about reciprocal navigation at this point had also 
changed. In place of the sympathetic Webster there was a 
new Secretary of State, Abel Upshur, whose views on the 
issue were as yet unknown. As Kennedy noted, he was no 
longer Chairman of the Commerce committee, his mantle 
having been assumed by Isaac Holmes. Holmes showed some 
signs of action on the matter, by having printed a section 
from a report from the new Secretary of State critical of 
the treaties, and by deputing a member of the committee to 
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investigate the issue. Kennedy, however, became impatient 
at the lack of progress and requested, unsuccessfully, the 
consideration of his old resolutions.36 
The most significant contribution to the navigation 
question in the 28th Congress came from Charles Jared 
Ingersoll, the veteran Pennsylvanian Jacksonian, who now 
became the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs committee. 
While reflecting the largely non-partisan nature of the 
issue, this development was somewhat ironic in view of 
Ingersoll • 13-~i!"elations with Kennedy, who described him as 
"a most absurd buffoon" for his attacks in 1846 upon 
Webster's alleged use of secret funds to procure a 
favourable reaction to the Treaty of Washington in 1842. 
On matters of commerce Ingersoll was well-informed, if not 
always consistent. He had supported heavy protective 
duties at the Harrisburg convention in 1827, but had later 
moderated his demands for protection in order to 
conciliate Southern opponents of the tariff. He was, 
though, a consistent advocate of the use of diplomacy to 
obtain commercial favours, and in 1845 expressed his 
dissatisfaction at the record of American ministers and 
charges abroad who neglected their duties in search of 
pleasure and social intercourse. It was not surprising, 
therefore, that he advocated the use of special commercial 
agents overseas to promote markets for American exports. 
In 1844, with a whole range of diplomatic and commercial 
matters under his gaze, he revealed sentiments sympathetic 
to the critics of the reciprocity policy.37 
His response was much like Kennedy's, as he 
introduced the following resolution: 
That the President of the United States be 
requested, as soon as it can be done amicably and 
without just cause of complaint, to rescind the 
reciprocity treaties subsisting between the Hanse 
towns, Denmark and Sweden, and the United States, 
and to procure such a modification of that with 
Great Britain as will open the trade between her 
colonies and the United State with Great Britain. 
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If the response was the same, then so too was the outcome. 
Two attempts to suspend rules in order to have his 
resolution made the special order for the day were 
defeated, and the matter was laid to rest on the table.38 
In this abrupt fashion the issue of reciprocal 
navigation slipped from the legislative agenda, in this 
form at any rate, for the next four years. This was not 
the result of lack of interest in the matter. In July 
1844 Abbott Lawrence requested from Kennedy advice on 
which bits of his 1842 report to publish in abridged form 
for Rhode Island shippers who felt "sensibly the operation 
of our foreign arrangements touching the carrying trade," 
and were "ready to make an effort to place our tonnage 
upon a rational foundation." Ingersoll touched on the 
question in a speech in 1845, expressing concern at the 
relatively slow increase of American tonnage as a 
result of, among·other things, British monopoly of steam 
navigation, false measurement of tonnage, dearer ship-
building, and the "extremely detrimental reciprocity 
treaties with many small navigating States •••• " This 
was just one way in which "foreign commerce was lost sight 
of by government." He made plain, though, that his 
concern was for commerce as a whole, and indeed the speech 
was made in support of a call for an appropriation for 
special commercial agents, with whose help in promoting 
trade in general the "marine and navigation of this 
country must surpass all others." Ingersoll's speech was 
to herald a new era of commercial diplomacy, especially in 
U.S. relations with Germany. But the speech also 
highlighted the fact that the state of navigation was not 
dependent on legislative action alone. Diplomatic efforts 
could also alter the position of American shipping in 
relation to foreign rivals. What is more, for the past 
seven years the State department had undertaken 
significant changes in the reciprocal navigation policy as 
applied through diplomatic arrangements.39 
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Chapter 5. The Diplomatic Response, 1837-1845: 
Reciprocity on Hold 
On May 18, 1843, over one hundred of the leading 
lights of Baltimore's mercantile community attended a 
public dinner. After the traditional toasts the Chairman, 
Robert Gillmore, introduced their guest as a man who had 
rendered "eminent services ••• to our country, and 
indeed, to the whole commercial world." Amidst great 
applause and loud cheers Daniel Webster rose and proceeded 
to offer some suggestions "touching the commercial 
interests of the country, and the policy in regard to them 
which the time demands." Proclaiming the "essential 
connection" between all forms of economic pursuit, he 
deemed it essential that the prosperity of commerce be the 
highest and most important consideration for all public 
men and intelligent citizens. He was encouraged by the 
fact that forces ~11 over the world were combining to 
produce an age "in which governments and individuals are 
thinking more of benefiting themselves than of annoying or 
destroying their enemies," a trend illustrated by the 
increase in commercial treaties in recent years. Now it 
was the duty of the federal government to respond to that 
trend by adopting a system of policy beneficial to all 
parts of the country: 
eminently favorable to agriculture, to the 
grain-growing and plantation States; reasonably 
favorable also to the manufacturing and 
commercial interest; and if we could make an 
impression on it that should last for twenty 
years, we would soon have a much better state of 
things than we have seen for years and years past. 
When he came to the future direction of policy 
towards commerce and navigation, Webster knew the mood of 
his audience well. He concluded by attacking earlier 
mistakes of policy and left no doubt as to his views on 
treaties of reciprocal navigation, claiming it to be his 
"strongest belief that all this principle of supposed 
reciprocity in the carrying trade ••• is wrong--a 
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mistake from the beginning, and injurious to the great 
interests of the country." Referring to the direct trade 
to Bremen, a topic bound to strike a painful chord with 
his audience, he ran through the usual arguments against 
the policy and asserted that the treaties should be 
terminated, leaving the subject "open for new negotiation 
or for such provisions as Congress may see fit to adopt." 
Amidst growing applause he envisaged a glorious future: 
We are destined, I trust, to act in the world 
the part of a great maritime nation. We have no 
inferior game to play--no subordinate part to 
act. It is no assumption to say, either, that 
in whatever respects commerce and the seas, and 
the character exhibited upon the seas, for 
national defence or national glory ••• we may 
have rivals, but we admit no superior! 
Straining to make himself heard, he concluded by warning 
how policy should be directed to that glorious end: 
How are we to do this without founding for 
ourselves a wise, a cautious, a comprehensive 
policy, not marked on the one hand by narrowness 
or meanness of spirit, nor on the other by an 
excessive or foolish liberality; a policy that 
shall rear up and maintain and furnish 
employment to a body of seamen who are to defend 
our rights where assailed on the boundless ocean? 1 
Although Webster had resigned a few days before 
attending the dinner, the speech still aroused much 
interest. Foreign governments and commentators believed 
Webster's recent position gave the speech the "character 
of a semi-official document," and it was included in lists 
tracing shifts in U.S. attitudes on reciprocity. At home, 
the speech was viewed more as a political event. John P. 
Kennedy, in whose estimation Webster had fallen to an all-
time low, believed the dinner had been arranged originally 
to rally support for Tyler, but that it had failed because 
Webster's resignation had scared many Tyler men into not 
attending: they feared that "Webster might ••• not be 
in the best humor with Tyler,'' and might say things to 
make them regret having given him a platform. As it was, 
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Webster was told not to talk politics, leaving him to make 
what Kennedy considered a contemptible speech, its 
contents being a poor re-working of his own report of the 
previous year. For others the speech's contents, rather 
than the circumstances in which it was made, had political 
implications. Recalling that Clay had been responsible 
for negotiating many of the treaties which Webster was now 
attacking, they claimed that this was an attempt by 
Webster to promote his presidential ambitions among 
Baltimore merchants, at the expense of Clay's reputation. 2 
There were other occasions on which Webster sought 
political capital out of the matter. For instance, in a 
speech delivered in Boston in September 1842 in which he 
refused to resign as Secretary of State, he attacked 
anti-Tyler Whigs in Massachusetts for proposing a "full 
and final separation from President of the United States." 
He warned that such a split might jeopardise the prospects 
of measures which relied on close co-operation between the 
Executive and legislative branches. His choice of example 
was significant: if Tyler should attempt, "by 
negotiation, or by earnest and serious application to 
Congress," to solve the problems in the colonial trade, 
were the Whigs of Massachusetts to give him "neither aid 
nor succor?" Similarly, if the President chose to review 
and amend the policy of reciprocity "to which so much of 
our tonnage is now sacrificed," would Massachusetts Whigs 
oppose him? Asserting that by the policy as it stood "we 
take the bread out of our children's mouths and give it to 
strangers," he concluded by asking whether the Whigs would 
remain inactive under any such grievance for the duration 
of Tyler's presidency.3 
From his contribution in the short debate in the 
Senate in 1840 to later reports issued as Secretary of 
State, Webster had earlier made clear his very real doubts 
about reciprocity. It was in the latter role that 
Webster's stance assumed greatest importance, because 
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reciprocal navigation, as a diplomatic issue, was subject 
to the review of the Executive branch, just as, as a 
commercial topic, it fell within the domain of Congress. 
The performance of the State department was crucial in 
shaping the debate about reciprocal navigation, since it 
was the agency which could report the effects of the 
policy, and decide upon the efficacy of maintaining or 
amending it by means of further treaties. The repeated 
efforts to pass resolutions calling for the abrogation of 
the original reciprocal treaties with the states of 
northern Europe would seem to indicate that the actions of 
the Van Buren and Tyler administrations failed to satisfy 
the critics of the treaties. Nevertheless, within an 
overall context of continuity in navigation policy, those 
eight years did witness some changes in Executive-branch 
attitudes to reciprocity in those trades which had given 
cause for concern. 
The formulation of foreign policy depended upon a 
close interaction betweeJ~~resident, the Secretary of 
State and other policy-makers within the Executive branch, 
with the occasional directive from Congress. U.S. 
diplomatic representatives overseas could also be 
influential, because it was their despatches which kept 
the State department informed of any infractions or 
problems arising in treaty relations. Some ministers and 
charges, most often those in Latin America where 
communications were less regular, even took it upon 
themselves to initiate negotiations on terms they thought 
appropriate, presenting the State department with a fait 
accompli in the form of a treaty. In most cases, though, 
it was the Secretary of State whose views mattered most, 
since it was he who gave the orders for negotiation. 
The Van Buren and Tyler administrations employed five 
men in the office of Secretary of State, along with 
several acting Secretaries, such as Aaron Vail and John 
Nelson, who held the post during temporary absences or 
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vacancies. The latter, and indeed at least two of the 
regular Secretaries, did not hold office long enough to 
play a major role in the shaping of reciprocity policy. 
Hugh Legare, who had hinted at the undesirable effects of 
reciprocity offered to Swedish shipping in the mid-1830s, 
occupied the office from Webster's resignation in April 
1843, until his own death two months later. Abel Upshur, 
who succeeded Legare, did not last much longer, dying 
tragically when the "Peacemaker" cannon exploded on board 
the Princeton in February 1844. However, he merits closer 
attention, in recognition of his important statements on 
the issue during his brief tenure. This is in marked 
contrast to John C. Calhoun, who filled the office for the 
final year of Tyler's term. In view of his hostility 
towards the protection of manufactures, it is likely that 
he would have felt the same way about protecting shipping, 
and indeed in the debate on the tariff bill of 1842 he 
expressed his opposition to the "novel principle" of 
allowing foreign goods to be entered free of duty only 
when carried in American vessels. But he made no official 
reference to reciprocity as it related to the problems 
experienced with the shipping of northern Europe. 4 
John Forsyth was the first of the three Secretaries 
who exercised most influence upon the issue. He had held 
the office since 1834, serving both Presidents Jackson and 
Van Buren, and therefore had had plenty of time to view 
reciprocity in action. His record before taking up the 
office revealed little interest in matters affecting 
navigation. Although known as a politician from Georgia, 
where he was governor from 1827 to 1829, Forsyth was a 
Virginian by birth and so might have been influenced by 
the tobacco connection. Yet his early actions in office 
and his written opinions held out little hope to the 
opponents of reciprocity. Before complaints really 
surfaced he was an enthusiastic supporter of extending 
reciprocity in indirect trade and pursued that goal in his 
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diplomatic orders. In his report of 1839, the ideal 
opportunity to express doubts with the policy, he betrayed 
no hint of any such doubts. Moreover, in a despatch to 
Henry Wheaton Forsyth further dented the hopes of the 
proponents of change: "the President has determined not 
to interfere at present with the Treaties with Prussia and 
the Hanse Towns," and so they would "continue in force 
under the perpetuity clause in each respectively.'' The 
phrase "at present" might have kept those hopes alive, but 
time would tell whether Forsyth responded sympathetically 
to the calls for change.s 
On paper Daniel Webster and Abel P. Upshur encouraged 
hopes of more positive action. They could hardly have had 
more different backgrounds. Webster was of course an 
experienced statesmen, well-used to the political 
limelight. A leading Whig, his consistency in the anti-
Jacksonian cause was not always to be relied upon when 
other interests interfered. In the 1820s he had 
represented the New England shipping community, and 
although he changed his policy preferences on issues such 
as the protective tariff in response to the growth of 
manufactures in his own state of Massachusetts, his 
interest in matters affecting navigation persisted. Hence 
his pronouncements on reciprocity were no surprise.6 
Upshur was a state-rights Whig from Virginia and a 
loyal supporter of President Tyler. When the first Tyler 
Cabinet, inherited from William Henry Harrison, resigned 
~ masse (with the exception of Webster) after the 
President's two bank vetoes, Upshur had become Secretary 
of the Navy in the second Cabinet, transferring to the 
State department after the death of Legare. He had no 
apparent personal or constituency interest in matters 
affecting navigation, although as a Virginian he might 
have had an eye open for conditions in the tobacco trade. 
Like Webster, though, he did take seriously the despatches 
from Germany, and in a report to Congress in November 1843 
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he presented conclusions very similar to those already 
expressed by the New Englander. He advised action to 
protect the country's commercial marine against the "great 
and constantly increasing amount of foreign shipping in 
our ports." He laid the blame squarely on the treaties: 
The remedy is consequently in our own hands, and 
we have only to retrace our steps, and make 
known the determination of this Government to 
regulate its foreign trade, in future, upon such 
principles of reciprocity as shall not extend beyond 
the direct importation trade in the pro~uce and 
manufacture of the contracting parties. 
Not surprisingly the actions of Forsyth, Webster and 
Upshur failed to live up to their written and spoken 
views, producing a period of raised and dashed hopes for 
those seeking change in navigation policy. On the face of 
it things did not get any worse. New treaties of indirect 
trade reciprocity were negotiated, but they were in those 
areas deemed to represent no threat to U.S. shipping. 
While this constituted a clear continuity in the approach 
adopted in relations with Latin America, Asia and the 
Mediterranean from the mid-1820s into the late 1840s, 
relations with northern Europe did experience a change. 
But the fact that no new full reciprocal treaties were 
signed with countries in that region was not enough to 
please the critics of reciprocity, whose calls for the 
abrogation of existing treaties went unheeded. As a 
result the policy of reciprocity remained a subject for 
debate to the end of the Tyler Presidency. 
The extension of full reciprocal navigation to Latin 
America remained a desirable goal throughout this period. 
Although complaints about the intrusion of northern 
European shippers into trades between Latin America and 
the United States formed a central part of the criticism 
of reciprocity, it was clear that this was not the fault 
of treaties signed with Latin American states, whose 
fleets did not rival American shipping. Rather, it was 
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the result of U.S. treaties which afforded equal treatment 
in American ports to European vessels coming from Latin 
America. Significantly, critics of reciprocity made plain 
that they did not wish for the abrogation of the treaties 
with Latin American states. After all, if reciprocal 
conditions could be secured in the trade with the southern 
neighbours of the United States, it would free American 
ships from added burdens when trading between two American 
countries, or when sailing to Latin America with European 
goods in triangular voyages. 
This policy stance persisted right through the Van 
Buren and Tyler terms, and James K. Polk's besides, into 
the 1850s, making a single survey of the whole period to 
1851 the most satisfactory way of examining U.S. relations 
with the region. Polk's Secretary of State, James 
Buchanan, wrote in 1847 that "we are anxious to strengthen 
our friendly relations with all the South American 
Republics, and there is no more effectual means of 
accomplishing this than by a Treaty of Commerce based upon 
the most liberal terms of perfect reciprocity." Indeed, 
it was Buchanan who drew out most clearly the distinction 
between U.S. policy in Europe and Latin America: 
With the nations on this Continent, we either 
have already concluded, or are always willing to 
conclude, Treaties of indirect reciprocity; but 
the reason is manifest. They have not many 
advantages for ship-building, and but few of 
their vessels engage in distant voyages. The 
privilege, therefore, granted to our vessels, of 
carrying to their ports from the ports of third 
Powers the production of all countries, upon the 
same terms with their own vessels is deemed of 
itself sufficient equivalent for the benefits 
which we bestow. The case, however, is far 
different in regar~ to the Northern commercial 
nations of Europe. 
Diplomacy in Latin America remained a tricky and at 
times hazardous business. The region was still prone to 
political upheaval, as was shown in Central America where 
the federation of the same name fractured into several 
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constituent parts. In the Rio de la Plata district 
Argentina, Uruguay and Paraguay were racked by successive 
internal revolutions, provincial revolts, civil wars and 
wars between states. Of course, the United States were 
themselves no strangers to war at this time, and the 
diplomatic battles over Texas and California, leading to 
conflict with Mexico, prevented any constructive 
commercial diplomacy with that nation. Other obstacles 
remained important, such as the persistent conviction that 
Britain and to a lesser extent France were prejudicing 
Latin American leaders against the United States. New 
problems arose to complicate negotiations further: the 
right to trade up the great rivers of the continent to 
states in the interior grew in importance; the demand for 
fertiliser made rights to farm and trade in guano on 
certain islands an attractive goal of U.S. policy; and 
after the acquisftion of California in 1848 the 
desirability of a trade route of some kind across Central 
America became obvious to all. Whether it were to be a 
canal across the Isthmus, or a railroad further north in 
the region, the United States were keen to secure 
favourable trading rights in any such route, as well as 
possible permission to build or even own it. 
Despite all these complications, U.S. commercial 
diplomacy in Latin America was remarkably successful in 
the years 1837 to 1851. Terms of indirect trade 
reciprocity were secured with most states on the 
continent, whether by confirmation or amendment of old 
agreements or by the negotiation of new ones. Apart from 
Mexico, only in the case of Bolivia did American 
approaches end in complete failure, which, considering the 
interior location of that state and the lack of any U.S. 
diplomatic relations with it until 1848, can hardly be 
judged as surprising. Indeed, when John Appleton was 
despatched to La Paz to secure a treaty of full 
reciprocity in 1848, he found no established government 
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with which to negotiate. Elsewhere, th?ugh, the story was 
one of a successful, if at times tortuous, path to full 
reciprocity in navigation.9 
A first goal of diplomacy was to preserve intact 
those treaties of full reciprocity already in operation. 
The treaty with Venezuela was the most recent of that 
type, and throughout the 1840s relations with that state 
gave cause for neither concern nor complaint. Fears did 
arise in 1849, after the treaty had officially expired, 
when the Venezuelan President, Jose Tadeo Monagas, issued 
a decree in accordance with its perpetuity clause, 
declaring the continued operation of the treaty terminated 
in one year's time. However, the President calmed those 
fears by promising to give urgent attention to a new 
treaty after consideration of the needs and interests of 
his country. Doubts arose also over the status of trade 
with Brazil, which had declared its treaty terminated soon 
after its due expiry date in 1841. Even though it did not 
appear that American vessels or produce were treated any 
differently after the termination, U.S. statesmen were 
still wary that Britain might secure more favourable 
terms. So Upshur, Calhoun and Buchanan all recommended 
that relations be put back on the sounder treaty footing, 
preferably on terms of full reciprocity, but at least on 
terms equal to Britain. The Brazilian government was 
unwilling to negotiate, but, despite continuing British 
influence, still treated American vessels on terms equal 
to their own. Polk acknowledged this in 1847 by issuing a 
proclamation in accordance with the act of 1828.10 
The Federation of Central America had been the first 
Latin American state to agree to terms of full reciprocity 
with the United States. John Forsyth was perfectly 
satisfied with the treaty's operation and in 1838 gave 
orders for its renewal, as the time for its expiry 
approached. The U.S. charge, Charles De Witt, opened 
negotiations but failed to secure ratification of the 
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treaty, because the authority of the Federation had 
collapsed in the wake of a civil war which tore the region 
apart. De Witt's successors had no more luck, as they 
found no central government with which to negotiate, and 
so William Murphy, under orders from Webster, set in train 
negotiations with various of the former Federation's 
constituent parts. The aim in each case was to secure 
full reciprocity. These efforts did not bear fruit until 
Polk's term, when the governments of Guatemala and 
Nicaragua finally agreed to negotiate. With one eye on 
the new interest of the United States in securing a 
transit route between the Gulf of Mexico and the Pacific, 
successive negotiations brought treaties with Guatemala, 
Costa Rica, San Salvador and Nicaragua, all on the basis 
of full reciprocity, and with the Nicaraguan treaty 
incorporating exemptions from port and tonnage duties for 
goods in transit.11 
The pursuit of full reciprocal navigation was also 
successful in the cases of Peru and Chile, both of which 
had previously only ceded "most favoured nation" terms. 
Initially relations with Peru were somewhat fraught, as 
the Peruvian government claimed that the existing treaty 
signed by the defunct Peru-Bolivian confederation was no 
longer valid. Undaunted, Buchanan regarded this as the 
opportunity to secure a completely new treaty and 
succeeded in signing one with the Peruvian minister in 
Washington, Senor de Osma. However, this instrument, and 
another signed by Webster during his second term in the 
State department during Millard Fillmore's Presidency, 
both failed to meet with the approval of the government of 
Peru, because of articles concerning the farming of guano 
on Peruvian islands. Only in 1851 did a third treaty win 
the approval of both sides, including as it did a clause 
providing for full reciprocity in the indirect trade. 
Efforts with Chile took equally long to succeed, thwarted 
for most of the 1840s by Chile's discriminations in favour 
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of other Latin American products. U.S. representatives 
tried hard to find loopholes through which the United 
States might claim similar privileges, but to no avail. 
Hopes were raised when Chile gave notice to terminate 
their treaty in 1849, with the intention of negotiating a 
new one, but again Chilean insistence on the 
discrimination blocked further progress. However, it 
became clear that the discrimination in favour of Latin 
American products did not extend to shipping and that 
American vessels paid no more duties than Chilean vessels 
in both direct and indirect trades. Millard Fillmore 
acknowledged this with a proclamation in line with the act 
of 1828, reciprocating the treatment for the few Chilean 
vessels entering U.S. ports.12 
The achievement of full reciprocal terms with four 
states not enjoying treaty relations with the United 
States in 1836 completes the success story. Two of these, 
Ecuador and New Granada, had been bound by treaties 
before, as parts of Colombia, but that had only been on 
"most favoured nation" terms and the treaty had now 
lapsed. The route each took to more liberal trade 
conditions was very different. The negotiation with 
Ecuador was relatively simple, as in 1837 its President 
had expressed a willingness to come to terms. Two major 
problems arose. First, Ecuador insisted that its own 
vessels, built in its own ports, enjoy special treatment 
in accordance with its existing legislation. The United 
States agreed to make this concession on the grounds that 
Ecuador was unlikely to become a ship-building and 
shipping rival. Second, Ecuador demanded that it be 
allowed in future to grant more advantageous terms to 
Spain and other Latin American countries, a demand 
steadfastly rejected by the United States. It was feared 
that the Ecuadorean Senate, which had suggested the 
licence to treat fellow Latin countries more favourably, 
would protest its omission by refusing to ratify the 
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treaty, but after an anxious delay of three years, during 
which the influence of British and French officers in 
Ecuador's army came under suspicion, the treaty was 
finally ratified in 1842. Although levels of trade with 
Ecuador were not significant, the treaty was still hailed 
to be "mutually advantageous," and throughout Polk's term 
it was held up alongside the treaty with Venezuela of 1836 
as a model for any future negotiations. 13 
In 1842-43 the United States had high hopes for a 
settlement with New Granada, as its ministry had proposed 
legislation offering equal treatment for American ships 
entering its ports. However, the New Granada legislature 
refused to make any such concession without reductions of 
U.S. tariff duties on its products. Aware that New 
Granada had no significant mercantile marine of her own to 
protect by withholding equal treatment, U.S. diplomats 
once again discerned the hand of Britain at work, as she, 
along with other Europeans, feared that an unburdened 
American marine would engross all New Granada's trade. 
William Blackford did sign a treaty on less than the most 
liberal terms in 1844 but the U.S. Senate twice postponed 
consideration of it as the Polk administration instigated 
new negotiations. Indeed, Blackford's treaty was 
abandoned altogether, when in March 1847 the Senate 
received one negotiated by his successor, Benjamin 
Bidlack. This treaty at last incorporated full reciprocal 
terms, although they were made conditional upon American 
agreement to guarantee New Granada's possession of Panama. 
Bidlack had been keen to secure a separate treaty dealing 
with Panama, especially to obtain transit rights across 
the Isthmus, and he regretted the insistence of New 
Granada in linking the two issues. Polk's Cabinet also 
had doubts about the form of the treaty, even though "as a 
commercial Treaty it was liberal & in all its respects 
satisfactory." The posture of the Senate justified those 
doubts, as it viewed with suspicion not only the guarantee 
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of Panama, but also a clause allowing foreign-built 
vessels under New Granada's flag to claim equal treatment. 
After one postponement the treaty was finally ratified in 
June 1848, against greater opposition than normal. Even 
so, apart from the clause on flagging, reciprocal terms of 
a satisfactory nature had been secured.14 
The final two treaties strictly fall outside the time 
limit of this study but they serve to illustrate the 
continuity of the policy of reciprocal navigation as 
applied to Latin America right up to the Civil War. They 
also demonstrate the persistence and patience of U.S. 
diplomats in overcoming the most dire circumstances 
possible for negotiation. The whole Rio de la Plata 
region was in turmoil for most of the period, with 
American trade, at one time quite substantial, interrupted 
by wars and also by blockades between 1844 and 1847, 
imposed in turn by the Argentine dictator General Rosas 
and by Britain and France. Despite these problems the 
State department kept trying to secure treaty relations 
with the Argentine and, after recognising its independence 
in 1845, with Paraguay. Successive Secretaries sent 
orders 
basis, 
best. 
to that effect, with reciprocity as the desired 
but with "most favoured nation" terms as a second 
Although the lifting of blockades heralded a 
recovery of trade, there was no further progress with 
negotiations until the signing of a treaty with Argentina 
in 1853 and finally one with Paraguay in 1860.15 
Throughout this period U.S. diplomacy in Latin 
America was geared towards securing full terms of 
reciprocity in the indirect trade. Satisfied with the 
operation of such terms where they already operated in the 
continent, U.S. diplomats saw no reason to upset the 
continuity in this policy. Similar considerations 
influenced policy-makers when it came to relations with 
Mediterranean states, and in these too the prevailing 
trend was one of continuity rather than change. 
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The problems of reciprocal navigation did not greatly 
affect trades involving Mediterranean countries. Spain 
and France could be considered Mediterranean states but 
the fact that they were also Atlantic powers made it 
difficult to assess the impact of the policy on the 
Mediterranean branches of their navigation alone. What is 
more, in both cases reciprocity was limited to the direct 
trade anyway, by legislation in the case of Spain and by 
the convention of 1822 with France. This was the position 
with most Mediterranean powers and only Austria enjoyed 
treaty terms of full reciprocity. The surge of Austrian 
shipping operating from Adriatic ports in 1837 did arouse 
enough fears for that state to be linked with those of 
northern Europe in the initial condemnation of the effects 
of reciprocity. However, when the number of Austrian 
ships arriving in U.S. ports resumed its usual 
insignificant level, later assessments of the policy 
omitted the Austrian treaty from the list of those 
treaties requiring action. Tuscany was the only other 
Mediterranean state enjoying full reciprocal terms, on the 
proclaimed basis. 
With little practical experience of difficulties to 
warn against the extension of the policy, successive 
administrations pressed ahead in securing full reciprocity 
treaties with states in the Mediterranean region. In two 
cases negotiations preceded the major campaign for change 
and the effects of the resultant treaties confirmed the 
value of the policy in this region, encouraging further 
negotiations to extend it. 
The Jackson administration had already tried but 
failed to secure a treaty with the Kingdom of the Two 
Sicilies, but Forsyth had more success in negotiations 
with two other states. Trade with Greece had been much 
interrupted by wars and piracy, reducing the American urge 
for formal relations. But when the Greek representative 
at London, Spiridion Tricoupe, suggested a commercial 
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treaty in 1837, the United States still responded 
positively. As a first step Van Buren issued a 
proclamation in accordance with the act of 1828, in 
recognition of equal treatment for American ships in Greek 
ports. Soon afterwards Andrew Stevenson signed a treaty 
of full reciprocity with Tricoupe in London. The 
following year, Nathaniel Niles, special agent to the 
Kingdom of Sardinia, was ordered to secure similar terms, 
as well as to obtain lower duties on American tobacco. 
Until then trade with Sardinia had been regulated by the 
act of 1824, but the Kingdom was keen to extend 
reciprocity to the indirect trade and Niles was soon able 
to report success in securing this by treaty. There was 
one exceptional clause allowing Sardinia to favour her own 
vessels carrying grain, rice, oil and wine from other 
Mediterranean ports for the next four years. However, 
this was accepted by Niles as harmless to the main 
American interest, the indirect carriage of colonial 
products to the port of Genoa, which John Calhoun would 
later describe as "the largest commercial Emporium in the 
Mediterranean, ••• the principal port from which the 
smaller ports of Italy, the Levant and Africa are supplied 
with the colonial products of this hemisphere."16 
The Sardinia treaty was deemed a great success in 
helping to promote U.S. trade with the Mediterranean. In 
1844 Calhoun noted how "our trade • • • has been rapidly 
on the increase." Equal treatment for American vessels 
and a reduction of the duties on tobacco had led to a much 
enlarged exportation of that article to Sardinia, and, 
through Genoa, to other parts of Italy besides. Cotton 
exports also increased, and Calhoun anticipated the day 
when American cotton manufactures would replace those of 
England in Mediterranean markets. American ships did not 
find many products in the kingdom to carry back directly, 
but they did carry Italian products, such as medicinal 
articles, marble and olive oil, for sale elsewhere in the 
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Mediterranean, where they could pick up return cargoes for 
carriage to the United States. More importantly there 
seemed to be no invasion of the U.S. carrying trade by 
Sardinian vessels. Indeed, the greatest activity of 
Sardinian ships in U.S. ports was seen in 1837, the year 
before the treaty! 17 ITAB.4] 
Encouraged by the conditions which inspired such a 
glowing report, U.S. diplomats hoped to secure similar 
terms with other Italian states. In 1841 Edward Everett 
travelled around the region and learned from American 
merchants in Florence that "a commercial treaty with 
Tuscany is much wanted." As reciprocity already operated 
with Tuscany by proclamation, it is likely that they 
desired similar terms on a more secure treaty basis. 
Later the same year Charles Sumner remarked upon the 
likely benefits of a treaty with the Papal States, which 
would secure for ·Americans a trade "free from the 
competition of England," whose laws still banned relations 
with Rome. In the cases of Tuscany and the Papal States 
it is possible that the State department held back from 
negotiating such treaties, at least under the stewardship 
of Webster, since no positive instructions were sent.18 
By the time the Polk administration took over in 1845 
any doubts had been erased, and negotiations with the 
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies began. The American charge at 
Naples, who happened to be the President's brother, 
William, was ordered to bestow "the right on that state to 
trade indirectly with the United States for permission to 
enjoy in like right." However, the negotiation proved 
only half-successful, because the Sicilian government 
would concede reciprocity only in the direct trade. 
Despite this disappointment, the treaty was approved by 
the Cabinet and by the Senate in 1846. 19 
The treaty with the Two Sicilies was the final 
diplomatic success in Italy in this period. One U.S. 
commercial agent, Ambrose Dudley Mann, remained hopeful 
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that further treaties would be signed, especially as there 
were rumours of a customs union being formed between 
Tuscany; Lucca and Rome, and possibly the Two Sicilies and 
the Duchy of Modena as well. In such treaties he hoped 
for reductions of import duties on American products, but 
also for indirect trade reciprocity: 
We would assuredly be the party most benefitted 
by a Navigation Treaty of extended reciprocal 
liberality with the Italian states. It would 
rarely happen that one of their vessels would 
arrive at a port of the United States with a 
cargo from a third country, while we might do a 
large portion of the carrying between British 
and other foreign ports and Leghorn, Civita 
Vecchia, Naples, &c. 
Mann's attitude at this juncture was significant because 
he was to become involved in the debate on reciprocal 
navigation at another time and in another country. On 
that occasion he ~xpressed very different views as to the 
value of reciprocity in indirect trades, affording a 
telling illustration of the facts that the policy was 
deemed to work differently in diverse trades with various 
countries, and that U.S. statesmen counselled shaping 
policy accordingly.20 
This flexibility was further illustrated by relations 
with China, which marked a continuity of approach from the 
Roberts missions of the mid-1830s, with their slightly 
narrower ambitions so far as securing shipping privileges 
was concerned. Conditions for trade in China had been 
worsened by wars within the Celestial Empire, and by its 
struggle with Britain over the opium trade. British naval 
action had secured a treaty giving her control of Hong 
Kong and opening trade in certain Chinese ports, but the 
latter was a mixed blessing for Americans who feared top-
heavy British influence as much as they had regretted the 
closure of the Chinese trade. It was not even certain on 
what footing the British treaty left other countries in 
their trades with China, and Americans were keen to have 
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this clarified, since the Chinese trade had been a 
profitable line of business for many enterprising 
merchants, especially from New England. Caleb Cushing, 
the special agent sent to negotiate, came from a family 
with strong commercial links with China, but ironically he 
was not the first choice for the job. It had been 
intended that Edward Everett should vacate his post at the 
Court of St. James to go to China, leaving the London post 
open for Webster, who was keen to resign as Secretary of 
State. However, Everett refused to step down, which meant 
that Cushing got the job as part-reward for his loyalty to 
Tyler. Webster's resignation turned into an early, 
temporary retirement after his last official action of 
signing the orders for Cushing's mission. The Webster 
family still continued to influence affairs though, as 
Daniel Fletcher Webster accompanied Cushing to China as 
his secretary. 
Leaving the United States in 1843, Cushing succeeded 
in 1844 in signing a treaty which gave Americans what they 
wanted. It laid the foundations for regular diplomatic 
relations in future, but more importantly from the 
commercial point of view it guaranteed that certain 
Chinese ports would be open to American vessels, 
regardless of the terms in Britain's treaty with China. 
Access to ports was considered more important than 
reciprocal terms, because it was not anticipated that 
Chinese shipping would pose any threat in the direct trade 
between the two. This same line of policy persisted into 
the 1850s, with the famous Perry mission to Japan 
following the same principles.21 
Experience had given no cause to alter policy in 
relations with Latin American, Mediterranean and Asian 
countries. But how would the State department respond in 
relations with north European and other potential shipping 
rivals? Here would be the proof of whether or not the 
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Executive branch took complaints against reciprocity 
seriously. The response was disappointing. For various 
reasons, including the fact that the campaign for change 
did not really reach its peak on the domestic level until 
well into Tyler's term, Forsyth continued to seek full 
reciprocity in navigation, but with only limited success. 
Only at the very end of his time in office did he oversee 
a subtle change in the policy. Despite their more 
sympathetic statements Webster and Upshur did not build 
upon that change in terms of substantial results. The 
most that could be said for their tenure was that they did 
not sign any new treaties of full reciprocity, but equally 
there was no reversal of policy by abrogation of existing 
ones. This was not for want of advice from U.S. diplomats 
and especially from Henry Wheaton, the minister in 
Germany. He remained vocal in his criticism of full 
reciprocity and continued to suggest how the policy should 
be altered. In doing so he highlighted the much broader 
context of policy ambitions within which reciprocal 
navigation lay and he hinted at how the policy would 
develop later in the decade. 
Forsyth's later years in the State department 
produced four significant treaties of navigation, those 
with Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium and Hanover. 
These treaties shared the common feature of limiting 
reciprocity to the direct trade and so, on the surface, 
could be seen as a concession to calls for change in 
navigation policy. However, examination of the individual 
negotiations reveals that Forsyth was not yet ready for so 
revolutionary a step. As was so often the case the final 
terms of these treaties depended not only on American 
ambitions, but also on what treating parties were prepared 
to concede. So, with the exception of that with Hanover, 
these treaties represented a failure of Forsyth's efforts 
to extend full reciprocity, rather than a deliberate 
attempt to withhold it. 
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Portugal's maritime heritage and her links with her 
former colony of Brazil encouraged Americans to seek 
closer relations. But it was a long-standing dispute over 
tonnage duties which accelerated progress toward a treaty. 
The two countries had argued about the treatment of 
shipping in each others' ports since 1832, when Portugal 
had stopped imposing discriminating tonnage duties upon 
vessels in the direct trade. Congress had responded by 
passing legislation to make the terms of the tonnage act 
of 1830 applicable in this case and to refund duties 
already levied. At the last moment, though, Portugal had 
undermined these reciprocal terms by re-imposing extra 
duties. This pattern was repeated two years later when it 
seemed as if a decree had revoked all discriminating 
duties imposed at Lisbon, Oporto and Madeira. Congress 
declared the 1824 act applicable to trades with those 
ports in which American vessels were treated equally. Yet 
again, though, American hopes were frustrated when 
evidence of extra tonnage duties came to light, and Van 
Buren was compelled to proclaim Portuguese shipping 
subject to like discriminations.22 
Such fluctuations in the level of duties afforded an 
uncertain basis for trade and both sides sought the firmer 
treaty footing for commercial impositions. Edward 
Cavanagh started the ball rolling in 1835 with 
conversations in Lisbon, and it soon became clear to him 
that amongst important men "the favourite basis ••• 
appears to be that of perfect reciprocity, without the 
allowance of indirect trade." This was a familiar refrain 
throughout the negotiations, which lasted until 1840, much 
delayed by internal political and dynastic problems in 
Portugal. The sticking-point was not just reciprocity, 
but also Portugal's refusal to allow any vessels to enter 
her ports indirectly. It also went without saying that 
Portugal opposed foreign involvement in her colonial 
trade. 
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These obstacles would not have mattered if Forsyth 
had been listening to the complaints about reciprocity. 
But from the very first he expressed a preference for a 
treaty on the basis of reciprocity in the indirect trade. 
In his orders to Cavanagh in January 1836 he proposed the 
1832 treaty with Russia as a model which embodied ''all the 
important principles upon which the commerce of the United 
States with foreign countries generally is sought to be 
established." Four months later, learning of the 
Portuguese stance, he noted that the 
limitation of the Treaty to the territories of 
Portugal on the European Continent and the 
Azores and Madeira Islands, and the refusal to 
allow an indirect trade, are objectionable 
features in the proposed Convention, and not to 
be silently or readily conceded. 
However, they were "not so unexpected or important, that 
they should be permitted to constitute any very serious 
obstruction to the progress of the negotiation." In other 
words, Forsyth adopted the regular stance of holding out 
for full reciprocity if attainable. He was not going to 
make any concessions to critics of reciprocal navigation. 
While Forsyth could contemplate a treaty without the 
indirect or colonial trades, he was not prepared to 
concede a clause allowing Portugal to favour the 
productions of Brazil. Fearing that Brazilian rice and 
sugar would force American products out of the Portuguese 
market, Forsyth insisted that no higher import duties be 
imposed on American goods. Portugal seemed likely to 
stick on this point and at the very point of signing a 
treaty this intransigence almost caused Cavanagh to pack 
his bags and leave Lisbon. The treaty was saved when both 
parties agreed to omit the disputed clause until such time 
as Portugal had negotiated with Brazil--favourable 
treatment might not have transpired--and, if necessary, to 
include an extra clause before each side ratified the 
treaty. As it turned out the treaty was ratified without 
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any extra clause, although there were signs that Forsyth 
had been about to relax his stance a little. 
Freed of this obstacle, Cavanagh was able to conclude 
the treaty on lines that were much as expected. It 
established reciprocity in the direct trade only, but 
guaranteed that if and when Portugal's indirect and 
colonial trades were opened to foreign vessels Americans 
could share in them on the basis of the "most favoured 
nation." This did not guarantee reciprocal treatment in 
future, but it did provide for the possibility of it. 
Despite his concern for the Brazilian-products clause and 
the failure to secure full reciprocity, Forsyth still 
expressed satisfaction at the unexpected success of 
Cavanagh in signing the treaty. The Senate also 
demonstrated its approval with a unanimous ratification in 
February 1841.23 
Initial negotiations for a treaty with Belgium 
followed a similar path, although the commercial stakes 
were considerably higher in view of her potential as a 
channel for American goods from the North Sea coast into 
the interior of Europe. Indeed, Belgium's energetic 
approach after securing independence from the Dutch had 
encouraged hopes of a healthy transit trade as early as 
1832, when the acting U.S. minister in London, Aaron Vail, 
had anticipated the value of formal relations with her: 
As Antwerp is to be made a Free-Port and to be 
connected with Cologne and the navigation of the 
Rhine by a Rail-road which is to be immediately 
commenced, such a power [to enter third party 
products free of discrimination] would make us 
the carrier in the trade which at present 
supplies, thro' Hamburg, the Rhenish provinces, 
and a great part of the interior of Germany, and 
cannot fail to open a new field for our 
commercial enterprise. 
Such prospects explain the enthusiasm with which the 
United States pursued treaty relations with Belgium and 
the disappointment at the failure of the Belgian 
government to ratify the treaty signed in 1832. Unbowed, 
-188-
though, successive Secretaries of State had pushed for a 
re-negotiation of the treaty, if necessary omitting the 
clause which had offended the Belgian Chambers. Just as 
in the case of Portugal, problems over discriminating 
duties made both parties keen to reach an agreement: 
Belgium continued to claim equal treatment in U.S. ports 
on the grounds that the Dutch enjoyed that status, even 
though they too discriminated against American vessels. 
Forsyth stressed that neither the Netherlands nor Belgium 
deserved such treatment and he was supported in this 
stance by Congress, which passed a bill in 1836, stating 
that Belgian ships should indeed be treated on the same 
terms as Dutch ships, but that this did not entitle them 
to reciprocity until Belgium abandoned her discriminating 
duties. This dispute reinforced Forsyth's commitment to a 
treaty settlement: 
The precarious state in which the commercial 
intercourse between the U.S. and Belgium is thus 
placed, and the acknowledged importance of 
stability in all regulations which concern the 
interests of trade will induce the Belgian 
Government, it is hoped, to examine into the 
operation and effect of their discriminating 
duty and will lead to some permanent arrangement 
by which the views and policy of the Government 
may be fully met, and the commercial relations 
between the two countries may be fixed upon 2ae 
solid basis of a fair and equal reciprocity. 
It was over two years before negotiations began. In 
the autumn of 1839 the new Belgian minister, Charles 
Serruys, arrived in Washington bearing a projet for a 
treaty. This made quite clear the limit to Belgian 
concessions, including the explicit recommendation that 
reciprocity operate only in the direct trade. In 
conveying to Serruys the regret of the President at the 
proposed limitation, Forsyth once again revealed his 
commitment to full reciprocity: "Under a perfect 
conviction that the extension of that benefit to 
importations generally without reference to the place 
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whence imported, would secure greater advantages to the 
navigation of both contracting parties," Van Buren had 
expressed "his preference for the last mentioned basis, 
and his hope that Mr. Serruys will feel himself authorised 
to agree to it in the conclusion of the proposed treaty." 
Clearly Serruys did not feel so authorised, because the 
treaty signed in March 1840 represented another climb-down 
from U.S. ambitions. While full reciprocity would operate 
with respect to tonnage duties, reciprocity in import 
duties was limited to the direct trade. 
Subsequent events revealed pressures upon Serruys 
from home which explain Forsyth's failure to prise from 
him the concession of full reciprocity. While the U.S. 
Senate gave the treaty a unanimous ratification, for the 
second time in nine years a United States-Belgium treaty 
failed to satisfy the Belgian Chambers. Virgil Maxcy 
reported from Brussels that campaigners had petitioned 
against the treaty on the grounds that it would abolish 
discrimination even in the direct trade. Moderates might 
have accepted those terms, but "the more rigid professors 
of the restrictive doctrines would have made a 
discrimination in favor of Belgian vessels a sine gua non 
of any and every treaty." The latter opinion prevailed in 
the Chambers, and once again frustrated American hopes for 
a treaty. But the significant fact remained that as late 
as 1840 those hopes, as represented by Forsyth in the 
State department, included full reciprocal conditions in 
indirect trades.25 
The early stages of the negotiations with Belgium 
were intimately bound up with relations with the 
Netherlands. Both were keen to attract transit trade to 
the European interior and so each kept a wary eye open for 
possible advantages their rival might grasp. For instance 
when Congress proposed retaliation against the Dutch 
bounty in favour of their own vessels, the Dutch worried 
that U.S. trade might in future go via Belgium. Of 
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course, the dispute over discriminating duties also 
paralleled United States-Belgian relations and, as in that 
case, it accelerated progress toward a treaty. Some, 
including the U.S. representative at the Hague, Auguste 
Davezac, believed that Dutch shipping had benefited so 
greatly from protection that extra U.S. duties on top of 
the usual ten per cent should be imposed to redress the 
balance. Ideally, though, Forsyth hoped for the removal 
of all extra duties by both sides, in favour of the policy 
of reciprocity, secured by treaty if possible.26 
Unofficial conversations with the Dutch began in 
Washington in early 1838, developing into full-blown 
negotiations in the summer. The central issue in the 
talks, as was to be expected, was the shipping bounty 
which the Dutch were reluctant to give up, even in the 
direct trade, without an equivalent. It was clear that 
the Dutch opposed reciprocity in the indirect trade as 
well. Less apparent are the limits of U.S. ambitions in 
this negotiation, because the sources do not reveal 
whether Forsyth started with the intention of pressing for 
full reciprocity. But in the light of the other talks 
conducted in 1836-39, it is likely that he did. 
The treaty signed and ratified in January 1839 might, 
therefore, have been another disappointment, because it 
did not include full reciprocity. The standard provision 
of equal treatment in the direct trade was there, as was a 
clause guaranteeing the same for vessels entering the 
other country's ports after a voyage from anywhere in the 
world in ballast. However, discriminating duties would be 
imposed in the indirect trade, with the following 
exception: goods, "whatever their origin," would not be 
subject to extra duties when carried directly between the 
ports of the United States and the Netherlands. The 
implications of this clause were as follows: American 
vessels could take the products of any country to Dutch 
ports and pay the same duties as if those goods were 
-191-
imported in Dutch vessels, as long as those products had 
first been landed in the United States. For practical 
reasons, this was likely to apply only to products of the 
American continent and, less feasibly, to Oriental goods 
carried to the United States by the Cape Horn route and 
then re-exported. It also effectively meant that American 
vessels carrying European products to Dutch ports would be 
subject to extra duties. In view of the fact that 
transatlantic trade was more valuable for American vessels 
anyway, this was less of a disappointment than might 
appear to be the case. Moreover, this provision had the 
added effect of allowing discriminating duties on Dutch 
vessels sailing to U.S. ports from Latin America, thereby 
meeting one of the major criticisms of reciprocity. 
Unfortunately the sources do not reveal whether Forysth 
had this in mind when negotiating the treaty. The only 
fear was that this clause might allow ports such as 
Amsterdam to become entrepots for trade in European goods 
to the United States in Dutch ships, diverting it from 
American vessels carrying those goods from their countries 
of origin. However, without the shipping bounty in the 
direct trade it was hoped that American vessels could now 
compete successfully in that route in future.27 
Paradoxically in 1841-42 critics of reciprocity 
listed the Dutch treaty among those arrangements which 
should be modified. This is puzzling, in view of the fact 
that the treaty differed from the others in meeting fears 
of foreign involvement in the indirect trade. Of course, 
some worried that Dutch ships might divert trade from the 
Baltic via Dutch ports, as Wheaton warned might happen if 
the treaty with the Hanseatic towns were abandoned. But 
experience erased such doubts, as statistics revealed no 
great rise in Dutch involvement in trades with the United 
States. The critical year of 1837, again before the 
treaty had been negotiated' witnessed the share of Dutch 
vessels in those trades at its highest, and after that the 
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trend was downwards. In 1843 Christopher Hughes was able 
to report the healthy condition of trade with Holland and 
the large numbers of American vessels crowding the quay at 
Rotterdam. Significantly, after 1842 the Dutch treaty no 
longer came in for criticism.28 ~A&.~] 
In the cases of Portugal and Belgium, and almost 
certainly in that of the Netherlands as well, Forysth had 
persisted in seeking full reciprocal navigation 
agreements. Although unsuccessful on each occasion, his 
stance was in apparent disregard of complaints against 
that policy. However, even these three cases do not give 
a fair picture of Forsyth's response to those complaints. 
After all, negotiations started long before criticism 
began to surface and the loudest cries of distress were 
heard. Nor, with the possible exception of the 
Netherlands, did these three fit the mould of countries 
likely to threaten American shipping. Portugal was not a 
maior northern European shipping power. Belgium was still 
a young state and was not expected to challenge in 
navigation. As Virgil Maxcy noted in proposing yet 
another attempt to secure a full reciprocal treaty in 
1842, Belgium was a country "where from want of timber 
they can never build ships cheaply.'' Even with 
discriminating duties in favour of her own shipping, "the 
Belgian flag is hardly ever seen in our ports."29 
Notwithstanding these circumstances, it is tempting 
to suggest from the tenor of his orders, his reports to 
Congress, and his track record, that Forsyth was so wedded 
to the principles of free trade and reciprocity that he 
would not have paid heed to criticism anyway. At the very 
end of his term in office, however, he did oversee a 
partial modification in the policy of reciprocity, 
seemingly in line with the demands of its critics, most 
especially those resident in Germany. The treaty which 
introduced this change was with the Kingdom of Hanover, 
which again could hardly be deemed a major threat to 
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American shipping. But Hanover did provide an entrance 
into the tangled diplomatic relations with Germany, a 
region undergoing change, which in turn raised many 
new questions about the shape of U.S. commercial policy. 
Hanover's location on the North Sea coast of Germany 
gave her an importance in U.S. policy-makers' eyes beyond 
her actual status. Hanover did not as yet have extensive 
maritime facilities but was engaged in developing the port 
of Bremerhaven on the Weser as a potential rival to 
Bremen. The facts that the latter port was an enclave of 
Hanover, and that Hamburg lay just across the Elbe, seemed 
likely to add extra spice to any negotiations with the 
Kingdom on navigation rights. One point of contention was 
the notorious levy of duties at the town of Stade on all 
ships sailing up and down the Elbe from Hamburg. These 
duties possessed-great nuisance value, subjecting American 
vessels to delay as well as expense, and the exaction was 
all the worse because the same dues were not imposed on 
Hanover's own ships, or on Hamburg's. British diplomats 
had tried for several years to have the duty removed, but 
despite their close connection with Hanover--she was of 
course ruled by King William IV until his death in 1837 
--their efforts had been to no avail. Even so, U.S. 
diplomats recommended that an attempt be made to exempt 
American vessels from payment of the Stade dues.30 
As the United States contemplated a negotiation in 
1837, two circumstances threatened to complicate prospects 
for success. Under British influence, Hanover had 
remained aloof from the dominant shift toward commercial 
union in the rest of Germany. Not only had she not joined 
the Zollverein, but she was at the heart of the rival 
Steuerverein. When Victoria ascended the British throne, 
Hanover reverted to the male line under the Duke of 
Cumberland, Ernst Augustus, whose connections at the 
Prussian court might have inclined him to take Hanover 
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into the Zollverein, making a separate negotiation with 
the United States unlikely. However, American expectation 
that this would be the case was not borne out, and Hanover 
did agree to negotiate in late 1837.31 
Hanover's membership of the Steuerverein also raised 
the question of whether to negotiate separately with 
Hanover or with the whole union. Linked talks with 
Oldenburg and Brunswick were preferable but were likely to 
be beset with problems when it came to discussing 
reciprocity. By a proclamation issued in 1828, in 
accordance with the act of 1824, Hanover enjoyed 
reciprocal terms only in the direct trade; Oldenburg's 
trade was regulated by a proclamation issued in 1830, in 
accordance with the act of 1828, granting full reciprocity 
in the indirect trade. It was unlikely that Oldenburg 
would accept any less privileged a position than she 
already enjoyed, ~nd this would jeopardise the success of 
any joint negotiation. Nevertheless, when Forsyth sent 
Henry Wheaton his orders in December 1837, he recommended 
negotiating with Hanover first but included within the 
power to negotiate, "the Grand Duchy of Oldenburg, the 
Duchy of Brunswick, and any other State or States that may 
1oin the Commercial and Customs Union formed by them.'' 
Following these orders, Wheaton tried but abandoned talks 
with Oldenburg when it became clear that the Grand Duchy 
would not accept the terms on offer.32 
The terms which Oldenburg found unacceptable 
concerned reciprocal navigation. In communications 
expressing their desire to negotiate with the United 
States, officials of the government of Hanover had 
stressed that the Kingdom already treated American vessels 
on equal terms in both direct and indirect trades and that 
any treaty should also be upon that basis on both sides. 
However, Forsyth had clearly listened more closely to the 
advice of his agents overseas, because his orders provided 
the first evidence of a change in tack in reciprocity 
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policy, along the lines suggested by its early critics. 
For the navigation provisions of the treaty Wheaton was to 
take as his model the Prussian treaty of 1827, 
with this important difference ••• that no 
stipulation shall be inserted placing the 
vessels of Hanover and of the States that may be 
joined in the Treaty & their cargoes engaged in 
the indirect trade to the United States upon t~3 
footing of American vessels and their cargoes. 
The course of negotiation was a tortuous one, as 
Hanover was in the throes of a constitutional crisis which 
delayed proceedings from mid-1838 to October 1839. 
Wheaton also had to contend with Hanoverian efforts to 
secure full reciprocal terms, right down to a last-minute 
ruse to slip in a clause which would have given them what 
they wanted without everyone understanding its 
implications. It was normal for treaties to guarantee 
that any favour granted to a third party by a new treaty, 
would also be offered to the contracting party, freely if 
granted freely, or upon like conditions if granted 
conditionally to the third party. Hanover proposed to 
extend this to any favours renewed by perpetuity clauses 
of existing treaties, clearly anticipating that if the 
Hanseatic and Prussian treaties were allowed to continue, 
she could then claim for herself the terms in those 
treaties. Of course, this only reinforced Wheaton in his 
determination that those existing treaties should be 
modified rather than perpetuated, but he managed to 
prevent the inclusion of the clause anyway.34 
As it was, the treaty did not turn out quite as 
Forsyth or Wheaton had planned, but not in a way 
detrimental to American shipping. Aware of their own 
limited export potential and of their prime location for 
collection of other German goods for export across the 
Atlantic, the Hanoverian negotiators demanded 
the right to carry to the United States in 
Hanoverian vessels comint directly from the 
ports of Hanover, not on y the products & 
manufactures of Hanover, but those of other 
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countries of Germany, in order to equalize the 
advantages which our vessels would have in 
carrying return cargoes of those articles in 
exchange for the bulky freights of our Staples 
brought to Europe, whilst the Hanover vessels 
would be confined to the transportation of the 
linens & other fabrics of Hanover & Brunswick, & 
in effect excluded from both branches of the 
carrying trade. 
This was acceptable to Wheaton: it did not allow 
Hanoverian vessels to trade from Latin America free of 
discrimination; moreover, it would have been difficult to 
police a strictly direct trade in Hanoverian goods; and, 
finally, it would encourage the transit trade from the 
interior of Germany, to the benefit of both American and 
Hanoverian shipping. Wheaton's proposal to accept this 
"mezzo termini" between full and direct trade reciprocity 
found favour in Washington, as "no material inconvenience 
appears likely to arise under the circumstances." Forsyth 
did suggest one quite considerable demand in return: that 
American ships be allowed to carry to Hanover's ports on 
equal terms "all articles the growth & manufacture of this 
Continent and the West Indies islands." Hanover was 
prepared to accept this proposal, and it was incorporated 
into the navigation clauses of the treaty.35 
The negotiations touched on two other issues relevant 
to navigation. Wheaton raised the question of the Stade 
duties, but, as John Cuthbert noted, it was "evidently the 
intention of the Hanoverian Government to delay this 
adjustment as long as possible, being great gainers by the 
present unfixed mode." More directly linked to matters of 
of 
reciprocity was the issue of the flaggingAforeign-built 
vessels. Andrew Stevenson had advised limiting equal 
treatment to ships built in Hanover and the United States, 
his central concern being to prevent Hanseatic vessels 
using the Hanover flag for convenience if ever their own 
treaty were terminated. By now such a limitation was 
regarded as sensible general policy, correcting previous 
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oversights, and Wheaton succeeded in securing its 
inclusion in the treaty.36 
Wheaton sent the treaty to Washington in mid-1840, 
where it met with unanimous approval from the Senate. 
Although Forysth did not leave explicit reasons as to why 
he had countenanced such a development, the Hanover treaty 
appeared to signal a change of direction in reciprocity 
policy with relation to the north of Europe. One of the 
architects of this shift even wrote to the soon-to-be 
President, William Henry Harrison, extolling the virtues 
of the Hanover treaty as a model for future treaties with 
other northern European states. Henry Wheaton concluded: 
It may deserve your consideration whether if our 
Treaties with Prussia, the Hanseatic towns and 
Denmark (which may be made to expire at any time 
on giving one year's notice from either Party) 
should not be continued it would not be 
expedient in any negotiation for their revision 
to insist on the same restriction3's to the indirect trade with these powers. 
The arrival of Harrison, and soon afterwards of 
Tyler, in the White House heralded the beginning of Daniel 
Webster's first term of office in the State department. 
If Forsyth had introduced modifications in reciprocity, 
even on a modest scale, then what sort of response could 
critics of the policy expect from the apparently more 
sympathetic Webster? His reports to Congress promised 
much, his very first describing the Hanover treaty as 
favourable to navigation. Yet despite these statements 
and the recommendations of Webster's successor, Abel 
Upshur, the Tyler years must have been bitterly 
disappointing to the opponents of reciprocity, as the 
rising tide of protest illustrates only too well.38 
In one respect Webster satisfied expectations, not 
allowing any extension of full reciprocity to nations in 
northern Europe. Virgil Maxcy implored Webster to advise 
him on how to conduct affairs in Belgium, and specifically 
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to send orders to re-negotiate a treaty on as liberal a 
basis as possible. But Webster's reply was quite 
explicit: although he trusted Maxcy to negotiate a good 
treaty, he expressed "doubts upon the expediency of the 
measure at present." The Tyler administration was 
"reconsidering the whole subject of our reciprocal 
treaties," some of which had "proved very disadvantageous 
to the navigation of the United States." His own opinion 
was that "we must forbear from extending the principles of 
reciprocity to the indirect trade." Webster also resisted 
the further claims of the Hanover government, which, 
through Count Kielmannsegge in London, expressed 
dissatisfaction with the limited nature of the treaty of 
1840 and again demanded to be granted full reciprocal 
terms. These demands were rejected.39 
Upshur displayed a similar determination. He too 
refused to give in to passionate pleas for orders to 
negotiate from the new U.S. representative in Brussels, 
Henry Hilliard. Upshur was perhaps more concerned that 
any treaty with Belgium would be rejected for a third 
time, but he was encouraged by the news that Belgium was 
likely to limit reciprocal terms to the direct trade in 
future. Whatever policy the Belgian government might 
decide upon, though, he insisted that any negotiations 
should take place in Washington and not in Brussels. 
Upshur also supported limiting reciprocity to the direct 
trade with German states. When Wheaton requested orders 
to negotiate several treaties in the region, Upshur 
acceded to his demand, but with most explicit guidelines. 
In any negotiation with Oldenburg and Mecklenburg-
Schwerin, Wheaton was to stress that "the proposed 
conventions are not to stipulate, on the part of the 
United States, a greater concession to those powers in 
respect to the indirect trade, than is granted by the 
Treaty with Hanover." However, Wheaton had great 
difficulty in pursuing these orders to a favourable 
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conclusion, because of the old problem of the existing 
status of the navigation of the states in question. Both 
enjoyed full reciprocity by proclamation, which allowed 
them to refuse to ratify any treaty which offered them 
less. As a result Wheaton's efforts came to nothing and 
his only suggested course of action for the future was the 
repeal of the act of 1828, which provided the legislative 
basis for proclaimed reciprocal conditions.40 
Preventing the further spread of full reciprocity did 
not really suffice at this time, as critics called for 
changes in those treaties already in operation and 
especially in those with the Hanseatic towns, Denmark, and 
Sweden. Although both Webster and Upshur advocated that 
course of action in their communications to Congress, they 
failed to carry it out in practice, for no clearly 
discernible reason. Most likely they were waiting for 
Congessional sanction for such a step, a sanction which 
never came, thanks to the successive failures of Kennedy's 
and Ingersoll's resolutions. Less feasibly they were 
taking account of the opinions of representatives of other 
countries, who implored them not to abrogate the treaties: 
men like the Prussian minister, Baron de Roenne, who 
blamed the relative decline of American navigation on the 
return of peace in Europe since 1815 which had deprived 
Americans of the neutral carrying business, and who 
explained Bremen's rise by the greater trust which German 
emigrants put in Bremen's vessels; and like the Russian 
minister, Count Bodisco, who called on Henry Clay to stop 
his fellow citizens from attacking the treaties, on the 
grounds that such a course would jeopardise American 
tobacco exports through Bremen--a big risk to take "for 
the sake of the few ships she employs."41 
Another foreign observer, Senator Schmitt of Bremen, 
summarised the U.S. position: "The sword of Damocles 
which has remained suspended over the Treaty with the 
Hanse • • • may still remain thus suspended for an 
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indefinite period." And suspended it did remain. Just as 
Forsyth had refrained from announcing the abrogation of 
the offending treaties, so too did Webster and Upshur fail 
to order the termination of those instruments. Admittedly 
they consistently opposed all attempts by the Hanseatic 
towns to have their treaty renewed, but at the same time 
in that particular case they did not respond to Wheaton's 
repeated calls for modifications in the treaty. 42 
If failure to abrogate or modify existing treaties 
revealed an unwillingness to respond swiftly and 
positively to shippers' complaints against reciprocity, it 
was also becoming clear that Wheaton had deeper motives 
than simply protecting the interests of American 
navigation. For example, since 1841 he had considered the 
treaty with Prussia as a useful bargaining counter in 
future diplomacy. As the Zollverein increased its 
geographical scope, Wheaton anticipated that Prussia would 
want to modify the treaty to cover the whole union. As 
the treaty contained "the largest measure [of] concession 
as to Navigation, on the basis [of] reciprocity, which we 
have granted to any European nation," he anticipated that 
the Zollverein would "probably not be satisfied with 
less." The United States could, therefore, put pressure 
on Prussia, by threatening to abrogate the treaty 
altogether or to withhold its extension to the Zollverein 
as a whole. Conscious of the wider commercial aim of the 
United States, of increasing markets for their export 
staples, he proposed to use that threat as a means to 
securing tariff reductions: "To my judgment the extension 
of our present Treaty with Prussia to all the associated· 
States of the Commercial Union for twelve years, or more, 
might fairly be considered as an equivalent of some value 
to them." Informal discussions of this proposal in the 
years 1841-42 proved fruitless, as the Prussian government 
was quite satisfied with the current status of her 
navigation under privileges which they did not "appear to 
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apprehend we may be disposed to put an end to under the 
clause requiring a year's notice." Prussia specifically 
refused "to grant a reduction of the duties ••• in 
return for an extension to the other states of the 
association ••• of the privileges of commerce & 
navigation secured by the existing treaty •••• "43 
Blocked by Prussian intransigence, Wheaton turned to 
new tactics to secure reductions of import duties upon 
American goods, which in 1843 produced a convention of 
commercial reciprocity. With this change of tactic came 
revealing evidence that, in relations with Prussia at 
least, Wheaton viewed criticism of full reciprocity as 
little more than a tool to be used to prise concessions 
from trading partners. Until 1842 he had consistently 
listed Prussia with other states as a target for criticism 
of reciprocity in the indirect trade. However, in 1844 in 
a private letter ·to John Calhoun he observed that 
very different considerations of policy ought to 
be applied in negotiating for a revision of 
these [navigation] Treaties with States such as 
the Hanse towns & Denmark from those which are 
applicable to the German Zollverein represented 
by Prussia, which has equivalent commercial 
advantages to offer for the largest concessions 
in favour of its shipping interests. 
In a telling reversal of his opinion expressed to Harrison 
in 1841, he recommended the basis of the Hanover treaty 
for the Hanseatic towns and Denmark, "whilst in respect to 
Prussia, I think the existing treaty of 1828 may be 
suffered to continue without inconvenience."44 
Wheaton's apparent change of tack should again 
caution us as to how seriously the threat to navigation 
was viewed at this time. What is certain, though, was 
that U.S. statesmen did listen to the complaints which had 
arisen in the years 1837-45 and were prepared to act upon 
them, if not always in the manner desired by shippers. 
Admittedly no further treaties of full reciprocity had 
been negotiated, except in those regions where such 
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arrangements were considered unlikely to cause problems, 
most notably Latin America and the Mediterranean. But by 
the early 1840s it was becoming clearer, if it had not 
already been so before, that navigation policy had to be 
considered within a wider framework of commercial 
diplomacy. What was not so clear was just how compatible 
the interests of navigation were with that wider 
framework, and whether, if interests should clash, one or 
another would be given priority over the rest. The 
diplomacy conducted under the Polk administration was to 
leave a strong impression that although the interests of 
navigation and commerce in general were often pursued in 
tandem, on occasions those of shippers were indeed 
subordinated to the wider commercial ambitions of the 
United States. 
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Chapter 6. Tariffs and Tolls, 1836-1846: 
Wider Motives and Methods in Commercial Diplomacy 
While the 1840 convention with Hanover was most 
significant in marking a change in reciprocal navigation 
policy, the negotiations which preceded it also 
illustrated the wider ambitions of U.S. statesmen in 
commercial diplomacy. Henry Wheaton tried unsuccessfully 
to secure exemption for American vessels from the Stade 
duties. But he was also ordered to make representations 
upon other commercial regulations operated by the Kingdom. 
John Forsyth believed that the negotiation was "the most 
favorable opportunity for obtaining a modification of the 
duties upon American tobacco," and he ordered Wheaton to 
"keep this important ob;ect in view." 
These orders were in line with assessments by 
Wheaton and by Andrew Stevenson in London of the value of 
raising the issue of Hanover's tariff in any negotiation. 
They considered the Kingdom and her Steuerverein partners 
to be a sizable potential market, with a combined 
population of nearly two million, but they were under no 
illusions as to the sort of goods which Hanover would 
consume. Britain, already favoured by close political 
ties with Hanover, would dominate the supply of 
manufactures, leaving no market for similar American 
products. Britain would also discourage any moves towards 
an indigenous manufacturing sector, and, as the few 
existing manufactures were in linens, there was little 
hope of increasing the exportation of cotton to Hanover. 
Tobacco, however, was a different matter. Stevenson had 
already alerted Baron Ompteda, Hanover's representative in 
London, to the high duties imposed on tobacco, explaining 
"the effect of the onerous restrictions, both as it 
regarded them and us, and endeavour[ing] to make him 
sensible of the mutual benefit that would result from 
their repeal, or modification." He informed Ompteda that 
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in any treaty discussions "the Tobacco trade would form a 
prominent subject of negotiation." Wheaton concurred, 
remarking that "the question of reducing the tobacco 
duties in that Kingdom can be best treated in combination 
with other subjects of common interest rather than an 
isolated matter."1 
The negotiation on tobacco duties proved to be an 
anti-climax, although not without a happy ending. In 
1839, after the bulk of the talks were completed, Wheaton 
reported that he had "ascertained that the duties on the 
importation of raw tobacco .•• are already as low as we 
could reasonably desire." Nor was there any immediate 
likelihood of their being increased. He did consider 
asking Hanover to agree to a clause guaranteeing that the 
duties would not be raised in future but he rejected this 
idea as likely to complicate the negotiation; Hanover 
would ask for some sort of equivalent in return, which 
Wheaton was not empowered to grant, and so he did not 
"deem it expedient to urge the point."2 
The Hanover negotiation, its satisfactory outcome 
apart, was typical of the diplomatic approach to 
commercial matters in the late 1830s and 1840s, and 
especially of relations with German states. U.S. 
statesmen were concerned that duties upon imports and most 
particularly upon those staple goods which the United 
States exported in greatest volume, were too high 
throughout Europe. They made a concerted effort to secure 
the reduction of such duties, as well as of other burdens 
on commerce such as transit dues. In Hanover the 
prevailing levels of duty were bearable, but this was 
rarely the case in other states, and so U.S. diplomats had 
to find ways of getting them to reduce their duties. If 
persuasion alone failed, then the United States usually 
had to offer some sort of equivalent commercial favours in 
exchange for the desired reductions. Yet such a course 
was fraught with political danger, liable to arouse the 
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ire of economic, sectional, and partisan interest groups 
in the United States. Commercial equivalents to foreign 
governments inevitably affected the economic interests of 
some and the policy preferences of others, especially when 
tariff policy was involved. What is more, towards the end 
of the 1840s diplomats of the Polk administration found in 
reciprocal navigation another tool for their negotiations, 
especially in northern Europe and the German States. In 
this way reciprocal navigation became even more closely 
linked with the wider motives of commercial diplomacy. 
As with navigation regulations, 1815 had heralded the 
return of restrictive systems of commercial duties 
throughout Europe after artificially low levels during the 
years of war. Freed of the necessity of supplying their 
populations in wartime, European governments reverted to 
more traditional ~oals of commercial regulation: revenue 
and protection. Anxious to rebuild war-torn economies, 
they imposed near prohibitive duties on goods they hoped 
to manufacture or grow for themselves, while they placed 
heavy revenue duties on the goods they had to import. 
For exporting countries the potential for harm from 
such duty levels was high. For most of the period from 
1815 to 1860 the United States experienced a worrying 
surplus of imports over exports, and, as the country still 
produced large quantities of exportable staple products, 
many blamed limits imposed on foreign markets for this 
situation. It was not so much the protective duties of 
other countries which rankled. These at least had some 
sort of logic, and, moreover, such prohibitions did not 
usually affect goods grown in the United States. Wheat 
products were the major exception, and the British Corn 
Laws were just one among many sets of protective 
regulations which did annoy Americans. But far more 
perplexing, and so also frustrating, were heavy duties 
imposed for revenue purposes on goods which did not 
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compete with domestic productions. Such duties did not 
prevent importation of American products such as tobacco 
and rice, but they were regarded as a barrier to higher 
levels of consumption. Cotton escaped this type of 
treatment, since it was a vital raw material for the 
protected domestic manufactures of Europe, guaranteeing 
employment rather than a mere supply of food. However, 
although cotton was of great importance to the U.S. 
economy, it could not provide employment and profits for 
all regions and all groups in society. Nor could new and 
exciting markets in the Orient and Latin America be 
expected on their own to provide an adequate stimulus to 
the producers of export goods of all types. The barriers 
in Europe therefore needed to be broken down. 
In the difficult years of the late 1830s when 
economic depression hurt commercial farmers and planters 
just as it did merchants and shippers, memorials reached 
Congress demanding better access to European markets. 
Congressmen responded with calls for information about the 
State Department's efforts to encourage the exportation of 
wheat and rice, and recommending that committees, both 
regular and select, investigate the issue. The tobacco 
lobby was especially vocal from the late 1830s onwards, 
successfully founding a select committee to examine the 
tobacco trade and inspiring the Executive branch to take 
more positive action to improve the prospects for American 
tobacco in overseas markets. The lobby even had influence 
in appointments to key diplomatic posts: for example, in 
1841 Daniel Jenifer, the former head of the tobacco select 
committee, was picked as minister to Austria, whose 
tobacco policy was regarded as particularly illiberal.3 
At a diplomatic level regular U.S. representatives 
were ordered to keep an eye open for opportunities to 
impress upon host governments the desirability of reducing 
import duties. Henry Wheaton was especially active 
throughout northern Europe, and Joshua Dodge toured around 
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the various German states even before his appointment as 
special agent. This concern for improving market 
opportunities for exports was also reflected in a feature 
included in most treaties. With the exception of those 
with Peru and Chile, all such treaties contained a ''most 
favoured nation" clause guaranteeing that duties upon 
American products were no higher than those on goods of 
other countries. 
Some thought regular diplomats would never fulfil 
this aspect of their work adequately. They had too many 
other duties to be able to devote enough time to purely 
commercial affairs. To supplement their efforts, men like 
Charles Ingersoll called for the appointment of special 
agents, in either an official or unofficial capacity, who 
would promote exporters' interests abroad. These men 
could devote all their time to this one matter and could 
work in states with which the United States did not yet 
enioy full diplomatic relations. The promise of this 
policy was fulfilled among the smaller states of Germany 
by the activities of Dodge in the 1830s, and a decade 
later by Ambrose Dudley Mann. Nathaniel Niles pursued a 
similar course in Italy and Austria, and even Duff Green 
played a similar role, annoying Edward Everett by 
conducting unofficial discussions with British ministers 
on behalf of President Tyler in 1842-44.4 
An active pursuit of reductions in other countries' 
import duties was an acceptable goal of commercial 
diplomacy for most Americans. Evidence of bipartisan 
support for the policy can be seen in the tobacco 
committee, on which Whigs mingled comfortably with 
Democrats. However, the methods to be used did pose 
problems. Some trusted in the power of persuasion alone. 
They believed European governments, and their people and 
press, to be ignorant of the benefits to be obtained from 
a reduction of duties, whether in lower costs to 
consumers, or in the creation of a bigger return trade in 
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European goods to the United States. Ingersoll proposed 
that U.S. agents be given financial resources with which 
they could encourage the printing of papers to influence 
public opinion and the governments of Europe. He 
stressed, though, that by this he did not mean "any unfair 
measures; bribery or corruption, common as they are in all 
European diplomacy •••• "5 
Showing Europeans how fairly their exports were 
treated on entering the United States constituted one part 
of any such information campaign. But another was the 
threat that retaliatory duties would be levied on certain 
products if the United States did not gain satisfaction. 
Both methods flirted with the hazardous currents of the 
domestic tariff debate, and here the bipartisan approach 
to commercial diplomacy was likely to founder in the face 
of political, sectional and economic rivalries. The 
tariff issue was ·a complex one whose intricacies have been 
described too many times over to require re-telling here, 
but its connection to commercial diplomacy was vital in 
dictating the choice of policy acceptable to men of 
different stances in the protection/free-trade debate. 6 
The protectionist line of commercial regulation in 
itself represented one response to the prevailing 
conditions in Europe after 1815. If Europe would not 
accept American products, the argument ran, then the 
United States should turn inwards and develop their own 
manufactures, which would provide markets for raw 
materials and employ a working population which consumed 
food rather than produced it. A protective tariff fitted 
neatly into the integrated and developed economy so 
skilfully advocated by Henry Clay as a complete "American 
System." Although the logic of that system demanded a 
reduced dependence on overseas commerce, that branch of 
the economy was not neglected. Any exportation of staple 
and eventually, it was hoped, of manufactured products, 
would be a bonus, providing employment for that other 
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important branch, navigation. So, protectionists 
supported the promotion of overseas commerce and were 
strong advocates of the use of retaliatory duties against 
countries which imposed what were considered unjust levels 
of duty on American goods. Protection came first, though, 
and its advocates would not contemplate measures reducing 
preferred levels of U.S. duties on imports in exchange for 
better treatment abroad. 
Support for retaliatory duties came also from some 
men hostile to protectionism, but only as a temporary 
tool, and indeed the most fervent free-trade advocates, 
such as John Calhoun, opposed even that course. On the 
whole, free-trade theorists differed greatly from 
protectionists in their proposed methods of securing 
better conditions for American products overseas. By 
interest, temperament, and principle, they believed 
protection to do ·more damage than good. Concerned 
primarily with the fortunes of the country's agricultural 
producers and the mercantile sector which serviced them, 
free-traders claimed that protection harmed overseas trade 
while providing inadequate substitute markets at home. 
Reducing imports, they claimed, could only cause exports 
to decline, for several reasons: foreign governments 
would retaliate with higher duties of their own; but more 
importantly the balance of trade would be disturbed, with 
no return cargoes for merchants to bring to the United 
States. Robert J. Walker, the Mississippi Senator who 
became Polk's Secretary of the Treasury, summarised the 
argument: protection 
discriminates in favour of the manufacturer and 
against the merchant by injurious restrictions 
upon trade and commerce; and against the 
shipbuilding and navigating interest by heavy 
duties on almost every article used in building 
or navigating vessels. It discriminates in 
favor of manufactures and against exports which 
are as truly the product of American industry as 
manufactures. 
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In free-traders' eyes, therefore, protection was not the 
solution to the problem of finding markets for American 
goods. 7 
In the light of such a view it was hardly surprising 
that they were prepared to take greater liberties with 
existing duty levels in order to win commercial favours 
abroad. Their preferred option, naturally enough, was a 
tariff setting duties purely for revenue, and not 
excessively so. Such legislation would lessen the burden 
on American consumers, provide more trade for American 
shippers and merchants to conduct, and, most importantly 
in relation to commercial aims overseas, establish an 
atmosphere conducive to more liberal trading conditions 
the world over. Released from heavy burdens on their 
goods entering the United States, other countries would 
relax their own restrictions. Robert Walker cited the 
case of Britain to explain the operation of this idea: 
"If we reduce our tariff the party opposed to the corn 
laws of England would soon prevail and admit all our 
agricultural products at all times freely into her ports 
in exchange for her exports."8 
There were two problems with this somewhat naive 
approach. First, even if successful in adjusting the U.S. 
tariff, free-trade advocates could not guarantee that 
other countries would respond in the way they hoped. 
Their own conviction that free-trade theories were best 
was not shared by all, and, if the prevailing level of 
duties in Europe was anything to go by, then few indeed 
adopted the same line. Between 1815 and 1846, though, 
this did not actually matter in practical terms, by reason 
of the second problem with the free-trade approach. This 
stemmed from the simple fact that they were unable to 
bring their views to bear upon the process of tariff-
making. Especially from 1824 onwards U.S. tariffs imposed 
duty levels far higher than desired by free-traders. The 
1828 Tariff of Abominations was no doubt the worst of all 
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in their eyes, but it was pushed close by the tariff of 
1842. Even the tariffs of 1832 and 1833, which provided 
for some reduction of duties, had maior flaws. The first 
did not reduce duties generally enough for the liking of 
extreme free-trade advocates and was not allowed long 
enough to operate anyway, in the face of the Nullification 
movement in South Carolina. The second might have 
anticipated revenue duty levels of 20 per cent, but these 
would only be reached in 1842 after gradual reduction, and 
worse some duties were actually increased in 1833 to 
disguise the tariff's protective features. What is more, 
the years after 1833 saw the tariff issue relegated to the 
background for fear of upsetting the sectional compromise 
which had been reached in that year.9 
Although free-traders had little success in 
influencing tariff policy by legislation, they did not 
despair and in the field of commercial diplomacy found a 
remedy which they hoped would secure reductions of duties 
both at home and abroad. This was the principle of 
"commercial reciprocity," which consisted of foreign 
countries negotiating mutual reductions of tariff duties 
on each others' products. It is significant that the 
loudest calls for commercial reciprocity seemed to be made 
in the wake of the most shocking tariff rises. The years 
1830-31 witnessed several eloquent calls for diplomatic 
efforts to secure such arrangements. Churchill Cambreleng 
hinted at it in his famous free-trade report of 1830: 
The best means of securing such a reciprocity in 
trade, is mutually to establish a maximum rate 
of duty, under which, the produce and 
manufactures of each may be freely imported into 
the other country. In other words, a mutual 
stipulation, that no prohibitory duty shall be 
levied on either side. This maximum should be 
ascertained and adiusted with a cautious regard 
towards our various interests, and should be 
enforced so gradually, as to interfere, as 
little as possible, with existing investments. 
The following year, Senator Thomas Hart Benton set out a 
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series of resolutions on overseas commerce, one of which 
proposed the importation free of duty of certain products 
not in competition with American goods, a privilege to be 
offered to all countries which "shall grant equivalent 
advantages to the commerce of the United States, and will 
receive the products of their industry ••• either free 
of duty, or upon payment of moderate and reasonable 
duties, to be agreed upon in treaties •••• " 
Protectionist control of Congress during Tyler's term, as 
illustrated by the tariff of 1842, made a repeat of such 
calls very likely.10 
Politicians were not always consistent in their 
attitude toward commercial reciprocity. In 1831 President 
Jackson cited his opposition to grants of special 
privileges to any country to iustify turning down an offer 
of access for American vessels to the island of St. Croix 
in exchange for preferential terms for Danish West Indian 
products entering U.S. ports. Yet, in the same year he 
approved a treaty with France which included mutual duty 
reductions, a treaty cited by some as a precedent for 
other commercial reciprocity arrangements. Party lines 
were not a sure indicator of support for, or opposition 
to, the principle. The Tyler administration sought such 
arrangements in talks with Britain and German states and 
even Webster, the truest Whig in the Tyler Cabinet, looked 
favourably upon commercial reciprocity in 1842-43. 
However, his stance was seen by some more as part of an 
effort to attract producers and free-trade merchants to a 
third political party than it was a genuine response to 
their material interests, and by September 1843 Webster 
had abandoned his support for the principle.11 
Apart from its connection to the protection/free-
trade debate, commercial reciprocity raised one further 
note of controversy: if adopted, how would the policy be 
implemented? Most agreed that Congress would be central, 
since that body alone had the power to regulate commerce 
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and set levels of import duties. Some historians have 
hinted that the U.S. tariff reductions of 1846, mirrored 
by the repeal of the British Corn Laws, were the result of 
unofficial negotiations which helped to cool relations 
over Oregon at the same time. While such reductions were 
general in their impact, affecting all countries' imports, 
advocates of commercial reciprocity also suggested duty 
reductions only for those nations which responded in like 
fashion. Taking as their models the acts of 1824 and 1828 
with respect to navigation, they proposed similar 
legislation offering lower import duties to those who met 
the United States half way, with the final terms to be 
enshrined in treaties. Benton's fifteenth resolution of 
1831 declared: 
That the safest and most satisfactory mode of 
regulating foreign commerce on these principles 
would be by combining the action of the 
legislative ·and treaty-making powers, Congress 
fixing, by law or joint resolution, the articles 
on which duties may be abolished, and the 
Executive negotiating wit~2foreign nations for the grant of equivalents. 
Such measures presupposed a degree of Congressional 
initiative in the case of the offer of mutual reductions, 
or at least Congressional support for lower tariff levels 
in general in the case of the 1846 tariff. What, though, 
if protectionists controlled Congress and the Executive 
branch negotiated an arrangement without prior legislative 
sanction, presenting it as a fait accompli to be rejected 
or accepted by the Senate? This raised important 
questions concerning the separation of powers between the 
Executive and legislative branches in relation to the 
regulation of commerce. It also raised the possiblity of 
dispute between the House of Representatives and the 
Senate. Negotiations leading to a commercial convention 
with the Zollverein in 1843 provided the stage for debate 
on these issues. The domestic reaction and the subsequent 
moves in the tariff debate in the United States set the 
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scene for the final entanglement of reciprocal navigation 
with the wider aims of commercial diplomacy. 
Relations with northern Europe, and especially German 
states, illustrated well the motives and problems of U.S. 
commercial diplomacy. Moves toward commercial union 
within Germany offered the prospect of less complicated 
relations in future, but in the process it also posed 
difficult questions. The apparent internal liberalisation 
signalled by the creation of the Zollverein did not 
necessarily portend reduced duties on imports, because 
there were states and interest groups within the union 
which remained committed to protection, and which might 
have succeeded in extending restrictive duties to a wider 
expanse of German territory. The removal of transit tolls 
within the union was encouraging but made more frustrating 
still those duties imposed on goods entering the union 
through neighbouring states. The latter, by resisting the 
draw of the Zollverein, also complicated U.S. diplomacy: 
should the United States simplify matters by encouraging 
them to join the union; or should they help maintain their 
independence, an attractive course in some respects, 
because the independent states often imposed lower import 
duties? In deliberation of these choices and problems it 
tended to be the needs of American exporters which took 
first priority in the minds of U.S. statesmen. 
Germany offered good trade prospects, if only certain 
restrictions could be removed. Tolls on transit were 
regarded as especially burdensome, as the efforts in 1837-
40 to have Hanover remove or reduce the Stade dues on the 
Elbe river had made clear. The Kingdom exacted similar 
dues on vessels and goods in transit along the Weser, 
while most other states made some sort of imposition on 
goods passing through to neighbours or, more distantly, to 
Switzerland, Austria and beyond. The removal of such 
duties within the Zollverein alleviated this problem 
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somewhat but by no means completely, and in the eyes of 
U.S. diplomats it remained an annoying throw-back to less 
enlightened times. To by-pass German transit tolls, those 
diplomats hoped to promote alternative routes into the 
Zollverein market. They kept an eye open for 
opportunities to secure favourable terms of access through 
Belgium and the Netherlands, and they made representations 
to the Danish court, to bring about the removal the Sound 
dues, considered by many to be the most burdensome and 
degrading tolls of all. 
There was no longer a logical justification for the 
duties imposed at Elsinore on ships navigating the Sound: 
whereas both banks of the channel had once belonged to 
Denmark, now Sweden owned the western shore. However, the 
United States had given tacit recognition to the right to 
collect them by agreeing to a clause in the treaty with 
Denmark of 1826 that their ships pay the same Sound duties 
as paid by vessels of the most favoured nation. This made 
the grievance harder to bear, especially as the method of 
valuation penalised American vessels in particular because 
of the type of cargoes they carried. Moreover, few 
American vessels were bound for Denmark anyway, yet they 
still had to dock at Elsinore to pay the duty, making them 
liable to a port charge as well! The years 1841-44 
witnessed some reduction in the rates of duty, especially 
on articles carried by American vessels, like coffee, 
sugar, rice and tobacco. Also, the degrading formality of 
having to lower a vessel's top-sail at the castle of 
Cornberg was discontinued, which inspired Webster to 
inform the Danish representative in Washington that the 
changes were "well calculated to strengthen and perpetuate 
the bonds of comity and good will between the two 
countries." However, Webster's successors as Secretary of 
State still found the principle of the exaction insulting, 
even if the material burden was reduced, and John Calhoun 
ordered William Irwin to press for its abolition so as to 
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remove "the chief obstruction to the full development of 
the Baltic trade, and more especially of the direct trade 
of the United States with the States comprising the German 
Customs Union."13 
Although burdensome in themselves, transit duties 
were viewed more as a barrier to a potentially greater 
trade in future. This view inspired U.S. statesmen to pay 
most attention to the task of reducing the burdens upon 
imports and especially upon staple products. The 
Zollverein represented a cocktail of interest groups which 
clamoured for different types of tariff. Grain-producing 
Prussia, the dominant force, wished to protect that 
article but was not so keen to afford protection to 
manufactures, which would increase the price of textiles. 
She also desired to maximise the amount of revenue from 
the tariff, which would militate against protective levels 
of duty. Saxony·and other manufacturing states of 
southern Germany adopted the opposite line. U.S. 
diplomats needed to steer a careful course between these 
groups. As Joshua Dodge intimated in 1837, although 
Prussia, "from the enlightened policy ••• and the 
friendly feelings which exist in that Government towards 
the United States," might be expected to treat American 
products favourably, the United States had to 
bear in mind the peculiar nature of the numerous 
German States which compose their federation, 
that Prussia has but one voice in the league, 
and that therefore it is not simply by 
convincing Prussia alone of the sound policy of 
diminishing the duty on that most important 
article of our exports [tobacco] that we can 
hope to succeed, but that each one of these 
States, naturally jealous of the influence of 
Pru~sia14must likewise be convinced of its good pol1cy. 
Dodge's reference to the "most important article" of 
tobacco left no doubt as to the main channel along which 
energies were to be directed. After all, Dodge had been 
appointed specifically to look out for the interests of 
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tobacco farmers. Even so, diplomats worked on behalf of 
other products as well, with considerable success. German 
textiles provided a market for cotton and consequently 
duties on that article were not set at a burdensome level. 
Duties on rice posed more of a problem, and in 1835 Henry 
Wheaton reported that, along with tobacco, rice was 
"exceedingly highly taxed." Hugh Legare, of the rice-
growing state of South Carolina, brought up the matter in 
Congress, proposing that agents be instructed to "produce 
a reduction of the duties on American rice imported into 
the states of Germany, especially those associated in the 
German Commercial and Customs Union." It was with great 
pleasure, then, that Wheaton was able to report in October 
1839 that his representations had indeed brought about 
such a reduction.15 
Wheaton's efforts to secure a similar reduction in 
the duty on tobacco did not succeed. This merely added to 
growing frustration at the treatment of that article in 
Germany. The market seemed a promising one, and already 
Germans consumed almost half U.S. tobacco exports, 
amounting to some 41,000 hogsheads annually. However, 
Dodge noted that this was despite the high duties, which 
at 11 Rix dollars per hundredweight of processed tobacco, 
equated to nearly a doubling of the actual price of the 
commodity. Austria imposed a greater burden still, 
amounting to a near total prohibition of tobacco. Nor was 
the extent of the trade as great as might be expected if 
the duties were reduced. "When we consider the habits of 
the people of Germany, where smoking is indulged from the 
highest to the lowest," declared Dodge, "this is a small 
quantity in comparison to that which would be consumed, 
were the duties diminished on its consumption •••• " He 
admitted that the duties were partly designed to protect 
tobacco grown in the interior of Germany, but he condemned 
this brand: "it is ••• of a very inferior quality, and 
emits, when smoked, a very disagreeable smell; but from 
-218-
the high duties levied on American tobacco, the peasantry 
are compelled to use it •••• "16 
Dodge and Wheaton combined encouragement and threats 
in their efforts to change this position, but these proved 
largely fruitless. Dodge spent much of his time simply 
educating German ministers about the treatment afforded 
their products in the United States. He thought it odd 
that men, "who enioyed, from their station, the greatest 
influence in the various courts," were "utterly 
unacquainted with the liberal policy the United States had 
pursued towards Germany, by taking off the duties entirely 
on many of its principal manufactures, and in greatly 
diminishing the duties on the remainder." He told them 
that, in the light of the 1833 tariff, German duties were 
unfair, and he took encouragement from the fact that 
various statesmen agreed with him that "in common iustice" 
they ought to "do something for our tobacco." 
However, Dodge was prepared to back words with 
action, to make sure the Zollverein complied with U.S. 
wishes: "We have in our hands a powerful engine, which 
can, if necessary, be made use of; and if properly 
applied, will undoubtedly, induce the various Governments 
of Germany to agree to such a measure--! mean our tariff." 
As German linen exports to the United States provided 
essential employment, the U.S. tariff could be 
made to operate, in a powerful measure, in 
overcoming any difficulties that the interior 
States of Germany might, contrary to sound 
policy and their own interests, put in the way 
of a diminution of the duties on tobacco coming 
from the United States, and consumed within 
their territories. 
Wheaton agreed with this retaliatory course. In the 
worsening economic climate of the 1830s Germans would 
"feel more seriously ••• the value of our market." In 
revising the tariff, therefore, Americans should seize the 
opportunity of correcting the error which was 
committed in gratuitously exempting from duty 
two-thirds of the German commodities imported 
-219-
into the United States; & of obtaining some 
equivalent concessions in the course of a new 
arrangement of the tariff in return for this 
exemption if it is to be continued. 
However, such advice had little effect in the face of 
fears of disrupting the compromise established by the 1833 
tariff. Only in 1842 was the tariff revised, by an act 
which changed totally the background to commercial 
diplomacy with the Zollverein.17 
Another tactic used by U.S. diplomats in order to 
improve market opportunities for American goods in Germany 
was to exploit the peculiar geo-political circumstances 
prevailing in the region. As the Zollverein grew in 
geographical scope, the United States had to decide 
whether to support the independence of smaller states. In 
so doing they took into account the commercial 
ramifications of such a move, and the eventual decision 
often depended ori how each state treated American exports 
in comparison to the Zollverein. 
The Kingdom of Saxony did not ioin the Prussia-
dominated predecessor of the Zollverein until 1833, 
uncertain if her manufacturing interests would benefit 
from union. Indeed, in 1830 Saxony had approached the 
United States for a commercial treaty to help secure her 
independent stance. She offered the United States "most 
favoured nation" status for imports and a pledge not to 
increase transit duties on American goods passing through 
her own lands and those of her partners in a Middle German 
Customs League. Such terms were welcomed as likely to 
encourage American trade at the important commercial fair 
at Leipzig. However, one enthusiastic advocate, Aaron 
Vail, perceived the treaty's wider importance. He denied 
that the actual terms of a treaty would be "productive of 
much greater practical advantage to our commerce than is 
now enjoyed under the legislative protection of each 
country." However, a treaty would afford the "means of 
obstructing the introduction of the system of exclusion 
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which Prussia is now endeavoring to impose upon the 
smaller States of the Germanic circle." Implying that 
Saxony treated American goods better than the Prussian 
league did, Vail believed this was "sufficient inducement 
to accept the invitation of Saxony and such others of 
those States as may be disposed to follow its example." 
However, Washington did not authorise a negotiation, and 
Saxony succumbed to Prussian pressure to join the 
fledgling Zollverein.18 
Hanover, of course, had more success in maintaining 
her independent status. Initially U.S. diplomats were 
wary of initiating a negotiation with the Kingdom, fearing 
that any agreement might be overtaken by events. In 1835 
Henry Wheaton did counsel the establishment of some sort 
of diplomatic link with Hanover separate from the 
Zollverein, ''with a view to any future contingency that 
may arise in peace, or in war, by which the political & 
commercial status of those States may be affected." But 
two years later the consul in Hamburg, John Cuthbert, 
predicted a change in circumstances, "if Hanover, as is 
generally supposed she will, ioin the German Customs 
Union." Although Hanover did flirt with the Zollverein 
after Ernst Augustus' accession, to the extent of reaching 
an agreement to prevent smuggling, the Kingdom's economic 
interest dictated that she remain outside the union. 
Hanover was even more an agricultural state than Prussia 
and so was hostile to the idea of paying the higher prices 
which would result if South German manufacturers secured a 
protective tariff. No doubt the fact that Britain still 
hoped to import manufactures to Hanover also influenced 
this stance. As Hanover imposed lower duties upon U.S. 
products than did the Zollverein, the State department was 
happy to oblige when the Kingdom asked for a treaty.19 
Relations with the Hanseatic towns raised the same 
dilemma. In 1843 John Adami, a Bremen merchant, 
attributed U.S. threats to terminate their treaty to men 
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"who wish for an accession of our Hanseatic ports to the 
well known German Zollverein." There is no evidence to 
suggest that the State department endorsed this line, but 
ever since the signing of the treaty Americans had 
observed that it would help to maintain the status of the 
towns. In 1827 Albert Gallatin had asserted that on top 
of its material benefits the.towns hoped the treaty would 
"have a tendency to encreas~~~e consideration in which 
they are held and to strengthen the tenure on which they 
hold their situation of independent Republics.••20 
By the end of the 1830s some Americans were doubting 
the sense of allowing this state of affairs to persist, 
and they added this to their list of reasons for 
terminating the Hanseatic treaty. No-one denied that the 
Hanseatic ports imposed lower duties upon imports or that 
the ports were an important transit route to the interior 
of Germany. But ·a transit route was all they were, and 
the demand for American products was dictated more by the 
duties charged by the interior states than by the lower 
Hanseatic duties. In these circumstances keeping the 
towns independent of the Zollverein might do a disservice, 
in that it would block direct contact with the true 
markets for American goods. The rivalry between the 
Zollverein and the Hanseatic ports had induced the former 
to impose heavy duties on goods arriving from the latter. 
Even if the Zollverein did reduce duties on American 
products, it was conceivable that goods going via the 
Hanseatic ports would still be charged at the higher 
level, unless great care was taken to ensure that those 
goods were registered as American, and acknowledged as 
such by Zollverein customs officials. 
Francis Grund advocated termination of the treaty on 
these grounds in two letters in the winter of 1841-42. He 
informed Webster that the Hanseatic towns refused to ioin 
the Zollverein "principally because their treaties with 
the United States enable them to carry on trade on the 
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principle of reciprocity." Indeed, their citizens boasted 
of this "unheard of favor." Giving grounds for the claims 
of Herr Adami, Grund expressed his hope that the towns 
would lose their independence: "Were they to ioin the 
league, as otherwise they would be obliged to do, the U.S. 
might trade with the league on principles of reciprocity 
and obtain new markets for their produce on the Rhine, the 
Danube and the Weser." In his letter to Caleb Cushing 
Grund claimed that Bremen did not enjoy a "single 
advantage in its trade with the interior, that would not, 
if sought for, be evidently granted to Americans." As it 
was, Bremen was surrounded by a customs barrier which 
American goods found difficult to penetrate. How much 
more satisfactory it would be, Grund claimed, if Bremen 
was absorbed by the Zollverein, "by which means a direct 
rapport might be established between the American cotton 
growers and the manufacturers of Saxony." He concluded: 
"The treaty, as it now stands, gives Bremen the advantage 
of a nation, & prevents those national arrangements, by 
which a direct trade between the US & Germany might be 
opened." As we know, though, Grund's advice was not 
adopted. 21 
Relations with Germany reached a climax in 1843-44. 
Unsuccessful in using arguments of fair play or threats of 
retaliation to obtain reductions in duties on American 
imports, the Tyler administration now adopted the most 
controversial line of negotiation yet. In December 1843 
the President reported to Congress that the Zollverein was 
contemplating a reduction of the duty on tobacco, "the 
first intimation of a concession on this interesting 
subject ever made by any European power." Accordingly, he 
had ordered Henry Wheaton to 
enter upon the negotiation of a commercial 
Treaty, which, while it will open new advantages 
to the agricultural interests of the United 
States and a more free and expanded field for 
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commercial operations, will affect 2~njuriously no existing interest of the Union. 
The initiative for these moves came jointly from 
Wheaton and Abel Upshur. In October 1843 the minister 
reported that he had begun negotiations and from the start 
made clear what the basis of any treaty would be: Prussia 
was prepared to lower the duty on all tobacco entering the 
Zollverein in exchange for a reduction of U.S. duties on 
certain Prussian goods, or on all goods of the same type. 
Upshur was enthusiastic about this "reciprocal exchange of 
equivalent reductions of the tariff" and, after securing 
Tyler's support for the scheme, ordered Wheaton to 
proceed. However, both President and Secretary of State 
were wary of Congress' reaction to such an arrangement, 
and so advised Wheaton not to proceed to a final draft 
until that body had been consulted. After all, as Upshur 
noted, it was possible that "on full consideration, it may 
be deemed more proper to regulate the matter by 
legislation, than by Treaty." However, they left to 
Wheaton the decision as to whether any arrangement should 
be by treaty or convention.23 
Tyler's reference to the negotiation in his message 
of 1843 was the first shot in the battle to win 
Congressional support for a treaty. With the message came 
a report by Upshur explaining the benefits which would 
accrue from a reciprocal arrangement and denying any 
detrimental effects. The value to export producers was 
clear: the Zollverein would agree not to introduce duties 
on cotton; favourable duty levels on rice would be 
maintained; and, most importantly, the duty on tobacco 
would be reduced. In exchange, the United States would 
surrender little of real importance: 
For these vast advantages, the conditional 
arrangement proposes that the United States 
should give to the Customs Union proper 
equivalents, by reducing the heavy duties of the 
present tariff upon silks, looking-glass plates, 
wines, toys, linens, and such other articles as 
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are not of the growth or manufacture of the 
United States. 
This last point was vital to the success of any treaty, 
because it should have consoled those who feared that the 
principle of protection was under attack. Upshur also 
sought to allay fears about the wider impact of such an 
arrangement. Citing the claims treaty with France as a 
precedent, he stressed the conditional nature of the deal 
and the fact that "the advantages of the new treaty shall 
be given only on the same terms on which they are given to 
the party of that treaty."24 
Congress had an early opportunity to decide on the 
matter, as Wheaton's negotiations went so smoothly that he 
had completed a conventional arrangement by March 1844. 
It was on the predicted lines, with an additional 
concession by the Zollverein of a reduction of duties on 
lard. In exchange the United States would limit duties on 
products of the type referred to in Upshur's report to 
between ten and twenty per cent ad valorem. Wheaton was 
excited about the fruit of his labours and saw in them a 
model for future negotiations. He noted in a letter to 
the President that, if his work was ratified, "some of the 
most objectionable features of our present tariff will be 
got rid of" and he expressed the opinion that "the most 
advantageous mode of effecting the desirable modifications 
in our existing Tariff is by Diplomatic Arrangements." He 
stressed that the equivalent concessions involved goods 
which were not produced in the United States, which had 
not been subiect to duties under the tariff of 1833, but 
which subsequently had been excessively taxed by the 1842 
tariff. Surely nobody could complain at the duty levels 
of between ten and twenty per cent proposed by the 
Convention: 
I do not see how those states of our Union 
peculiarly interested in home manufactures can 
reasonably refuse such a concession to the 
agricultural States of the South and West, 
especially when their own commercial & 
-225-
navigating interests will be essentially 
promoted by the Arrangement. I should think a 
strong appeal might be made on this ground to 
the sense of justice, & even of interest, in the 
North. Whatever may be thought of the policy of 
protecting, by duties carried beyond what is 
necessary for revenue, branches of manufacture 
which already exist & might perish for want of 
that protection, it surely cannot be wise to 
attempt to force into existence new branches, at 
the expense of the agricultural, commercial, & 
navigating interests of the country, as well as 
the general interest of the great body of 
consumers. 
If put into effect the convention might inspire other 
countries to follow suit. Apologising for any 
exaggeration, Wheaton avowed that it would "form a new era 
in (what may be called) international commercial 
legislation." Other countries would make concessions in 
favour of free trade, "until the fetters which now bind 
the industrious faculties of nations shall be broken, & 
all obstacles removed to that liberal intercourse with 
each other, by which their greatest possible progress in 
wealth & its attendant prosperity can alone be attained." 
Other diplomats perceived the potential importance of the 
convention, Irwin in Denmark reporting that it was "looked 
upon as one of the most important achievements of modern 
times in a diplomatic and commercial point of view."25 
Mindful of the fact that the convention would have to 
be ratified by the Senate and then the new duty levels set 
by Congress as a whole, Wheaton also wrote to Senator 
James Buchanan of the Foreign Relations Committee, 
outlining the value of his work and anticipating a 
favourable response to it. Here, though, Wheaton was 
over-optimistic, because when Tyler presented it to the 
Senate the convention ran into more trouble than he had 
expected. Predictably, some expressions of support for 
the convention arrived from communities interested in 
tobacco, such as Prince George's County, Maryland. 
However, the prospects for the convention were poor. 
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Since the opening of the 28th Congress in December 1843, 
the Democrats had had a majority in the House, allowing 
the Whigs to express their hostility to the turncoat Tyler 
only in areas of responsibility exclusive to the Senate, 
notably appointments and foreign affairs. Already they 
had vented their anger by rejecting the nominations of 
Caleb Cushing, Henry Wise, and David Henshaw to a variety 
of Executive posts. Now the Zollverein convention 
provided another opportunity for a partisan victory over 
Tyler, and an especially apt one because it involved the 
tariff, one of the Whigs' most cherished policies. 26 
The Foreign Relations committee set the tone for 
debate on the convention. Buchanan's fellow members were 
all Whigs, the chairman William Archer of Virginia, 
Richard Berrien of Georgia, Rufus Choate of Massachusetts, 
and Nathaniel Tallmadge of New York. Even Buchanan, a 
Democrat, was not certain to support the convention 
because, as a Pennsylvanian, he had the weight of the most 
protectionist state behind him. Choate drafted a report, 
presented in mid-June 1844, which recommended that ''the 
Senate ought not to advise and consent to the ratification 
of the convention aforesaid." The report put to one side 
the detailed terms of the convention, apart from 
concluding that the list of concessions granted by the 
United States were not balanced by enough equivalents from 
the Zollverein. The deal would not greatly increase the 
demand for tobacco and certainly not enough to justify a 
break from past traditions of commercial policy. In the 
latter line of argument lay the Committee's main objection 
to the convention: 
The committee ••• are not prepared to sanction 
so large an innovation upon ancient and uniform 
practice in respect of the department of 
government by which duties on imports snall be 
imposed. The convention ••• changes duties 
which have been laid by law, It changes them 
either ex directo and by its own vigor, or it 
engages-rhe faith of the nation and the faith of 
the Legislature through which the nation acts to 
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make the change. In either respect it is the 
President and Senate who, by the instrumentality 
of negotiation, repeal or materially vary 
regulations of commerce and laws of revenue 
which Congress had ordained. More than this, 
the executive department • • • places it beyond 
the power of Congress to exceed the stipulated 
maximum of import duties for at least three 
years, whatever exigency may intervene to 
require it. 
In other words the convention infringed the constitutional 
grant to Congress of the power to regulate commerce, and 
it broke the essential rule that the Executive branch 
should fulfil rather than ordain the law and should follow 
rather than lead the will of Congress.27 
The extent to which partisan motives outweighed 
genuine principle as the cause of opposition to the 
convention is hard to gauge. The Whigs, since their days 
of opposition to "King Andrew," had put more faith in the 
legislative than·in the Executive branch, a prejudice 
reinforced by the acts of the new "King John." Perhaps, 
then, there was a mixing of genuine principle with 
partisan opportunism. Either way the convention ran into 
other difficulties as well. The death of Upshur and the 
departure from the United States of De Roenne, the 
Prussian minister, removed two men who might have swayed 
waverers into supporting the convention. There were even 
rumours that Hanseatic merchants used the influence of 
their trading houses in U.S. ports to foster opposition to 
the convention, although, to be fair, supporters from the 
interior of Germany did the same in its favour. The 
upshot was that a majority followed the committee's 
advice, tabling the convention by a vote of 26 to 18, on 
fairly strict party lines. Buchanan, significantly, was 
absent on the occasion, although his fellow Pennsylvania 
Democrat, Sturgeon, did vote with the majority. 
The convention's supporters were furious at this 
rejection. Ex-President Jackson was among them, appealing 
to the public to pay good attention to the episode: 
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"There never was such treachery to the laborer of the 
South and West as the rejection of this Treaty." Thomas 
Clemson hoped that the 1844 elections "would change the 
sentiment of the senate" in its favour, and John Calhoun 
ordered Wheaton to press the Zollverein for an extension 
of the ratification period in anticipation of the Senate 
being more co-operative in the following session. He 
thought the committee had misrepresented the beneficial 
aspects of the treaty while exaggerating the concessions 
to be made by the United States, and he also believed that 
the principled opposition to it would be shown to be 
unfounded. 28 
Calhoun was no doubt disappointed when the Senate 
took up the matter again in February 1845. Archer 
pointedly noted that tabling the convention had been 
intended to kill off the arrangement without giving the 
Zollverein the grounds for anger which outright rejection 
would have afforded. Although the committee re-assessed 
the potential value of the convention in terms of 
increased demand for tobacco, they found "no adequate 
reason" to revise their recommendation that the treaty not 
be ratified. Archer admitted that the House, dominated by 
a Democratic majority, would probably agree to the 
proposed duty reductions, but that should not undermine 
the reasons of principle for opposing the convention. 
Finally, Archer warned that the national revenue could be 
endangered if this type of measure was passed. Although 
in theory the grant of similar duty reductions to other 
countries was conditional on like reductions on American 
products, in practice U.S. duties would be reduced on like 
goods of all countries without equivalents. Other 
countries would not accept the argument that the "most 
favoured nation" clauses in their treaties with the United 
States were on a conditional basis, and they would claim 
the same treatment as the Zollverein enjoyed. To avoid 
retaliation and to maintain friendly relations, the United 
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States would have to grant similar reductions of duties to 
all-comers. 29 
Once again the committee's advice was effective. 
Although the matter was taken up by a special Executive 
session, now with a Democratic majority, after the 
termination of the 28th Congress, consideration of the 
convention was again postponed. After a good eighteen 
months' delay, in March 1847, the Democrat-controlled 
Senate investigated it again, but the result was no 
different, as the Foreign Relations Chairman, John Sevier, 
recommended tabling the convention. By that time, of 
course, the whole field of commercial regulation had been 
altered by a new tariff passed in 1846. Indeed, Polk, in 
Buchanan's orders recalling Wheaton from his post in 
Berlin in September 1845, had advised against pressing for 
a reprieve for the convention "until after he shall 
ascertain which changes will be made by Congress in the 
existing Tariff." While regarded as a triumph for the 
Democrats on the domestic front, the changes introduced by 
the 1846 tariff necessitated yet another shift in 
commercial diplomacy with the German States.30 
The new Secretary of the Treasury, and passionate 
free-trade advocate, Robert J. Walker, believed that the 
rejection of the convention with the Zollverein confirmed 
his view that the best way to encourage other countries to 
reduce their import duties was for the United States to 
reduce their own duties unilaterally. In 1845 Walker 
ranked the influence of staunch protectionists above 
partisan hostility to Tyler and principled opposition in 
the list of reasons for the Senate's action: "The 
manufacturing interest opposes reciprocal free trade with 
foreign nations. It opposes the Zollverein treaty; and it 
is feared that no other treaty producing a reciprocal 
reduction of our own and foreign tariffs will receive its 
support." So domestic action alone would have to suffice, 
and Walker was suitably pleased with the 1846 tariff.31 
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Henry Wheaton, revealing his greater experience of 
the difficulties of commercial diplomacy, saw things in a 
different light. Initially he had high hopes of 
fulfilling Calhoun's orders, by persuading the Zollverein 
to extend the period allowable for ratification of the 
convention to leave room for a change of mind by the 
Senate. He soon discovered that the Zollverein, on 
learning of the change of administration in Washington, 
and of the political complexion of Congress, had decided 
not to contemplate such a treaty again: 
The Zollverein states are not disposed ••• to 
revive the negotiation on the basis of the 
former Treaty, as they expect to obtain, in the 
revision of our Tariff by Congress, reductions 
in favour of their manufactures, without 
conceding any equivalent reductions in favour of 
our agricultural staples. 
Bitter at this loss of a "golden opportunity," made worse 
by Polk's order ·to delay, Wheaton could only wait to see 
if the subsequent tariff revision iustified his fears. 
Louis Mark, a consul in Germany, was more optimistic, 
predicting that the new tariff would not reduce duties on 
products included in the convention to the levels provided 
for by that instrument, which meant there would remain a 
chance to bargain for reductions of the duty imposed on 
tobacco by the Zollverein. However, the 1846 tariff 
delighted German manufacturers, and, although Mark still 
picked out glass as a future bargaining counter, the scope 
for negotiation had been greatly reduced. Indeed, 
Wheaton's fears proved well founded, as the Zollverein now 
refused to offer any mutual or unilateral reduction of 
their duties.32 
Faced with this refusal, U.S. statesmen concerned for 
the interests of export producers hunted around for 
alternative ways of securing duty reductions abroad. 
Tariff reform at home had quashed hopes for commercial 
reciprocity arrangements. The threat of retaliation no 
longer possessed such a menacing ring when uttered against 
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a background of free-trade statements by the Polk 
administration. The solution hit upon, under the further 
encouragement of diplomats in Germany, harked back to an 
approach suggested earlier by Wheaton: to threaten 
existing rights enioyed by foreign shipping or to offer to 
extend navigation privileges in return for equivalent 
favours to American export products. As once before, 
negotiations with Hanover would mark a significant 
turning-point in policy, heralding a new approach to 
commercial diplomacy throughout northern Europe. 
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Chapter 7. Reciprocity Revised: 
A "New Era" in Commercial Diplomacy, 1845-1848 
In December 1845 familiar-sounding despatches reached 
Washington from an equally familiar figure. Removed from 
the scene of his problems in Bremen, Francis Grund now 
resumed the fight against reciprocal navigation in a new 
arena, Belgium, where he had brought his personal brand of 
diplomatic behaviour to the Antwerp consulship. The 
passage of time and four frustrating years of inaction on 
the treaty with the Hanseatic towns had not changed his 
opinion of reciprocity, and when Thomas Clemson negotiated 
a treaty with the Belgian government Grund did not refrain 
from speaking his mind: "Since the treaty with the Hanse 
towns & with Prussia the American flag has almost 
disappeared from the North Sea & the Baltic & the treaty 
with Belgium may.drive it away entirely." He attributed 
Clemson's misguided course to an old fallacy: 
From a conversation with our charge, it would 
appear that he labors under the impression that 
the U.S. build ships cheaper and sail them at 
less cost, than the people of the North of 
Europe. If this were really the case, this 
Treaty would be a master stroke of1Diplomacy. But the case is quite the reverse. 
Clemson, frustrated by Grund's trouble-making, 
reported that the consul was "determined to kick it down" 
on the false grounds that the treaty was "more favourable 
for Belgium than the United States." Clemson countered 
rather lamely that this could not be the case, because it 
had been "stated in the [Belgian] Chambers that it was 
much more favourable to the United States than either of 
the preceeding, which however were not ratified by this 
Government." Regardless of its value to the respective 
parties, the treaty, which brought to a climax fifteen 
years of difficult relations, was significant in bringing 
the issue of reciprocal navigation to the fore again.2 
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The years 1842-44 witnessed a lifting of the fog of 
confusion as to exactly what each country was prepared to 
offer in terms of reciprocal treatment of shipping. 
Webster and Upshur had made clear their opposition to 
anything more liberal than reciprocity in the direct 
trade, while in 1843 the Belgian government gave notice of 
its intention to increase duties imposed on all foreign 
vessels in the indirect trade. Upshur was delighted, 
avowing that such a move would "operate to the advantage 
of the navigation of the United States." Reports from the 
mid-1830s onwards had noted the massive presence of 
Hanseatic and Swedish shipping in the route between the 
United States and Belgium, to the extent that "the larger 
portion of the trade between the two countries [was] 
carried on in vessels of a third Power." The new Belgian 
policy would discourage this trend. Moreover, in 1844 a 
royal decree put.American shipping on an equal footing 
with Belgians in the direct trade, bringing to an end 
years of discrimination in that route. This measure left 
American shippers in an even stronger position to exploit 
the changed regulations in the U.S.-Belgium trade and, 
together with a Belgian treaty with the Zollverein, which 
eased access from the North Sea to the interior, caused a 
notable increase in American vessels in Belgian ports.3 
These developments gave U.S. statesmen the confidence 
to believe that the Belgian government had finally settled 
upon a permanent commercial policy, and encouraged hopes 
of a successful treaty negotiation. However, it was the 
Belgian government which made the first moves, offering 
Clemson a projet which he sent on to Washington. The U.S. 
charge was excited by the prospect of a treaty, both in 
the amount of trade in American products it would 
encourage and in the practical advantages it would afford 
to American shipping. He was also anxious to calm fears 
that any arrangement reached now would suffer the same 
fate as its two predecessors: 
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this Government has done all in their power to 
do away with those impressions which were 
created by the non-ratification of the treaty of 
1840 and I can not for a moment entertain the 
least suspicion of the recurrence of similar or 
any future difficulties in the way of a 
reciprocal consummation of the treaty as it 
stands, or may be modified according to your 
instructions. 
Understandably Buchanan remained wary of a repeat of 1832 
and 1840 and told Clemson to suspend negotiations if there 
was a change of ministry or policy in Belgium. To be on 
the safe side the Secretary insisted that the talks be 
completed while the Belgian Chambers were in session, in 
order to avoid any delay in ratification. However, he was 
happy with the contents of the projet and accepted it as 
the basis of a treaty without substantial amendment. 4 
The projet, and the treaty which it became in 
November 1845, contained both standard and original 
prov1s1ons. The· terms for navigation in the direct trade 
were similar to those in the 1839 treaty with the 
Netherlands: articles guaranteed reciprocity for American 
and Belgian vessels carrying goods of either country's 
production; and also for those carrying goods of third 
countries, landed and warehoused in U.S. and Belgian 
ports, and then shipped directly between them.5 
It was the latter provision which Grund condemned, 
and although he had not commented on the Dutch treaty, he 
no doubt opposed the same principle in that as well. He 
denied that Americans could benefit from equal treatment 
for vessels carrying warehoused third party goods. 
American shippers would not choose to take Latin American 
products to U.S. ports prior to carrying them to Europe 
and would only have surplus goods to carry across the 
Atlantic if they had over-traded in the trade from Latin 
America to the United States. Moreover, as of 1845 there 
were not even any public warehouses where goods could be 
landed on bond, free of duty, before transhipment to 
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Europe. Everything conspired against Americans 
participating in that "direct trade" in third party goods. 
Belgians, on the other hand, would benefit greatly at the 
expense of Americans involved in trades with other 
European countries. Antwerp was a well-appointed port in 
a central location, with steamship connections to Britain 
and railroad links to Germany and France. It could become 
"the warehouse of English, French, German & Dutch goods 
all of which may be carried to the U.S. in Belgian bottoms 
to the great detriment of our shipping in Havre, 
Liverpool, London, Rotterdam &c." Even if Belgium did not 
yet have many vessels to exploit this position, Grund 
believed that "our treaty will enable the merchants to buy 
or build them," especially as it did not lay down strict 
enough rules about the national identity of vessels 
eligible for equal treatment. Papers confirming national 
status were adequate, and as Belgian law did not prohibit 
foreign-built ships becoming national vessels, this 
provision presaged only one result, in Grund's opinion: 
I swear positively that a number of German 
vessels from Bremen, Oldenburg & Hanover are now 
but waiting the ratification of the treaty to 
hoist the Belgian flag & avail themselves of all 
the advantages secured to the Belgians. The 
merchants of Europe have not that feeling of 
nationality which characterises our own, & are 
ready to sail under any fla~ that will secure to 
them commercial advantages. 
Given Grund's concern, it is somewhat surprising that 
he failed to anticipate problems from the treaty's 
provisions for the indirect trade. In one respect, again, 
the treaty was similar to that with the Netherlands: it 
removed discriminating tonnage duties from vessels in 
ballast in indirect routes, although it also removed those 
same duties on ships carrying goods. More controversial, 
though, was the eighth article, which had the potential 
for granting full reciprocity in the indirect trade at 
last, after four years of U.S. refusal to grant that 
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privilege to Belgium. It ruled that the ships of either 
country carrying goods from third countries direct to the 
other's ports would be treated on the same terms as ships 
of the "most favoured nation."7 
The wording of the treaty left some doubt as to how 
this provision would operate in practice. If the clause 
was unconditional then Belgian ships undoubtedly could 
claim equal treatment in U.S. ports, but it was less 
certain that American ships could in return. Ambrose 
Dudley Mann, yet another of the special commercial agents 
in Europe, highlighted this imbalance in the privileges 
granted by each side. There was no doubt that in U.S. 
ports the ships of the "most favoured nation" enjoyed 
equal terms, and so Belgians would claim similar 
treatment. However, since 1843, Belgium had limited 
reciprocity to the direct trade, and so Americans could 
not claim full reciprocal rights in return. In other 
words, "'reciprocity in the indirect carrying between that 
kingdom and the United States is 'exclusively on~ 
side.'" Nearly three years after the treaty was signed 
Mann still referred to this article as a mistake "not very 
creditable to those concerned in the negotiations, whether 
on one side or the other," putting it down to an oversight 
on Clemson's part. Mann demanded a remedy: "With this 
government of Belgium there can be but little to do now, 
except to make an effort to correct the mistake in the 
Treaty which gives ten per cent advantage to the Belgian 
flag, over ours in the triangular carrying." 
An alternative interpretation of the treaty would 
demand that grants of treatment given to "most favoured 
nations" be conditional upon either party to the treaty 
offering to the other the same terms as offered by those 
"most favoured nations." Belgium would have to treat 
American vessels in the indirect trade equally to her own, 
if she wanted full reciprocal rights in exchange. 
However, whichever way the eighth article was interpreted, 
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the implication was the same: the Polk administration was 
prepared to grant full reciprocal treatment to Belgian 
vessels in the indirect trade, either unconditionally or 
conditionally. No longer were such terms to be avoided at 
all costs. 
What accounted for this change in outlook? It was 
certainly not an oversight, as claimed by Mann. The 
article was included in the projet submitted to the State 
department and must have received full attention. What is 
more, in subsequent comments on the treaty Clemson singled 
out the eighth article with some pride. Perhaps Buchanan 
intended to insist on the narrower, conditional, 
interpretation of the treaty and so anticipated that 
Belgium would not be able to claim equal treatment in the 
indirect trade, having so far refused to open up her own 
indirect trade to such terms. They might have believed, 
along with earlier observers, that Belgian shipping posed 
no threat to that of the United States in any case. Or, 
possibly a commitment to free-trade principles caused them 
to play down the damaging effects of reciprocity to 
shipping in general, even though Buchanan had certainly 
sympathised with shippers on this issue in the past. 8 
A final possibility is that the Polk administration 
judged the balance of the treaty in all its terms to be in 
favour of U.S. interests, outweighing any potential damage 
to American shipping. Among the additional articles in 
the treaty were privileges which promised to benefit both 
the commercial and navigating interests of the United 
States. Dues levied upon American vessels sailing up the 
Scheldt were to be refunded. Steamships in regular packet 
service between the two countries were to be exempt from 
the payment of tonnage duties. Finally American goods 
carried by railroads to interior Belgian markets or beyond 
to other markets would be exempt from transit duties, a 
relief from a potentially burdensome imposition on trade. 
These were just the sort of restrictions that U.S. 
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statesmen found frustrating in the 1840s, and it is 
tempting to suggest that their removal was demanded as an 
equivalent for the privilege of indirect trade 
reciprocity. However, again these terms were included in 
the original Belgian projet, and it is clear that the 
Belgian government judged them equally beneficial for 
their own commercial ambitions.9 
Although these privileges were granted willingly by 
Belgium, subsequent events in Germany suggest that the 
Polk administration was not averse to making bargains of 
equivalents. Ambrose Dudley Mann played an important role 
in those events, and it is significant that in his 
criticism of the Belgian treaty it was the possible 
imbalance in the method of granting reciprocity in the 
indirect trade which underlay his opposition, rather than 
the grant itself. As later actions would reveal, he was a 
strong advocate of a policy of offering reciprocal terms 
in navigation as an equivalent for other favours from the 
countries of central and northern Europe. 
Ambrose Dudley Mann's early career was typical of the 
U.S. commercial agent in Europe, as he travelled widely 
through the continent in pursuit of a variety of goals. 
After a West Point education he had had a fairly standard 
introduction to public life, g1v1ng up a career in law to 
take the familiar route into politics. Significantly his 
first diplomatic post was as replacement for Francis Grund 
in the u.s. consulate in Bremen, in 1842. Four years 
later Buchanan appointed him as a special agent, and he 
went about his new duties with much vigour and success. 
He toured extensively, visiting Britain and Italy as well 
as many of the smaller states of Germany, including both 
members of the Zollverein and non-members. Later missions 
included a tour of duty in Hungary during Kossuth's 
ascendancy and a period of residence in Switzerland, 
before he brought an end to this spate of globe-trotting 
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by becoming Assistant Secretary of State in the Pierce 
administration. 
Mann's roots were in the South. A Virginian by 
birth, he became an ardent Southern Rights man in the 
1850s and advocated greater economic independence for the 
region. Along with J.D.B. De Bow he championed the 
development of a Southern mercantile marine, attempting to 
promote a steamship line from the South to Europe. When 
Civil War broke out he followed the logical course laid 
down by his experience and background and became a 
commissioner representing the Confederacy in Europe. He 
spent his time trying to persuade Britain and Belgium to 
take more Southern exports, and to counter the outflow of 
Irish and German emigrants who were swelling the ranks of 
Union regiments. Largely unsuccessful in these efforts, 
he endured exile in Europe until his death in 1889.10 
There are hints of sectional prejudice in Mann's 
approach to the issue of reciprocal navigation. His later 
advocacy of a Southern merchant fleet revealed a 
willingness to put the narrower interests of the South 
above the wider fortunes of the whole country's shipping, 
which was dominated by Northerners from New York and 
Boston. In like fashion, it is feasible that he would 
have put the interests of Southern producers before those 
of Northern shippers. After all, the South tended not to 
mind who carried their exports and imports, as long as the 
service provided was the best value for money. This 
outlook influenced Mann's appraisal of reciprocity, which 
was at best ambiguous. In 1849 he noted that reciprocity 
had operated in favour of American shipping in many areas: 
the trades with Austria, which Americans dominated; the 
direct trade with France, which led Mann to predict 
similar results if reciprocal terms were extended to the 
French indirect trade as well; and the Mediterranean in 
general, where he advocated full reciprocity in treaties 
with Italian states. But northern Europe was a different 
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case. Countries like Prussia, Denmark, and Sweden, as 
well as the Hanseatic towns, exploited reciprocity, 
causing American shipping to face unfair conditions. In 
the same breath, though, he could conclude that "our 
reciprocity system of Navigation has been productive of 
vast benefits to the country" and that he was "in favor of 
the future observance of the liberal principle in which it 
had its origin." 
Those "vast benefits" no doubt referred partly to the 
general impact of reciprocity upon American shipping with 
Europe and Latin America. However, had Mann been a 
committed supporter of navigation interests, he would have 
found it hard to express a desire to see reciprocity 
extended, especially in the context of a discussion of its 
effects in trades with northern Europe. Perhaps he had 
some other "vast benefits" in mind, to be enjoyed by 
groups closer to.his heart, such as Southern producers. 
While discussing prospects for a treaty with a future 
Italian customs union, he put producers' concerns on a 
level with those of shippers, noting that it might be 
possible to win "concessions in favor of our staple 
products"; and throughout his career Mann was prepared to 
promote the interests of producers at the same time as 
those of shippers and, sometimes, even at the expense of 
the latters' policy preferences. Moreover, the course he 
followed, offering full reciprocity in navigation in 
exchange for equivalent commercial favours, received the 
Polk administration's full support and was recommended to 
other U.S. diplomats as well.11 
Hanover again provided the opportunity to test this 
new approach. During the negotiations for the 1840 
convention the Kingdom had made clear her desire to extend 
reciprocity to the indirect trade, and in the subsequent 
five years she strove unsuccessfully to persuade the Tyler 
administration to abandon its refusal to grant that 
privilege. Hanover persisted with her efforts after Polk 
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entered the White House, and even won from Buchanan an 
admission that in most respects she was eligible for 
reciprocal treatment on the proclaimed basis in accordance 
with the act of 1828, as the Kingdom's ports were open to 
American vessels on equal terms with Hanoverian shipping. 
However, there remained one obstacle: no proclamation 
could be issued while the Stade duties still operated 
unequally on American vessels sailing up and down the 
Elbe. Even though the level of duty had been reduced in 
1844 by an ordinance putting American ships on the same 
terms as British vessels, the inequality with Hanover's 
(and Hamburg's) vessels remained. The prospect of some 
sort of bargain on this issue brought Hanover to the 
negotiating table in 1846.12 
Hanover had been hinting for some time that such a 
deal might be possible. Wheaton reported in the early 
days of his negotiation that "the Hanoverian minister 
admitted in a conversation with me that they might be 
willing to relinquish it [the Stade duty] on some terms or 
other." In 1842 Count Kielmannsegge, the Hanoverian 
minister in London, intimated to Edward Everett, in a 
conversation about his Kingdom's desire to secure full 
reciprocity, that he was negotiating with Britain for a 
reduction of the Stade duties on her ships and that there 
would be "no difficulty in extending the same favour to 
our vessels •••• " Now, in 1846, Buchanan was prepared 
to make a deal with Hanover involving full reciprocal 
navigation, with high hopes that such a deal would be 
favourable. Even though a grant of full reciprocity would 
be considered by some as palpably unequal in its effects 
and beneficial to Hanover, he did not anticipate such a 
result. Hanover neither had an extensive mercantile fleet 
to rival American ships in indirect routes such as the 
trade with Latin America, nor was likely to develop one: 
"Hanover ••• [does] not possess within [her] limits the 
chief materials for ship building. These she must 
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purchase from abroad. Their vessels are built at great 
expense and their present commercial marine is 
inconsiderable." As long as the United States insisted on 
a clause ruling that only Hanover-built vessels were 
eligible for reciprocal treatment, Buchanan could see no 
practical difficulties arising from the grant of 
reciprocity in the indirect trade.13 
Even so, Buchanan recognised that in the context of 
the recent U.S. stance such a grant would be seen as a 
concession. Therefore he advised agent Mann that full 
reciprocity would only be granted "provided Hanover will 
yield equivalents for such a concession which she can do 
not only without injury, but with benefit to herself." He 
stressed the point: "You are to conclude no treaty ••• 
unless the Government of Hanover should stipulate for the 
following equivalents." 
Not surprisingly the Stade duties were top of the 
list, with Buchanan insisting that they should be 
equalised on the shipping of the two countries. Such a 
demand was a logical requirement of reciprocity, whose 
very principle was equal treatment for each country's 
vessels. But Buchanan also targeted for abolition some 
other transit duties. As Hanover consumed only a small 
amount of the American produce which arrived at her ports, 
the imposition of duties on goods such as cotton, tobacco, 
rice, and whale oil in transit to the interior of Germany 
was intolerable. If the Kingdom removed them, both 
parties would benefit: "Hanover ••• in order to promote 
[her] own internal trade, and to increase the 
transportation on the rail-roads, ought to abolish the 
transit duties on these and all other articles, the 
growth, produce, or manufacture of our country." Again he 
stressed that "without such an abolition or reduction of 
the transit duties ••• you are not authorized to 
conclude a treaty." 
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Buchanan's final demand originated in the debate on 
whether or not to preserve the independence of small 
German states from the Zollverein. In the case of Hanover 
the same factors as had operated in 1840 were still 
applicable six years later. Hanover treated American 
products on far better terms than did the Zollverein. For 
example their import duties on tobacco were 69c. and $3.33 
per 100 lb. respectively, a state of affairs the United 
States would be keen to perpetuate by helping to maintain 
Hanover's independence from the Zollverein by means of a 
further treaty. But Buchanan's terms revealed a 
recognition that that independence might not last long, 
and represented a remedy for the worst-case scenario. 
Ernst Augustus was "old and infirm" and Buchanan feared 
that "his successor may be prevailed upon to change his 
father's policy in this particular." Therefore Mann was 
to reject any treaty which failed to stipulate that 
Hanoverian import duties, especially those on tobacco, 
would not rise in future. This stipulation should operate 
even if Hanover did eventually join the Zollverein, so 
that Hanover's favourable duty levels would be maintained 
and, more optimistically, the Zollverein might reduce its 
own duties to those levels.14 
Mann opened negotiations in May 1846, doubtful at 
first as to how far Hanover would be prepared to meet 
Buchanan's terms. These doubts appeared justified when he 
reported that Ernst Augustus was "unwilling to enter into 
an obligation not to increase the existing import duty on 
tobacco." Regarding the other terms, however, things 
looked brighter. The King was likely to agree to equalise 
the Stade duties and to abolish transit duties. Moreover, 
he might also concede an abolition of import duties on raw 
cotton, not one of the original terms demanded by 
Buchanan, but highly desirable nevertheless.lS 
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After a month of negotiation Mann left Hanover for 
London, from where he reported a successful conclusion to 
his efforts. In return for full reciprocity the final 
treaty included all the equivalents he had hinted at in 
earlier despatches: the abolition of all transit duties, 
and of import duties on raw cotton; equal treatment with 
regard to the Stade duties; and an article limiting 
reciprocity to ships built in Hanover and the United 
States. Only on the issue of tobacco duties did Mann have 
to give ground. Hanover refused to give up completely her 
right to raise the duties, but the treaty stipulated that 
she could only increase them after giving a year's notice, 
in which case the United States would have the right to 
abrogate the treaty immediately. This demonstrated that 
reciprocity in navigation was regarded as an equivalent, 
revocable if ever Hanover withdrew any of the concessions 
she had made, as·she might if she joined the Zollverein. 
Of course, Mann hoped that this would never occur, 
and indeed the twelfth article of the treaty catered for 
quite the opposite; it provided that any state of the 
German Bund could enjoy the same treatment as Hanover by 
officially acceding to the treaty and by making the same 
concessions as Hanover had made. Clearly Mann hoped that 
other small states, and maybe even the Zollverein as a 
whole, might agree to those terms. A similar hope for 
united German action to reduce the burdens on commerce 
inspired one final article, by which Hanover agreed not to 
collect duties on traffic along the Weser, if and when 
other states bordering the river agreed to do likewise.16 
Buchanan and Polk received the treaty with enthusiasm 
and forwarded it to the Senate, anticipating a swift 
ratification. Their hopes were sorely dashed as a 
combination of opposition to the treaty and pressure of 
business blocked its immediate progress. Many Senators 
from the North-East opposed further extension of 
reciprocity on principle, but they alone could not have 
-245-
obstructed the treaty's progress. Others considered the 
equivalents granted by Hanover to be adequate but were 
less happy with the more mechanical aspects of the treaty, 
most especially Hanover's right to increase duties on 
tobacco at a year's notice. Some Senators put forward an 
amendment which would provide an opportunity to review the 
effects of the treaty after an experimental period. It 
should operate only for the original term of the treaty, 
twelve years, without the standard perpetuation 
thereafter, and each country should decide whether a 
renewal be negotiated. Buchanan reluctantly assented to 
this, anxious that the treaty be ratified before Congress 
adjourned. However, in the busy summer of 1846, with a 
complex tariff debate in progress and war with Mexico 
raging, the Senate failed to find time to go into 
executive session for consideration of the treaty, and so 
postponed it until their next session. Despite this 
setback Buchanan was optimistic for its chances second 
time round and told Mann to assure Hanover that the treaty 
would be ratified "at an early period ••• either with or 
without the single amendment."17 
In Hanover Mann was more concerned than the Secretary 
of State at the initial failure to ratify the treaty. The 
Foreign Affairs minister had already expressed some 
surprise that "a convention so entirely one-sided--so 
immediate in its favorable bearings (or rather calculated 
to be so) upon the interests of the United States--should 
have encountered either opposition or delay in the 
Senate." Everything Hanover had won in the treaty could 
have been secured by proclamation only by her equalising 
the Stade duties on American vessels and without having to 
offer other privileges to American commerce as well. Nor 
would reciprocity by proclamation have been restricted to 
vessels built in Hanover, as it was by treaty. Only by 
saying that the diverse make-up of the Senate always 
entailed careful and often problematic deliberation of 
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treaties had Mann been able to pacify the Hanoverian 
government. 
In saying this Mann was partly correct. Privately, 
however, he laid the blame for the delay squarely on the 
shoulders of New England Senators, especially those from 
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Connecticut. He 
anticipated the day when they would be embarrassed by 
their opposition to the treaty: 
The northern senators may oppose or yield a 
reluctant support to the Treaty, but when a 
great interest of the enterprizing portion of 
the Union which they represent, is so 
effectively guarded as the one under 
consideration I predict that if its provisions 
are carried into operation, they or those who 
may succeed them, will have cause to regret its 
abrupt abrogation by the amendment which has 
been insisted upon. 
The "great interest" of New England to which Mann 
referred was the ·whaling industry, which would benefit 
from the treaty more than those Senators appreciated: 
"The chief produce of our fisheries in the South Seas 
[whale oil] ••• is to be free from transit duties, 
whereby every barrel of it, passing into the Zollverein, 
will be relieved of a tax of something like 40 cents." 
Whereas whale oil previously went to Germany via Bremen, 
Hamburg and the Prussian ports, the treaty would encourage 
that trade to go via Hanover's ports, not only free from 
the Stade duty, but also by-passing the Sound and the 
duties imposed there, as it could be carried to Lubeck by 
railway for further distribution in the Baltic. And 
whereas the existing trade was dominated by foreign ships, 
now New England shipping would fare well, because "their 
navigation interest ••• has been especially well taken 
care of.'' Hanover had little shipping of her own to rival 
Americans either in the direct trade or in other carrying 
trades: "the number of indirect Hanoverian vessels to and 
from the United States can under no conceivable 
circumstances exceed half a dozen per year." 
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As 1846 wore on, Mann's concern deepened. He was 
certain that the treaty was a good one and he feared that 
further delay would jeopardise its success, as Ernst 
Augustus appeared to be slipping nearer to death. Mann 
believed the United States owed something to this man, 
who, being 
animated by a desire to better the conditions of 
his subjects, adjoined to the sea-coast, has not 
calculated the cost of purchasing for them such 
privileges in their intercourse with us, as we 
have given to all nations which have applied for 
them at a comparatively, vastly lower cost. 
It must have been with some relief that Mann learned that 
the treaty had at last been ratified in January 1847. 18 
Ratification had not been won without a struggle. 
Although the treaty had been reported to the Senate 
without the amendment added in the previous session, James 
Fowler Simmons tried to modify it again by striking out 
the twelfth article which allowed for later extension of 
its terms to other members of the German Bund. This 
attempt bears the hallmarks of damage limitation on the 
part of those who opposed further extension of 
reciprocity. Acknowledging that they were unlikely to 
block the treaty as a whole, they made a determined effort 
to ensure that its terms would be enjoyed only by Hanover 
rather than shared by all who agreed to abide by it. This 
plan stood a chance of being approved by the Senate on the 
grounds that it would deny the dangerous principle of 
allowing countries to enjoy treaty relations with the 
United States without the need for Senate approval of each 
case. However, even this limited victory eluded the 
treaty's opponents, as the proposal was defeated by the 
relatively close vote of 30 to 14. The final vote on the 
treaty also departed from the usual unanimity of ballots 
on treaty ratification: with a count of 32 to 13 for 
ratification, opponents of the Hanover treaty could at 
least point to a vigorous show of minority discontent.19 
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What lay at the heart of that discontent? The two 
recorded votes on the issue, the first on Simmons' motion 
and the second on the treaty as a whole, reveal a distinct 
pattern of partisan voting behaviour modified by 
constituency interest. 
The evidence for a partisan vote is compelling. The 
twelve who voted both to amend the treaty, and then to 
reject it, were all Whigs. These included all Whigs from 
New England states, who considered the treaty to be 
against local shipping interests. The two Whigs from the 
Midwest, with no apparent local interest, opposed the 
treaty, probably as a result either of support for 
protection of shipping as a domestic industry; or of 
sectional jealousy against an arrangement 
favour Southern producers; but especially 
hostility toward the Polk administration. 
which seemed to 
of partisan 
Two Midwest 
states, Ohio and ·Michigan, along with New Hampshire, 
provide further evidence of a partisan vote: each had one 
Whig and one Democrat, who divided against and for the 
treaty respectively. New Hampshire's Democrat, Charles 
Atherton, and his party colleague from Maine, John 
Fairfield, were the only New Englanders who both opposed 
the Simmons amendment and voted in favour of the treaty in 
the final roll call. Neither, and especially not 
Fairfield, put local concern above party loyalty or above 
the belief that reciprocity was a principle worth 
upholding at any cost. This stance was shared by almost 
all Democratic Senators, with only one stepping out of 
line with his colleagues in each vote. 
The absence of a similar near unanimity among the 
Whigs revealed that other forces besides the partisan were 
at work. On the question of amending the Whigs split 
thirteen to six in favour, while on the final question to 
ratify the split was twelve to eight against. With one 
exception all the Whigs who supported the treaty were from 
the South, including Maryland. Their stance is easy to 
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comprehend: they greeted the terms secured for cotton, 
rice and tobacco with enthusiasm and they allowed this to 
override any partisan qualms or, in Maryland's case, fears 
for Baltimore's shipping interest. 
Only a handful of Senators failed to fall into either 
the partisan or local interest pattern, and even the 
behaviour of some of these can be explained. John Niles, 
a Connecticut Democrat, and George Badger, a Whig from 
North Carolina, both supported Simmons' motion to amend 
but then voted in favour of the final treaty. Both 
probably had doubts about the propriety of allowing the 
addition of new states to the operation of the Hanover 
treaty, but once unsuccessful in trying to prevent it 
reverted to the norm, with Niles putting party and 
free-trade principles above local interest and Badger 
following the Southern Whig line. The behaviour of two 
Senators alone defies reasonable explanation: Dayton, a 
New Jersey Whig who supported the treaty, and Isaac Bagby, 
a Democrat from Alabama who voted against amendment but 
also against the final treaty. 
The voting on the Hanover treaty revealed that the 
New England shipping states, and especially Whigs in those 
states, still harboured opposition to the further 
extension of full reciprocity. However, in Maryland and 
New York, two previous centres of discontent, it seemed as 
if prospective benefits to other groups, notably tobacco 
producers in the former, had outweighed fears for the 
shipping interest. Yet it remained the case that the Polk 
administration had apparently sacrificed that interest, in 
principle if not in practice, a development which raises 
the question as to where exactly the priorities of this 
late Jacksonian administration lay. 
There had been hints throughout the debates on 
reciprocal navigation and the colonial trade that it was 
the Democrats, especially those of a free-trade bent, who 
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tended to support existing policies. For them the wider 
interests of commerce as a whole outweighed the specific 
interest of navigation. One has only to recall the 
recurrent statements in favour of the colonial trade 
arrangement of 1830 on the grounds that it provided 
satisfactory business for American exporters. During 
Congressional consideration of these matters the 
statements of Levi Woodbury and Silas Wright stand out, 
although Wright's free-trade credentials were perhaps not 
so well established as those of others. 
Yet principle and party were not solely responsible 
for determining stances on these issues. The example of 
Henry Lee proved that threats to local interest, if strong 
enough, could outweigh both. How much more likely it was, 
then, that free-trade Democrats from non-maritime 
communities would be least attentive to complaints about 
reciprocal navigation. The Polk administration marked the 
arrival of just such a group of free-trade politicians 
with strong links to the producing areas of the country, 
especially in the South. This was not a complete 
departure from the past, since Tyler, Upshur and Calhoun 
were all Southerners, keeping a keen eye open for the 
interests of that region's export producers. But the 
arrival of the Polk administration seemed to herald a 
subjugation of other interests, including navigation, in 
favour of the agricultural producing sector. 
Of course it is not always possible to determine the 
extent to which commerce, in general, and navigation, in 
particular, were kept separate in politicians' minds. An 
increased volume of commerce could provide a greater 
amount of carrying for American shippers to participate 
in. So then rhetorical flourishes of the type used in 
Polk's Inaugural address in March 1845 can be taken at 
face value. He promised that 
no opportunity will be lost to cultivate a 
favorable understanding with foreign governments 
by which our navigation and commerce may be 
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extended and the ample products of our fertile 
soil, as well as the manufactures of our 
skillful artisans, find a ready market and 
remunerating prices in foreign countries. 
Nine months later Polk celebrated the fact that American 
commercial interests, including shipping, were "second to 
but one power in the world" and would soon be inferior to 
none. Secretary of the Treasury, Robert J. Walker, 
appealed to the same combination of interests in proposing 
a reduction of the tariff which would relieve shippers and 
shipbuilders from heavy duties on the goods they bought, 
as well as encouraging more business for both merchants 
and shippers to enjoy.20 
Besides the tariff other policy options of the Polk 
administration seemed to combine the interests of commerce 
and shipping. In the summer of 1846 the administration 
supported moves in Congress to establish a warehouse 
system, which was· designed to allow importers to store 
their goods in public warehouses for up to three years 
before paying import duties. Its prime purpose was to 
allay fears of merchants that they would be unable to pay 
the duties immediately after it was ruled that they had to 
be paid for in specie. Merchants could now delay the 
actual presentation of goods for payment of duty until 
such time as they had the necessary resources of specie. 
Protectionists claimed that the system would encourage 
more foreign imports by allowing goods to be entered at 
the most favourable moment, harming American manufacturers 
in the process. Polk later denied that claim, asserting 
that the system precluded the need for forced auction 
sales of surplus imported goods at times of over-trading, 
a practice which forced down prices to the detriment of 
manufacturers and importers alike. Nevertheless, the 
warehouse system was undoubtedly of greater benefit to the 
importing interest of the country. It was also expected 
to help American shippers. Goods landed and held in 
warehouses for a small storage fee could now be 
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re-exported much more cheaply than had previously been the 
case. This countered Francis Grund's claims that American 
shippers would not benefit equally from the treaty with 
Belgium for lack of warehouses in U.S. ports. Now it 
seemed likely that American shippers would be encouraged 
to carry Caribbean and Latin American goods to U.S. 
warehouses before carrying them to Europe. This prospect 
moved some port-city Whigs, including Daniel Webster and 
Robert Winthrop, to support the bill in Congress. 21 
Territorial expansion might also benefit both 
commerce and shipping. Robert Walker, in a famous letter 
advocating the "re-annexation" of Texas in 1844, noted the 
value of this region as a market for American goods: 
"agriculture, commerce, and navigation, the products of 
the forest and the fisheries, the freighting and ship-
building interests, would all feel a new impulse •••• " 
If the United States failed to act, Britain might 
intervene, a prospect which Walker viewed with alarm: "do 
we never wish to see the day when New York shall take from 
London the trident of the ocean, and the command of the 
commerce of the world? Or do we prefer London to New 
York, and England to America?" A year later Buchanan 
ordered John Slidell to purchase a stretch of the Pacific 
coastline from Mexico, which would secure access to the 
valuable San Francisco bay and harbour. And after the 
United States had indeed obtained the Californian 
coastline, although not quite by the methods envisaged by 
Buchanan in 1845, President Polk again stressed the 
commercial prospects: the new territories were an empire 
in themselves, representing a large potential market for 
American products in exchange for their own bountiful 
resources. Moreover, Pacific ports would enable the 
United States "to command the already valuable and rapidly 
increasing commerce of the Pacific." Whaling vessels 
could be based there, while mechanics established 
themselves to "furnish ready means of shipbuilding and 
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repair, which are now so much wanted in that distant sea." 
In sum, control of the Pacific coast would afford 
"security and repose to our commercial marine."22 
So great was the commercial value of expansion that 
some historians have attributed to it the most influential 
role in the impulse which drove the United States 
westwards in the 1840s. For example, Norman Graebner 
claims that "the determining factor that charted the 
course of the American nation across the continent to the 
Pacific was the pursuit of commercial empire." Expansion 
was supported by politicians of both parties, motivated 
not by concepts of Manifest Destiny and the desire to 
spread a society of democratic farmers across the 
continent, but rather by specific commercial goals. 
Diplomacy was geared towards securing coastal land of 
value to trade, not for settlement, Graebner claims. 
Trade with the Orient and the search for new markets and 
new sources of goods for exchange provided the main 
dynamic for expansion. Any celebration of the benefits to 
producers was token support for an agrarian ideal, 
incidental to the requirements of commerce. Indeed, 
farmers supported commercial groups in the hope that 
expansion would open a gateway for their products to 
Oriental markets and not because it would provide more 
land for settlement.23 
Thomas Hietala offers a different explanation of the 
expansion impulse, challenging the view that settlement 
was not a major force behind it. He identifies strong 
ideological grounds for settlement by expansion in the 
desire to maintain the essentially agricultural outlook of 
the country in the face of industrialisation and 
urbanisation. However, expansion for commercial reasons 
could help fulfil this desire. Since the 1837 crash, 
farmers had been worried about surplus production as 
existing domestic markets proved inadequate, and the fear 
was that more Americans would be lured into manufacturing 
-254-
labour rather than encouraged to lead independent, farming 
lives. New overseas markets were the only sound 
alternative, and so the push to the Pacific coast to ease 
the course of trade to the Orient represented one way of 
nourishing the country's agricultural roots. The 
diplomatic efforts to secure more favourable treatment for 
American goods in Europe were equally useful, especially 
when they had the added value of encouraging importation 
of manufactures, as was the case with the conjunction of 
Corn Law repeal and the 1846 Tariff: "This welcome 
development, like the acquisition of California's ports, 
would protect the Jeffersonian arcadia from the menace of 
manufacturing, economic distress, and monopoly." 24 
There is evidence to suggest that such a concern did 
influence the Polk administration. Even in the extract 
from his Inaugural quoted above Polk seems to betray 
special concern for the interests of the producer, whether 
of the "ample products of our fertile soil," or of "the 
manufactures of our skillful artisans." Again in his 
first annual message, when Polk proposed expenditure on 
steam-powered naval vessels to protect American shipping 
around the world, he commented also on the wider 
importance of such a move, revealing a deeper interest: 
"The productions of the interior which seek a market 
abroad are directly dependent on the safety and freedom of 
our commerce."25 
Of course, a more cynical interpretation would stress 
the irony of a Tennessee-based, slave-owning President 
extolling the virtues of the modest independent farmer. 
Surely such words were little more than rhetorical 
camouflage for measures designed to promote the business 
interests of the Southern planter class, while keeping 
western farmers sweet with the prospect of more open 
markets. After all, the most vigorous lobbyists in 
Washington were those working on behalf of tobacco, rice 
and cotton producers, and, significantly, all three 
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articles benefited from the Hanover treaty. Apart from 
two members, Polk's Cabinet revealed a decided leaning to 
the South. Secretary Walker came from Mississippi and 
Cave Johnson and John Mason hailed from Tennessee and 
Virginia respectively. Even William Marcy, the Secretary 
of War from New York, belonged to the southerly-leaning 
Hunker faction of that State's Democratic party. While 
Polk's first Secretary of the Navy, George Bancroft, was 
from Massachusetts, and his belief in free trade was 
perhaps more attuned to the needs of the northern and 
western farmer, in principle and policy he still found 
himself aligned with his Cabinet colleagues.26 
While it would be an exaggeration to claim that the 
southern interest alone prevailed--after all the Polk 
administration also supported the modification of the 
British Corn Laws--it certainly seemed to be the southern 
producer who benefited most often from their policies. 
And in the case of the Hanover treaty it was at the 
possible expense of the shipping interest. It might 
appear strange that the chief agent of that sacrifice was 
James Buchanan, who had earlier expressed sympathy with 
the shippers' cause in the 1840 debate on reciprocity, but 
even his stance is understandable. He clearly shared his 
colleagues' goal of improved markets for agricultural 
producers. In 1846 he proposed the stipulation in the 
Hanover treaty against any increase in duties on tobacco, 
as a provision which "would be of the first importance to 
the great agricultural interest of our country." But he 
also had his constituency position to consider. As a 
Pennsylvanian he could hardly adopt free-trade principles 
and so he advocated a more balanced tariff of the type 
favoured by earlier Democrats. He voted for the Whig 
tariff of 1842, but only under orders from his State 
legislature, and he also opposed views on the other 
extreme when the Polk Cabinet discussed the tariff in 
1846, proposing that higher duties be left on certain 
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protected articles, such as iron, sugar and coal. When it 
came to the question of commercial diplomacy, Buchanan's 
awareness of the manufacturing interest led him to oppose 
commercial reciprocity as a means to securing duty 
reductions in overseas markets. His absence or abstention 
from the final vote on the convention with the Zollverein 
in 1844 assumes added significance in this light, and 
throughout his term in the State department he steadfastly 
rejected further suggestions of such an approach to 
negotiation. For Buchanan the sacrifice of shipping 
interests by exchanging grants of reciprocal navigation 
for favours to the producing interest was politically the 
safer option. 27 
Buchanan's handling of commercial diplomacy in 
northern Europe after the signing of the Hanover treaty 
reveals his priorities more clearly. Had that treaty 
stood alone, then American shippers would have had little 
to worry about in practice. The Kingdom did not have a 
large mercantile fleet to rival them in either direct or 
indirect trades--the number of Hanoverian vessels trading 
in U.S. ports rarely ran into double figures prior to 
1848--and so American shippers were in a good position to 
exploit any increase in those trades. However, when 
Buchanan sought to extend the principle behind the Hanover 
treaty to negotiations with more powerful maritime 
countries, the implications for American shipping were 
more ominous. When Buchanan drafted three sets of 
instructions in 1847 and 1848, outlining the new rules of 
commercial diplomacy to be followed by U.S. agents, 
charges and ministers in northern Europe, it seemed as if 
a distinct choice of priorities had been made, with the 
producing interest coming out on top. 
Although their details varied in accordance with 
local problems, Buchanan's orders to Henry Ellsworth in 
Sweden, Robert Fleniken in Denmark, and Andrew Jackson 
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Donelson in Prussia, were near identical in their basic 
format. Each set outlined practices considered 
unacceptable by the United States, such as excessive 
import duty levels, transit dues, or unfair advantages 
enjoyed by the other country's shipping as a result of 
indirect trade reciprocity. The inclusion of the latter 
grievance was significant, as it reveals that Buchanan 
made no attempt to deny the existence of the problem. In 
the orders to Ellsworth he avowed that so far as the evils 
suffered by American shippers were concerned "such a state 
of things cannot long continue to exist." Ellsworth 
should warn the Swedish government that the United States 
were close to taking their rightful and near immediate 
remedy: "The Treaty may be abrogated at any time, after a 
year's notice, by either party." Although the President 
had "arrived at no positive conclusion respecting the 
abrogation of any of our existing Treaties of indirect 
reciprocity," it was certain "that he will not authorize 
the conclusion of any new Treaties of this character, 
without equivalents to the United States to compensate, in 
some degree, for the superior advantages which we may 
grant over those which we receive." In effect, "the late 
Treaty with Hanover ••• is the commencement of a new era 
in our policy in this particular •••• Under its 
provisions.we have obtained fair equivalents for the 
advantages we have conferred." 
In his orders to Donelson Buchanan added one final 
element to the argument, to emphasise that the United 
States meant business. He adverted to the fact that 
"there exists at present in the United States much 
objection to such Treaties," as the faltering progress in 
the Senate of the "advantageous" treaty with Hanover had 
illustrated. Therefore it should be clear to the 
Zollverein and other countries that American shippers and 
their sympathisers would not hesitate to scrap the 
principle of reciprocity in indirect trade if they got the 
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chance. If "a treaty less favorable to our Country [than 
the Hanover treaty] be concluded with the Zollverein," 
Buchanan warned, "it would doubtless encounter strong 
opposition in the Senate, and if it were much less 
favorable, it would most probably be rejected.n28 
So then, Buchanan armed his representatives with the 
threat to withdraw reciprocal navigation favours, as a 
means of putting pressure on Denmark, Sweden and Prussia. 
The type of equivalents which Buchanan demanded in return 
for maintaining reciprocity varied in each case. Yet 
despite entreaties and warnings of the possible abrogation 
of treaties, little progress was made in putting into 
practice the theoretical "new era" which Buchanan had 
prematurely celebrated. 
Denmark, of course, had been a target for critics of 
reciprocal navigation for some years by the time members 
of the Polk administration took up the attack. Ambrose 
Dudley Mann asserted in 1846 that "Denmark derives more 
benefits for her navigation with the United States than 
any state in Europe, and gives comparatively nothing in 
return." The President himself believed that the treaty 
was "a very beneficial one to that country," and in 1848 
Buchanan agreed, avowing that the convention was "more 
favorable in its terms to the commerce and navigation of 
Denmark, than any which now exists or has existed between 
her and any other nation." It was "manifest that such a 
concession [of indirect trade reciprocity] to our vessels 
is far, very far from being a fair equivalent for the 
privileges which Danish vessels enjoy in our ports." He 
ranged through the familiar arguments: how could one 
compare the continental territory of the United States, 
possessing two long coastlines, "numerous and excellent 
harbors," and a population of over twenty millions who 
imported and exported large quantities of goods, with 
Denmark, "a small and poor country, in a high and severe 
northern latitude," with a population of not much more 
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than two million, and with little external trade? 
Buchanan estimated that there was ten times more business 
in the U.S. indirect trade for the Danes to exploit than 
there was for American shippers to exploit in the Danish 
trade. The truth was that "so far as regards this trade, 
the reciprocity is but a mere name."29 
The solution of another old problem provided the 
likely equivalent for any perpetuation of this state of 
affairs. The Sound dues still represented a major 
annoyance for American exporters and shippers, even if 
there had been a reduction of some tolls, notably upon raw 
sugar, spirits, and especially raw cotton. Although 
William Irwin, the minister in Denmark, anticipated in 
1846 that these changes would provide for a more certain, 
and a more direct, trade in American goods to the Baltic, 
others considered them insufficient. In 1848, Irwin's 
successor, Fleniken, suggested that it would be an 
auspicious time to negotiate on the matter again, while 
Mann had already made clear how he felt the question 
should be approached: "She should be notified that unless 
she abolishes the 'Sound or Belt tolls' the treaty which 
we concluded with her in 1826 should be of no longer 
duration, after the expiration of the twelve-months from 
the date of the notice for its cessation."30 
Buchanan consulted with the President, who agreed 
that the dues were a "heavy tax" and that a treaty ought 
to be signed "by which our commerce in that quarter might 
be relieved from these tolls." They agreed to use the new 
approach and to instruct Fleniken to stress the value of 
the treaty to the Danes, "with an intimation that unless a 
satisfactory arrangement was made as respects the Sound 
duties or tolls, the U.S. would give the notice and 
abrogate the treaty." Any new treaty would revise the 
1826 version by including an article exempting American 
goods from payment of the dues, and as a sweetener the 
United States would be prepared to pay up to $250,000 if 
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Denmark abolished them immediately and for perpetuity 
rather than just for the term of the treaty.31 
With Denmark at war over Schleswig-Holstein, the 
prospects for a successful negotiation were not good. 
There were also rumours of a general European settlement 
of the Sound tolls issue, projected for 1851-52, which 
gave Fleniken cause to believe that the Danish government 
would postpone negotiation on it until that time. Even so 
he agreed to press on as ordered and suggested adding 
import duty reductions on tobacco and rice to the list of 
equivalents he should seek. However, despite his warnings 
that the 1826 treaty was under review, Fleniken was fobbed 
off with diplomatic bluff and he found it impossible to 
negotiate in the atmosphere of war which prevailed until 
his departure at the beginning of Taylor's presidency. 
Even so, this failure in practice does not conceal the 
intention to win ~ommercial privileges from Denmark by 
conceding to that country reciprocal navigation in the 
indirect trade, in the face of known opposition to that 
principle. 32 
The same approach had been adopted towards Sweden, 
even more narrowly in the interests of producers than was 
the case with the Sound dues. Again, there had been 
reports of the advantages which Sweden enjoyed at the 
expense of American shipping. Henry Ellsworth noted how 
the carrying trade was "almost entirely confined to her 
vessels," and claimed that during his term in Sweden "not 
a single American vessel has arrived at Stockholm, and 
only a few have come to Gothenburg!" Buchanan's 
explanation for this problem was nearly identical to that 
he had used in relation to Denmark, give or take a few 
statistical variations. The Swedish population was larger 
than Denmark's at about four and a half million but this 
was still not believed to provide enough trade for 
Americans to share in as an equivalent for Swedish access 
to the huge trades of the United States. The Swedish case 
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was exacerbated by the fact that it was acknowledged that 
Sweden built, manned and sailed vessels "at a cheaper 
rate, perhaps, than any other country." As public opinion 
was "fast taking a direction against the concession, to 
any Power, of the indirect trade with the United States 
upon terms of equality with our own vessels," the example 
of Sweden only accelerated the trend: the effects of the 
Swedish treaty were "always presented as the strongest 
argument to prove the impolicy of such Treaties."33 
The course to take seemed clear to Ellsworth. In 
January 1847 he asked whether "the time has not come when 
some change should be made in the Treaty," and again a 
year later, "How long then shall the treaty we have made 
with her exist?" He noted that while the treaty was 
"notorious" in the United States, in Sweden "the very 
reverse is the case," as it was "talked of with 
exultation." If ·the treaty was so highly valued by 
Sweden, she should be willing to protect it, and so 
Ellsworth's proposed course of action followed that of 
Ambrose Dudley Mann, whose treaty with Hanover he admired: 
I do not wish to be understood • • • as 
precisely recommending a speedy demolition of 
the treaty now existing with Sweden, but as 
urging the immediate necessity of securing ~ 
equivalents for the benefits ana-advantages we 
scatter with so liberal a hand. 
And Ellsworth's reports had suggested the sort of 
equivalent which would be desirable: a reduction of 
import duties on products such as cotton manufactures, 
sugar, and especially tobacco; duties which were onerous 
and in cases near prohibitive, made worse by an odd method 
of valuation.34 
Had communications with Washington been swifter, 
Ellsworth would have discovered that his thinking was in 
line with Buchanan's. The Secretary of State had already 
complained at Swedish persistence in the "injustice and 
impolicy of levying extravagant duties on articles 
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imported into Sweden by means of an assessed valuation, 
twice or thrice greater than the actual cost," a practice 
which bore "with peculiar hardship" upon several American 
productions. In May 1847 he ordered Ellsworth not to make 
an all-out attack on the Swedish tariff, which would have 
provoked calls of outside interference in the country's 
domestic business, strengthening the hand of Swedish 
restrictionists. Instead Ellsworth was to use methods of 
gentle persuasion to enlighten Swedish opinion on 
political economy and to encourage those who favoured a 
less restrictive tariff. But the minister was also to 
make discrete references to the Hanover negotiation and to 
the evidence of American discontent at reciprocal 
navigation. Such a juxtaposition of hints might have "a 
favorable effect in reducing the rate of duties on 
American productions."35 
Both before·and after receiving these orders 
Ellsworth looked on helplessly as the Swedish government 
debated changes in the country's tariff. Various 
reductions were suggested, and a modification of the 
valuation method was mooted. But more worryingly a 
proviso was drafted to favour Swedish shipping by reducing 
import and export duties on goods carried in vessels which 
in the past three years had exported Swedish goods to the 
volume of half their tonnage, a condition which would 
exclude most foreign ships. On hearing of this Buchanan 
warned that it would be an infraction of the spirit of the 
treaty of 1827, and that in the unlikely event of the 
proviso being enacted it would justify the United States 
in abrogating the treaty. It must have been with some 
relief, then, that Buchanan learned of the rejection of 
the proviso. As to the rest of the tariff, however, there 
was no joy. Ellsworth reported that such changes as had 
been made were "of little importance to the commerce of 
the United States." There had been no change on tobacco, 
and duties on sugar were still heavy. Again, then, 
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Buchanan's "new era" policy had failed to bear fruit. 36 
The third of the set of instructions issued by 
Buchanan were those sent to Donelson in Berlin. His 
duties extended to the Zollverein as a whole and involved 
complex questions of intra-Germany rivalries as well as 
the more familiar issues of duty levels, transit dues, and 
reciprocal treatment. His position was complicated by the 
continued presence in Germany of agent Mann, for whom the 
Hanover treaty was only the opening shot in a campaign to 
secure more favourable commercial terms for the United 
States throughout the Bund. The two men disagreed over 
the best means towards the same general commercial ends. 
A final complication was the eruption of revolution in 
virtually all the German states in 1848, which confronted 
U.S. statesmen with new men and institutions with which to 
deal. So intricate and complex were these developments 
that they merit their own, separate consideration. 
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Chapter 8. Frustrated Hopes: 
Commercial Diplomacy with Germany, 1846-1849 
The "new era" approach to commercial diplomacy 
espoused by the Polk administration after 1846 was just 
another in the long list of methods used to try to reduce 
duties on exports into Germany. Friendly persuasion, 
threats of tariff retaliation, and mutual tariff reduction 
had all been tried and found wanting in the 1840s. Now, 
after the successful Hanover negotiation, Buchanan was 
prepared to use the same method with the rest of Germany. 
This did not mean, however, that earlier tactics were 
abandoned altogether as outright failures. Persuasion by 
reference to the mutual value of reduced duties could 
still be effective and was used in negotiations. Even 
after the Senate's rejection of the Convention of 1844 
some still thought that reciprocal tariff reduction was 
the preferable course. Most importantly the U.S. minister 
in Berlin, Andrew Jackson Donelson, subscribed to that 
view and was prepared to act upon it, even if that meant 
going beyond his instructions from the State department 
which advocated the "new era" method in its diplomacy in 
Germany. However, the uncertain condition of German 
politics, as the region underwent revolutionary events in 
1848-50, made any diplomacy difficult. Moreover, serious 
flaws in the mechanics of the new approach undermined its 
effectiveness, so that by 1849 not only had Buchanan's 
efforts been of no avail, but earlier successes had also 
begun to crumble in his hands. 
In 1846-47 these problems lurked in the future and 
Buchanan had high hopes for the future success of the 
course adopted in signing the treaty with Hanover. He was 
certain that other German states, notably Prussia, would 
perceive the value of good commercial relations with the 
United States: 
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I have reason to believe that some of the 
Zollverein States are prepared for as liberal 
terms as are contained in our treaty with 
Hanover. A reduction of the duty on tobacco 
even to one half of its present rate would open a 
fine market throughout Germany for that article. 
In these hopes he was buoyed up by the enthusiasm of 
Ambrose Dudley Mann. In one respect Mann's course 
followed the old tactic of underpinning those states, 
notably Hanover, which had remained independent of the 
Zollverein and which treated American goods more 
favourably. Mann too, though, dreamed of an extension of 
the Hanover terms to the rest of the region: 
I want to see Germany united upon liberal 
commercial principles • • • • I want to see the 
'Old Holy Roman Empire' with her kindly 
sentiments for our own country • • • consigning 
to infamy the remains of the feudal age still 
laid upon her rivers and highways; and erecting 
herself, in the panoply of her strength, upon a 
platform, that will admit of an extended and 
wholly natural commercial intercourse with the 
rising world of the west. 
The Hanover treaty contained clauses which made 
possible the accomplishment of this end, which, "if 
judiciously and perseveringly followed up," would 
contribute to the fame of the Polk administration and of 
Buchanan in particular. The eighth article held out the 
prospect of the abolition of all transit dues on the 
Weser. The twelfth article, offering all the same terms 
as granted to Hanover in exchange for the same or 
equivalent terms as she offered in return, was designed 
primarily to apply to Hanover's neighbours and fellow 
members of the Steuerverein. But if successful with them, 
there was every reason to apply it to the rest of Germany 
as well, opening up new markets in the interior and 
removing burdens on goods passing from the Baltic and 
North Seas through to Austria and Switzerland. Together, 
the two articles promised to be "productive of the best 
results to American interests," by creating within the 
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Zollverein the sentiment "that of all the methods of 
raising public revenue yet adopted, the tax exacted from 
merchandise in transitu, is the most detrimental to 
commercial prosperity." In 1847 Mann held the highest 
possible of hopes: "I by no means despair of uniting all 
Germany--the Austrian portion excepted--in the provisions 
of our Treaty with Hanover •••• "1 
Mann threw himself into the first part of this 
project with great energy. As in 1837 the power to 
negotiate with Hanover had encompassed Oldenburg and the 
two Mecklenburgs, Schwerin and Strelitz, as well, but just 
as Wheaton had done on the former occasion, so Mann also 
had decided to postpone talks with them until the main aim 
of his mission was achieved. In both cases the fact that 
their shipping already enjoyed better terms in U.S. ports 
than did Hanover's caused problems, but Mann was able to 
overcome these and bring both negotiations to successful 
conclusions.2 
The Grand Duke of Oldenburg expressed a willingness 
to join the Hanover treaty almost as soon as he had heard 
of its successful completion and after a brief trip to 
London to send the final document to Washington Mann 
resumed negotiations in the Grand Duchy. The Oldenburg 
authorities proposed two changes to the treaty if they 
were to accede to it, which could have delayed negotiation 
or even have necessitated the drafting of a completely new 
treaty. After all the Senate had approved the Hanover 
treaty in one form and hardly could be expected to allow 
other states to join it on modified terms. One of the 
proposed modifications was unacceptable anyway. Confident 
in the knowledge that her shipping, unlike Hanover's 
before the treaty, already enjoyed full reciprocity by 
proclamation, Oldenburg sought an extra equivalent: both 
she and Hanover ought to be allowed to flag vessels built 
in the others' ports as their own when it came to claiming 
reciprocal terms. Mann and Buchanan successfully resisted 
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this dangerous principle. The other proposed alteration 
posed far less of a problem, and it is somewhat surprising 
that Oldenburg suggested it in the first place. For the 
simple reason that the Grand Duchy did not lie on the 
banks of the Weser she did not impose duties upon traffic 
along it. Nor, of course, were the Stade duties her 
responsibility. Rather than simply ignoring the articles 
on those duties in the Hanover treaty as irrelevant, 
however, Oldenburg insisted on their removal from the 
document by which she acceded to the treaty. As it would 
have no practical effect, Buchanan considered this safe to 
do, and in March 1847 Mann incorporated that term in the 
accession document. Importantly, though, Oldenburg agreed 
to abide by all the other terms of the Hanover treaty, 
including the vital reduction and prohibition of duties.3 
The Oldenburg negotiation had been relatively simple. 
The Grand Duchy was a member of the Steuerverein, which 
made it sensible to put her relations with the United 
States on the same footing as Hanover's. Less obvious 
were the chances of success for negotiations which Mann 
initiated with Mecklenburg-Schwerin towards the end of 
1847, in accordance with Buchanan's orders. This Grand 
Duchy was not a member of the Steuerverein, but like 
Hanover had resisted Prussian pressure to join the 
Zollverein. Mann was anxious to perpetuate Mecklenburg-
Schwerin's independence of the wider customs union and 
viewed with alarm the wiles of the Prussians who thronged 
the court. Even the Grand Duke's mother, the King of 
Prussia's sister, appeared likely to discourage 
independent relations with the United States. Mann 
derived great personal satisfaction, therefore, when his 
efforts met with success: "I have taken my revenge upon 
Prussia. I never enjoyed, apart from the benefit, to be 
derived to my country, my triumph so much." 
Aside from Prussian influence, Mann had anticipated 
many other obstacles to a smooth negotiation. Mecklenburg 
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claimed that she had nothing to gain from the treaty, 
already enjoying reciprocal terms by proclamation. Mann 
countered that a treaty would put those rights on a more 
permanent basis, and at first this claim seemed to work, 
as Eustow, the Grand Duchy's foreign minister, said he 
would be prepared to accede to the Hanover treaty "for the 
purpose of securing the shipping interest of Mecklenburg 
for a lengthened period all the privileges the navigation 
of Mecklenburg enjoyed from the year 1835 •••• " When 
negotiations began in earnest, however, Eustow noted that 
the treaty would actually reduce the rights enjoyed by the 
Grand Duchy: the treaty would limit reciprocal treatment 
to vessels of her own construction, whereas the act of 
1828 made no such restriction. Only by inferring that the 
laws of 1824 and 1828 would soon be repealed did Mann 
convince Eustow to accept final terms. The nature of 
those terms represented the last hurdle. They differed in 
detail from those offered by Hanover, necessitating a new 
treaty rather than just an accession to Hanover's. But in 
basic principle they were the same: the abolition of 
import duties on raw cotton and rice in the husk; the 
reduction of duties on all other types of rice, on tobacco 
and on whale oil; the abolition of all transit duties on 
goods passing through the Grand Duchy's ports; and a limit 
of transit duties on goods using the Hamburg-Berlin 
railroad through Mecklenburg territory to two schillings 
per 100 lb. In effect, of course, Mann had also bullied 
the Grand Duchy into surrendering the right to reciprocity 
for foreign-built vessels, which added to his delight in 
securing the treaty. The fact remained, though, that even 
with this safeguard the granting of reciprocal navigation 
was contrary to the wishes of some American shippers. 
Their sacrifice in favour of producers was repeated.4 
Talks with the Hanseatic towns constituted the final 
part of Mann's diplomatic offensive in the North Sea 
coastal region of Germany. If any power was a target for 
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use of the "new era" approach, then surely it was Bremen, 
long regarded as the state most successful in exploiting 
the alleged inequalities of reciprocity. Andrew Jackson 
Donelson reported that things were still no different in 
that regard: Americans could not compete with a city 
whose people, proportionally to size of population and 
commerce, were "the greatest ship builders in Europe"; 
American ships carried only ten per cent of U.S. trade 
with the city and could not hope to carry more "as long as 
their marine is less costly than ours, & the rate of 
interest for the use of money is lower in Europe than 
America." Donelson thought the Hanover treaty was likely 
to exacerbate the situation: the abolition of transit 
dues on the Weser, if accomplished, would encourage 
greater use of Bremen and its shipping, at the expense of 
Hamburg and of the Elbe route, where the Stade dues had 
only been reduced and not abolished altogether. 5 
Ironically it was the same eighth article of the 
Hanover treaty which gave Mann greatest hope of gains in 
talks with Bremen. Prior to the treaty he had urged the 
city authorities to abolish their duty of four cents per 
100 lb. on goods passing along the Weser, a change "due to 
the United States, on account of their liberal policy 
towards the Hanse towns." There was a veiled threat, 
though, that the United States could coerce Bremen into 
the abolition, by threatening to abrogate the 1828 terms 
of indirect trade reciprocity. The treaty with Hanover 
made it unlikely that that extreme measure would be 
necessary. On hearing of the treaty the Bremen Senate 
announced that they would remove the duty on goods bound 
for Hanover and Oldenburg. Moreover, if in future any 
state of the Zollverein were to abolish its transit dues 
on the Weser, then Bremen would remove its duty on goods 
bound for that state as well. Mann was able to report 
exciting moves which might lead to valuable results: 
"delegates from the different sovereigns directly 
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concerned in the navigation of the river are now in 
session, and it is confidently believed that the tolls, if 
they be not abrogated altogether, will be diminished to a 
tax of control merely." Hamburg also caught the spirit of 
the age and its Foreign Affairs Minister assured Mann that 
after the accession of Mecklenburg to the Hanover treaty 
"his Government will abolish, or reduce to a mere nominal 
rate, the tolls levied on our four chief staples in their 
transit to the interior •••• "6 
A combination of hard work, good fortune, and 
threats, both implicit and explicit, that the United 
States would take away the privilege of indirect trade 
reciprocity, had brought Mann much success. Some import 
duties had been lowered, others frozen, and transit duties 
had been reduced or abolished altogether. He did abandon 
an approach to the Grand Duchy of Mecklenburg-Strelitz; 
but that was because he feared a failure in negotiations 
with this comparatively insignificant state would reduce 
the momentum which had already been built up, perhaps 
persuading others not to treat. Now, instead, he turned 
to individual members of the Zollverein, beginning with 
Saxony, again in accordance with his orders from Buchanan. 
However, his course went against the advice of the other 
U.S. diplomat in Germany at the time, Andrew Jackson 
Donelson, who advocated a completely different approach to 
any negotiation with the Zollverein. The two men clashed 
over the priority given to reductions of tariff or transit 
duties respectively, but more especially over the methods 
to be used in their diplomacy. Most fundamentally of all, 
they had different perceptions of the future development 
of inter-state relations within Germany. The calculations 
of both, though, were swept away by the storm of 
revolution which broke in 1848.7 
Despite the failure of the U.S. Senate to ratify the 
convention of 1844 the Zollverein had not eschewed further 
-271-
relations with the United States. Even after Congress had 
revised the tariff downwards in 1846, fulfilling some of 
the Zollverein's diplomatic ambitions, the union had other 
goals to pursue. Foremost among these was the extension 
of the terms of Prussia's treaty of 1828 to apply to all 
member states of the customs union. As well as 
guaranteeing for interior goods the same treatment as was 
accorded to Prussian goods and ensuring reciprocity for 
the shipping of all Zollverein states, it was hoped that 
this would encourage those states independent of the union 
to join it without losing any of the treaty privileges 
they already enjoyed. So in February 1846 Baron Gerolt, 
the Prussian minister in Washington, had approached 
Buchanan, proposing to extend the treaty of 1828 "so as to 
embrace the states of the Zollverein." Polk and Buchanan 
considered the proposal carefully, agreeing that there was 
no real objection to such a move. But Buchanan saw the 
chance to make some important changes in the terms of the 
treaty, and when he told Gerolt that talks on the matter, 
preferably to be conducted in Germany, would be desirable, 
he advised him to inform his superiors to be prepared to 
accept modifications.8 
Learning of the likelihood of such negotiations, both 
Mann and Donelson advised Buchanan on the best course to 
pursue. Predictably Mann recommended that the Zollverein 
be made to take heed of the Hanover treaty, of the methods 
used to obtain it, and of the concessions wrung from the 
Kingdom. In his view the transit trade was the most 
important issue and he believed that the United States had 
the means to force Prussia to "remove these transit and 
other historical duties--relics of feudal ages--wherever 
they exist." He repeatedly stressed how Buchanan could 
achieve this aim: "we have but to seriously threaten 
Prussia, with our intention to terminate the reciprocity 
treaty under which she enjoys a large indirect trade with 
the United States to hasten its consummation." If Prussia 
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failed to follow the example of Hanover, then the United 
States "should not hesitate .•• to retaliate by 
terminating •.• a convention which sustains, in all 
eminent degrees, the shipping of that kingdom." The 
United States, while being liberal in their commercial 
policy by granting reciprocity to states like Prussia, 
should "take good care to make it a sine qua .!!.£!!., that in 
return, they grant us every favor at their disposal."9 
Mann made no secret of his desire to see all Germany 
united upon liberal commercial principles, preferably 
along the lines of the Hanover treaty of 1846 which he 
clearly believed to be advantageous. Donelson, however, 
held a diametrically opposite view, noting in 1849 that 
his own efforts had been inspired by a desire "that the 
disadvantages of Mr Mann's treaties might be countered." 
First and foremost he disagreed with Mann in maintaining 
the independence ·of the smaller states from the Zollverein 
by means of treaties. Admittedly Donelson conceded that 
if the customs union refused to guarantee that ports of 
the smaller states, once incorporated within it, would not 
be used "to enforce a policy of unwise restriction & 
unnecessary burdens," then those states should "be 
protected in their independence." Ideally, though, the 
opposite should be the case: "The Hanse towns, Hanover, & 
Mecklenburg would be most valuable additions to the 
Zollverein, & ought to be encouraged to join it." Aware 
of Prussia's desire to enlist those states in the customs 
union, Donelson feared that Mann's treaty with Hanover 
might endanger U.S. relations with Prussia by 
strengthening the "impression on the minds of some 
individuals that it has been dictated by a wish to lessen 
the influence of Prussia & render more difficult the 
extension of the Zollverein." 
Donelson made clear why he thought American best 
interests lay in good relations with Prussia. He played 
down the value of the changes in import and transit duties 
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in Mann's treaties: Hanover would never consume as great 
a volume of American products as did the Zollverein; and 
the removal of transit tolls would be of value only if 
goods did actually go to the interior, something again 
which demand from the Zollverein would determine. The 
United States should take care to get their priorities 
right: "To obtain the advantages of the most unrestricted 
trade with the States out of the Zollverein, would avail 
nothing if it were accompanied by causes that lessen the 
demand of the people who form the association." So it was 
important not to appear as if they were "trying to thwart 
the policy of the Zollverein, by strengthening those 
States which are independent of it •••• "10 
Buchanan agreed with both Mann and Donelson in 
regarding reductions of tariff and transit duties as 
vital, especially on items such as tobacco. To obtain 
such reductions he opted almost wholly for the course 
suggested by Mann, putting to one side the fears expressed 
by Donelson about upsetting the Zollverein. In May 1847, 
in the third of the set of diplomatic instructions which 
signalled the start of the "new era" approach, Buchanan 
advised Donelson that the Zollverein should follow the 
example of Hanover. He recognised that it was "the 
highest policy and the strongest desire of Prussia • 
to embrace all the German States in the Zollverein league, 
and place herself at their head"; but he was adamant that 
such integration should not be based upon the restrictive 
system of the Zollverein. An alternative development was 
preferable: "Why should not the States of the Zollverein 
become parties to the Hanoverian treaty in the manner 
prescribed by the Twelfth Article; or conclude a Treaty 
with the United States of the same character?" In a 
letter to Mann Buchanan revealed the same ambivalence 
about whether the Zollverein should absorb smaller states. 
He was pleased by the prospect of the Hanseatic towns 
remaining independent of the union as a result of the 
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Weser duty provisions of the Hanover treaty, and he 
repeated his desire that Zollverein should also become a 
party to that treaty by reducing its trade restrictions. 
His orders to both men reflected this desire but also 
recognised the fact that the Zollverein was unlikely to 
comply immediately. Throughout his orders to Donelson 
Buchanan referred repeatedly to the Hanover treaty, its 
provisions, and the methods used to obtain them. He 
warned his minister that any treaty less favourable would 
probably meet a sad fate at the hands of the Senate. 
Donelson should try to convince the Zollverein to follow 
the example of Hanover, reducing its import duties on 
American products, and especially those on tobacco. 
Moreover, the union should be induced to accede to the 
Hanover treaty with regard to transit duties. If the 
Zollverein proved obstructive, then Donelson was to 
impress upon them the fact that reducing their 
restrictions would improve trade in general and would 
"secure a fine field for the extension of Prussian 
navigation, which now seems to be the cherished interest 
of that Kingdom." Here was tacit admission that Prussian 
shipping would benefit substantially if the Zollverein 
reduced her duties, both by having a greater volume of 
trade to carry, but also by having a continued guarantee 
of reciprocity. Significantly, though, Buchanan did not 
give any specific, explicit order to threaten to withhold 
reciprocity if the Zollverein refused to meet his terms. 
His reference to methods used in the Hanover negotiation 
and also the enclosure of his instructions to Ellsworth in 
Sweden, in which the threat was made explicit, were no 
doubt intended to alert Donelson to the possibility of 
using such methods himself, but the absence of specific 
orders to that effect was to cause difficulties. 
Buchanan's orders to Mann a month later reveal that 
he did not expect immediate and total success in the 
negotiations with the Zollverein. He advised Mann to be 
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prepared to tour Germany, to talk to member states of the 
union, such as Baden, Bavaria, Saxony, Nassau, Hesse 
Darmstadt and Brunswick, where the United States had no 
regular diplomatic representative in residence. If the 
Zollverein refused to accede to the Hanover treaty as one 
body, then at least some of its constituent parts might be 
persuaded to do so.11 
Mann's talks with Mecklenburg-Schwerin prevented him 
from pursuing his new instructions until 1848, but 
Donelson had already been active in Berlin. He was no 
less concerned to bring about reductions of duties in 
Germany, noting in a private letter to the President how 
anxious he was that "we should be able to say that we have 
opened a new market to our tobacco, salt provisions, rice, 
& cotton twist." But he did not subscribe to the "new 
era" approach of threatening to withhold reciprocal 
navigation in order to win reductions in tariff and 
transit duties. His efforts were guided instead by the 
principles which had led to the unratified convention with 
the Zollverein of 1844. Undeterred by predictions that 
the U.S. tariff of 1846 would lessen the desire of the 
union for mutual duty reductions, Donelson expected orders 
to proceed upon that basis. Indeed, he advised Polk that 
he could make most progress "if you will allow me to make 
some slight concessions to German manufactures that are 
not in competition with our own." Even after receiving 
different orders, he waxed enthusiastically about his 
adopted course: "We can never be losers when by a 
judicious reciprocity of Tariff reductions we open new 
markets to our great staples and increase the consumption 
of them in such ••• flourishing states."12 
Buchanan's frustration at Donelson's independent line 
of negotiation soon became apparent. The Secretary of 
State quickly informed Polk of the state of play, 
asserting that the "attempt to change the existing Tariff 
by Treaty would, in my opinion, be highly impolitic & 
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would re-open discussions which I had hoped were buried." 
Buchanan no doubt felt uncomfortable when any question of 
the tariff was raised, but especially when the balance 
between Executive and Legislature in tariff-making was 
involved. This became even clearer in his subsequent 
correspondence with the minister in Berlin, which at times 
became quite bitter. In a stinging rebuke Buchanan stated 
his objections to the principles which Donelson adopted: 
The more I reflect upon the subject, the better 
am I convinced that the Executive Branch of the 
Government, ought not to attempt to change by 
Treaty, the rate of duties which has been 
adopted by Congress in our late Tariff;--
certainly not, unless it should first be 
ascertained to a moral certainty, that such a 
change would meet the approbation of the Senate 
as well as of the Legislative power. Such a 
result I would not anticipate. Considering, 
therefore, that the rejection, by the Senate, of 
Mr. Wheaton's Treaty with the Zoll-verein, 
excited much feeling in Prussia, it might 
seriously embarrass our relations with that 
power, should a new Treaty of a similar 
character show the same fate. 
There were also Hanover's views to consider. That Kingdom 
had received only full reciprocity as her reward for 
reducing duties on American products and would no doubt 
feel aggrieved if the Zollverein, for the same sort of 
concessions, won reductions of duties on its products 
entering U.S. ports as well as preserving reciprocal 
navigation rights. This would have the undesirable effect 
of discouraging the accession of any more small states to 
the Hanover treaty, and as such, in Buchanan's opinion, 
would be a "retrograde movement." 
Noting that the U.S. tariff of 1846 removed any 
grounds Prussia had for calling for more, mutual, 
reductions, Buchanan repeated his desire that the Hanover 
treaty be the model for any future arrangements in 
Germany. Again he stressed that the threat to withhold 
reciprocal navigation offered the best chance of success, 
especially in view of the facts that Prussia was "anxious 
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to build up a commercial marine," and that reciprocity so 
patently operated in her favo~~: 
[C]an any thing attribut~~~ore effectively to 
the accomplishment of this object than for the 
United States to continue to throw open all 
their numerous ports, both on the Atlantic and 
the Pacific, to Prussian vessels bearing hither 
the productions of all foreign countries upon 
the same terms with American vessels? It will 
not be pretended that a similar privilege 
extended to our vessels in the few and 
comparatively insignficant ports of Prussia, is 
any e9uivale~t f~r t~~ advantages conferred upon 
Pruss1an nav1gat1on. 
The refusal of Buchanan to countenance a further 
reduction of U.S. import duties in return for mutual 
favours was the final straw for Prussia and the 
Zollverein, which were already annoyed by the direction 
which U.S. policy seemed to be taking, with its implicit 
support for the independence of the smaller German states. 
Negotiations in Berlin ended in failure. But what of the 
threat to withhold reciprocal navigation rights? 
Donelson, of course, had never favoured the use of this 
tactic and was certain that the Zollverein would not bow 
to such pressure. After all Prussia, unlike Hanover prior 
to her treaty, already enjoyed full reciprocity in 
navigation. By his own admission, though, Donelson did 
not make much of an effort to follow Buchanan's orders, 
either by threatening to terminate the Prussian treaty, or 
by ruling out the possibility that it would be extended to 
cover the Zollverein as a whole. For this he blamed the 
less than specific nature of his initial orders: 
Had it been your intention to say that the 
United States would discontinue the existing 
Treaty with Prussia unless she reduced her 
duties on our staple production, as Hanover had 
done, I should have supposed you would not have 
left so important a movement to be inferred from 
the general declaration that the commercial 
policy of this President was expressed in the 
Treaty with Hanover. 
Donelson had understood this to be a statement of the 
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policy goals to be attained rather than the specific 
methods to be used in attaining them and he felt he would 
have been justified in concluding any treaty which 
promised to extend the consumption of American products 
without reducing U.S. revenue or the protection due to 
national industry.14 
Donelson did obey Buchanan in trying to secure 
reductions of transit duties as well as import duties. 
But he considered such reductions to be of minor 
significance, since, as he informed Buchanan, transit 
duties were "of but little force, compared with the import 
duties, in checking the consumption of our productions." 
For instance a hogshead of tobacco paid an import duty of 
38 dollars compared to transit duties of little more than 
two dollars. He repeated the point in a letter to Polk in 
which he kept up his attack on the "new era" approach: 
"The transit duty must fall of itself as a greater injury 
to Germany than to us, and it is besides too small to end 
materially the extension of our products." 
Donelson's main purpose in writing to Polk, though, 
owed more to his hope to sign a treaty of commercial 
reciprocity. He remained convinced that his approach was 
sound: "If you could put your finger upon some articles 
in our Tariff that can bear reduction and yield us more 
money, such articles as are supplied by Germany, they 
might be used as equivalents for reductions asked by us of 
the Zoll Verein." He even asked for leave of absence from 
his post to meet with Polk in person: "I am anxious to 
see you • • • • I will take the next steamer, give you 
the basis of a Treaty that will help our tobacco & cotton, 
and return here in two weeks."15 
Events in Europe frustrated Donelson's wish to visit 
Washington. Revolution had erupted in France, and Polk 
and Buchanan turned down Donelson's requested leave in the 
belief that full U.S. representation was required in 
Europe to respond to fast-moving developments. Polk did 
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inform the minister that they had been on the point of 
allowing him leave when the changes in Europe intervened, 
but he gave no hint of any re-thinking of commercial 
policy. As it was, those changes gave Donelson hope for a 
renewed negotiation. In Germany change manifested itself 
initially in moves towards a unity extending beyond the 
borders of the Zollverein. As well as removing the 
problem of transit duties altogether, such a development 
opened the opportunity for the signing of a single treaty 
with a new united Germany, by which to "gain some 
reduction of the import duties on our staples." Of 
course, such optimism had to be balanced against the 
possibility that the disruptions in Germany would delay 
negotiations at least until such time as the final geo-
political outcome was clear. Coming close to the end of 
Polk's term of office these changes thwarted the 
successful application of the "new era" approach to 
commercial diplomacy with the German states.16 
The events in Germany did not 
diplomatic efforts in the region. 
affected, as fighting broke out in 
only disrupt 
Trade itself 
the Baltic. 
u.s. 
was 
Inspired 
by the other revolutions in Europe the German populations 
of the Danish provinces of Schleswig and Holstein revolted 
against Denmark's rule. Danish troops responded by 
entering Schleswig to put down these disturbances and the 
Danish navy preyed on the shipping of Bremen and other 
German states. Although this raised the long-dormant 
spectre of neutral traders being faced with searches for 
contraband, at first shippers' hopes were high. The 
acting U.S. consul in Bremen, H.W. Bohme, reckoned the 
fighting would offer a "good chance • • • for American & 
other neutral vessels to be employed in the carrying trade 
at high rates of freight for merchandise as well as for 
passengers." Those hopes were dashed, however, when in 
August 1848 Denmark responded to Prussian military action 
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in Schleswig by imposing a blockade on Germany's North Sea 
and Baltic ports. One month later an armistice brought a 
temporary lifting of the blockade, but fighting broke out 
again the following year and the blockade was re-imposed 
in April, interrupting what had become in the intevening 
six months an extensive American intercourse. In the face 
of such conditions restraint in diplomacy was essential.17 
Doubts about the political future of Germany 
reinforced the need for restraint. These were exciting 
times, and Donelson was caught up in the middle of them, 
reporting occasional outbreaks of violent disorder on 
Berlin's streets. Of potentially greater significance, 
though, were dramatic events which seemed to presage full 
German political union. Five hundred delegates met in 
Frankfurt early in 1848 to set rules for the election of a 
representative government for the whole of Germany, and in 
May 1848 the Frankfurt Parliament was convened with a 
stated aim of establishing a new confederation of 
sovereign states. But from the start there was argument 
over how much power individual states should retain and 
over the relative influence of the larger states. There 
was also disagreement as to whether to create a single 
head of the Confederation with the title "Emperor," to be 
offered to either the Prussian or Austrian Kings. Such 
debate proved premature, however, as both men opposed the 
Parliament and, having secured their domestic positions, 
worked to undermine its activities. In May 1849 members 
began to resign, and the Parliament effectively 
disintegrated.18 
Despite this precipitate collapse the prospects for a 
united Germany had been good enough for the United States 
to take seriously. Of course the moves at Frankfurt 
promised to fulfil a long-term ambition of U.S. diplomats 
by creating a united Germany with an economy free of 
internal barriers, able to conduct a greater volume of 
trade with the United States. A new confederation might 
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also avoid one difficulty of the Zollverein, by starting 
from a new base and reducing Prussia's influence. But 
American hopes had to be tempered, not only because of the 
possibility that the Parliament might fail, but also for 
fear that a predominantly nationalist outlook among 
Frankfurt delegates might result in protectionism, in the 
form of a unified, but high, German tariff.19 
The enthusiastic, yet cautious, reactions of Donelson 
and Mann reflected such hopes and fears. Mann was the 
less optimistic and stuck by his approach to commercial 
diplomacy as the best way to ensure that the United States 
did not lose out by the changes in Germany. He expected 
that the new central government would try to negotiate a 
treaty similar to the one already enjoyed by Prussia and 
recommended, as usual, that the United States should not 
bestow the privileges of the indirect carrying 
where an in~quality existed in Commerce, extent 
of sea board &c. upon such Nations as are not 
generous in their tariff of duties on the 
articles of our growth and produce, which their 
inhabitants require for consumption. 
To secure reciprocal navigation a new Germany would have 
to guarantee not to impose a duty higher than 25 per cent 
ad valorem on tobacco, a level low enough to encourage the 
importation of American tobacco at the expense of domestic 
tobacco production, while the ad valorem rate would 
exclude finer, more costly, tobacco from the West Indies. 
To Mann the results of such a clause would be manifold: 
"In benefitting the Tobacco planter we should benefit by a 
fair division of labor, every tiller of the soil in the 
Union, as well as our Commerce and Navigationo" For once 
Donelson suggested a similar plan, with any treaty to 
include an article by which the new Germany would impose 
no duties upon imports of raw cotton and rice in paddy, 
and no duty higher than three Rix dollars on tobacco. 20 
Donelson was less certain about how swiftly to 
initiate negotiations. At the beginning of November 1848 
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he predicted that the new federal system would "hereafter 
govern Germany," but later that month he counselled delay, 
in order to avoid making commitments to any party or power 
while there was still doubt as to the outcome of the 
changes in Germany. Policy-makers in Washington had 
already considered this problem, and had adopted the 
compromise stance of recognising the new government but of 
refusing as yet to negotiate a treaty with it. 21 
Congress took the first steps in welcoming the 
changes in Germany. In August 1848 the House of 
Representatives tendered 
congratulations ••• to the United German 
Confederation, lately founded on the great 
principles of the sovereignty of the people in 
sovereign States, to govern themselves without 
hereditary rulers, whereby forty millions of 
Germans may be peacably restored to the first 
rank among great nations. 
Polk's Cabinet followed suit, agreeing to give the 
minister in Berlin the temporary responsibility of 
representing the United States at the new Parliament as 
well. As soon as it was known that a new chief executive 
of the German Confederation was "invested with exclusive 
powers to conduct diplomatic relations for all the states 
of Germany" then the Prussian mission would be 
discontinued. Congress made this position permanent by 
establishing an independent mission in Frankfurt, to which 
post Polk appointed Donelson, replacing him in Berlin with 
Edward Hannegan of Indiana.22 
At the same time Buchanan was careful not to trap the 
United States in an embarrassing position, should events 
in Germany take another turn. Donelson was not to broach 
the subject of a commercial treaty "until the German 
confederation was more fully established, & until that 
Government had appointed a minister to represent it in the 
U. States." After all the new government was not yet 
officially constituted, and until it was the United States 
should eschew formal diplomatic ties with it for fear of 
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offending those states with which they already had 
treaties. President Taylor's Secretary of State, John M. 
Clayton, also recognised the need for caution and refused 
to give orders to negotiate any treaty or convention: 
"The advantages of such a Convention are obvious; but it 
appears clear to my mind that to attempt negotiations at 
this time, and under the present circumstances, would be 
both premature and improper." The virtual disintegration 
of the Frankfurt Parliament in May 1849 only seemed to 
confirm the sense of the policy which had been followed. 23 
In the mean time Donelson was ordered to use the 
force of advice and information to prevent the passage by 
the Parliament of potentially damaging measures. He was 
to "watch carefully the progress of the Bill to establish 
a uniform Tariff for Germany, and use your best endeavors 
to have their transit duties abolished and the duties on 
our important articles of export, fixed at a reasonable 
rate." And the Cabinet agreed that the United States 
should also seek such terms as the basis for a treaty as 
soon as circumstances allowed negotiation to take place. 
Finally, the Polk administration re-affirmed its faith in 
the Hanover-style negotiation of exchanging reciprocal 
navigation for better treatment of American products. 24 
Time caught up with the Polk administration as fast 
as events in Germany ended the prospect of a new united 
government with which to negotiate. The passing of the 
Democrats from office and the virtual collapse of the 
Frankfurt Parliament, occurring within two months of each 
other, concluded an exciting chapter in United States-
r German relations. Donelson still hoped that something 
might be salvaged from the situation, with a resurgent 
Prussia leading the Zollverein in a successful campaign to 
absorb the rest of Germany, a development much more 
acceptable to him than to his colleagues. It was just sad 
that the Polk administration would not win any plaudits 
for their efforts in Germany: "A beautiful field is there 
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opening for a general Treaty with all the states in which 
Genl. Taylor will gather the fruits as he did those of the 
Mexican war."25 
Subsequent events no doubt eased Donelson's partisan 
jealousy. Although there were indeed signs of increasing 
commercial unity in Germany, even as attempts at political 
union waned, no United States-Zollverein treaty resulted, 
bringing to an end four years of relative failure for U.S. 
efforts. The "new era" in commercial diplomacy had proven 
fruitless in relations with Denmark, Sweden and wider 
Germany. Existing treaties remained in force with the 
first two countries, Prussia and the Hanseatic towns, yet 
the Polk administration had not won equivalent favours in 
return. For the best part of three years the states of 
northern Europe had resisted American threats, or had been 
in such a state of political turmoil that meaningful 
relations were not feasible anyway. Only the treaties 
with Hanover, Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin bore 
testimony to the efforts of Buchanan and his agents. And 
even those small gains were threatened, as the moves to 
commercial unity so desired by Donelson jeopardised the 
"new era" approach of underpinning the independence of the 
smaller German states as an example to the rest. The 
arguments used by the Zollverein to appeal to those states 
revealed loopholes in the "new era" approach, requiring 
Mann to put in place one final piece of his own analysis 
of the policy of reciprocal navigation. 
The first half of 1849 witnessed the apparent 
crumbling of all Mann's achievements. In January Donelson 
reported that Hanover and Oldenburg had declared their 
intention to increase their import duties on tobacco, a 
decision which would trigger U.S. abrogation of the 
Hanover treaty. In February it seemed as if the Hanseatic 
towns were committing themselves to the commercial policy 
of the Frankfurt Parliament, and the next month witnessed 
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Mecklenburg-Schwerin imitating Hanover's action in raising 
her duties on imported tobacco, again in violation of her 
treaty with the United States. Donelson believed the 
pressure for a united Germany had become irresistible, 
with the result that "the preservation of the Hanover 
treaty" was impossible "on account of its tending to 
disunite the interests of Germany •••• " Even if the 
potential failure of the Frankfurt Parliament threatened 
these steps to commercial unity, they still "furnishe[d] a 
hope that the Zollverein will be enlarged and made to 
embrace such general interests as are involved in a more 
direct trade with the United States." Such moves accorded 
with Donelson's dream of more valuable relations with a 
properly united Germany, and the increase of duties on 
tobacco in the northern German states could not deflect 
him from his optimism. As long as the decisions of 
Hanover and Mecklenburg were accepted gracefully and the 
treaties abrogated, thereby easing the absorption of 
northern Germany into a new union, then the United States 
would be in a favourable position from which to conduct 
negotiations with the new Germany. If the new federal 
authorities collapsed and the Zollverein was resurgent, 
his recommended course would still win "the good will of 
the leading states of the association."26 
Ambrose Dudley Mann, not surprisingly, was less happy 
with the decision of the northern German states. Not only 
was the increase of import duties on tobacco regrettable, 
but it also seemed as if his work in maintaining the 
independence of the smaller states as an example to the 
Zollverein had counted for nought. He urged that every 
effort be made to persuade Hanover and Mecklenburg not to 
implement their decision. They should also be informed 
that the United States were "determined to conclude no 
treaty with the German Union ••• less favorable to our 
interests, than those in operation with themselves." Such 
a statement would counter claims that a treaty could be 
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negotiated "on terms particularly advantageous to their 
Navigation," claims made by the new German government, as 
by Prussia previously, in order to lure the northern 
states from their independent stance. Of course, Mann had 
always been concerned that the pressure of Prussia, and 
now of the new united government, could undermine his work 
and he feared especially the claim that Hanover had sold 
herself short by agreeing to limit reciprocity only to 
vessels of Hanoverian construction, whereas by 
proclamation, or by a promised new treaty as part 
united Germany, she could avoid that restriction. 
he battled to salvage his handiwork in the face of 
of a 
Now, as 
such 
claims, he switched his attention to the legislative basis 
of reciprocal navigation and proposed an alteration in 
this as the solution to his problems.27 
It should be stressed that Mann was not opposed to 
German unity per~· He was determined, though, that U.S. 
commercial relations with any such union be on the same 
lines as those already enjoyed with the northern German 
states, a view which strengthened his desire to defend the 
Hanover treaty, in order "to fortify the Coast States in 
their generous commercial sentiments towards us •••• " 
He was no doubt cheered to learn that Buchanan still 
inclined to his view. The Secretary of State ordered 
Donelson to hint to any united government that it would be 
difficult to set separate import duties when Hanover was 
treaty bound to another tariff of rates, his hope being 
that the new Germany would adopt Hanover's tariff. 
However, the opposite seemed likely to occur when 
Hanover planned to raise her duties, and the ease with 
which this happened only illustrated the problems which 
Mann had faced in withstanding the pressure for the 
absorption of the smaller states into the union. If in 
1849 the pressure came from the new united government, in 
the past it had come from Prussia, as evidence from his 
earlier diplomatic efforts made clear. In 1847 Mann had 
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kept his successful negotiation with Hanover as secret as 
possible, lest Prussia learn of it and try to block its 
ratification, or to prevent others becoming a party to it. 
During the negotiation with Mecklenburg, Prussia had 
exercised so much influence that not only had the 
Mecklenburg government begun to doubt the value of signing 
a treaty, but Oldenburg and Hanover had also started to 
wonder if they had such a good deal after all. Only by 
persuading them that they should "be of good cheer for 
their hour of triumph would assuredly come," had Mann been 
able to stop them abandoning their treaty.28 
Mann had found it more difficult to deny specific 
claims made by Prussia. Most Americans agreed that he had 
achieved something of a coup by winning such favourable 
terms from weak negotiating stances. Even Donelson, not 
the greatest friend of the treaty, had to agree that "all 
" 0 • the concession they made are a clear gain to us 
Hanover could have claimed by proclamation the same 
privileges secured in the treaty merely by equalising the 
Stade tolls upon American vessels. Reviewing the 
negotiation several years later, Mann noted that Buchanan 
had even informed the Hanoverian consul in New York that 
"the President had promised to issue his proclamation on 
her behalf • • • before I was called upon to undertake the 
mission to that kingdom." Yet, although Prussia had tried 
to remind Hanover of this opportunity, Mann had prevailed, 
and secured the treaty.29 
The Mecklenburg negotiation had been more troublesome 
still as a result of the fact that the Grand Duchy already 
enjoyed indirect trade reciprocity by proclamation in 
accordance with the act of 1828. Prussia had contended 
that Mecklenburg not only enjoyed reciprocity, but did so 
on terms far better than would be secured by treaty. The 
United States would limit equal terms to vessels built in 
the Grand Duchy, whereas the act of 1828 made no such 
restriction. Mann had responded with the daring claim 
-288-
that there was a considerable degree of 
certainty that the Act of Congress, authorising 
the President's Proclamation, by which the 
Grand-Duchy was entitled to the privileges of 
the indirect carrying would be repealed at an 
early day, and that consequently, the advantages 
in commerce and navigation would be lost. 
When the Mecklenburg minister of foreign affairs had 
countered in turn that the Grand Duchy carried so small an 
amount of American indirect trade that Mann's threat had 
little weight, Mann had thrown doubt upon the proclaimed 
basis for reciprocity in the direct trade as well. He had 
asserted that 
circumstances might arise to render a change of 
this system, even, indispensible: That we might 
be forced in justice to ourselves to repeal the 
law of 1824, and act in a spirit of retaliation 
• • • by levying tonnage duties upon the vessels 
of every state that collected transit duties on 
our staple products, in their movements to a 
third stater to double or thrice-fold the amount 
at present exacted. 
It might be U.S. policy to extend the utmost liberality to 
small states but it remained an "object of our government, 
in order to extend the consumption of our rapidly 
augmenting agricultural and other products, to require in 
return a similar liberality." 
Mann had even sketched out a bill which he had urged 
Congress to pass as a measure of "purely retributive 
justice upon Prussia," whose influence it sought to 
counter. An amended act of 1828 would deny full 
reciprocal navigation to states which imposed transit 
duties above a set level. States which had little or no 
shipping to punish by withholding reciprocity would face 
extra import duties on their products, regardless of the 
nationality of the ships which carried them. Such a bill 
would squeeze states like Denmark, Prussia and the 
Hanseatic towns, while providing Mecklenburg and Hanover 
with an "ample justification for the spirit of liberality 
which they have displayed, to the other German states."30 
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Of course Mann's suggestion that the legislative 
provision of reciprocity be repealed or amended had not 
been without precedent. Henry Wheaton had suggested a 
similar course as early as 1841 before adopting reciprocal 
reduction of import duties as his preferred means of 
securing commercial favours. And in 1844, when trying to 
get Oldenburg to come to terms, he had anticipated only 
failure for as long as the Grand Duchy enjoyed reciprocity 
on the proclaimed basis. Even Buchanan had contemplated a 
re-examination of the acts of 1824 and 1828, making clear 
his preference in a letter to Donelson: "If I had my way, 
I should make short work with the last Act and leave the 
indirect trade to treaty stipulations. It is a good 
consideration to enable us to make advantageous 
bargains."31 
Domestic hostility to full reciprocity had provided 
the final encouragement for Mann's proposals. Whereas 
previous attacks in Congress had been restricted to the 
treaty basis, notably in the debates of 1842-43, there had 
now been a challenge to reciprocal navigation legislation 
as well. In 1847 Buchanan had reported to Mann how 
opposition to the Hanover treaty had ''manifested itself so 
very strongly and decidedly as to render it quite 
problematical how long our Act of 24th May, 1828, will be 
allowed to remain in force." And sure enough, when the 
Senate had broached the matter in 1848, John Clarke of 
Rhode Island had included among resolutions calling for 
information about treaties and the colonial trade 
arrangement a further request for a select committee to 
inquire into the expediency of repealing the 
first section of the act ••• so far as the 
same authorizes the President, by proclamation, 
to extend to the vessels of any foreign nation 
the right to engage in the trade between the 
United States and third countries upon the same 
terms with American vessels. 
The Senate had approved, nominating Clarke and both 
Senators Davis, John of Massachusetts and Jefferson of 
-290-
Mississippi, to constitute the committee.32 
Confronted with danger to his work in Germany, Mann 
was keen to get the incoming Taylor administration to 
exploit these moves in Congress by encouraging them "in 
obedience to an imperative duty, to repeal or amend the 
Acts of 1824 and 1828 • • " If this were done, "no 
alternative would be left Prussia but to accede to the 
Hanover treaty, and the governments of the other states of 
the Zollverein • • • could not oppose a diminution of the 
duty on Tobacco to 25 per. cent. ad.val.'' As time 
passed without any change he pressed harder, appealing to 
bi-partisan support on this question: "However widely we 
may occasionally differ with respect to home questions, we 
are at least in our international policy, in so far as 
concerns a profitable augmentation of our trade 
intercourse, an united people." The benefits of repealing 
the acts were obvious: "While the Acts of 1824 and 1828 
remain on our code book, and certain treaties continue in 
force, it is not possible for us to negotiate stipulations 
securing concessions favorable to the most extended 
consumption of our products in Foreign countries." 
Without a means to retaliate U.S. policy was simply too 
liberal: "In fact no value whatever is placed upon our 
generous Navigation policy from the circumstances of its 
being utterly unrestricted, making no discriminations 
between selfish and liberal states."33 
By 1849 the "new era" approach to commercial 
diplomacy advocated by James Buchanan and Ambrose Dudley 
Mann had reached crisis point. Prussia, Denmark and 
Sweden had stubbornly held on to the privileges they 
already enjoyed. The year 1848 had brought political 
turmoil to Germany, disrupting prospects for successful 
negotiation and threatening to undermine the limited 
achievements already attained, as pressure for a united 
Germany seemed likely to cause Hanover and Mecklenburg to 
ditch their treaties in favour of privileges on. a 
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proclaimed basis. In Mann's opinion the only remedy was 
to remove any sense of security the legislative basis 
might afford to foreign states by repealing or amending 
the acts of 1824 and 1828. However, if moves in Congress 
encouraged him in these ideas, he was sadly misled, as 
they were inspired by other momentous events in the 
turbulent sea of commercial diplomacy. Britain's review 
of her navigation system and the American desire to make 
the most beneficial response to that review, condemned 
Mann's suggested line of policy to total failure, as new 
circumstances reinforced U.S. commitment to maintaining 
the legislative basis of reciprocal navigation. 
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Chapter 9. A "Revolution" in World Shipping: 
The United States, the Colonial Trade and the Repeal of 
the British Navigation Acts, 1842-1850 
Dramatic developments in world shipping in the late 
1840s and early 1850s formed the backdrop to U.S. 
deliberations over reciprocal navigation. This was the 
time when great clipper fleets were reaching the peak of 
their success, bringing speed and grace to trade routes 
across the globe. Yet, even though these fleets would 
sail proudly long into the second half of the century, 
their days were already numbered, as steam-powered 
navigation and iron-hulled ships began to revolutionise 
the shipping industry. For over twenty years steam had 
powered coastal vessels and river boats, but by the mid-
1840s steam power had become a fixture on the oceans as 
well and especially on the transatlantic route. Debates 
in Congress now touched on questions such as subsidies to 
steamship lines, as well as on the older issue of the 
paper freedoms and restrictions confronting American 
shippers. Moreover, British technological progress seemed 
likely to follow the relative novelty of steam with the 
use of iron-hulled boats and the screw propellor. 
Shipping would never be quite the same again. 
Ambrose Dudley Mann predicted where these 
developments would lead: within twenty-five years "a long 
voyage [sailing] ship will be quite as rarely seen on the 
ocean highway as a barge upward bound, propelled by 
boatmen, is at this time on the Mississippi river." He 
held out little hope for sail-powered vessels which could 
not "fail to rapidly diminish when fairly subjected to 
competition with bottoms which move onward speedily and 
majestically, regardless of head winds or mountain waves." 
Indeed, Mann went so far as to anticipate a genuine 
revolution in shipping as a result of these technological 
changes. He noted, however, that another change would be 
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just as important, predicting that "the modification of 
the 'British Navigation Laws' will facilitate the 
revolution, on account of the wide field of enterprise 
which the measure throws open, which steam is destined to 
occasion to navigation."1 
The repeal of the British Navigation acts was 
something of a revolution in itself. They had provided 
the framework of the Navigation System since the mid-
seventeenth century, regulating British and colonial trade 
in order to promote the nation's maritime strength. While 
modifications had occurred, such as the opening of direct 
trade with the colonies to foreign ships, many protective 
features remained in place, most notably the British 
monopoly of routes between colonies and between Britain 
and the colonies, and the prohibition of any indirect 
trade to Britain. The 1820s had witnessed the first 
cracks in the latter part of the system when European 
vessels were allowed to carry certain products from a 
third European country to Britain, but, of course, this 
was of no value to the United States. More promising from 
their perspective were events in the 1840s which caused a 
more general assault on British commercial restrictions. 
A combination of attacks by producers and consumers and of 
natural disaster as the Irish famine necessitated a quick 
relief response, challenged the Navigation System, and as 
a result Britain was compelled to lift, temporarily, the 
prohibition of indirect trade in grain.2 
Americans quickly took advantage of these limited 
reforms, coming, as they did, so soon after the repeal of 
the Corn Laws. In 1848 the New York diarist, Philip Hone, 
recorded how "Individual prosperity has increased in this 
part of the Union; men have grown rich in supplying the 
wants of the starving population of Ireland." Moreover, 
it seemed that other changes were on the way when, in 
March 1847, Parliament appointed a select committee to 
investigate the possibility of repealing the Navigation 
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acts completely and permanently. U.S. statesmen prepared 
to celebrate and sought every opportunity to encourage the 
movement for repeal.3 
Celebration seemed well in order, because the United 
States were on the point of achieving a long-term 
diplomatic goal. Ever since the limitation of reciprocity 
to the direct trade in the convention of 1815 U.S. 
statesmen had tried to extend it to the indirect trade 
with Britain as well. Adams and Clay, through Albert 
Gallatin, had failed three times to secure that objective 
by formal negotiation. Successive Jacksonian Secretaries 
of State had bemoaned the fact that Britain, along with 
France and Spain, withstood pressure to tear down the 
edifice of navigation restrictions. Now the system seemed 
to be crumbling, and the prospects for Americans looked 
bright. At last American navigation could pit its 
superior skills against the British under fair conditions. 
Unlike the shipping powers of northern Europe Britain's 
large population, many ports, and massive trade, offered a 
true equivalent in an exchange of indirect trade 
reciprocity. Repeal was also seen as the solution to the 
persistent problem of trade with Britain's American 
colonies. While diplomatic and legislative initiatives 
had addressed some aspects of this question, there 
remained the belief that British and colonial shippers 
enjoyed unfair advantages in the colonial trade as a 
result of restrictions imposed by the Navigation acts. 
But beyond these material opportunities there was a 
deeper-rooted cause for excitement among U.S. statesmen. 
The central place of Britain within world trade had 
accorded the Navigation acts a symbolic quality, 
representing all that was most restrictive in shipping 
regulations around the world, just as the Corn Laws 
symbolised commercial restrictions. Cause them to fall, 
and down would come restrictive shipping laws the world 
over. 
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Some Americans tempered their enthusiasm with 
caution. Indeed, a few warned against any change, echoing 
old fears about the inability of Americans to compete with 
more efficient rivals, especially as it now seemed that 
vessels of countries other than Britain and the United 
States would be allowed to sail between U.S. and British 
ports. This opposition proved unavailing in the rush 
towards reciprocity. Others were keen for the United 
States to react positively to the repeal of the acts but 
realised that such a response could have damaging 
implications for diplomacy in the rest of Europe. Failure 
to regulate this matter by any form other than mutual 
legislation would commit the United States to retaining 
their own navigation laws of 1824 and 1828 in order to be 
eligible for equal treatment in British ports. But this 
would remove the last negotiating weapon at the disposal 
of Mann and others like him who were still striving to 
secure favourable treaty terms from the powers of central 
and northern Europe. Further commercial gains would 
follow in Europe, but British repeal brought an end to 
concerted diplomacy along the "new era" lines advocated by 
Buchanan and Mann. 
The failure to resolve matters of controversy 
relating to the colonial trade provided one cause for 
excitement at the prospect of the repeal of the Navigation 
acts. From 1847 onwards debates in Congress on the 
possibility of arranging a commercial reciprocity deal 
with British North America provided ample opportunity to 
assess the general state of trade and navigation with the 
British colonies as well as the continuing effects of 
Jackson's 1830 agreement. Evidence suggested that there 
had been little improvement in the operation of the 
agreement in its effects on navigation. J.D. Andrews, the 
U.S. Consul at St. John, New Brunswick, echoed previous 
assessments which had tried to put a bright face on what 
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were depressing statistics for American shippers. 
Although the restricted number of colonial ports open to 
American vessels meant that "the arrangement made by Mr. 
McLane had an injurious effect for a short time on our 
navigation interests, and was obnoxious in some of its 
results," nevertheless "its influence on the manufacturing 
and agricultural interests have been of a highly 
satisfactory character." He concluded, 
the grand results, the contrast in state of 
feeling, the difference in the amount of trade 
between 1830 and 1850, so favorable to the United 
States, prove the wisdom of Mr. McLane in effecting 
a settlement of a vexed and troublesome question, 
and the pressing necessity that existed for a basis, 
even if it were not as comprehensive as he desired. 
Like Jackson, Livingston and Forsyth before him, Andrews 
placed satisfaction with benefits for the wider interests 
of commerce above concern for the narrower interests of 
navigation. It seemed as if nothing had changed, either 
in the fortunes of American shippers in the colonial trade 
or in the sympathy they could expect from some officials.4 
The 1840s had, though, witnessed some attempts to 
change things for the better. Congress had spent a 
considerable amount of time debating the colonial trade 
issue between 1839 and 1843, and the Tyler administration 
had responded positively by ordering its ministers in 
London to broach the matter in their discussions with the 
British government. Moreover, legislative activity and 
policy changes on both sides of the Atlantic in the mid-
1840s also produced a slight alteration in the position of 
American shipping in the colonial trade. But such 
tinkering did not address the central problem of the 
exclusion of American vessels from the triangular trade 
between Britain, the colonies and the United States, and 
it was this matter which the repeal of the Navigation acts 
promised to resolve. 
Even as Congress debated how to tackle Britain on the 
question of the colonial trade in June 1842, Edward 
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Everett had already made informal representations on it in 
London. Although the colonial trade was a matter of some 
priority for Secretary of State Webster, there were many 
other topics to discuss as well, the commercial business 
alone including claims in accordance with existing 
treaties, the effects of the countries' respective 
tariffs, and the prospects for mutual tariff reduction. 
Even so Everett took every opportunity possible to bring 
up the question of the colonial trade. For example, in 
April 1842, in the pleasant surroundings of a dinner at 
Lord Stanley's, Everett informed Lord Aberdeen, the 
Foreign Secretary, that "great discontent" existed in the 
United States "relative to the operation of the convention 
negotiated by himself [Aberdeen] and Mr McLane on the 
subject of the colonial trade" and that Americans were 
"not satisfied with the principles on which it [was] 
founded." The reply was polite but of course strictly off 
the record: "'Well, perhaps we can do something about 
that matter also.'" Everett was sufficiently encouraged 
by this "quite incidental" chat to give details of it to 
Webster, but further talks revealed how little store 
Aberdeen had put by it. Seven months later he raised the 
matter himself, mentioning that he had only recently 
learnt, with some surprise, of American dissatisfaction 
with the 1830 arrangement. When reminded of their 
previous conversation and of his vague hint of possible 
action, Aberdeen appeared to have forgotten the occasion. 
Worse still "nothing more was said on the subject."S 
Although such frustrating behaviour caused some to 
doubt the prospect of any successful negotiation, the 
failure of Congress to pass retaliatory legislation meant 
that diplomacy appeared to be the only way forward. What 
is more, it seemed as if negotiation would have to take 
place through the regular diplomatic channels, because 
elements within both governments were unwilling to 
sanction a special mission to resolve issues outstanding 
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between the two countries. The failure of Congress to 
pass an appropriation for a mission to London mirrored the 
reluctance of Aberdeen and of Lord Ashburton who had just 
returned from his own mission to Washington and who 
revealed, Everett believed, "some feeling ••• of 
personal objection to a measure which might seem to 
derogate from the value of his own arrangement." As many 
believed that the British minister in Washington, Henry 
Stephen Fox, was being kept on "only to make him 
pensionable," the onus seemed to fall very much on 
Everett's shoulders if effective diplomacy was to ensue. 6 
With orders from Webster and news of the "very full & 
striking reports" which had issued from Congress in 1842 
to back him up, Everett attempted to use persuasion and 
then bargaining to get British officials to change their 
stance on the colonial trade. At first he came up against 
the usual barrier of words. Aberdeen agreed to consider 
any specific proposal put before him but asserted that 
Britain could not be expected to give up the arrangement 
gratuitously, "merely on the ground that it was found 
favorable to British tonnage, if such was the case." And 
so Everett resorted to bargain~ng, advising Webster that 
he did "by no means despair of obtaining from G.B. a 
relaxation in reference to the W. India trade, if we could 
offer them any thing like a guid pro~·" In discussions 
in June 1843 with the new President of the Board of Trade, 
William Gladstone, a possible guid pro guo emerged. Their 
topic of conversation was commercial reciprocity, and when 
Gladstone offered inadequate British tariff reductions as 
equivalents for the level of reductions demanded of the 
United States, Everett suggested the following: "by 
giving us some privileges now denied us in the West India 
trade they might make up for witholding some things of a 
different kind." To make clear to Gladstone the value of 
such a concession, he informed him of the continuing 
American dissatisfaction with the arrangement and 
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especially with the use by Britain of preferential duties 
to encourage the indirect trade in American goods to the 
West Indies in British vessels. 
Everett was stunned by the reply he received. 
Gladstone asserted that since the passage of Britain's new 
customs regulations in 1842 that preference "was wholly 
done away & no longer legal." The U.S. minister learned 
the same from Peel and Aberdeen two months later when he 
hinted that the inclusion of new arrangements for the West 
India trade in any treaty would increase its chances of 
winning support in the Senate "by enlisting a wider 
interest in the United States in favor of what might be 
agreed upon." Peel replied that Britain already "had 
relaxed considerably in reference to the colonial monopoly 
last year, by admitting, agreeably to Lord Ashburton's 
treaty, the timber and agricultural produce of the right 
bank of the St. Johns, and by the Canadian Corn bill."7 
As U.S. statesmen had long expected would happen, 
these changes responded to British rather than American 
interests, but even so they seemed likely to benefit the 
latter as well. West Indian planters' complaints that the 
preferential duty policy required them to pay artificially 
high prices for supplies were met by the British tariff of 
1842, which reduced the duties on foreign products, 
including foodstuffs and timber, entering the West Indies. 
This not only reduced the burdens on Southern and Mid-
Atlantic shippers and producers who had maintained a 
successful trade despite earlier British policy, but it 
also held out hope of more direct trade from New England 
to the islands. The Canadian Corn bill of 1843 was 
designed to protect Canadian farmers by imposing a 3 
shilling duty on American wheat entering Canada, but that 
duty also seemed likely to boost the direct trade in 
American vessels from northern U.S. ports to the Caribbean 
by discouraging the importation of American wheat for 
indirect trans-shipment to the West Indies through Canada 
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in British and provincial vessels. The preferential duty 
policy and its harm to American shipping business with the 
Caribbean seemed to be finished.8 
The changes of 1842-43 were not immediately hailed as 
a triumph by Americans, especially as previous British 
reforms had not delivered in practice what they promised 
on paper. The Lubec and Eastport delegates to the New 
England Commercial Convention admitted that the British 
tariff of 1842 "shows to the eye, that this inequality is 
soon to terminate" and that it "may really come to an 
end." However, had not the previous inequality been based 
on the British law of 1825, which McLane had accepted in 
1830 on the grounds that it had seemed "quite as fair and 
equal"? They advised that the measure should be judged by 
how it worked in practice before celebrations began. 
Nor was the preferential duty policy the only, or 
even the most important, problem with the colonial trade. 
The delegates noted the continuing abuse of the free ports 
and the fact that British ships still enjoyed advantages 
in the triangular trade as a result of their monopoly of 
the route between Britain and the colonies. Moreover, 
both the British tariff of 1842 and the Canadian Corn bill 
the following year actually threatened to exacerbate the 
latter problem even as they eased difficulties in the 
Caribbean trade. By reducing discriminating duties on 
Canadian imports to Britain, again to favour Canada's 
farmers, the new regulations made exporting American wheat 
to Britain cheaper by the indirect route via Canada in 
British vessels than by the direct route from the United 
States in American ships. Hugh Legare, remarking upon 
western farmers' excitement at the commercial 
opportunities opening to them, noted that "the course of 
that commerce will be, to some extent, diverted from the 
outlet by the Hudson to that by the St. Lawrence •••• 
Then the carrying trade of England will gain so much more 
under her navigation laws.'' The old dilemma of whether to 
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put satisfaction for producers above frustration for the 
shipping interest reared its head again, and even Everett 
plumped for the former, as he revealed when expressing his 
preference for the existing Corn Law, with the Canada Corn 
bill as part of it, above fixed duties or even entire 
freedom of trade in wheat products: 
Either of these measures would subject our corn 
to a competition with those ports in the North 
of Europe, from which it can generally be 
imported cheaper than from America, whereas 
under the present state of the law, although the 
transportation is monopolized by English 
bottoms, it would seem as if all the corn 
imported from abroad mijst come from the United 
States through Canada. 
Such ideas, reinforced by the lifting of the 
preferential duties, resulted in a temporary suspension of 
U.S. diplomatic action on the colonial trade. At the same 
time an easing of economic pressure, as the nation finally 
started to recover from the depression of the late 1830s, 
no doubt helped to tone down domestic complaints about the 
issue. However, complaints did continue into 1843 and 
1844, reminding politicians of a persistent anger in some 
maritime towns at the way in which the colonial trade 
agreement worked. In January 1844 petitioners from 
Belfast in Maine prayed for "an alteration of the laws 
regulating the trade and commercial intercourse of the 
United States with the British North American 
colonies." And later that year the Maine legislature called 
on its Senators 
to present to the consideration of our National 
Legislature the facts connected with the trade 
between the United States and the British 
colonies, under the arrangement now in force, 
and to exert their iy0luence to rescind the same as soon as possible. 
Congressional action in response to these appeals was 
negligible. Reports had been issued, resolutions 
considered, and yet no direct action ensued. To a certain 
extent there were few avenues open to Congress, especially 
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after Britain's 1842 tariff which rendered the main 
retaliatory weapon of the United States counter-
productive. As Lord Ashburton had intimated to Everett 
and as Everett told Webster, closing the direct trade with 
the West Indies would now only harm American interests by 
encouraging the very indirect trade in products from the 
United States to the West Indies which the scrapping of 
the preferential duties was supposed to stop.11 
There was one line of action open to Congress, which 
held out the possibility of counteracting the tendency 
under the new British regulations of American wheat taking 
the indirect route to Britain via Canada. This was the 
use of drawback laws refunding import duties imposed on 
foreign goods entering U.S. ports when those goods were 
subsequently re-exported. For some years there had been 
calls for such laws in the hope that they would promote 
internal commerce, but, as a memorial from the New York 
Chamber of Commerce in 1844 made clear, a law refunding 
duties paid on goods re-exported to Canada would 
greatly add to our carrying trade, both from 
abroad and through the Canals • • • -- the 
comparative cheapness in our market of Sugar, 
Coffee, and many other principal articles, added 
to the earlier and quicker internal transit, 
offers great inducements over imports by the St. 
Lawrence from abroad. 
In June 1844 just such a bill was introduced, and in March 
the next year it became law. Even greater promise, 
though, lay in the application of the same principle to 
trade in the other direction by refunding import duties 
imposed on Canadian goods re-exported from the United 
States. Congress passed such a law in August 1846, and 
although primarily designed to aid western merchants and 
millers, the act also encouraged the carriage of Canadian 
products by American ships from U.S. ports to the rest of 
the world. Most importantly some even believed that this 
law would make it economically viable to import Canadian 
wheat and then re-export it to Britain in American 
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vessels, in the process sidestepping the British monopoly 
of the carriage of colonial goods to the mother country. 12 
The drawback of duties on Canadian products looked 
even more valuable in the light of one further British 
legislative action with implications for the colonial 
trade. Once more the repeal of the Corn Laws owed its 
inspiration to domestic pressures but yet again it seemed 
likely to benefit Americans as well. Although Everett's 
fears that Britain's removal of heavy discriminations in 
favour of her own and colonial grain products would lead 
to greater competition from northern Europe were borne out 
to a certain extent, the prospects were still bright. Not 
only did the reduction of duties open a potentially larger 
market for American foodstuffs in Britain, but the 
scrapping of the discrimination in favour of colonial 
products also meant that it was no longer automatically 
cheaper for American products to go to Britain via Canada 
in British ships. Indeed, it was almost certain to be 
cheaper by the direct route from U.S. ports in American or 
British ships, whichever were more competitive. Moreover, 
urider the drawback provisions it might also be cheaper for 
Canadian products to go to Britain indirectly via the 
United States rather than directly from Canada, if Britain 
allowed. 
Anglo-American commercial relations had undergone 
rapid alteration as legislation on both sides of the 
Atlantic modified the practical environment in which the 
colonial arrangement of 1830 operated. For the most part 
these changes seemed to have acted to improve the position 
of American shippers by removing tariff laws which had 
artificially guided American exports to the West Indies 
and Britain into British and colonial vessels. And yet 
there remained doubts and complaints about the colonial 
trade as regulated by the arrangement of 1830. Even as 
Americans in general welcomed the repeal of the Corn Laws 
and as free traders in particular celebrated the U.S. 
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tariff of 1846, Richard Rush believed there was still more 
progress to be made: 
will not England now do something for our 
tobacco, and become wholly liberal in the 
arrangements of her West India trade with us. 
Our new tariff may well justify us in urging her 
on these and other points in which she is still 
much behind the liberality of our own system. 
And in 1849, when Senator Clarke introduced his resolution 
calling for information on reciprocity treaties, Daniel 
Webster succeeded in having the colonial trade agreement 
added to the the list, since it was "the most important of 
these cases."13 
It was against this background of persistent 
discontent with the colonial trade relationship that news 
broke that Parliament was considering modifications of the 
Navigation system. Despite improvements afforded by the 
changes in British customs duties, American shippers still 
perceived problems. Perhaps some judged that Americans 
were losing out to the British in the much freer 
conditions of the late 1840s, just as they did under 
reciprocity with some Europeans; after all one less 
digestible element of the original analysis of the 
colonial trade had been the claim that American vessels 
were less competitive than their British rivals in certain 
trades. More common, however, was the opinion that even 
the remaining British restrictions were unfair to American 
shipping, whether the abuse of free ports, or more 
especially the prohibition of all foreign shipping from 
the trade between Britain and her colonies, which allowed 
British vessels alone to develop profitable triangular 
trades involving Britain, the colonies and the United 
States. Certainly this was the view of George Bancroft, 
U.S. minister to Britain from 1847 to 1849, whose initial 
excitement on hearing about the moves towards repeal of 
the Navigation System stemmed mainly from its implications 
for the colonial trade. He hoped that forces in England 
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would "ere long incline her to listen to propositions on 
our part, which would do away with the worst features of 
the Colonial monopoly." Nor was it surprising that 
Buchanan's first interest was in "how far the British 
Government might be induced to proceed in relaxing their 
Colonial restrictions." For the next two years, then, the 
Polk administration would give its whole-hearted support 
to the British reform moves which seemed to herald victory 
in a seventy-year battle to secure a proper and fair 
participation in the colonial trade.14 
Modification of the British Navigation acts also 
offered tantalising openings for exploitation in other 
British trade routes. Many critics of full reciprocity 
with smaller European powers had remained committed to 
securing similar terms in the indirect trade with Britain, 
and although this commitment had lately been verbal rather 
than active, this resulted more from a belief that Britain 
would not give ground than it did from any waning of 
enthusiasm for the ultimate objective. Now in 1847 an 
opportunity beckoned at last, and statesmen of the Polk 
administration made every effort to promote the reform by 
explaining its value to Americans and British alike. 
Bancroft put forward the free-trade argument, 
declaring in a letter to Lord Palmerston that "universal 
reciprocity, in the widest sense," was the only 
appropriate basis for intercourse between their countries: 
"The prohibition of the indirect trade has but restrained 
enterprise; it had done good to neither country. To 
abrogate it, would at once set free dormant commercial 
wealth, without injuring anyone." Yet the promise of 
reciprocity went beyond its commercial value, since it 
"could not but give openings to still farther relations of 
amity between them; and ••• create new guarantees for 
the peace of the world."lS 
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Ambrose Dudley Mann concurred with Bancroft in 
welcoming reciprocity in the indirect trade with Britain. 
The Navigation acts had "operated with peculiar severity 
against us," acting as the "principal hindrance to our 
becoming, speedily, the first commercial and maritime 
nation on earth." Because most of the staple products 
exported by the United States were "of a ponderous 
nature," while the goods they imported were "light," 
American vessels were "frequently o • • despatched from 
abroad in ballast." Such inefficiency could be avoided if 
American ships were allowed to carry foreign products to 
British ports where they could take on a proper cargo for 
carriage back to the United States. He had no doubt that 
"in a few years we should proportionally, with British 
bottoms, do as much of the foreign carrying to British 
ports o •• as we now do of the direct carrying." Such 
triangular trades were "the joy of our sailors, the 
nourishment which causes our Mercantile Marine to augment 
with so much rapidity." Mann was convinced that American 
ships, sailors, and masters, were so superior to British 
rivals that the United States "should unquestionably turn 
what we would get to a much better account than Great-
Britain would turn that which we should giveon16 
Now all that was left was for Buchanan to give the 
word to nudge the British along the right course. In 
August 1847 Bancroft wrote to the Secretary of State 
asking, "[a]m I not right in feeling assured that the 
President would wish every effort to be made to obtain 
success, in order, as far as England is concerned to open 
the indirect trade of the world to our ships?" Buchanan 
had actually been considering the matter for some time and 
had fallen into line with his colleagues in distinguishing 
Britain from other countries which took unfair advantage 
of their reciprocity treaties. Reciprocity with Britain 
was desirable "because, from their population and wealth, 
our navigation would derive advantages equal to those we 
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shall concede to their vessels." So in September 1847, 
with apologies for the delay in sending orders, he 
instructed Bancroft to continue with his endeavours to 
"prepare the minds of the members of the British Cabinet 
for abolishing every restriction in the trade, direct and 
indirect, between all the possessions of the two 
countries." Perfect reciprocity was "equally required by 
the enlightened spirit of the age, the avowed policy of 
both nations, and the material interest of their people." 
And ten months later Buchanan still had the highest of 
hopes for the benefits to be obtained from repeal: 
Commerce and navigation, relieved from the 
fetters which have so long restrained them, 
would bound forward with invigorated energy. 
Mutual benefits and blessings would thus be 
conferred upon the people of both countries, and 
the peace and friendship now so happily 
subsisting between f~e kindred nations would be 
rendered perpetual. 
Buchanan's orders set the stage for nearly three 
years of feverish diplomatic activity culminating in the 
opening of full reciprocal relations between the United 
States and Britain on 1 January 1850. As was to be 
expected with so complex and important an issue, numerous 
obstacles lay in the path to final settlement. Despite 
American entreaties, the ultimate fate of the proposed 
changes lay with the ability of the British ministry to 
push them through to completion. Even so, American 
interests were important in helping to define the scope of 
the changes, in relation to the inclusion of the coastal 
trade in any reciprocal deal and to the flagging of 
foreign-built ships. Americans were also interested in 
whether the new reciprocal relationship would be 
established by legislation or by treaty, a choice with 
implications for other areas of commercial diplomacy. 
Finally, the negotiations spanned the transition from the 
Polk to the Taylor administration, which raised the 
possibility of a different partisan stance on the whole 
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question, especially in the context of known persistent 
hostility to reciprocity in some maritime communities. 
The technicalities of establishing reciprocity were a 
problem which could have jeopardised a final settlement. 
The trickiest issue arose when Bancroft suggested that 
each country be allowed to participate in the other's 
coastal trade, an odd offer to make, as most Americans 
supported the policy adopted in 1817, of American monopoly 
of the coastal trade. The subsequent massive growth of 
that trade, with the potential for more after the 
acquisition of California, seemed to bear out the sense of 
that stance, and it was hardly surprising that Bancroft's 
suggestion was criticised on the grounds that Britain's 
coastal trade did not offer an equivalent volume of 
business. Once made, though, it was unlikely that the 
British would agree to an arrangement without this deal. 
Henry Labouchere~ President of the Board of Trade, made 
clear his regret on learning that Bancroft had been 
ordered to retract the offer, and the U.S. Ministeris 
blushes were only spared when the British ministry decided 
to amend their navigation bill by dropping the clause 
opening the British coastal trade to all-comers out of a 
fear that it would lead to Belgian, Dutch and French 
rivals becoming dominant in it. But Bancroft did not take 
this to be the end of the matter: 
I hold it an advantage for the United States, 
that this amendment has been dictated by British 
interests, rather than by hesitations on our 
side. We stand in a great deal better position 
as it regards future negotiation for opening the 
British colonial trade. 
He gave his hosts the impression that the United States 
were prepared to open the coastal trade as an equivalent 
for full American rights in the colonial trade, and even 
when informed that this was not the case, the British 
still insisted that they be allowed to trade between 
Atlantic ports and U.S. "colonial" possessions on the 
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Pacific coast. In the Senate Daniel Webster attacked the 
idea of such a bargain and the possibility that its evil 
effects might be multiplied if other countries were to 
claim similar access to the inter-coastal trade. His 
fears were premature, however. American ships were 
admitted to colonial ports in 1850, but when Britain 
inquired as to her rights in the coastal trade, Clayton 
referred the matter to Congress which upheld the 
prohibition of foreign shipping, even from the California 
route. 18 
The question of flagging was not so successfully 
resolved. Critics of reciprocity had often attacked the 
careless drafting of treaties which allowed nations to 
claim equal treatment for cheaper foreign-built, but 
national-flagged, vessels. More recent treaties had 
corrected this error by restricting reciprocity to vessels 
built domestically, and observers such as Ambrose Dudley 
Mann were determined that the same terms should apply to 
Britain whose reforms seemed likely to end the prohibition 
of foreign-built vessels from her shipping registry. They 
feared that whereas British-built vessels would not be 
able to compete, even under reciprocal terms, ships bought 
cheaply, for instance from the Baltic, would pose a 
greater challenge to Americans. Bancroft disagreed with 
this view, being more confident that the superior skills 
of American shippers would enable them to compete with 
British rivals under any conditions. Indeed, he claimed 
that allowing Britain equal treatment for foreign-built 
vessels would have positive results as well by giving 
American ship-builders the opportunity to sell their 
product to the biggest market in the world. With no 
orders telling Bancroft to make a major issue of it, 
either from Buchanan or from his successor as Secretary of 
State, John M. Clayton, this question was finally resolved 
by the method used to establish reciprocity: the 
legislative basis. As that did not specify that ships had 
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to be built in Britain to be eligible for equal duties, 
the notes sent to customs collectors to guide them in the 
treatment of British vessels did not make any reference to 
the construction of vessels either.19 
On the question of the basis upon which to found 
reciprocity the two most significant American figures at 
the start of Britain's reform moves were in agreement. 
Bancroft's despatches repeatedly recommended the treaty 
basis, and in his orders of September 1847 Buchanan made 
clear that Polk was "not only willing but anxious to 
conclude a new convention with Great Britain." But it was 
Mann who best summed up the reasons for this choice in a 
series of despatches commenting upon the progress towards 
reform in Britain. Although his own general preference 
for the treaty basis no doubt coloured his opinion, there 
were still specific reasons why a treaty with Britain was 
desirable. One was the old danger that the legislative 
basis was too lax on the question of flagging of foreign-
built ships, something a treaty could remedy by a specific 
clause limiting reciprocity to domestic-built vessels. 
More important, he believed, was the prospect that British 
shippers would lose so much ground to more efficient 
rivals under the looser trading conditions that they would 
demand a return to the old system of restriction and 
protection within a couple of years. Putting reciprocity 
on the treaty basis would make it far harder for Britain 
to withdraw from her reforming stance.20 
The course of events thwarted the negotiation of a 
treaty by the Polk administration. From the start 
Buchanan feared that adjusting all the details of such a 
complex system would be "a task of much difficulty," and 
it became clear that British officials were reluctant to 
commit themselves to a treaty when still unsure of the 
limits of reform. Late in 1847 Labouchere informed 
Bancroft that reform was not yet far enough advanced for 
the Ministry to consider a treaty, and Lord Palmerston 
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thought his government would not be "justified in advising 
the crown to enter into arrangements which could be at 
variance with some of the most important principles of the 
existing navigation law, without the previous sanction of 
Parliament." Hopes for a successful negotiation were 
raised again when Parliament seemed to move in the right 
direction. Mann even went to London to lend Bancroft 
support, hoping that his own success in Hanover and 
Mecklenburg would provide a British audience with examples 
of the value of the treaty basis. But although Parliament 
seemed to be making promising progress towards repeal of 
the navigation restrictions in 1848 and early 1849, time 
was running out for Polk, Buchanan and Bancroft. When 
British agents were ordered to collect material relevant 
to the drafting of legislation, by inquiring how the 
British reforms would be received abroad, Buchanan may 
have answered that Britain only had to comply with the 
terms of the U.S. act of 1828 and reciprocity in the 
indirect trade would be hers; but at the same time he 
hinted at the preferable possibility of a treaty to cement 
reciprocity. Meanwhile, in London Bancroft, in a mood 
approaching desperation, demanded orders to negotiate "at 
as early a day as may be possible."21 
By February 1849 Bancroft was certain that he would 
not have time to sign a treaty before the change of 
administration in Washington. He feared that Taylor might 
end negotiations, to the embarrassment of both the nation 
and him personally, and he even contemplated resignation 
in order to avoid that fate. Nevertheless, he thought 
better of this and resolved to carry on in London, cheered 
by news that his efforts seemed to be on the verge of 
success. He had agreed with the British "to proceed 
between our two countries by a Convention," with the 
understanding that "the negotiation with the United States 
[was] to go forward step by step with the progress of the 
Bill in Parliament.'' Yet despite Bancroft's plea to be 
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allowed to continue his work, Clayton instructed him 
instead "to suspend all negotiations on the subject of a 
conventional arrangement," on the grounds that, with the 
arrival of Sir Henry Bulwer in the United States expected 
soon, it was "not deemed advisable that the subject of a 
new treaty of commerce and navigation ••• should be 
further pressed by you at the present time."2 2 
Bancroft's reply was the first shot in a bitter 
exchange of correspondence between the two men. He argued 
that his orders would give heart to the opponents of 
reform in Britain and were "regarded as 'a very serious 
impediment' to the passage of the Bill." Indeed, the 
"coldness of our Government" made harder the Ministry's 
task of forcing the bill through the House of Lords. And 
even when the bill did pass, Bancroft blamed a delay in 
its implementation, from September 1849 to January 1850, 
upon the lack of ~nthusiasm from Washington. In a tone 
little short of contempt he reviewed the Taylor 
administration's stance in the context of its 
predecessors': his own efforts "as the humble disciple of 
the great men of the Revolution" should have met with a 
little more gratitude. Was he "to be left without 
encouragement from the President ••• at a time when I am 
rendering service in effecting that freedom of indirect 
and Colonial trade which has always been the ardent 
aspiration of my country and its great statesmen?" He 
found it strange that at this glorious moment he "should 
be left, single-handed, to speak for my country from its 
history and its statute book, without one word of cheering 
encouragement from its present Government."23 
Clayton countered with a blistering attack on 
Bancroft's actions and assertions, which in tone was 
clearly meant to be a partisan dig at his Democratic 
predecessor as well. He claimed that it had not been 
Taylor's intention to end negotiations, but rather to 
switch them to Washington and to await the final passage 
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of Britain's new laws before signing any treaty. He 
denied that this approach had caused the delay in the 
implementation date (Parliament had already decided upon 
this before Bancroft received his orders) and justified 
his action by noting that British legislation now offered, 
freely, rights which Bancroft, with the sanction of 
Buchanan, had been prepared to buy with concessions -- a 
reference to the possible exchange of coastal trade for 
colonial trade. Clayton was cautious about the prospects 
for navigation under the proposed changes and wanted more 
time to consider them and, he claimed, to give Congress a 
chance to have its say, in order to avoid repeating 
mistakes made in the past: 
The people of this country were still smarting 
under the effects of the memorable arrangement 
in regard to the British Colonial trade of 1830, 
and it therefore became extremely desirable to 
the President that no arrangement, touching the 
great interests of our navigation, should be 
entered into without mature consideration, and 
ample opportunity of consulting those to whom, 
in his view of the Constitution, the power on 
this great subject, as a legislative question is 
peculiarly entrusted. 
Clayton concluded by playing down the minister's 
contribution. As Bancroft had admitted, Britain had 
contemplated changes long before his arrival, out of 
domestic and European causes; also he had not given 
Britain any further encouragement than she would have got 
from hearing what most Americans had been saying about 
reciprocity for twenty years or more; and so he could 
claim little credit for the reforms. With no further need 
for Bancroft's services, Clayton promptly recalled him. 24 
Clayton's initial willingness to contemplate talks in 
Washington gave advocates of the treaty basis some hope 
that one might still be signed. Mann thought the most 
important aspect of the new British laws was a provision 
"authorizing the Ministers in Council to contract with 
Foreign Nations reciprocity Treaties of Navigation for the 
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indirect carrying to and from British ports," and he hoped 
that Clayton would take advantage of this. Yet President 
Taylor was fearful that a Democratic Senate might not 
ratify a treaty for purely partisan reasons, even if they 
did support it in principle. Indeed, despite his earlier 
claim Clayton proved unwilling to place the issue before 
Congress at all, as even members of his own party demanded 
a supervisory role. Bancroft noted with a sense of poetic 
justice that the Taylor administration was in trouble, 
"because Webster says, our ports are not to be thrown open 
without the action of Congress." So Clayton opted for the 
quickest method of establishing reciprocal relations, by 
reference to existing U.S. laws. But even this produced 
controversy, as there was some debate as to which laws 
should be used to open the indirect trade. Bancroft had 
originally advised both Clayton and the British that all 
that was needed was an exchange of notes confirming that 
the new British laws would open the trade on 1 January 
1850 and that the u.s. act of 1817 prohibiting British 
ships from the U.S. indirect trade would cease to apply 
from that date. Subsequent meetings between Buchanan, 
Clayton, and the Secretary of the Treasury, William 
Meredith, produced apparent agreement that Taylor, in 
accordance with the act of 1828, would have to issue a 
proclamation as well if British vessels entering U.S. 
ports in indirect trade were to receive equal treatment. 
However, Clayton clearly neglected his predecessor's 
advice and advised Bancroft "that no proclamation is 
necessary: that nothing more is wanting to open the 
indirect trade to England & the United States 
respectively, than what has been done." Whether or not 
the confusion arose over the distinction between merely 
opening the trade and applying reciprocal terms to it is 
unclear, but Clayton stuck to his chosen stance. In 
October 1849 the Treasury Department simply sent a letter 
to customs collectors ordering them, as from 1 January, to 
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admit British vessels in the indirect trade on equal terms 
with American vessels; no proclamation was issued.25 
The affair was over. Thirty-five years of sporadic 
diplomatic activity had finally ended in Americans 
securing the right to trade in and out of British ports, 
in goods of all countries, on exactly the same terms as 
British vessels. Moreover, they could trade between 
Britain and her American and West Indian colonies, as well 
as between individual colonies. The only disappointment 
was Britain's refusal to allow American vessels to ply 
between two ports in the same colony, although even this 
was permitted if sanctioned by the local governor. 
Bancroft had earlier predicted such changes would mark 
"the requiem of the old Colonial system" and was doubtless 
relieved at the final outcome. At the same time, though, 
he remained contemptuous of Clayton's behaviour which had 
revealed not only a willingness to criticise both Buchanan 
and himself but also complete ignorance ''of international 
law & of the foreign relations of the country."26 
Official Whig reaction was predictably very 
different. In his first annual message Taylor celebrated 
the "most friendly character" of U.S. relations with 
Britain and expressed his hope that the establishment of 
full reciprocity would "be productive of benefit to both 
countries." Bancroft's successor in London, Abbott 
Lawrence, reported that the British government were highly 
satisfied with the changes, while he personally saw them 
as a great opportunity for Americans to "test our ability 
to compete successfully with the greatest navigating 
nation in the world." At last the rules of that 
competition were not weighted against the United States: 
We are young and vigorous and a fair field is 
now open for the exercise of the physical and 
mental powers of the Old and Young Anglo-Saxon. 
We have now open to us by the repeal of the 
British Navigation Laws a field for action, the 
barriers to which we desired to have removed 
some thirty years ago. We offered all the world 
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reciprocity so far as the carrying trade was 
concerned. England, more important to the 
United States than all other countries besides, 
refused to accept it. She now has adopted the 
proffer we then made. I have no doubt we shall 
obtain advantages of great consequence from it. 
And figures from "practical shipbuilders" illustrating the 
advantages enjoyed by American shippers as a result of 
their cheaper purchase costs and smaller, more efficient 
crews, only reinforced Lawrence in his belief that "[t]he 
enterprise, energy and intelligence of~ ship owners, 
officers, and men, will in the end prevail." Things 
looked set fair.27 
Amidst the celebrations arose a few cries of 
discontent. There might have been a revolution in 
international trading relations but some old problems 
remained to be solved, and it was possible that the 
establishment of reciprocity with Britain might actually 
exacerbate some of them. Even in his triumphal mood, 
Abbott Lawrence still sounded a note of caution, echoing 
earlier doubts about the wisdom of granting reciprocal 
terms to countries like Sweden, Prussia and Denmark, terms 
which had caused American navigation to suffer severely. 
The acceptable price for further enjoyment of such terms 
had a familiar ring: 
I cannot ••• but entertain the hope, that 
those Nations upon the Continent of Europe which 
have enjoyed the high privileges of reciprocity 
in Navigation, may be induced to reduce the 
duties upon 2gobacco, and other articles of our production. 
Lawrence's hopes and fears raise three questions. What 
effect did the basis for reciprocity with Britain have 
upon the "new era" approach to diplomacy in the rest of 
Europe? Would the Whigs persist with that approach, as 
Lawrence's comment seemed to suggest they might, even 
though it was believed to sacrifice the interests of some 
American shippers? More importantly, how far did the 
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views of those shippers accord with the general euphoria 
brought about by Britain's policy changes? 
For Ambrose Dudley Mann the winning of full 
reciprocity from Britain evoked mixed feelings. No doubt 
he had every hope that American shipping would benefit 
greatly from the new development and so he joined in the 
celebrations. His excitement was tempered, however, by 
his dislike of the foundation upon which the new 
relationship was laid. He had consistently opposed the 
legislative basis for a number of reasons. As he stressed 
to Clayton in October 1849 when it was still not too late 
to come to treaty terms, "[w]hile that Act remains in 
force it would be idle to attempt to negotiate an 
advantageous treaty with Great-Britain, or indeed with any 
other country as respects commerce and navigation." Of 
course his preference for a treaty with Britain was well 
known; it would provide the necessary security for 
reciprocity against future British changes of policy and 
would guard against the problems of flagging. But a 
treaty would also allow the United States to scrap their 
own navigation acts without jeopardising the new 
relationship with Britain. And Mann made clear why this 
was desirable, in outlining the alternative: 
The liberal provisions of the British Navigation 
Act are calculated to create an impression 
adverse to a revision of our own legislation, 
with reference to foreign Navigation, and may 
contribute to the defeat of an object so much 
required for a more complete development of our 
prosperity. 
By the "object so much required" he meant the "new era" 
diplomacy in Germany and Denmark, as was made clear by a 
reference later in the same paragraph to Prussia's transit 
duties and the Sound tolls. Relying on legislation to 
secure the desirable goal of reciprocity with Britain 
would deprive Mann of his last weapon in the battle to 
wrest favourable treaties from German states -- the threat 
of repealing the 1828 act. At first Mann hoped to get 
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around this by suggesting an amendment to the act which 
would allow Britain reciprocity while penalising states 
which still imposed transit duties. By this means the 
United States could "within a comparatively short period, 
remove the most restrictive existing fetters upon our 
commerce in Europe." But the eventual use by Clayton of 
the 1817 act jeopardised even that approach, since other 
states would insist that they should enjoy the same 
construction of it as did Britain, allowing them to by-
pass a reformed 1828 act in the process. Mann did urge 
the repeal of the 1817 act as well, in a last desperate 
attempt to promote the treaty basis for reciprocity in 
preference to legislation. But no treaty was signed; nor 
were the acts repealed or modified; and so, stripped of 
his last weapon, Mann considered himself powerless to 
continue his work in Germany.29 
As it was the Taylor administration's wariness of 
making commitments to any government in Germany had 
delayed Mann's efforts anyway. Indeed, a policy of 
caution prevailed within the Clayton State department in 
most matters, and his orders to other U.S. diplomats gave 
no firm sense of direction for future commercial talks. 
But it would be dangerous to suggest that this caution 
stemmed from a greater concern for the navigation interest 
and that the change of party in the White House had 
brought with it an upturn in fortune for the critics of 
reciprocity. Clayton did not encourage "new era" tactics 
but, with the exception of Germany, neither did he order 
an end to such negotiations. Moreover, Lawrence's 
adoption of the "new era" approach apparently belied his 
New England Whig background. Finally, Clayton's decision 
to avoid Congress in implementing the new relationship 
with Britain also revealed a degree of neglect of shipping 
interests, because in so doing he not only sidestepped 
possible defeat at the hands of Democrats but also ignored 
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a latent hostility to any establishment of reciprocity, 
even in the indirect trade with Britain. 
Despite the symbolic value of the reform of Britain's 
Navigation acts, there were grounds for fearing the real 
effects of this change. Part of the criticism of 
reciprocal arrangements in the past had been a claim that 
American vessels were losing their competitive edge, and 
now there were hints of opposition to the establishment of 
similar terms with Britain on the same grounds. The new 
regulations opened the way for British ships to 
participate in American trade with third countries and for 
third party vessels to get involved in the Anglo-American 
trade for the first time, and in each case there was real 
concern that American shippers would be squeezed out. 
The likelihood of British intrusion in the trade 
between the United States and those third countries which 
accepted her offer of full reciprocity depended on whether 
or not British vessels could undercut their American 
rivals. This was a question which had aroused some 
disagreement, with supporters of reciprocity making clear 
their belief that Americans would prove their superiority 
under such conditions, whereas others suggested that such 
optimism was misplaced. Before 1849 the direct trade 
between Britain and the United States provided the only 
testing-ground for these rival views, although any figures 
from that route had to be considered in the light of 
claims that British vessels gained an advantage from their 
colonial trade monopoly. Even so critics did point to a 
growing British share in the direct trade which could be 
explained by greater British competitiveness. In his 
report of 1842 John Pendleton Kennedy had cited figures 
showing that the British share of the direct trade had 
risen from one sixth to almost one half under the 
operation of the convention of 1815 which had "entirely 
gratified the expectations of its advocates on the other 
side of the Atlantic." Britain had always taken care to 
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grant reciprocal terms only when sure of the "comparative 
cheapness of British navigation," so that "these 
arrangements are only maintained by Great Britain from a 
settled persuasion that she enjoys this advantage over the 
countries with which she treats." Hence, Britain had not 
signed such a deal with Prussia. But, more importantly, 
she had been prepared to allow reciprocity in the direct 
trade with the United States, the implication being that 
she had expected her shipping to be more competitive. 
While Kennedy did not discuss the merits or otherwise of 
establishing full reciprocity with Britain, his views did 
give grounds for later doubts as to the effects of such a 
move. What is more, as Britain took the lead in maritime 
technology, it was feasible that this would reinforce her 
ability to compete with American shippers in all routes.30 
Some disagreed with this analysis but found other 
reasons to be wary of offering too liberal terms. 
Secretary of State Clayton asserted that the direct. trade 
between Britain and the United States had been one "for 
which they [British vessels] had never successfully 
competed with us •••• " At the same time, though, 
Clayton did fear that other countries would gain unduly 
from the change in British policy. Traditional European 
shipping rivals would now be allowed to take American 
products to Britain, while they could also carry British 
goods to the United States free of any discriminating 
export duties imposed in Britain. Clayton was concerned 
about the likely impact of this change: "By allowing the 
ships of all the nations to come into competition with us 
in carrying our own produce to the United Kingdom the bill 
••• will most affect our commercial marine." There was 
even circumstantial evidence to confirm such fears, as 
statistics revealed an increase in the number of foreign 
vessels trading in U.S. ports in 1847 and 1848, years when 
Britain had temporarily relaxed her navigation 
restrictions. A fall in clearances and entrances by 
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American vessels in the same period no doubt gave 
considerable cause for concern.31 
Somewhat surprisingly this apparent relative decline 
in shipping and the fears of permanent disadvantage did 
not inspire a wave of petitions from maritime communities 
to match that of the early 1840s. Nevertheless, Congress 
did see fit to address the matter. In March 1848 the 
House requested Polk to provide them with any 
correspondence with Britain relating to the adoption of 
reciprocity. Given the momentous potential of the change 
in British policy such a request was only to be expected. 
But moves in the Senate revealed deeper-rooted concern 
with the operation of reciprocity in general. In December 
1848 John Clarke of Rhode Island introduced a resolution 
calling for information on all reciprocity treaties, on 
the state of the trade of the contracting nations, and on 
"the effect of such treaties comparatively, upon the 
commerce and navigation of the United States." Later he 
focussed just on treaties establishing reciprocity in the 
indirect trade, calling also for information on 
proclamations which did the same. Finally he secured the 
appointment of a select committee to examine the 
possibility of repealing the act of 1828. 
There are several possible interpretations of 
Clarke's motives. It could have been that he was 
following Ambrose Dudley Mann's advice to repeal the act 
so that other countries would have to seek the treaty 
basis for reciprocity in future, a basis which the United 
States could turn to their advantage by demanding 
favourable equivalents. But in the light of the views of 
previous Whig Senators from Rhode Island on matters of 
navigation, this explanation is less than convincing. The 
short speech Clarke made to support his resolutions echoed 
earlier statements of genuine concern for shipping, 
inspired by fears about the effects of reciprocity: 
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It is manifest, from the inequality in 
population and mercantile advantages of smaller 
nations, that treaties made by the United States 
are disadvantageous to this Government. Certain 
nations, small in population and of but few 
resources, though not deficient in intelligence 
and industry, enjoy indirectly a large portion 
of the trade of the whole world. For example, a 
nation with a population of a few millions, 
limited in resources and enterprise, had the 
same right to contribute in the commerce of 
other countries that this nation, with a 
population of twenty millions, and in the 
possession of almost boundless resources and 
ability to carry on commercial transactions, 
enjoys. The inequality that is thus manifest 
has struck me as being grossly unjust. 
Clarke pointed to the effects of existing treaties, 
recognising that they would allow rival European shippers 
to participate competitively in the trade between Britain 
and the United States. Depriving them of full reciprocity 
would not stop them being treated equally in Britain when 
carrying goods from U.S. ports but it would discourage 
their participation in the reverse trade from Britain to 
the United States and, by discriminating against them in 
the carriage of third country goods to U.S. ports (an 
important trade for countries which exported few products 
of their own to U.S. markets), it would make triangular 
trades less viable. As such Clarke was continuing the 
tradition of defending shipping against European rivals, 
this time in the vital U.S.-Britain trade route. 
Repealing the 1828 act would provide a safeguard, so that 
smaller shipping powers, if deprived of treaty-based 
terms, could not claim reciprocity by the legislative 
basis instead. It is just possible, also, that Clarke 
suggested repeal of the act in order to signal his 
hostility to reciprocity with all countries, including 
Britain. After all, a treaty between the two countries 
seemed elusive, which meant that repealing the 1828 act 
would effectively block reciprocity altogether.32 
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It is best not to overstate the opposition to 
reciprocity with Britain. Clarke did not mention Britain 
by name. Nor did she exhibit the same trends in 
population and volume of trade which made the U.S. offer 
of reciprocity to smaller shipping powers appear so 
unjust. So Clarke might have shared the enthusiasm for 
establishing reciprocity in the indirect trade with 
Britain, provided other countries' ships were not allowed 
to take unfair advantage. 
That proviso, however, did reveal a definite concern 
among certain elements about the persistent effects of 
reciprocal relations with the shipping powers of northern 
Europe. It is also clear that those critics had as little 
success as their predecessors had had in bringing their 
analysis to bear upon U.S. policy. It was highly unlikely 
that the United States would turn their back on 
reciprocity. Bancroft illustrated the prevailing attitude 
in 1849 when replying to a Conservative Lord's query as to 
the chances of the United States receding from their 
policy of an open indirect trade: 
I thought I might safely say that a policy 
sustained by so many Administrations, desired by 
Franklin and his associates, permitted without 
restriction for thirty five years, encouraged by 
Madison, by Clay, by John Quincy Adams, by John 
C. Calhoun, as well as by the late 
Administration, was not likely to be subverted. 
To the weight of tradition can be added the political 
reality of a Congress dominated by Democrats, where 
shipping interests were very much in a minority. Ambrose 
Dudley Mann commented on this in a despatch to Clayton: 
I feel quite confident that any effort to change the 
laws of 1824 and 1828, for the purpose of favoring 
our navigation, would prove unavailing. The 
measure must be urged expressly with a view to the 
coercing of Prussia, Sweden, Denmark, &c. to make 
import, excise and transit, river and Sound duty 
concessions in favor of our principal staples. A 
recommendation of that kind • • • would command 
doubtless~~' a large majority of each House of 
Congress. 
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Mann's hopes for repeal or amendment of all the U.S. 
navigation acts were of course thwarted, as the Taylor 
administration overcame its caution and established 
reciprocity with Britain on the legislative basis. While 
for Mann this represented the end of an ambition to secure 
more valuable commercial treaties, for shipping groups it 
marked a final defeat of their campaign against 
reciprocity. Their complaints had been manipulated in an 
attempt to wrest better terms from European treaty 
partners. The treaties they had criticised so vocally had 
been allowed to remain in force. And now the legislative 
basis for reciprocity was retained and virtually 
guaranteed to remain in place for as long as it was the 
basis of the more generally acceptable new relationship 
with Britain. 
The next five years witnessed the resolution of 
several of the diplomatic questions involving trade. and 
navigation left outstanding at the beginning of the 
decade. In most cases this resulted more from changes in 
European policies than from State department initiatives, 
but on each occasion the American response reinforced the 
prevailing balance of influence between the interests of 
shipping and those of commerce as a whole. 
Events in Germany finally justified Mann's policy of 
encouraging the independence of northern German states 
from the Zollverein. With the customs union treaties due 
for revision or renewal in 1852-54, the major German 
states jockeyed for positions of influence. At first U.S. 
ministers feared that Austria would join the union and 
cause it to adopt prohibitive duties on tobacco. But it 
became clear that Prussia would try to prevent this 
development by calling upon the support of the northern 
states, especially when Austria attempted to coax some of 
the southern states into a rival protectionist league. In 
September 1851 Prussia and Hanover signed a treaty which 
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would establish a union between the Zollverein and the 
Kingdom in 1854. Significantly the duties to be imposed 
on "colonial" imports, including tobacco, would be at the 
lower rates preferred by Hanover. And when the general 
Zollverein treaties were renewed in 1853, the terms of the 
Prussia-Hanover treaty were included in them. Mann's 
dream of uniting Germany upon the lines of his treaty with 
Hanover had come true, resulting not only in lower import 
duties upon American goods entering the Zollverein but 
also in reduced transit duties.34 
Apart from having supported Hanover's separate status 
in the past, U.S. diplomacy played no part in this 
development. There had been no further threats to 
terminate the Prussian treaty and certainly no hint of 
trying to limit the offer of reciprocity. Meanwhile 
reciprocal terms with the Netherlands had been extended. 
In 1850 the Dutch government followed Britain's example by 
scrapping its remaining restrictions on navigation. New 
laws introduced equal treatment in the indirect trade for 
vessels of countries which reciprocated, and all Dutch 
colonial trade was opened to foreign vessels. The State 
department was slow to respond to this unilateral change 
of policy, provoking both enquiries as to whether Dutch 
ships would now be treated equally in U.S. ports in 
accordance with the act of 1828 and warnings that American 
vessels would continue to pay discriminating duties until 
reciprocity took effect. It would be tempting to conclude 
that the delay resulted from opposition on the part of 
Daniel Webster, in his second term as Secretary of State. 
This is doubtful, however, because eventually Webster did 
agree to the establishment of full reciprocity, and not 
just by proclamation. In August 1852 he took the active 
step of enshrining the new terms in a convention 
supplementary to the treaty of 1839, effectively giving 
his positive sanction to an extension of reciprocity in an 
indirect trade.35 
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For a man of Webster's record on navigation questions 
in general and on the issue of reciprocal navigation in 
particular this action is somewhat surprising. Maybe he 
considered the opening of the Dutch colonial trade as an 
adequate equivalent for the concession of full 
reciprocity, an exchange which at least had the potential 
for fostering the interests of American shipping. Yet 
that hardly squared with his previous record of harsh 
criticism of reciprocity on any terms, first as Senator in 
1840, then as Secretary of State, and even as late as 
1848-49 in the Senate again. Perhaps Webster was simply 
being inconsistent, as his fluctuating stance on free 
trade, protection, and commercial reciprocity showed he 
was capable of on other issues. 
What Webster's shift of opinion makes clear, however, 
is that it is dangerous to attribute different stances on 
the reciprocal navigation question to hard and fast party 
or even personal prejudices. Many Americans thought 
commercial diplomacy, as with all diplomacy, should have 
been an issue above domestic partisan battles. In the 
early 1830s Jacksonians and National Republicans sometimes 
fought over the credit for trade agreements, but in 
general refrained from blocking their acceptance in the 
Senate. In 1849 Ambrose Dudley Mann had appealed to 
statesmen, as representatives of "an united people," to 
drop party stances and to support measures to back his 
efforts in Germany. Certainly it would be wrong to 
suggest that reciprocal navigation was a partisan 
question, helping to define party lines.36 
And yet these issues were not always above domestic 
politics in the 1840s. Some statesmen, politicians, and 
interested individuals dealt with them in partisan terms 
or made use of them within their wider party and sectional 
battles. This was especially the case when a commercial 
treaty touched on long-standing policy debates in domestic 
politics, as did the convention with the Zollverein with 
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its implications for the tariff dispute. But the issue of 
reciprocal navigation was also dragged into domestic 
politics, reflecting local and sectional priorities. 
On the surface Whigs were more sympathetic to those 
critical of reciprocity; that is to say those politicians 
who accepted the arguments against the further extension 
of equal terms in the indirect trade and who acted 
accordingly tended to be Whigs. It was Whigs who were 
more active in presenting memorials. It was Whigs who 
were the most active in suggesting legislative remedies to 
the problems raised by reciprocity and who opposed the 
treaty with Hanover in 1847. And it was Whigs of varying 
shades who ran the Department of State during that period 
when the further extension of reciprocity was suspended. 
But this trend increasingly reflected local and 
sectional interests as well, which shattered any illusion 
of this being a strict party issue. Whigs from maritime 
centres such as New England and Baltimore were the most 
sympathetic, as witnessed in the legislative developments 
between 1840 and 1845. But by 1847 even Maryland's Whig 
Senators had deserted the critics of reciprocity by voting 
in favour of the treaty with Hanover. Whigs from other 
regions had not been so convinced in the first place. 
Henry Clay from Kentucky was scornful of criticism of the 
reciprocity treaties, although his authorship of many of 
them no doubt coloured his opinion. But other Southern 
Whigs were unsympathetic as well, as borne out in their 
unanimous support for the treaty with Hanover. So 
distinct was the sectional division among Whig Senators in 
this vote that it is tempting to explain it not in terms 
of attitudes towards reciprocity at all, but rather as 
part of the growing North-South rift within the party in 
the mid-1840s. Certainly party unity had diminished since 
their unanimous opposition to the Zollverein convention 
only three years earlier, a measure whose concessions to 
producers would surely have appealed to Southern Whigs 
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just as much. Even though there had been the added 
element of tariff protection to defend on the earlier 
occasion, by 1847, after the annexation of Texas, the 
beginning of the Mexican War and the debate on the Wilmot 
Proviso, Southern Whigs demonstrated that they had fewer 
qualms about breaking party ranks in order to support a 
measure which would help their section's interests. 
Moreover, the sectional theme can be traced through to the 
end of the decade. It was perhaps significant that Abbott 
Lawrence, whose support for the extension of full 
reciprocity to Britain and for the continuation of the 
"new era" approach with other European states apparently 
went against his New England background, was a "Cotton 
Whig," one of those Whigs less aroused by the issue of 
slavery extension in the 1840s and more concerned to 
preserve the national unity of both party and country. 
And John Clayton; as Secretary of State for the southern 
President Taylor, put aside his own doubts about 
reciprocity and indeed his own negative vote on the 
Hanover treaty, to respond positively to Britain's repeal 
of her Navigation Acts. 
Democrats had nothing like the same trouble over the 
issue of reciprocal navigation. Despite the seemingly 
sectional priorities lying behind the treaty with Hanover 
and the party's own sectional difficulties in the mid-
1840s, the Democrats maintained their unity upon this 
issue, in the Senate at least. Even northern Democrats on 
Van Buren's wing of the party, such as Senators Fairfield, 
Dix and Niles, kept the party line on this occasion. 
Indeed, throughout the 1840s Democrats in general had 
maintained a virtual unanimity in support of measures 
likely to remove trade restrictions the world over. So 
calls for protection of shipping interests received little 
joy from the likes of Lowell, Woodbury, and Wright, whose 
response consisted of not much more than the token effort 
of presenting memorials. Finally even those Democrats 
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more convinced than others by criticism of reciprocity, 
such as Forsyth, Ingersoll, and, of course, Buchanan, were 
more concerned to promote the wider fortunes of American 
commerce and in the process were prepared to sacrifice the 
narrower interests of navigation.37 
To some extent, therefore, it seemed as if attitudes 
on the issue of reciprocal navigation did distinguish 
Democrats from one part of the Whig party, the one 
representing wider commerce, the other the more limited 
ambitions of American, and especially of New England's, 
shipping. It should not be forgotten, however, that 
Democrats no doubt believed that an increase in commerce 
would inevitably provide more carrying business for 
American shippers to share in. In that sense offering 
reciprocity in exchange for better market opportunities 
overseas was expected to help shipping, in the same way as 
would Webster's g~ant of full reciprocity to the Dutch in 
1852 in exchange for trading rights with their colonies. 
So Democrats should not be accused of neglecting totally 
the American shipping interest. It should also be 
remembered that not all maritime communities agreed with 
the criticism of reciprocity. Nor did all shippers within 
communities which did send forth memorials. For many 
these were healthy times, as the general economic 
environment improved and as levels of overseas trade 
increased. So too did total U.S. tonnage figures increase 
in the late 1840s and 1850s, both for registered vessels 
and for vessels clearing and entering U.S. ports. 
Against this background, and with the emergence of new 
issues of interest to the mercantile community, most 
notably the growing sectional crisis but also specific 
commercial questions involving subsidies to steamer lines 
and access to river routes in Latin America, was it any 
surprise that reciprocal navigation had never been, nor 
would become, a major party issue in the 1840s and 1850s? 
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There was a dark side to this picture, however. 
While total shipping figures rose, the years 1848-1851 
witnessed an accelerated fall in American shippers' share 
in their own country's trade, with levels below fifty per 
cent in many cases, and sometimes much lower. Indeed, it 
is usually from the 1850s that historians chart the 
decline of the American mercantile marine. While this 
relative decline is no doubt more visible in hindsight 
than it was at the time, some contemporaries did continue 
to bemoan the fate of shipping, and some of those critics 
also blamed reciprocity as partly responsible for that 
fate. Barely six months after the establishment of full 
reciprocity with Britain, the Boston Atlas criticised its 
effects upon American shipping. And, in tacit admission 
that the old problems persisted, the Pierce administration 
adopted the "new era" approach in 1854-55, by threatening 
to abrogate the U.S. treaty with Denmark unless something 
was done about the Sound dues. Reciprocity was not solely 
to blame for the decline, and historians are probably 
correct in attributing many of the complaints of the time 
to a "sour grapes" mentality. It was the cheaper 
provision of new shipping technology by other countries, 
and especially by Britain, which in the long run allowed 
them to outstrip their American rivals in winning a larger 
share of a growing trade. But reciprocity did remove the 
possibility of protecting American shipping in numerous 
routes, and so to that extent the critics of the policy 
were justified in their claims. Indeed, although the 
decline of the 1850s involved new technology and new 
circumstances, the basic lines of the critique remained 
relevant, as Americans proved unable to compete in open 
markets. The critics of reciprocity could almost be 
considered prophetic. But at the time they made their 
case most loudly, other Americans 
to listen, or did not help them. 
the campaign against reciprocity 
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either were not prepared 
Ignored, then exploited, 
failed. 38 ITABS.2,3.4J 
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APPENDIX 1 
Senate Voting on the Hanover Treaty, January 1847 
(Source: Senate Executive Proceedings 
29 Congress, 2 session, vo1.7, pp.175-6) 
Vote on Amendment to remove 12th Article 
Pro-amendment (14) 
Badger 
Cilley 
T. Clayton 
J. Clayton 
Corwin 
Davis 
Greene 
Huntington 
Miller 
Niles 
Phelps 
Simmons 
Upham 
Woodbridge 
(W-NCa) 
(W-NH) 
(W-Del) 
(W-Del) 
(W-Oh) 
(W-Mass) 
(W-RI) 
(W-Conn) 
(W-NJ) 
(D-Conn) 
(W-Vt) 
(W-RI) 
(W-Vt) 
(W-Mich) 
Allen 
Archer 
Ashley 
Atchison 
Atherton 
Bagby 
Benton 
Breese 
Bright 
Butler 
Calhoun 
Cass 
Chalmers 
Colquitt 
Dayton 
Anti-Amendment (30) 
(D-Oh) 
(W-Va) 
(D-Ark) 
(D-Mo) 
(D-NH) 
(D-Al) 
(D-Mo) 
(D-Ill) 
(D-Ind) 
(D-SCa) 
(D-SCa) 
(D-Mich) 
(D-Miss) 
(D-Ga) 
(W-NJ) 
Dix 
Fairfield 
Houston 
R. Johnson 
C. Johnson 
Lewis 
Mangum 
Pearce 
Rusk 
Sevier 
Speight 
Sturgeon 
Turney 
Wescott 
Yulee 
(D-NY) 
(D-Me) 
(D-Tex) 
(W-Md) 
(W-La) 
(D-Al) 
(W-NCa) 
(W-Md) 
(D-Tex) 
(D-Ark) 
(D-Miss) 
(D-Pa) 
(D-Tenn) 
(D-Fla) 
(D-Fla) 
Regional SElit Pro Anti Absent 
New England 8 2 2 
Mid-Atlantic 3 3 2 
Mid-West 2 4 2 
South-West 0 10 4 
South (inc. Maryland) 1 11 2 
Part~ SElit Pro Anti 
Whig 13 6 
Democrat 1 24 
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APPENDIX 1 cont. 
Final Vote on Treaty 
Anti-treat~ (13) Pro-Treat~ (32) 
Bagby (D-Ala) Allen (D-Oh) Fairfield (D-Me) 
Cilley (W-NH) Archer (W-Va) Houston (D-Tex) 
T. Clayton (W-Del) Ashley (D-Ark) Jarnagin (W-Tenn) 
J. Clayton (W-Del) Atchison (D-Mo) R. Johnson (W-Md) 
Corwin (W-Oh) Atherton (D-NH) C. Johnson (W-La) 
Davis (W-Mass) Badger (W-NCa) Lewis (D-Ala) 
Greene (W-RI) Benton (D-Mo) Mangum ~W-NCa) 
Huntington (W-Conn) Breese (D-Ill) Niles D-Conn) 
Miller (W-NJ) Bright (D-Ind) Pearce (W-Md) 
Phelps (W-Vt) Butler (D-SCa) Rusk (D-Tex) 
Simmons (W-RI) Calhoun (D-SCa) Sevier (D-Ark) 
Upham (W-Vt) Cass (D-Mich) Speight (D-Miss) 
Woodbridge (W-Mich) Chalmers (D-Miss) Sturgeon (D-Pa) 
Colquitt (D-Ga) Turney (D-Tenn) 
Dayton (W-NJ) Wescott (D-Fla) 
Dix (D-NY) Yulee (D-Fla) 
Regional SElit Anti Pro Absent 
New England 7 3 2 
Mid-Atlantic 3 3 2 
Mid-West 2 4 2 
South-West 0 11 3 
South (inc. Maryland) 1 11 2 
Part~ SElit Anti Pro 
Whig 12 8 
Democrat 1 24 
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APPENDIX 2 
TABLE 1:1 
U.S. Export/Import Figures, 1821-1850: Total (millions $) 
(Source: Historical Statistics, Series U 116/134) 
Year Ex2orts Im2orts Year Ex2orts lmEorts 
1821 55 55 1836 124 177 
1822 61 80 1837 111 130 
1823 68 72 1838 105 96 
1824 69 72 1839 112 156 
1825 91 90 1840 124 98 
1826 73 78 1841 112 123 
1827 74 71 1842 100 96 
1828 64 81 1843* 83 42 
1829 67 67 1844 106 103 
1830 72 63 1845 106 113 
1831 72 96 1846 110 118 
1832 82 95 1847 157 122 
1833 88 101 1848 138 149 
1834 102 109 1849 140 141 
1835 115 137 1850 144 174 
(*1843 figures for nine months only) 
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TABLE 1:2 
U.S. Export/Import Figures, 1821-1850: Britain (millions $) 
(Source: Historical Statistics, Series U 124/142) 
Year ExEorts Im12orts Year Ex12orts lmEorts 
1821 19 24 1836 58 76 
1822 24 35 1837 52 45 
1823 22 28 1838 52 36 
1824 21 28 1839 57 65 
1825 37 37 1840 55 33 
1826 21 26 1841 47 46 
1827 26 30 1842 40 34 
1828 20 33 1843* 41 12 
1829 24 25 1844 49 41 
1830 26 24 1845 45 45 
1831 31 44 1846 46 45 
1832 29 37 1847 87 48 
1833 32 38 1848 67 60 
1834 44 41 1849 78 58 
1835 52 60 1850 71 75 
(*1843 figures for nine months only) 
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TABLE 1:3 
u.s. Export/Import Figures, 1821-1850: Germany (millions $) 
(Source: Historical Statistics, Series U 126/144) 
Year ExEorts lmEorts Year ExEorts lmEorts 
1821 2 1 1836 4 5 
1822 3 2 1837 4 6 
1823 3 2 1838 3 3 
1824 2 2 1839 3 5 
1825 3 3 1840 4 3 
1826 2 3 1841 5 2 
1827 3 2 1842 5 2 
1828 3 3 1843* 4 1 
1829 3 2 1844 4 2 
1830 2 2 1845 6 3 
1831 3 4 1846 5 3 
1832 4 3 1847 5 4 
1833 3 2 1848 4 6 
1834 5 3 1849 3 8 
1835 4 4 1850 5 9 
(*1843 figures for nine months only) 
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TABLE 1:4 
U.S. Export/Import Figures, 1821-1850: Cuba (millions $) 
(Source: Historical Statistics, Series U 119/137) 
Year ExEorts Im12orts Year Ex12orts Im12orts 
1821 4 5 1836 6 13 
1822 3 7 1837 6 11 
1823 5 7 1838 6 11 
1824 6 7 1839 6 12 
1825 5 7 1840 6 9 
1826 6 7 1841 6 11 
1827 6 7 1842 5 7 
1828 6 6 1843* 3 4 
1829 5 5 1844 5 10 
1830 5 5 1845 6 6 
1831 5 8 1846 5 8 
1832 5 7 1847 6 12 
1833 5 10 1848 7 12 
1834 5 8 1849 5 10 
1835 5 11 1850 5 10 
(* 1843 figures for nine months only) 
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TABLE 1:5 
u.s. Export/Import Figures, 1821-1850: Canada (millions $) 
(Source: Historical Statistics, Series U 118/136) 
Year Exports Imports Year Exports Imports 
1821 2 a 1836 3 2 
1822 2 a 1837 3 2 
1823 2 a 1838 2 1 
1824 2 a 1839 4 2 
1825 3 a 1840 6 1 
1826 2 a 1841 6 1 
1827 2 a 1842 6 1 
1828 2 a 1843* 3 a 
1829 2 a 1844 6 1 
1830 3 a 1845 6 1 
1831 3 1 1846 7 1 
1832 3 1 1847 7 1 
1833 4 1 1848 8 3 
1834 3 1 1849 8 2 
1835 3 1 1850 10 5 
a = less than $500,000 
(* 1843 figures for nine months only) 
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TABLE 1:6 
U.S. Export/Import Figures, 1821-1850: France (millions $) 
(Source: Historical Statistics, Series U 125/143) 
Year 
1821 
1822 
1823 
1824 
1825 
1826 
1827 
1828 
1829 
1830 
1831 
1832 
1833 
1834 
1835 
Exports 
6 
6 
9 
10 
10 
11 
11 
9 
10 
11 
6 
12 
14 
15 
19 
Imports 
4 
6 
6 
7 
11 
8 
8 
9 
9 
8 
14 
12 
13 
15 
22 
Year 
1836 
1837 
1838 
1839 
1840 
1841 
1842 
1843* 
1844 
1845 
1846 
1847 
1848 
1849 
1850 
(* 1843 figures for nine months only) 
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Exports 
21 
19 
15 
18 
20 
18 
17 
12 
13 
12 
14 
19 
15 
13 
18 
Imports 
32 
21 
16 
32 
16 
24 
17 
5 
17 
21 
24 
24 
28 
24 
27 
TABLE 2 
Documented Merchant Vessels, 1821-1850 (tons) 
(Source: Historical Statistics, Series Q 169/170/171) 
Year 
1821 
1822 
1823 
1824 
1825 
1826 
1827 
1828 
1829 
1830 
1831 
1832 
1833 
1834 
1835 
1836 
1837 
1838 
1839 
1840 
1841 
1842 
1843 
1844 
1845 
1846 
1847 
1848 
1849 
1850 
Total Seaboard 
1,264,648 
1,298,385 
1,311,536 
1,361,776 
1,396,691 
1,500,910 
1,589,862 
1,691,744 
a 
1,145,929 
1,214,914 
1,367,411 
1,529,884 
a 
1, 735.,393 
1,773,125 
1,771,256 
1,836,564 
a 
2,014,214 
1,935,702 
1,888,134 
1,940,067 
2,033,237 
2,143,365 
2,256,786 
2,463,568 
2,728,516 
2,874,015 
3,051,390 
(a=no return reported) 
New England 
580,407 
600,977 
600,487 
613,340 
640,651 
706,167 
714,181 
786,971 
a 
581,173 
575,957 
700,433 
811,430 
a 
895,748 
877,371 
889,089 
901,058 
a 
1,012,343 
984,262 
915,237 
922,959 
962,572 
1,009,902 
1,070,842 
1,124,749 
1,258,314 
1,289,260 
1,368,049 
Mid-Atl./Gulf 
684,241 
697,408 
711,049 
748,436 
756,040 
794,743 
875,681 
904,773 
a 
564,756 
638,957 
666,978 
718,454 
a 
839,645 
895,754 
882,167 
935,506 
a 
1,001,871 
951,440 
972,897 
1,017,108 
1,070,665 
1,133,463 
1,185,944 
1,338,819 
1,470,202 
1,584,033 
1,664,686 
(figures include vessels in coasting and internal trades) 
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TABLE 3:1a 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1821-1851: 
Entrances to all U.S. Ports 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Gong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.2-3) 
Number Tonna'e 
Year American {%) Foreign American {% Foreign 
1821 765,098 90.4 81,526 
1822 788,961 88.7 100,541 
1823 775,271 86.6 119,468 
1824 850,033 89.3 102,367 
1825 880,754 90.5 92,927 
1826 942,206 89.9 105,654 
1827 918,361 86.9 137,589 
1828 868,381 85.3 150,223 
1829 872,949 86.9 130,743 
1830 967,227 87.9 131,900 
1831 922,952 76.6 281,948 
1832 949,622 70.7 393,038 
1833 1,111,441 69.1 496,705 
1834 5,628 58;8 3,953 1,074,670 65.4 568,052 
1835 7,023 62.2 4,269 1,352,653 67.8 644,310 
1836 6,103 59.7 4,121 1,255,384 64.9 680,213 
1837 6,024 56.5 4,632 1,299,720 62.9 765,703 
1838 6,079 62.2 3,696 1,302,974 68.8 592,110 
1839 8,336 67.0 4,105 1,491,279 70.5 624,814 
1840 7,211 61.2 4,571 1,576,946 68.9 712,363 
1841 7,735 63.0 4,638 1,631,909 68.9 736,444 
1842 6,939 60.5 4,535 1,510,111 67.3 732,775 
1843* 4,872 62.8 2,889 1,143,523 68.1 534,752 
1844 8,148 59.2 5,577 1,977,438 68.3 916,992 
1845 8,133 59.3 5,590 2,035,486 69.1 910,563 
1846 8,111 58.7 5,707 2,151,114 69.1 959,739 
1847 7,730 54.3 6,499 2,101,359 63.3 1,220,346 
1848 9,643 69.6 7,631 2,393,482 63.0 1,405,191 
1849 11,208 55.5 8,992 2,658,321 60.8 1,710,515 
1850 8,412 45.4 10,100 2,573,016 59.2 1,775,623 
1851 8,951 45.4 10,759 3,054,349 61.2 1,939,091 
(no record of numbers of vessels arriving prior to 1834) (* 1843 figure for nine months only) 
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TABLE 3:1b 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1821-1851: 
Clearances from all U.S. Ports 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.2-3) 
Number Tonna'e 
Year American C'O Foreign American (% Foreign 
1821 804,947 90.6 83,073 
1822 813,748 89.3 97,490 
1823 810,761 87.1 119,740 
1824 919,278 89.7 102,552 
1825 960,366 90.9 95,080 
1826 953,012 90.6 99,414 
1827 980,542 88.2 131,250 
1828 897,404 85.6 151,030 
1829 944,799 87.7 133,006 
1830 971,760 87.9 133,436 
1831 972,504 78.1 271,994 
1832 974,865 71.6 387,505 
1833 1,142,160 69.7 497,039 
1834 5,886 59.5 4,003 1,134,020 66.7 577,700 
1835 7,285 63.3 4,230 1,400,517 68.9 630,824 
1836 6,343 61.0 4,053 1,315,523 66.1 674,721 
1837 5,942 56.6 4,551 1,266,622 62.6 756,292 
1838 6,441 63.5 3,703 1,408,761 69.9 604,166 
1839 8,312 67.3 4,036 1,477,928 70.7 611,839 
1840 7,583 62.3 4,583 1,647,009 69.9 706,486 
1841 7,790 63.1 4,554 1,634,156 68.9 736,849 
1842 7,024 60.8 4,529 1,536,451 67.5 740,497 
1843* 5,290 65.0 2,848 1,268,083 70.8 532,949 
1844 8,343 60.3 5,500 2,010,924 68.9 906,814 
1845 8,197 59.5 5,583 2,053,977 68.8 930,275 
1846 8,451 59.4 5,770 2,221,028 69.6 968,178 
1847 8,102 56.4 6,268 2,202,393 65.2 1,176,605 
1848 9,695 55.9 7,634 2,461,280 63.7 1,404,159 
1849 11,466 56.4 8,847 2,753,724 62.3 1,675,709 
1850 8,379 46.1 9,816 2,632,788 60.4 1,728,214 
1851 9,274 46.4 10,712 3,200,519 62.4 1,929,535 
(no record of numbers of vessels arriving prior to 1834) (* 1843 figure for nine months only) 
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TABLE 3:2a 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1826-1851: 
Entrances to Portland 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong. 1 Sess., No.123, p.4) 
Number Tonnage 
Year American ~%) Foreign American ~%) Foreign 
1826 33,637 99.1 289 
1827 39,716 99.2 317 
1828 34,347 100.0 
1829 30,456 100.0 
1830 26,642 99.4 170 
1831 33,621 99.0 324 
1832 39,975 98.6 563 
1833 37,761 99.6 155 
1834 156 93.4 11 31,968 95.9 1,366 
1835 138 85.8 23 28,878 93.2 2,095 
1836 113 65.7 59 21,580 71.6 8,580 
1837 96 57.1 72 19,005 73.8 6,745 
1838 131 64.5 72 27,780 82.9 5,718 
1839 126 61."8 78 25,533 82.9 5,262 
1840 96 53.9 82 18,924 77.4 5,530 
1841 102 58.6 72 22,477 81.7 s,o24 
1842 81 48.8 85 17,335 64.5 9,536 
1843* 42 40.4 62 8,651 61.0 5,520 
1844 90 45.7 107 19,621 67.2 9,557 
1845 117 54.9 96 26,464 75.9 8,363 
1846 125 52.1 115 27,118 72.4 10,318 
1847 99 49.5 101 19,760 69.9 8,505 
1848 136 59.1 94 28,344 80.7 6,769 
1849 84 24.9 254 19,212 46.6 22,013 
1850 131 29.3 316 28,624 44.6 35,571 
1851 204 44.4 253 38,956 57.6 28,660 
(no record of numbers of vessels arr1v1ng (* 1843 figure for nine months only) prior to 1834) 
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TABLE 3:2b 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1826-1851: 
Clearances from Portland 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.4) 
Number Tonnage 
Year American ~~J Foreign American ~%J Foreign 
1826 43,816 99.3 290 
1827 42,340 100.0 
1828 46,963 98.9 527 
1829 37,006 100.0 
1830 38,560 99.9 17 
1831 41,830 98.9 510 
1832 43,858 98.1 829 
1833 42,823 99.4 237 
1834 217 94.8 12 40,313 96.2 1,572 
1835 222 90.6 23 42,669 95.3 2,095 
1836 237 80.3 58 45,067 84.2 8,444 
1837 231 77.3 68 43,746 86.9 6,566 
1838 219 76 •. 6 67 41,400 88.5 5,361 
1839 210 74.2 73 40,745 89.3 4,901 
1840 171 67.1 84 32,774 85.1 5,739 
1841 195 72.5 74 36,985 87.5 5,258 
1842 164 66.4 83 32,510 77.6 9,362 
1843," 118 66.3 60 22,939 80.4 5,578 
1844 162 59.8 109 32,516 77.0 9,708 
1845 160 63.7 91 32,827 80.6 7,917 
1846 196 62.4 118 39,512 78.5 10,799 
1847 191 63.9 108 35,814 79.7 9,150 
1848 202 68.5 93 41,165 86.4 6,472 
1849 187 42.0 258 38,828 63.9 21,966 
1850 202 38.6 321 41,887 53.9 35,758 
1851 255 39.9 256 48,973 63.0 28,752 
(no record of numbers of vessels arr1v1ng (* 1843 figure for nine months only) prior to 1834) 
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TABLE 3:3a 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1826-1851: 
Entrances to Boston 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.5) 
Number Tonnage 
Year American (%) Foreign American (%) Foreign 
1826 134,854 96.6 4,755 
1827 118,604 96.1 4,798 
1828 111,439 95.2 5,595 
1829 117,608 96.1 4,827 
1830 108,665 95.9 4,663 
1831 116,762 92.4 9,612 
1832 136,360 86.4 21,442 
1833 149,550 83.8 29,013 
1834 763 71.3 307 154,941 84.6 28,144 
1835 754 65.1 404 158,712 81.6 35,708 
1836 779 56.4 602 168,646 75.1 56,038 
1837 853 55.2 691 188,367 77.7 53,910 
1838 747 60.5 483 161,595 81.2 37,303 
1839 865 60.-1 575 189,126 82.0 41,430 
1840 864 57.3 643 191,752 78.2 53,581 
1841 1,019 58.9 711 224,969 77.2 66,354 
1842 849 49.4 870 197,481 71.5 78,885 
18431( 455 48.3 488 100,815 69.8 43,691 
1844 879 46.3 1,018 199,505 69.0 89,483 
1845 901 41.6 1,265 207,461 67.1 101,491 
1846 816 37.6 1,356 209,387 65.7 109,449 
1847 906 42.7 1,214 218,212 67.1 107,214 
1848 1,098 37.6 1,825 269,299 62.2 163,375 
1849 887 30.2 2,053 248,069 54.9 203,107 
1850 967 34.8 1,905 260,550 54.4 218,309 
1851 888 30.4 2,029 236,900 46.2 275,317 
(no record of numbers of vessels arriving (* 1843 figure for nine months only) prior to 1834) 
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TABLE 3:3b 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the u.s. ' 1826-1851: 
Clearances from Boston 
(Source: Senate Doc. , 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.5) 
Number Tonnage 
Year American (%) Foreign American (%) Foreign 
1826 89,703 95.1 4,579 
1827 85,450 95.5 3,951 
1828 87,811 94.8 4,819 
1829 88,593 95.9 3,825 
1830 88,232 94.5 5,176 
1831 94,708 92.8 7,403 
1832 125,751 84.9 22,427 
1833 130,012 82.4 27,813 
1834 674 68.2 314 127,295 81.2 29,542 
1835 736 64.1 412 144,958 79.9 36,335 
1836 767 56.5 591 151,214 74.0 53,120 
1837 662 48.4 705 128,486 69.7 55,887 
1838 645 56.4 498 125,070 76.4 38,644 
1839 775 57."2 581 153,454 78.4 42,210 
1840 660 48.8 693 128,973 71.0 52,620 
1841 822 53.2 722 166,710 70.9 68,133 
1842 713 45.3 861 146,828 65.1 78,588 
1843* 476 49.4 487 96,163 68.3 44,597 
1844 801 44.2 1,013 168,047 65.3 89,116 
1845 781 38.5 1,248 163,107 61.3 103,097 
1846 809 37.2 1,367 178,483 61.5 111,755 
1847 836 40.6 1,224 174,173 61.8 107,701 
1848 1,006 35.4 1,834 229,850 58.3 164,649 
1849 821 28.7 2,035 214,518 51.8 199,882 
1850 899 31.7 1,940 215,801 49,3 221,959 
1851 858 30.1 1,995 207,993 42.1 286,069 
(no record of numbers of vessels arriving (* 1843 figure for nine months only) prior to 1834) 
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TABLE 3:4a 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1826~1851: 
Entrances to New York 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.6) 
~umber Tonnage 
Year American (%) Foreign American (%) Foreign 
1826 248,176 90.4 26,285 
1827 251,522 87.5 35,887 
1828 242,660 85.2 42,319 
1829 244,558 90.4 26,049 
1830 273,790 89.7 31,391 
1831 278,571 83.5 55,107 
1832 298,127 74.4 102,358 
1833 314,409 74.8 106,099 
1834 1,465 75.1 485 342,630 77.2 101,067 
1835 1,528 76.1 480 374,602 80.4 91,063 
1836 1,545 70.1 660 396,906 74.3 137,632 
1837 1,408 63.4 814 391,357 67.6 187,837 
1838 1,253 77.1 372 342,900 81.2 79,597 
1839 1,579 7 3."9 559 427,627 75.9 135,990 
1840 1,443 73.8 512 417,443 76.5 128,488 
1841 1,570 74.5 528 423,289 77.3 124,405 
1842 1,424 71.7 563 419,076 73.5 150,939 
1843* 875 76.0 276 247,590 79.3 64,624 
1844 1,562 73.6 561 434,960 75.5 141,520 
1845 1,450 72.2 558 439,676 75.9 139,542 
1846 1,568 73.5 564 493,995 75.3 161,882 
1847 1,690 61.7 1,048 543,065 63.6 310,603 
1848 1,924 67.0 946 639,305 68.6 293,188 
1849 1,979 61.5 1,239 711,720 63.7 406,080 
1850 1,882 59.5 1,281 734,431 64.1 410,900 
1851 2,068 56.7 1,579 956,879 66.0 491,889 
(no record of numbers of vessels arriving (* 1843 figure for nine months only) prior to 1834) 
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TABLE 3:4b 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of tile U.S., 1826-1851: 
Clearances from New York 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong. , 1 Sess., No.123, p.6) 
Number Tonnage 
Year American n:.J Foreign American (%) Foreign 
1826 208,202 91.4 19,655 
1827 232,428 88.5 30,090 
1828 202,844 83.5 40,123 
1829 295,343 87.9 28,343 
1830 210,535 86.6 32,620 
1831 225,721 81.7 50,688 
1832 218,490 70.6 90,900 
1833 232,395 69.7 101,007 
1834 1,011 68.1 474 232,934 70.8 96,151 
1835 1,226 73.9 433 289,268 78.9 77,121 
1836 1,079 63.4 660 274,168 68.4 126,918 
1837 890 55.1 814 243,966 59.5 166,111 
1838 990 72,7 372 267,906 77.3 78,593 
1839 1,169 69.6 511 322,633 72.2 124,206 
1840 1,067 67.9 503 283,149 69.3 125,619 
1841 1,081 69.1 484 292,575 72.2 112,458 
1842 1,027 64.2 573 299,950 66.5 151,241 
1843~'r 801 74.7 271 221,733 77.7 63,748 
1844 1,289 71.2 522 371,968 74.7 126,286 
1845 1,127 66.8 561 341,094 70.5 142,431 
1846 1,237 68.7 564 396,498 71.6 157,218 
1847 1,476 61.5 925 495,509 65.3 263,236 
1848 1,351 57.7 992 491,219 62.3 297,116 
1849 1,533 57.4 1,140 569,711 61.2 361,798 
1850 1,379 52.9 1,230 596,812 60.7 385,666 
1851 1,658 53.7 1,427 793,229 64.5 436,853 
(no record of numbers of vessels arriving (* 1843 figure for nine months only) prior to 1834) 
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TABLE 3:5a 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1826-1851: 
Entrances to Philadelphia 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.7) 
Number 
Year American (%) Foreign 
1826 
1827 
1828 
1829 
1830 
1831 
1832 
1833 
1834 332 
1835 348 
1836 329 
1837 346 
1838 374 
1839 453 
1840 353 
1841 428 
1842 363 
1843* 221 
1844 376 
1845 343 
1846 346 
1847 435 
1848 390 
1849 421 
1850 352 
1851 404 
75.3 
83.7 
80.8 
78.9 
87.4 
85."3 
79.5 
85.9 
78.1 
86.6 
84.1 
81.6 
86.9 
70.0 
74.4 
69.5 
65.5 
69.5 
109 
68 
78 
92 
54 
78 
91 
70 
102 
34 
71 
77 
52 
186 
134 
185 
185 
177 
Tonnage 
American (%) Foreign 
81,533 
74,705 
80,350 
67,222 
72,009 
71,232 
64,268 
67,714 
64,347 
68,177 
69,101 
72,684 
74,992 
96,887 
75,479 
88,972 
80,297 
42,419 
76,791 
77,248 
78,843 
101,376 
99,772 
113,825 
100,009 
117,377 
93.7 
94.9 
90.6 
91.5 
93.5 
88.9 
78.4 
73.6 
76.8 
86.3 
81.8 
79.2 
90.2 
86.9 
86.1 
89.8 
84.9 
88.5 
85.8 
84.6 
89.5 
72.5 
83.3 
79.8 
75.6 
73.5 
5,496 
4,007 
8,320 
6,232 
5,007 
8,826 
17,671 
24,336 
19,457 
10,816 
15,383 
19,031 
8,131 
14,506 
12,223 
10,098 
14,257 
5,525 
12,738 
14,065 
9,205 
38,398 
20,105 
28,978 
32,361 
42,259 
(no record of numbers of vessels arriving prior to 1834) 
(* 1843 figure for nine months only) 
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TABLE 3:5b 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1826-1851: 
Clearances from Philadelphia 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.7) 
Number Tonnage 
Year American ~~) Foreign American (~) Foreign 
1826 69,444 93.9 4,445 
1827 68,753 94.4 4,097 
1828 61,819 91.3 5,880 
1829 52,841 91.9 4,625 
1830 62,959 92.8 4,870 
1831 65,149 89.6 7,596 
1832 46,726 76.8 14,131 
1833 49,109 68.7 22,378 
1834 262 72.9 97 46,411 74.1 16,236 
1835 318 81.7 71 57,088 83.9 10,935 
1836 272 77.7 78 49,670 77.6 14,349 
1837 244 73.5 88 45,185 71.2 18,284 
1838 284 84 •. 3 53 53,905 86.3 8,528 
1839 333 82.2 72 64,318 82.8 13,381. 
1840 376 81.9 83 72,288 86.4 11,340 
1841 390 85.7 65 74,201 88.8 9,322 
1842 328 76.9 98 65,208 82.6 13,712 
1843* 241 87.6 34 41,573 87.6 5,899 
1844 394 86.9 59 70,650 89.1 8,627 
1845 341 84.4 63 63,271 82.9 12,987 
1846 377 88.9 47 77,272 91.0 7,627 
1847 430 73.8 153 107,930 75.4 35,213 
1848 342 71.8 134 77,870 79.4 20,218 
1849 360 66.8 179 93,322 77.6 27,005 
1850 309 64.5 170 81,276 72.8 30,342 
1851 357 67.4 173 102,123 72.9 38,051 
(no record of numbers of vessels arriving (* 1843 figure for nine months only) prior to 1834) 
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TABLE 3:6a 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.Se, 1826-1851: 
Entrances to Baltimore 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.B) 
Number Tonnage 
Year American ('!J Foreign American (%J Foreign 
1826 68,860 94.3 4,130 
1827 55,092 92.4 4,515 
1~28 55,382 90.8 5,612 
1829 51,613 88.9 6,446 
1830 54,806 89.7 6,315 
1831 54,790 83.9 10,455 
1832 50,936 70.8 20,957 
1833 58,170 70.7 24,136 
1834 248 76.8 75 46,983 72.3 18,045 
1835 265 81.3 61 47,901 75.5 15,522 
1836 282 78.6 77 51,782 73.8 18,394 
1837 283 64.2 158 57,114 58.9 39,778 
1838 308 77.4 90 54,421 70.6 22,685 
1839 338 78~9 90 58,957 74.9 19,804 
1840 309 75.4 101 58,237 70.9 23,903 
1841 353 79.5 91 69,275 77.2 20,473 
1842 314 76.9 94 65,479 75.3 21,425 
1843* 187 73.3 68 37,134 71.9 14,464 
1844 298 72.9 111 61,469 74.2 21,344 
1845 286 74.5 98 59,944 74.9 2o,o1o 
1846 319 74.2 111 65,563 72.9 21,343 
1847 357 69.9 154 82,099 66.7 40,966 
1848 361 75.4 118 74,188 72.4 28,342 
1849 309 63.8 115 86,485 78.6 23,583 
1850 295 67.4 143 70,427 70.7 29,161 
1851 329 70.4 138 86,774 76.8 26,253 
(no record of numbers of vessels arriving (* 1843 figure for nine months only) prior to 1834) 
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TABLE 3:6b 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1826-1851: 
Clearances from Baltimore 
(Source: Senate Doc. , 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.8) 
Number Tonnage 
Year American ('!J Foreign American (%J Foreign 
1826 61,095 95.4 2,931 
1827 66,577 94.1 4,191 
1828 58,323 89.8 6,631 
1829 54,248 88.7 6,890 
1830 54,416 93.4 3,836 
1831 64,872 86.3 10,276 
1832 48,933 75.8 15,648 
1833 46,804 64.7 25,499 
1834 236 75.9 75 41,595 70.6 17,350 
1835 268 77.7 77 45,245 70.9 18,526 
1836 241 74.6 82 39,416 68.0 18,507 
1837 230 61.9 141 39,195 52.3 35,708 
1838 266 74.1 93 43,538 65.3 23,163 
1839 311 77 •· 8 89 49,298 71.6 19,556 
1840 352 76.4 109 67,718 72.6 25,546 
1841 347 77.9 93 63,588 72.9 23,598 
1842 299 75.9 95 61,447 74.3 21,260 
1843"";': 222 76.0 70 41,473 72.9 15,431 
1844 346 75.7 111 69,834 76.0 21,205 
1845 344 76.4 106 69,716 75.7 22,342 
1846 405 75.9 128 88,404 74.1 30,887 
1847 462 69.2 206 114,702 67.5 55,228 
1848 406 74.8 137 84,709 70.0 36,221 
1849 490 77.4 143 118,158 78.9 31,652 
1850 359 68.9 162 89,296 70.4 37,523 
1851 309 67.6 148 75,406 71.3 30,383 
(no record of numbers of vessels arr~v~ng prior to 1834) (* 1843 figure for nine months only) 
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TABLE 3:7a 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1826-1851: 
Entrances to Mobile 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.9) 
Number Tonnage 
Year American (%J Foreign American (%J Foreign 
1826 13,178 89.2 1,596 
1827 14,312 81.9 3,163 
1828 13,360 76.3 4,146 
1829 11,883 68.8 5,400 
1830 10,490 68.5 4,826 
1831 10,126 46.1 11,840 
1832 10,700 47.3 11,915 
1833 11,238 53.1 9,918 
1834 52 59.8 35 8,683 45.7 10,308 
1835 75 64.1 42 16,834 54.5 14,050 
1836 79 64.8 43 14,915 47.7 16,323 
1837 65 70.7 27 17,211 62.5 10,320 
1838 122 79.2 32 27,191 69.4 11,996 
1839 128 7 3."9 45 21,857 55.7 17,408 
1840 146 70.5 61 41,208 61.7 25,564 
1841 107 60.8 69 23,965 39.6 36,583 
1842 81 55.9 64 19,706 33.9 38,264 
1843* 138 58.9 96 48,892 46.3 56,648 
1844 102 54.2 86 27,095 33.5 53,676 
1845 137 53.9 117 47,654 43.1 62,952 
1846 69 43.7 89 24,722 32.0 52,468 
1847 50 38.8 79 16,956 27.8 43,162 
1848 55 41.9 76 16,135 26.2 45,491 
1849 55 35.3 101 20,858 23.9 66,213 
1850 40 26.3 112 11,914 12.4 84,108 
1851 23 19.3 96 9,186 16.5 46,498 
(no record of numbers of vessels arr~v~ng prior to 1834) (* 1843 figure for nine months only) 
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TABLE 3:7b 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1826-1851: 
Clearances from Mobile 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.9) 
Number Tonnage 
Year American (%) Foreign American (%) Foreign 
1826 16,086 89.9 1,807 
1827 13,696 81.7 3,073 
1828 15,359 76.3 4,765 
1829 14,494 74.5 4,953 
1830 22,277 84.6 4,059 
1831 14,707 57.3 10,953 
1832 18,764 60.2 12,384 
1833 29,067 75.8 9,286 
1834 120 76.9 36 29,272 73.4 10,614 
1835 119 7&.3 37 32,795 72.1 12,665 
1836 114 72.6 43 35,340 67.0 17,367 
1837 156 84.3 29 53,822 83.4 10,725 
1838 244 88~1 33 70,124 84.9 12,466 
1839 200 81.9 44 48,286 73.9 17,006 
1840 251 81.5 57 94,551 80.1 23,552 
1841 153 68.9 69 47,481 57.0 35,795 
1842 146 69.5 64 51,247 57.4 38,095 
1843* 200 67.6 96 79,107 58.6 55,900 
1844 134 60.4 86 47,097 46.6 53,938 
1845 190 62.1 116 80,032 56.2 62,491 
1846 110 55.6 88 46,044 47.4 51,007 
1847 57 42.5 77 23,103 34.9 43,135 
1848 146 64.0 82 67,574 57.8 49,359 
1849 149 58.2 107 76,523 51.7 71,593 
1850 76 41.8 106 32,268 28.6 80,717 
1851 129 55.6 103 68,747 56.7 52,518 
(no record of numbers of vessels arr1v1ng (* 1843 figure for nine months only) prior to 1834) 
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TABLE 3:8a 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1826~1851: 
Entrances to New Orleans 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.10) 
Number Tonnage 
Year American (~J Foreign American (%J Foreign 
1826 48,691 67.3 23,622 
1827 66,657 68.3 30,937 
1828 76,821 65.9 39,791 
1829 67,680 67.5 32,535 
1830 83,243 70.2 35,393 
1831 76,231 57.9 55,541 
1832 68,637 54.7 56,942 
1833 71,476 53.4 62,346 
1834 381 53.7 328 69,131 50.7 67,199 
1835 518 62.1 316 97,680 62.5 58,690 
1836 503 70.5 210 95,833 65.9 50,294 
1837 460 72.6 174 91,790 67.3 44,645 
1338 613 78.4 169 139,722 76.4 43,184 
1839 603 73~4 219 126,547 69.1 56,618 
1840 672 72.7 252 182,292 71.4 73,185 
1841 683 72.5 259 193,003 72.9 71,634 
1842 564 71.8 222 179,777 70.4 75,698 
18431: 833 78.1 233 261,053 74.3 90,450 
1844 727 72.1 281 211,282 67.9 99,705 
1845 752 70.1 320 237,268 65.2 12·6' 719 
1846 655 71.1 266 203,898 64.6 111,874 
1847 682 63.4 393 232,477 57.8 170,059 
1848 600 61.9 370 200,428 54.7 165,678 
1849 686 62.5 412 229,245 53.9 196,204 
1850 522 58.3 374 175,065 50.0 174,884 
1851 542 62.3 328 194,776 59.2 134,156 
(no record of numbers of vessels arriving (* 1843 figure for nine months only) prior to 1834) 
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TABLE 3:8b 
Shipping Engaged in Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1826-1851: 
Clearances from New Orleans 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.10) 
Number Tonna'e 
Year American ('7oJ Foreign American (% Foreign 
1826 68,144 74.8 22,943 
1827 89,793 74.8 30,240 
1828 85,341 68.8 38,731 
1829 87,657 72.5 33,172 
1830 106,017 74.5 36,317 
1831 96,753 64.4 53,558 
1832 88,236 59.7 59,620 
1833 86,021 58.7 60,580 
1834 456 57.5 337 112,230 61.1 71,599 
1835 587 64.9 317 137,391 70.0 58,778 
1836 632 76.9 190 147,838 75.4 48,110 
1837 668 78.2 186 175,563 79.4 45,523 
1838 764 81.9 168 217,126 83.7 42,142 
1839 684 76."7 208 177,257 76.4 54,772 
1840 850 76.2 265 277,021 79.1 73,350 
1841 741 74.1 259 244,988 77.1 72,577 
1842 644 74.7 222 244,110 76.8 73,668 
1843* 808 78.6 233 292,473 78.4 80,697 
1844 711 71.1 281 237,050 70.1 101,056 
1845 639 65.9 320 243,543 65.3 129,561 
1846 639 69.9 266 238,448 68.4 110,023 
1847 741 65.1 393 274,112 62.2 166,766 
1848 667 64.8 370 287,887 65.9 148,612 
1849 714 63.1 412 293,456 60.2 194,234 
1850 493 58.5 374 211,800 60.5 158,137 
1851 645 66.7 328 292,954 69.5 128,612 
(no record of numbers of vessels arriving (* 1843 figure for nine months only) prior to 1834) 
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TABLE 4 
Numbers of Foreign Vessels in the Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1834-1851 
(Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.l2-26) 
Year Austrian Belgian British Danish Dutch French 
1834 5 7 
-- --
3,350 3,377 23 21 9 13 96 96 
1835 9 7 3 3 3,682 3,650 18 17 17 12 65 57 
1836 26 22 
-- --
3,510 3,442 42 40 35 3~ 75 77 
1837 53 56 7 7 3,691 3,628 86 92 63 62 95 ~5 
1838 7 10 5 4 3,206 3,176 23 29 25 24 76 82 
I 1839 5 7 5 5 3,534 3,500 28 28 19 17 94 92 
w 1840 10 12 2 2 4,024 3,987 26 33 22 23 113 to a VI 
co 1841 4 3 2 2 4,032 4,057 26 25 18 16 67 68 
I 1842 1 2 15 14 4,052 4,023 30 33 19 24 56 65 
1843* 
-- --
2 4 2,614 2,568 12 18 3 4 39 36 
1844 3 2 7 9 5,030 4,953 31 36 13 10 55 54 
1845 9 11 7 9 5,030 4,931 22 19 9 10 41 74 
1846 6 7 8 8 5,194 5,209 20 19 14 13 46 51 
1847 12 14 15 11 5,746 5,556 44 41 31 26 101 91 
1848 6 7 20 21 6,398 6,876 47 49 30 41 73 76 
1849 10 10 16 17 8,214 8,079 47 53 25 21 99 93 
1850 16 13 15 15 8,999 8,715 53 53 29 30 116 106 
1851 15 20 24 18 9,489 9,423 43 41 69 66 95 100 
(First figure: entrances; second fi~ure: clearances 
(*1843 figures for nine months only 
TABLE 4 cont .. 
Numbers of Foreign Vessels in the Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1834-1851 
Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.12-26 
Year Hanoverian Hanseatic t·lecklenbuq~ Oldenburg Portuguese Pruss ian 
1834 
-- --
84 81 
-- -- -- --
2 2 3 4 
1835 -- -- 95 98 -- -- -- -- 5 7 1 1 
1836 
-- --
143 157 
-- -- -- --
2 4 13 10 
1837 
-- --
263 247 
-- -- -- --
4 6 10 12 
1838 3 4 127 136 
-- -- -- --
7 9 5 5 
1839 
-- -- 139 132 -- -- -- -- 7 6 8 3 I 1840 3 3 134 141 2 4 w -- -- -- -- -- --
VI 1841 2 2 131 138 -- -- -- -- 2 2 1 1 ..0 
I 1842 1 1 139 154 
-- -- -- --
3 3 6 7 
1843* 8 3 105 106 
-- -- -- -- -- -- 3 2 
1844 10 9 155 156 
-- -- -- --
1 
--
5 8 
1845 4 4 145 157 -- -- -- -- 5 5 12 20 
1846 4 2 173 194 
--
1 
-- --
14 12 6 4 
1847 5 7 241 238 
--
1 2 1 15 14 4 4 
1848 5 3 214 207 1 1 10 4 15 20 2 2 
1849 9 8 201 211 1 1 21 18 17 15 18 13 
1850 9 11 199 210 6 3 9 10 20 15 64 61 
1851 7 5 286 298 12 10 12 10 18 23 42 30 
(First figure: entrances; second figure: clearances 
(*1843 figures for nine months only) 
TABLE 4 cont. 
Numbers of Foreign Vessels in tt1e Foreign Trade of ti1e U.S., 1834-1851 
Source: Senate Doc., 32 Cong., 1 Sess., No.123, p.12-26 
Year Russian Sardinian Sicilian ~anist1 Swedish . Tuscan 
1834 3 4 2 2 5 4 241 295 52 57 
1835 1 1 3 2 5 7 162 177 64 56 
1836 13 10 2 2 14 17 75 74 99 91 
--
1 
1837 10 12 17 16 10 9 86 83 117 107 
1838 5 5 7 7 14 15 103 103 38 49 
I 1839 8 3 5 2 19 20 102 90 67 68 -- 2 
w 1840 2 4 9 8 17 20 101 103 61 76 (1'1 1841 1 1 5 4 20 22 82 86 83 77 0 
I 1842 6 7 6 7 19 20 65 54 78 80 
1843* 3 2 3 1 4 5 38 38 35 36 
1844 5 8 6 5 18 20 46 47 136 128 
1845 12 20 14 11 19 17 74 84 126 135 2 2 
1846 6 4 13 18 12 18 37 37 77 84 1 
1847 4 4 20 19 7 7 84 79 110 97 
--
1 
1848 2 2 10 9 15 11 118 119 99 120 
1849 18 13 21 17 13 12 113 109 105 106 
1850 64 61 44 35 22 22 134 135 182 189 
1851 42 30 57 54 21 21 176 168 199 207 4 5 
(First figure: entrances; second fi,ure: claarances 
(*1843 figures for nine months only 
I 
w 
0'\ 
.... 
I 
TABLE 4 conto 
Numbers of Foreign Vessels in the Foreign Trade of the U.S., 1834-1851 
Source: Senate Doc., 32nd Gong., 1st Sess., No.123, p.12-26 
Year 
1834 
1835 
1836 
1837 
1838 
1839 
1840 
1841 
1842 
1843* 
1844 
1845 
1846 
1847 
1848 
1849 
1850 
1851 
Argentine 
1 
1 
1 
2 
4 
4 
7 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
1 
3 
2 
5 
Brazilian 
1 4 
4 5 
3 4 
3 3 
- --
3 1 
2 3 
- --
1 1 
1 
1 
3 4 
9 5 
16 17 
7 7 
9 9 
9 8 
Cent. Am. 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
2 
2 
1 
4 
(First figure: entrances; second fi~ure: clearances 
(*1843 figures for nine months only) 
(a1834/5 figures for all Colombia) 
Nexican 
69 29 
123 122 
56 47 
11 18 
12 11 
17 16 
16 24 
31 27 
2 3 
1 1 
15 13 
31 33 
35 36 
17 17 
18 21 
19 20 
30 35 
36 38 
New Granada 
5 
4 
5 
5 
8 
11 
5 
8 
5 
3 
1 
1 
8 
5 
5 
5 
9 
6a 
3a 
7 
7 
7 
9 
7 
8 
4 
4 
2 
2 
6 
7 
4 
6 
7 
Venezuelan 
1 1 
4 4 
4 2 
3 7 
7 6 
9 6 
22 20 
9 10 
11 11 
8 8 
5 5 
5 3 
6 5 
6 4 
10 11 
9 10 
I 
w 
o--
N 
I 
TABLE 5:1 
U.S. Trade with European Colonies, Year ending 30 September 1831 
(Source: Senate Doc., 22 Cong., 1 Sess., No.80) 
Tonnage Entered 
American Foreign 
Tonnage Cleared 
American Foreign Im2orts Exeorts 
British West Indies 1,284,678 1,441,700 36,914 18,768 35,967 
British North America 864,189 4,060,896 88,670 88,777 66,805 
Swedish West Indies 218,918 263,048 3,969 263 8,600 
Danish West Indies 1,651,641 1,651,641 27,223 3,091 39,775 
TABLE 5:2 
U.S. Trade with European Colonies, Year ending 30 September 1833 
(Source: Senate Doc., 23 Cong., 1 Sess., No.42) 
15,106 
83,055 
724 
2,872 
Tonnage Entered 
American Foreign 
Tonnage Cleared 
American Foreign Im2orts Ex2orts 
British West Indies 1,349,955 1,810,494 53,139 26,638 64,562 21,775 
British North America 1,720,039 4,428,185 181,600 207,022 212,328 247,953 
Swedish West Indies 32,202 105,220 2,250 260 3,395 283 
Danish West Indies 1,119,407 1,545,589 22,657 2,218 32,642 3,512 
TABLE 5:3 
Hegional Origin of U.S. Exports to British Colonies, 1833 
(Source: Senate Doc., 23 Cong., 1 Sess., No.58) 
a) Totals Tonnage 
Produce($) American Foreign 
u.s. to North America 4,389,641 28,707 190,011 
Lake Ports 2,629,273 189,572 56,894 
South/Mid-Atlantic 1,261,009 15,180 66,607 
New England 499,359 13,527 123,404 
u.s. to West Indies 1,730,035 64,474 21,775 
South/~id-Atlantic 1,346,398 43,577 21,553 
~ew England 383,637 20,897 222 
b) Lakes/Vermont to North America, by collection district 
Vermont 377,399 35,106 
Champlain 488,218 31,940 55 
Oswego 97,759 7,177 9,955 
Oswegatchie 592,522 15,694 5,023 
Buffalo Creek 55,031 57,107 2,074 
lUagara 74,540 1,329 27,257 
Sackett's Harbor 40,259 14,930 
Gennesee 325,947 14,196 3,339 
Cape Vincent 343,000 9,408 4,856 
Cuyahoga 225,521 2,041 4,045 
Sandusky 23 80 
Detroit 9,054 644 210 
c) Soutn/Mid-Atlantic to North America 
New York 677,416 7,565 44,503 
Philadelphia 286,536 2,875 10,454 
Baltimore 28,887 1,058 2,838 
Georgetown 5,094 317 
Alexandria 104,492 693 1,637 
Norfolk 12,696 107 1,507 
Richmond 18,510 321 105 
Tappahannock 35,062 838 97 
Wilmington 165 184 
Newbern 2,337 336 39 
Washington 2,195 334 
Plymouth 2,557 276 
Charleston 1,102 2,346 
Savannah 4,768 1,355 
New Orleans 79,357 460 1,726 
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TABLE 5:3 cont. 
d) New England to North America 
Passamaquoddy 200,138 2,535 97,670 
Frencl1man' s Bay 231 281 
Penobscot 2,080 457 
Bath 995 
Portland 13,016 2,381 238 
t·1arblehead 102 238 
Boston 306,630 7,847 24,267 
Nantucket 132 49 
New Bedford 10,403 628 
Dighton 196 574 
Bristol 446 
Providence 1,858 189 
t1idd le town 315 69 271 
e) South/Hid-Atlantic to West Indies 
New York 348,804 11,159 6,536 
Perth Amboy 5,412 125 
Philadelphia 146,508 3,065 633 
Baltimore 194,903 3,859 1,492 
SnO\~ Hi 11 3,120 146 
Vienna 2,619 87 
Georgetown 23,862 631 
Alexandria 194,828 3,872 502 
Norfolk 202,665 4,516 6,458 
Wilmington 84,417 5,145 2,690 
Newbern 4,697 744 
Was~1ing ton 5,729 814 
Edenton 13,918 2,054 
Camden 11,201 1,621 
Plymouth 9,320 1,505 
Beaufort 1,225 69 88 
Ocracoke 6,543 974 
Charleston 29,632 603 1,463 
Savannah 31,380 1,701 1,226 
Brunswick 1,723 146 
Key West 2,630 38 
Mobile 163 57 
New Orleans 21,099 703 408 
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TABLE 5:3 cont. 
f) New England to West Indies 
Passamaquoddy 3,652 427 
Penobscot 3,019 177 
Waldborough 1,709 168 
Bath 49,425 5,270 
Portland 7,042 388 
Sa co 1,227 163 
Kennebunk 1,835 187 
Belfast 14,972 1,975 
Boston 54,699 4,423 222 
Plymouth 88 
Dighton 1,360 196 
Hewport 484 113 
Providence 3,046 1,213 
New Haven 214,319 5,195 
Middletown 20,935 672 
Fairfield 5,913 330 
TABLE 5:4 
U.S. Trade with British Colonies: 1831, 1832 & 1840 
(Source: House Report, 27 Cong., 2 Sess., No.650, pp.92-3) 
West Indies North America 
Year Imports Exports Imports Exports 
1831 $1,308,301 1,441,253 864,909 4,061,838 
1832 $1,442,237 1,686,206 1,225,526 3,614,385 
1840 $1,048,165 2,097,584 2,007,767 5,889,215 
TABLE 5:5 
Tonnage Entering U.S. Ports from North America, 1830-1840 
(Source: House Report, 27 Cong., 2 Sess., No.835, p.37) 
Year American British Year American British 
1830 130,527 4,002 1836 278,650 377,523 
1831 92,672 82,557 1837 286,670 488,996 
1832 74,001 108,671 1838 266,220 370,397 
1833 209,958 208,054 1839 384,121 332,097 
1834 173,278 289,984 1840 373,149 387,947 
1835 263,852 387,250 
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Jackson's Foreign Policy," Ph.D. Dissertation, University 
of Cambridge, 1977, both have more than usual on 
commercial topics. Jesse S. Reeves, American Di~lomacy 
under T~ler and Polk (Gloucester: Peter Smith, 1 67; orig. 
pub., 1 07) has virtually nothing on commercial diplomacy 
in the 1840s. Biographers of diplomats of the period are 
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involving their subjects without looking at the context of 
longer-term developments in commercial policy. For 
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Age of American Politics (New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1983); Alvin L. Duckett, John Forsyth Political 
Tactician (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1962); 
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